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ABSTRACT 
THE WORD BECAME FLESH: AN EXPLORATORY ESSAY ON JESUS’S 
PARTICULARITY AND NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
 
 
 
Andy Alexis-Baker 
Marquette University, 2015 
 
 
 
In this exploratory work I argue that Jesus’s particularity as a Jewish, male human 
is essential for developing Christian theology about nonhuman animals.  
The Gospel of John says that the Word became “flesh” not that the Word became 
“human.” By using flesh, John’s Gospel connects the Incarnation to the Jewish notion of 
all animals. The Gospel almost always uses flesh in a wider sense than meaning human. 
The Bread of Life discourse makes this explicit when Jesus compares his flesh to “meat,” 
offending his hearers because they see themselves as above other animals. Other animals 
are killable and consumable; humans are not. 
The notion that the Word became flesh has gained prominence in ecotheology, 
particularly in theologians identifying with deep Incarnation. Unless this notion is 
connected to Jesus’s particularity, however, there is danger in sacrificing the individual 
for the whole. We can see this danger in two early theologians, Athanasius and St. John 
of Damascus. Both of these theologians spoke of the Word becoming “matter.” Yet they 
ignored Jesus’s Jewishness and rarely focused on his animality, preferring instead to 
focus on cosmic elements. Consequently they often devalued animal life. 
Jesus’s Jewishness is essential to the Incarnation. His Jewishness entailed a vision 
of creation’s purpose in which creatures do not consume one another, but live peaceably 
by eating plants. This Jewish milieu also entails a grand vision for transformation where 
predators act peaceably with their former prey. 
Jesus’s maleness is also connected to his Jewishness. In the Greco-Roman context 
in which he lived, his circumcision marked him as less male and more animal-like. 
Moreover, Jesus’s Jewish heritage rejected the idea of a masculine hunter. His theological 
body was far more transgendered and connected to animality than the Roman ideal. 
Finally, Jesus’s humanity entails a kenosis of what it means to be human. By 
becoming-animal he stops the anthropological machine that divides humans from 
animals. We see this becoming animal most clearly in his identity as a lamb, but also in 
Revelation’s idea that he is both a lion and a lamb. His eschatological body fulfills the 
Jewish vision for creation-wide peace. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In this work, I examine Jesus’s particularity as a Jewish, male human for animal 
theology. My argument is simple. Working through Jesus’s particularities —Jewish, 
male, and human—provides an essential lens through which to view the Incarnation’s 
significance for nonhuman animals. Yet most Christian theologians writing about 
nonhuman animals have taken a different path.  
Working through Jesus’s particularity for animal theology seems counterintuitive. 
Particularities such as Jesus’s humanness seem like barriers. After all, many theologians 
have appealed to Jesus’s humanity to exclude other creatures. As a corrective, 
theologians can respond by relativizing Jesus of Nazareth altogether. That God became a 
Jewish male in first-century Palestine seems too specific to have universal significance. 
So one way to broaden the Incarnation would be to search for a “messianic structure” of 
life. For thinkers in this milieu, creation’s messianic structure does not depend on Jesus.1 
The particularity of religion is one thing, but universal “faith” is quite another. Some 
Christian ecotheologians have followed a similar path. 
The larger climate has not favored highlighting Jesus’s particularity. In 1967, 
Lynn White accused Christianity of having “a huge burden of guilt” for modern 
ecological problems.2 For White, the idea that God transcends creation led theologians to 
separate humans from the larger environment. Christians focus on their spiritual salvation 
                                                
1 See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Decontruction in a Nutshell, ed. John Caputo (New York: 
Fordham, 1997), 22. “As soon as you reduce the messianic structure to messianism, then you are reducing 
the universality and this has important political consequences. Then you are accrediting one tradition 
among the others and a notion of an elected people, of a given language, a given fundamentalism.” 
2 Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science March 10, 1967, 1203–
1207. 
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while ignoring the surrounding material world. Worse still, Christians promote human 
domination over nonhuman creation, leading to environmental degradation. By focusing 
on human needs and desires, Christians have helped to commodify nature. So White 
concluded that Christianity is “the most anthropocentric religion the world has ever 
seen.”3  
White’s analysis prompted some Christians to take creation more seriously.4 With 
such powerful arguments about Christianity in mind, focusing on Jesus’s humanity seems 
foolhardy. Even so, I argue that theological thinking about nonhuman animals needs the 
Incarnation’s particularity. The same could be said for his maleness and his Jewishness.  
But some theologians argue that for ignoring Jesus’s particularity. Instead 
they focus on Christ’s cosmic Lordship. That is, we must relativize his humanity to make 
room for other creatures. We need to see a universal “structure” apart from Jesus’s 
Jewishness or maleness. I will build on these previous works, but I will argue for a 
different starting point. In that light I turn to a review of some relevant literature for the 
task. 
                                                
3 Ibid., 1205.  
4 This is Celia Deane-Drummond’s conclusion in Celia Deane-Drummond, “What is Creation 
For?,” in A Faith Encompassing All Creation: Addressing Commonly Asked Questions about Christian 
Care for the Environment, ed. Andy Alexis-Baker and Tripp York (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014), 7–
8. While we might object to the sweeping indictment against Christianity that White makes, I take it as also 
true that Christians have not been quick to take the ecological crisis seriously and are even more reluctant 
to take on issues around nonhuman animals. So while White’s analysis prompted some theological 
reflection, Christians have not yet lived up to the task and too few theologians are taking seriously the 
modern ecological and death-dealing crisis in factory farming. These are major issues of our time, and an 
act of corporate repentance would at least entail serious theological work on these issues from more than 
niche theologians and scholars. Deane-Drummond argues similarly: “Half a century after White’s diatribe 
against Christianity, the attention ethicists and theologians have paid to ecology is still less than one might 
expect, given the scale and scope of the problems involved.” Ibid., 8. 
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The Incarnation and Ecotheology: A Review 
Joseph Sittler 
Some theologians have responded to the modern ecological crisis by emphasizing 
the biblical notion of the cosmic Christ, found especially in Colossians 1:15–20 and 
Ephesians 1:10, 20–22. In Colossians, the Pauline author claims that Christ created, 
sustains, and redeems “all things.” One of the first modern theologians to use the cosmic 
Christ vision in relationship to ecology was Joseph Sittler. Sittler first raised the issue of 
Christology and the environment at the 1961 World Council of Churches meeting in New 
Dehli. In that address, he appealed to passages from Ephesians and Colossians to argue 
that God’s theater of grace is creation.5 Only a “Christology expanded to its cosmic 
dimensions, made passionate by the pathos of this threatened earth, and made ethical by 
the love and the wrath of God” can address the radical split between nature and grace that 
has afflicted Christianity.6 This split has caused environmental damage and has made 
even atoms a tool for murder. So even “atoms must be reclaimed for God and his will.”7 
For Sittler, we must recover the New Testament’s vision of a creation-wide redemption. 
Christ’s redemption is cosmic in scope. 
Sittler’s address preceded Lynn White’s critique by eight years, calling upon 
Christians to recognize something already present in Christian tradition. Sittler called for 
Christians to recognize the truly broad scope of Jesus’s work. If Jesus Christ created all 
things, then Jesus Christ redeems all things as well. Anything less than a creation-wide 
                                                
5 For the phrase see Joseph Sittler, “Called to Unity,” The Ecumenical Review 14, no. 2 (1962): 
186. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 184. 
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focus on Jesus’s redemptive work misses God’s radical love for creation. Sittler, 
therefore, draws from New Testament Christologies to help Christian discourse more 
faithfully point to God’s beauty, goodness, and truth. Sittler had an ethical agenda as 
well: a cosmic Christ who redeems creation beckons Christians to care for the world 
around them and to tread lightly and carefully. 
Interestingly, however, Sittler’s passionate call for a cosmic Christ does not really 
deal with Jesus’s particularities. It is also striking that at the same time that he has much 
to say about redeeming all things, he has very little to say about nonhuman animals. He 
seems concerned about environmental destruction but says little about how humans treat 
animals or how such treatment would connect to environmental concerns. I will argue 
that this type of move results from not paying attention to particularities, which often 
loses the individual into the many. In such big pictures individuals disappear. We need 
these large portraits and must recover a sense of Jesus’s cosmic work. The question is 
how to get to the cosmic: do we start with the cosmic as Sittler does, or do we work 
through Jesus’s particular characteristics, uniting the particular and the universal so that 
Christ’s cosmic work also unites the one and the many, the particular and the universal? 
For if we swing in the opposite direction, theological discourse may easily lose individual 
creatures in favor of systems. To say this theologically, many theologians talk about 
God’s care for the environment and creation, but tend to ignore individual creatures and 
particularly whole classes of living creatures we call “animals.” Despite the beauty of his 
vision and passion of his call, Sittler seems to have made this move. 
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Jürgen Moltmann 
In The Way of Jesus Christ, Jürgen Moltmann attempts to develop an ecological 
Christology for the modern world. His treatment of Jesus relies on the Gospel texts, 
showing that Jesus’s way calls believers to a nonviolent way of life that would challenge 
the structures of oppression and preach liberation to the oppressed. He therefore grounds 
his Christology in Scriptures and makes Jesus normative for how Christians think and 
behave in the modern world. Moltmann also turns to the “Cosmic Christ,” arguing that it 
is necessary to recover this biblical vision for the modern world: “The rediscovery of 
cosmic Christology will have to begin with ecological Christology if cosmic Christology 
is to be of therapeutic relevance for the nature which is today suffering under the 
irrationality of human beings.”8  
Modern Christologies have tended to take their cues from the quest for the 
historical Jesus. They have therefore focused on humanity. By contrast, Moltmann argues 
that theologians should focus on creation more broadly. He then points readers to 
Ephesians and Colossians, where the authors depict Jesus as redeeming the entirety of 
creation. In the context of human-generated catastrophe, Moltmann argues, we must 
recover this sense of cosmic Christology. He says earlier in the work: “In the danger of 
annihilation that is hanging over us, God’s salvation is the healing and survival of the 
whole threatened earth and all individual created beings, in their common peril.”9 
                                                
8 Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 194–95. 
9 Ibid., 46. 
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Fortunately, Scriptures have provided the means to refocus our theological 
imaginations. Scriptures depict “the always greater Christ.”10 Every time we think we 
know Christ the texts expand our vision: “Christ is the first-born among many brethren – 
Christ is the first-born of the new humanity – Christ is the first-born of the whole 
creation: Jesus is Israel’s messiah – Jesus is the Son of man of the nations – Jesus is the 
head of the reconciled cosmos: the body of Christ is the crucified and raised body of 
Jesus – the body of Christ is the church – the body of Christ is the whole cosmos.”11 The 
early Christians understood Jesus as having died to reconcile the whole of creation (2 Cor 
5:19). The entire cosmos needs redemption. While the Apostle Paul, according to 
Moltmann, understood this cosmic redemption has not having taken place yet, Colossians 
and Ephesians see this redemption as “already” beginning. 
Moltmann then argues that today we need a cosmic Christology that can take 
seriously Jesus’s differentiated roles. Jesus is 1) creator of all things (creatio originalis); 
2) sustainer of all things (creatio continua); and 3) redeemer of all things (creatio nova). 
Modern Christians have neglected the third aspect, according to Moltmann. Moltmann 
understands this redemption as an eschatological peace: peace between humans, peace 
between humans and other animals, peace between all creatures: “the peace of Christ is 
universal and pervades the whole cosmos.”12 In this life evolution and natural selection 
have created an enormous amount of suffering in the world, particularly with nonhuman 
animals. Christ, Moltmann argues, suffers with all of evolution’s victims. But God 
                                                
10 Ibid., 275. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 306. 
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redeems evolution too. The cosmic Christ takes up the process and the suffering of every 
creature since the beginning of time.13 
Because God is the environment within which creation evolves and God is 
intimately involved in creation through the Spirit, and because Jesus redeems and 
reconciles the conflicting and warring elements of creation, Christians are those who 
witness to the coming kingdom that is already present in part. As such, Christians are 
those who understand themselves as part of a “community of human beings, animals and 
plants based on law.” Moltmann points to the Torah where the Sabbath laws apply to all 
creatures, not just humans. But the law’s main function is to regulate human tendencies to 
exploit one another, other animals, and the environment. 
This entails an understanding of a nonhuman animal as “a living being with its 
own rights.”14 Moltmann states that this at the very least means working to end “factory 
farming” and genetically engineering other animals. He notes that the Gospels do not 
have much to say about Christ’s relationship to other animals, except that angels and 
other wild animals “ministered to him” in the wilderness (Mark 1:13), adding that “this is 
an allusion to the messianic peace of creation, which is part of Israel’s hope according to 
Isaiah 11.”15 
Moltmann goes on to state that because human beings are embodied creatures we 
have no way of speaking about human rights apart from the rights of other animals. 
Presumably he means that humans share in the same evolutionary process and have deep 
biological connections to other creatures. He believes that if we do not formulate 
                                                
13 See ibid., 274–312. 
14 Ibid., 308. 
15 Ibid. 
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“ecological rights and duties” toward other animals, “then the rights of human beings in 
their own lives remain unrealistic.”16 
Moltmann’s Christology is one that is heavily rooted in the story of the Gospels. 
Jesus’s life provides a strong example for his subsequent followers in terms of their work 
for justice and peace as a witness to God’s full kingdom that is still coming. Moltmann 
places a strong emphasis on Christ’s cosmic redemption, which then entails new 
relationships throughout creation. These new ways of relating start within the Christian 
community, where believers treat each other, their enemies, and all of creation as Christ’s 
very good creation that will all someday experience a full redemption, only hinted at in 
Christian life. He points out that the eschatological peace Jesus inaugurates entails new 
relationships with nonhuman animals, and insists that without reconfiguring the human-
nonhuman animal relationship, attempts at intra-human peacemaking will fail. So his 
Christology is strongly ethical in orientation and includes nonhuman animals in 
redemption. His cosmic Christology is rooted in Scripture and answers many of the major 
problems facing the world today. How we understand Jesus, the cosmic Christ, depends 
heavily on how we read his life, which Moltmann covers in detail, arguing for the 
political and social relevance of Jesus’s life and teachings.  
Although Moltmann sometimes speaks of Jesus’s Jewishness, the treatment of 
Jesus’s Jewish roots is often too brief. However, he does bring out places where Jesus’s 
Jewishness seems to matter most. For instance, in a brief section titled, “The Death of the 
Jew,” Moltmann argues that Jesus’s death as a Jew at the hands of the Romans was what 
many Jews before and after him experienced at the hands of Gentiles.17 Jesus’s sufferings 
                                                
16 Ibid., 309. 
17 Ibid., 167–68. 
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and death as the Son of God are also Israel’s sufferings. So Moltmann begins with Jesus 
as a human, Jewish person and moves outward to Christ the cosmic redeemer. This short 
reflection shows Jesus’s Jewishness as mostly relevant for Jews only. How it might 
connect to ecology, Moltmann does not say. 
Of all the early proponents of cosmic Christology, Moltmann is the one who most 
focuses on Jesus of Nazareth and works from that perspective toward a cosmic vision. He 
is also one of the only theologians who worked on ecology to suggest that a strong stance 
of justice toward nonhuman animals is a non-negotiable aspect of Christian life. Yet it is 
not clear to me that Moltmann goes far enough. If the eschatological vision of Jewish 
vision entails a completely nonviolent new creation, seen only in part in the new 
community who love their enemies, then should that community also live as peaceably as 
possible with other animals, which would entail at least a provisional vegetarianism? 
Moltmann stops short and only calls for an end to factory farming and genetic 
engineering of other animals. 
Though Moltmann points to Scripture’s vision of an eschatological peace, 
elsewhere in his theology Moltmann may undermine this vision. He uses Jewish 
Kabbalah to illuminate Christianity’s doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. How do we explain 
God acting outward when God is all? That is, how can creation exist at all outside of 
God, and yet not be far from God? Withdrawing into God’s own self, God creates a void. 
As God retracts inward, God “let’s be” a negative space: “God-forsakenness, hell, 
absolute death.”18 This negative space constitutes “a partial negation of the divine Being” 
and is therefore “the non-being of the Creator.”19 The threat of nothingness emerges in 
                                                
18 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 74–75. 
19 Ibid., 87–88. 
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God. For creation to continue existing, God must suppress the divine negativity, which 
God does by transforming it into redemption on the cross. Since God has created 
everything within God’s own void, everything exists in God. Thus Moltmann advocates 
panentheism. He seems to undercut creation by positing a necessary ontological void 
within God as creation’s prerequisite. Brian Walsh states the problem: 
Redemption, then, is not primarily a restoration of a covenantal relationship 
broken in history, but a “re-filling” of that space, an overcoming of God’s self-
limitation by means of an annihilatio nihili. But if this nihil was for some reason 
necessary for the creatio originalis then how can the God/creation distinction still 
be maintained when this nihil is vanquished and God is all in all? Is the 
distinction between pantheism and panentheism only semantic?20 
Moltmann comes perilously close to making finitude evil since nothingness is a 
necessary precondition for creatureliness. God’s self-negation and God’s creativity work 
in dialectical opposition. Moreover, Moltmann’s idea that God first withdraws inward 
and basically punches a hole in divine space and then fills it with creation, suggests that 
God is some kind of spatial entity bound by time.21 God does not create space; God fills 
it. God creates “nothing” within already existing space in a temporal way. Finally, 
Moltmann’s view seems to require evil and suffering for God to self-actualize in the 
creation and redemption of the world. Ironically, by trying to uplift creation by positing 
this divine void, Moltmann has actually made creation antagonistic toward God, 
                                                
20 Brian Walsh, “Theology of Hope and the Doctrine of Creation: An Appraisal of Jürgen 
Moltmann,” Evangelical Quarterly 59, no. 1 (1987): 75. 
21 For this critique see Alan J. Torrance, “Creatio ex Nihilo and the Spatio-Temporal Dimensions, 
with Special Reference to Jürgen Moltmann and D. C. Williams,” in The Doctrine of Creation, ed. Colin 
Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 90–93. 
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something that must be constantly overcome. This makes a strange basis for a theology 
that wants to see creation as something good. 
Nevertheless, Moltmann’s work is a starting point for reflection on the 
Incarnation in relationship to other animals. He leaves many questions open for further 
investigation. How does Jesus’s Jewishness matter for the Incarnation in relationship to 
other animals? If we must move away from an anthropocentric theology, then how does 
Jesus’s humanity matter for other animals? Furthermore, since Jesus’s maleness is a 
particularity of some controversy, is there some aspect of Jesus’s maleness that might 
help us develop a theology of the Incarnation that also does justice to other animals? 
Moltmann says that human ethics and peacemaking must entail peacemaking with other 
animals. So he sees how deeply we are connected to other animals. My argument will 
build on that basic insight and goes further, exploring some ways that Jesus’s Jewish, 
male humanity works in favor of the Incarnation’s inclusion of other creatures. 
Matthew Fox 
Matthew Fox has also interpreted Christology in relationship to ecological 
concerns.22 Citing what he considered an obsessive and unhelpful scholarly focus on the 
historical Jesus, Fox looks to the cosmic Christ for aid. The quest for the historical Jesus 
discounts theological reflection needed for modern ecological problems. Christology for 
a new era of ecological crisis must take into account the historical Jesus. But the new 
quest for the cosmic Christ must connect the stars to life forms on Earth. In Christ we 
become connected anew to the universe. In the cross we see God and humanity severed 
                                                
22 See Matthew Fox, The Coming of the Cosmic Christ: The Healing of Mother Earth and the 
Birth of a Global Renaissance (San Francisco: Haper & Row, 1988). 
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as Jesus cries out asking why God had forsaken him.23 Butthrough the cross the 
connection is actually reaffirmed and strengthened. Jesus rises from the dead and 
becomes the cosmic Christ. So Christ connects us to our particular time and place and 
also to everything else. Christ connects us to the far-off mountains, to the homeless of our 
city, and to the animals in our backyards. In short, “It connects all creatures in the entire 
universe.”24 
Fox believes that Christians have lost the New Testament sense of cosmic 
redemption. The Enlightenment desacralized the universe and refocused Christians on 
personal salvation.25 Christians exchanged the God of the universe for an individualized 
salvation and a self-obsessed culture.26 Christian theologians shifted to the historical 
Jesus and away from the grandeur of Christ in all things. 
The only way forward, Fox argues, is to reclaim the cosmic Christ in a new 
“living cosmology.” This shift would have dramatic impact on the way Christians train 
theologians and pastors. The spiritual disciplines would help Christians recognize the 
“primal sacraments”—sea, land, wind, fire, and life. Mystical contemplation would help 
us see and hear Christ in the universe at large.27 Indeed, Jesus’s crucifixion is mother 
Earth’s crucifixion. The earth and universe itself is the universal cosmic Christ. To hear 
Christ one must listen to the environment.  
Fox corrects a theological tendency to make humans stand aloof from other 
creatures. He points to an interconnectedness that he likely learned from modern science. 
                                                
23 Ibid., 133. 
24 Ibid., 134. 
25 Ibid., 7. See also ibid., 81 where Fox quotes church historian Jaroslav Pelikan who wrote, 
“Enlightenment philosophy deposed the cosmic Christ.” 
26 Ibid., 151–52. 
27 Ibid., 40. 
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Even the dust out of which humans are made has a cosmic element, since Earth’s 
elements are a conglomerate of stardust. This can redefine what it means to be human in 
the modern world from independent autonomous individuals to deeply dependent and 
connected beings. Jesus’s body was no different. 
Yet, whatever the merits and worthy goals, Fox’s theology leaves serious 
questions unanswered. Fox maintains that early Christians put aside “nature” for 
introspection. He blames Augustine and the Enlightenment for this. Several issues arise 
from this story, one that Lynn White also tells. First, do Christian theologians obsess 
about personal sin and salvation? Is that the root of the modern ecological problem? 
Alternatively, although Christians have tended to view humans as superior to all other 
creatures, a sense of interdependence with other creatures used to mitigate that 
anthropology. Today we have largely lost interdependence as a part of anthropology. If 
Christians no longer sense our interrelationship with other creatures, perhaps we cannot 
solve the ecological crisis by collapsing the world into Christ’s body. Rather the more 
helpful task is to reattach a common creatureliness to theological anthropology. The 
fundamental theological division does not lie between humans and all other creatures but 
between God and all creation. God relates to all creation and creatures regardless of 
God’s relationship with humans. 
Returning to creatureliness, we might indeed see God in everything. But only by 
distinguishing God and creation can we recognize the divine in the first place. There has 
to be a difference between God and creation to be able to recognize creation. Fox seems 
to blur the lines between God and creation in his cosmic Christology. We encounter God 
by encountering the world around us. As we gaze in awe at the immensity of the 
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universe, we experience God per se. The universe does not point us toward God. The 
universe, according to Fox, is God for us at that moment of wonder. But one has to also 
wonder whether this God is a mere figment of human imagination projected onto the 
skies. If so, then God is a creation of human thought without transcendence from the 
human mind. This elevates human thinking above creation. 
Indeed, Fox suggests a path that would heighten anthropocentricism. He 
conflates humanity with divinity. He says, “Perhaps the most gross of all dualisms is the 
dualism between the divine and us. As if we hold no divine blood in us, as if we are 
creatures only and not creators. Co-creators with God.”28 We can see how problematic 
this statement becomes in the instrumental value he assigns to the suffering of other 
animals in creation. By conflating Christology with creation he is able to say that all 
nonhuman animal suffering over the vast course of life on Earth “may well be sacrificial 
suffering, a gift of our very being for others.” He goes on: “Whole species have been 
called upon to lay down their lives for others, and they have done so.”29 Fox sees 
nonhuman animal suffering as “sacrificial.” They live to the end of dying for “others” 
(and ultimately in his view those “others” are humans). But evolutionary suffering is not 
teleological or voluntary. In trying to renew creation in Christian theology, Fox creates 
more problems than he solves. He universalizes Christ but creates a problematic 
anthropocentricism. 
                                                
28 Matthew Fox, Original Blessing (Santa Fe, NM: Bear, 1983), 236. 
29 Matthew Fox, Creation Spirituality (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 51.  
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Sallie McFague 
While Fox ignores Jesus’s particularity, Sallie McFague goes further. She 
explicitly rejects the Incarnation's particularity. For McFague, Christianity teaches that 
God has become human form. The central message is not the particular person Jesus. 
McFague sidelines the particular man Jesus and focuses on humanity. Christian theology 
must do two things. “The first is to relativize the incarnation in relation to Jesus of 
Nazareth and the second is to maximize it in relation to the cosmos.”30 So the world is 
“God’s body.” Since this view echoes Fox’s I will not belabor the point by 
critiquing McFague. McFague’s impulse seems ethical. If Christians see the world as 
divine, they will act better toward it. But the price for this impulse is high. God is no 
longer perfect because God's body would have to be perfect. But this world is full of 
arbitrary suffering, predation, and meaningless death. That does not sound perfect. So if 
God is perfect, then God’s body cannot be “the cosmos” as we know it.31 
McFague wants Christians to act more compassionately toward nonhuman 
creation. This is a good goal. But marginalizing Jesus of Nazareth and claiming the 
cosmos as God's body is unnecessary. Deepening traditional Christian doctrines can do 
the same task. 
                                                
30 Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 
162. 
31 The only way for McFague to get out of this objection would seem to be for her to change the 
terms of what and who God is. If God is a principle, an impersonal intelligence that moves all of creation, 
then the world certainly could be God’s body. But that is not the God of Christianity. Nevertheless, 
McFague can be very vague about what God means. 
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Catherine Keller 
The same tendency to relativize the Incarnation’s particularity and “maximize” it 
in relation to the cosmos shows up in numerous treatments of Christology. Catherine 
Keller, for example, says that she wants to open up “breathing room back in Christology: 
an interval of ruach, right in between ‘Jesus’ and ‘Christ.’”32 For Keller, this means that 
creation is God’s incarnation.33 For Keller, “incarnation is co-extensive with the body of 
creation,” and Jesus of Nazareth’s particularity has little to do with anything.34 For 
Keller, the cosmic Christ eclipses Jesus of Nazareth: “The significance of the cosmic 
Christ extends—from a Christian perspective —infinitely outward, in all directions.”35 
Keller charges that theologians who make a strong Creator/creature distinction 
ignore the creative chaos of the watery depths depicted in Genesis 1:1. Consequently, 
these same theologians rarely consider the wild animals of Scripture or daily life. “They 
stand in a long line of animal erasure.”36 She notes, for example, that in his twenty 
sermons on the Book of Job, John Calvin completely ignored the animals that 
predominate in Job 39–41. “Christian interpreters may appreciate the sun and stars as 
evidence of divine order. But animals, especially wild ones, have always posed a gamy 
embarrassment to human dominion.”37 For these theologians, nonhuman animals have 
nothing to say worthy of pause. They must be subjected to dominion, like all chaos and 
                                                
32 Catherine Keller, On the Mystery: Discerning Divinity in Process (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2008), 136. 
33 See Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 2003), 
219. She asks, rhetorically “Might the ‘in’ of panentheism begin to designate creation as incarnation?” 
34 Ibid., 221. 
35 Keller, On the Mystery, 152. 
36 Keller, Face of the Deep, 135. 
37 Ibid. 
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multitude, and made one. So, according to most interpreters, Job’s final chapters 
primarily depict God’s power.38  
Ironically, however, though Keller indicts mainstream theologians for ignoring 
nonhuman animals, she also ignores other animals when she examines Job 38–41. She 
only mentions one nonhuman animal, behemoth, and interprets the creature as a 
mythological chaos monster arising from the chaotic depths rather than an actual sea 
creature (or both). Indeed, a search through all of her books easily reveals that Keller 
completely ignores nonhuman animal life. On her own terms, which legitimately decry 
animal erasure in theology and biblical studies as a function of anthropocentricism, 
Keller’s own theology does not really escape the very traps she hopes to move beyond. 
Keller deliberately unhinges her theology from Jesus’s life, death, and 
resurrection. Just as she ignores other-than-human animals in Job, she also ignores Jesus, 
preferring instead to talk about “tehom” and “chaos.” She believes that these 
Christological patterns will make Christian more open to the surrounding material world. 
The incarnation is not a unique event in history, but a process of God’s own becoming. 
Keller states “Creation is always incarnation—and would have been so without the birth 
of the Nazarene.”39 The world as we see it is God’s incarnation. Jesus, a wisdom teacher, 
coaches us to understand that “God’s commonwealth” entails sharing abundant life with 
neighbors, strangers and enemies. Jesus is bait. Jesus “lures” us toward a more deliberate 
becoming.40 
                                                
38 See ibid., 124–40 and Catherine Keller, God and Power: Counter-Apocalyptic Journeys 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 143–45.  
39 Keller, Face of the Deep, 226. 
40 See Keller, On the Mystery, 151. 
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But unhitching Christology from Jesus does not seem to give nonhuman animals 
any more importance in Keller’s theology than jumping straight to a cosmic Christ. 
Indeed it is hard to understand how Christology redeems nonhuman animals at all. In her 
schema the Spirit of God beckons the world toward great complexity. As the world 
moves toward greater and greater complexity the possibilities for happiness and pleasure 
increase, but so also do the possibilities for suffering and disorder. Without suffering and 
disorder, life would lack pleasure. Thus evil and suffering are not, as in traditional 
Christian theology, a distorted grasping for the good, but are inherent aspects of earthly 
life. Chaos moves the world toward greater complexity, and thus the potential for greater 
good as well.41 Complexity requires predation. Keller does not speak about sin or the 
need for redemption and salvation within creation. For Moltmann, God redeemed the 
suffering inherent in creation by becoming part of it and taking up the process. But 
Christ’s redemptive work transforms evolution. For Keller, Christ does not redeem 
evolutionary suffering because such suffering is simply part of life. “If incarnation is 
always going on, so is the carnage.”42 Predation and death in the animal world are part of 
the process leading to something, but what? Humans? It is not clear what the God of 
Keller’s process thought would save us from, since notions of moral and natural evil 
rarely arise. To the extent that they show up in Keller’s work, they tend to be subsumed 
into a process of becoming whereby a greater good arises out of death and decay. God 
lures us toward the greater good, but that might involve extinctions, disease, and other 
                                                
41 It is not clear what Keller means by “good” since she connects God being “purely good” with 
God being “purely dominant.” This is part of a “love-coated Christian dominology” that connect evil to 
chaos in her reading. Keller, Face of the Deep, 96. But if death and suffering are part of what it means for 
creation (and God) to be good, then it is hard to understand just what Keller’s point is in relationship to 
Christian salvation: why should humans reduce or eliminate our domination over the chaotic swarming 
animal others if part of what it means to be a creature is to suffer and die? Why not sin so grace can 
abound? 
42 Ibid., 220. 
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ills—evils that humans have not caused. It is hard to see how this avoids a theodicy 
problem. Nonhuman animals do not play a real role in this “cosmic Christology.” Jesus 
does not play a part either. The particular is lost in the chaos, sacrificed to God’s own 
becoming.  
– – – – 
It is very difficult to see how any of the Christologies that relativize Jesus of 
Nazareth and maximize a cosmic Christology can really accomplish the wholesale 
renewal of the doctrine of creation. The only theologian I have so far examined who even 
briefly examines the issue of nonhuman animals is Moltmann. His theology provides a 
decent place from which to begin thinking of the Incarnation and animals, despite some 
drawbacks in his overall view of the Trinity and creation broadly speaking. But most of 
the ecotheologians so far examined completely ignore Jesus’s particularity. In response to 
these kinds of trajectories and problems, Ernst Conradie has said that ecotheology has 
generally tended “to explore the ecological significance of God’s creation more than its 
Creator, God’s immanence more than God’s transcendence, the cosmic work of God’s 
Spirit more than the particularity of Jesus Christ, the humanity of Jesus more than the 
divinity of Christ, general revelation more than special revelation,” and other such 
reductions in a polarity.43 Some of the work reviewed so far—particularly Fox, McFague, 
and Keller—are prone to devolve into a thin consciousness of a Christ paradigm in 
nature. While they bring the entire created order into the purview of Christology, they do 
so at the expense of the Incarnation’s particularity. Their impulses are good: we 
                                                
43 Ernst M. Conradie, “Towards an Agenda for Ecological Theology: An Intercontinental 
Dialogue,” Ecotheology: Journal of Religion, Nature & the Environment 10, no. 3 (2005): 307. 
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desperately need to change our behavior and thinking about creation. But the result of a 
quick turn to cosmic Christology divorced from Jesus’s particularity does not really lead 
to a renewed respect for all of creation. Nonhuman animals almost never play a role in 
these theologies. They detach Christology from Jesus, who is presumed to be too 
particular and too historical to be of much use for a renewed Christology.44 To save the 
material world from Christian dogmatic erasure, the material Jesus has to be spiritualized. 
Emphasizing the cosmic dimensions of Christology at the expense of the 
particular historical incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth create serious doctrinal problems, 
some of which I have already noted: in process theology God and the world collapse into 
one another so that evil and suffering become part of God’s own becoming. These 
Christologies reflect ecological concerns, emphasizing systems and wholes rather than 
particular individuals. We humans certainly need to be reminded of our 
interconnectedness with all creatures and all of creation. But everything that exists does 
so in a particular place, a particular time, and has its own integrity. The question becomes 
whether we can encounter “the universe” as Fox and Keller suggest. I have never seen 
“the universe.” I have only seen particular bodies and creatures whose own particularities 
are bound up with other particularities. It is through the particular that we encounter the 
universe and not vice versa.45 
                                                
44 Celia Deane-Drummond makes this critique in Celia Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology 
(London: Dartmon, Longman and Todd, 2008), 107. 
45 There are ecologists who argue this way as well. For example, Freya Matthews claims that it is 
difficult to get abstract metaphysical principles from looking at “the universe.” We are unlikely to get 
principles like “e=mc2” or “reality is a reflection of the Form of the Good” from “the universe,” whatever 
that is. Rather, we learn from the world around by particularity. “This is because the world must speak, if it 
speaks at all, in the poetic language of particulars. It speaks through this landscape, through these 
individual women and men, through the tangled psychic terrain of this gathering, and through images 
borrowed from the seekers’ personal frames of reference.” When we ask a metaphysical question we are 
pointed to a particular entity in a particular place at a particular time. The universe then points us to 
individuals who have joys, sufferings, and concerns. This is metaphysics. But it is a metaphysics that 
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Keller, McFague, and Fox denounce traditional Western “metaphysics.” Yet the 
cosmic Christ they posit becomes a principle abstracted from concrete reality. Why 
would anybody need such a “Christ” to respect the universe or the Earth? But there is no 
need for a Christ-consciousness to respect these theoretical entities. If we want an 
encounter with the Other, whose particular individual presence before us demands a 
response, then we will need more than the cosmic Christ as a paradigm, and that will 
come from the particular: from Jesus of Nazareth. 
I will build upon the basic notion that Christ’s work is cosmic in scope and that 
this theological viewpoint entails a radical shift in behavior toward nonhuman creation. 
These are the insights that the theologians I have examined thus far bring to the table. 
McFague, Fox, and Keller, divinize creation but they do so with deeply pious motives: to 
bring God back into this world at a time when God’s transcendence would seem to beam 
God straight out of this world. There is not even room for God in the Eucharist in some 
theologies (Reformed and Anabaptist views, for example).46 For these theologians, 
bringing God back to this Earth in our theologies is a way to reaffirm the goodness of 
creation. But, as I have argued, their solutions come at a high price that probably 
undermines their intent. I will move beyond these insights by focusing on the particular. 
                                                                                                                                            
begins from the particular and only encounters anything like “the universe” by means of these 
interconnected individuals. See Freya Matthews, Reinhabiting Reality: Toward a Recovery of Culture 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), 111–12. 
46 In this sense, one could read McFague, Fox, and Keller as countering a trend toward complete 
atheism that ironically has its roots with the systematic negating of God in the material world in Zwingli 
and the trajectory he began. This is a tale of caution. If Zwingli, the Anabaptists, and Calvin sought to 
reform Christianity by reaffirming God’s complete otherness—taking away God’s real presence—they also 
make room for a secular world without God in some way. The irony here is that this leads to God’s utter 
absence if taken to its logical conclusion (though taking things to their conclusions may or may not be 
necessary). Ecotheologians who, with similarly good motives, wish to bring God back in and affirm the 
goodness of creation may very well end up with no God and a creation that cannot be affirmed as creation. 
Their negation of nonhuman animals is the most telling warning for this conclusion in my view. 
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Deep Incarnation 
Niels Gregersen 
In recent years, the phrase “deep Incarnation” has entered theological discourse. 
Diverse thinkers such as Elizabeth Johnson, Denis Edwards, and Normal Habel use the 
expression. Niels Gregersen coined the term. He first spoke of a deep Incarnation with a 
view toward understanding Christology in evolutionary terms.47 Deep Incarnation, 
according to Gregersen, means the Logos entered “into the very tissue of biological 
existence, and system of nature.”48 The Logos does not assume humanity alone but “the 
whole malleable matrix of materiality.”49 
Gregersen points to John 1:14: “the Word became flesh,” arguing that the Greek 
notion inherent in σάρξ does not simply point to “frailty and vulnerability” in our bodies 
that make everything subject to decay. He argues that σάρξ points to the Stoic notion that 
“bodies were taken to be part of a whole flux of material beings, always being in contact 
with one another.”50 So our “flesh” signals the “basic elements of earth, water, air, and 
fire.”51 If we translate this concept into modern ideas, then σάρξ covers “the whole realm 
                                                
47 See Niels Henrik Gregersen, “The Cross of Christ in an Evolutionary World,” Dialog: A 
Journal of Theology 40, no. 3 (2001): 192–207. 
48 Ibid., 205. 
49 Niels Henrik Gregersen, “The Idea of Deep Incarnation: Biblical and Patristic Resources,” in To 
Discern Creation in a Scattering World, ed. Frederiek Depoortere and Jacques Haers (Leuven: Peeters, 
2013), 321. Emphasis in the original. This article is an update to Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Deep 
Incarnation: Why Evolutionary Continuity Matters in Christology,” Toronto Journal of Theology 26, no. 2 
(2010): 173–88. Many of the quotes I use are also in the 2010 article, though there are differences between 
the two articles, such as Gregersen’s 2010 alignment with ecologist Arne Naess. The 2013 article leaves 
Naess aside for the most part. 
50 Gregersen, “The Idea of Deep Incarnation,” 321. On the connection to Stoicism see ibid., 322–
27. Gregersen does not claim that the Gospel of John is exclusively tied to Stoic doctrine. It has middle 
Platonist, Stoic, and Jewish ideas intertwined. See ibid., 327.  
51 Ibid., 321.  
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of the material world from quarks to atoms and molecules, in their combinations and 
transformations throughout chemical and biological evolution.”52 
Drawing on a few contemporary biblical scholars, Gregersen argues that the 
Gospel of John presupposes “a synthesis of Stoic thought and Jewish ideas, common to 
many of their contemporaries.”53 While Jewish thinkers would have kept a strict 
separation between God and creation, John maintains that the Logos “became flesh.” This 
means that the Logos was “present in Jesus as flesh, with the flesh of others, and for all 
flesh.”54 For Gregersen, the Gospel of John’s emphasis on flesh marks a Stoic and not a 
Jewish background. 
As a “semantically flexible” term σάρξ can mean Jesus’s body, sinful “flesh,” 
and/or “the realm of materiality in its most general extension, perhaps with a note of 
frailty and transitoriness.”55 Gregersen connects the last meaning to deep Incarnation. 
The Son of God has material existence writ large. What this means is that “in Christ, God 
is conjoining all creatures and enters the biology of creation itself in order to share the 
fate of biological existence. God becomes Jesus, and in him God becomes human, and 
(by implication) foxes and sparrows, grass and soil.”56 But this deep Incarnation, rooted 
in the interconnectedness of the material world, does not spread Christ thinly across the 
universe as a paradigm. Rather, “Christian people know of a more saturated or ‘thick’ 
experiences of the presence of Christ” in the preaching of the Word, the sacraments, and 
our “communal settings.”57 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 324. 
54 Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Christology,” in Systematic Theology and Climate Change: 
Ecumenical Perspectives, ed. Michael Northcott and Peter Scott (London: Routledge, 2014), 45. 
55 Gregersen, “The Idea of Deep Incarnation,” 328. 
56 Gregersen, “Deep Incarnation,” 182. 
57 Gregersen, “The Idea of Deep Incarnation,” 341. 
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Celia Deane-Drummond suggests that Gregersen points “to the equivalent worth 
of all life, caught up in a matrix of sarx.”58 She questions whether this view adequately 
distinguishes between different life forms. Gregersen’s emphasis on Stoic continuity, she 
suggests, stretches out materiality into a thin veneer. I am not convinced by this critique. 
Deane-Drummond is right to ask if Gregersen’s Stoicism adequately makes distinctions 
in forms of life. She is concerned with homogeneity. My concern is different. 
Stoics did not homogenize life forms. Stoicism sharply distinguished between 
rational humans and irrational nonhuman animals. Stoics made the difference between 
rational humans and irrational nonhuman creatures into a cosmic principle. For the 
Stoics, humans resemble the gods in that we have internal and external λόγος (thought 
and language) as well as freedom to act. By contrast, nonhuman animals are ἄλογα—
without reason or language, the two forms of λόγος in Stoic thought. Human speech 
(λόγος προφορικός) reflects internal thought (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), but animal sounds 
merely indicate blind reactions to external stimuli.59 As Diogenes of Babylon (ca. 230–
150 BCE) reportedly taught, “the voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air 
brought about by natural impulse.”60 Lacking λόγος, therefore, nonhuman animals merely 
act based on impulses for self-preservation, which explains why so many of them act 
resourcefully: they act from innate instincts and not from deliberation and reasoning.61  
                                                
58 Celia Deane-Drummond, “Who on Earth Is Jesus Christ? Plumbing the Depths of Deep 
Incarnation,” in Christian Faith and the Earth: Current Paths and Emerging Horizons in Ecotheology, ed. 
Ernst M. Conradie, et al. (London: T & T Clark, 2014), 33. 
59 For an overview of Stoicism and language see Lia Formigari, A History of Language Philosophy 
(Philadephia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2004), 46–51. 
60 Quoted in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, Greek text with English 
translation and edited by R.D. Hicks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 7.55. (Diogenes 
Laertius is a different person from Diogenes of Babylon). 
61 Seneca argues this way in Seneca, “Letter 121: On Instinct in Animals,” in Seneca Epistulae 
Morales, Greek with English translation and edited by R. M. Gummere (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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Stoics routinely used a teleological argument: all nonhuman entities exist for the 
sake of human beings. One of the earliest Stoics, Chrysippus (ca. 279–206 BCE), deduced 
from this teleology that “men can make use of beasts for their own purposes without 
injustice.”62 Chrysippus goes so far as to claim that pigs exist for the sole sake of 
nourishing humans, crudely stating that the pig’s soul “was given to it to serve as salt and 
keep it from putrefaction.”63 The telos for nonhuman animals— food, clothing, and 
slaves for humans—means they do not need thought and language. But the Stoic 
hierarchical view of the cosmos is very clear. It is very difficult to see how an emphasis 
on Stoicism could help theologians recover any kind of respect for nonhuman animals. 
I am also not convinced of a strong Stoic influence on the Gospel of John. For 
example, the Stoic idea that a male needed to be “passionless” and show very little 
emotion might sometimes be seen in the way that John’s Jesus walks this earth without 
much care. But at the same time, Jesus weeps over Jerusalem (John 11:35) and is moved 
strongly by Lazarus’s death (John 12:27), an indication that Jesus’s emotional life was 
not at all like a Stoic male. Jewish Psalms do not advocate a Stoic male emotional life 
either. Rather, the Psalms call for unrestrained joy and praise of God as well as deep 
lament at times. So the ostensible “Stoicism” of the Gospel of John seems at the very 
least severely qualified, and with such severe qualification, is it even worth reading 
Stoicism into the Gospel? 
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 1925). He echoed the major Stoics such as Zeno. See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the 
Eminent Philosophers, 2, 7.85. 
62 Cited in Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, Latin text with English translation and edited 
by H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 3.67. 
63 Cited in Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Latin text with English translation and edited by H. 
Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 2.64.160. 
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Scholars have long known that once Christians mixed up Stoic doctrine with 
Christianity, respect for nonhuman creation began to wane and anthropocentric arrogance 
worsened. Gregersen takes the Gospel of John out of its biblical heritage, a heritage 
utterly immersed in Jewish faith and life.64 This is a problem of particularity and is a 
central concern of this dissertation. I am intrigued by Gregersen’s ideas, but his Stoicism 
seems unnecessary and counterproductive to the extent that Stoicism is hostile to the 
“irrational” nonhuman world, utterly anthropocentric in the worst way, and at odds with 
the Hebrew Bible’s respect for all of God’s good creatures. Jesus’s story continues and 
arises from the story of God’s faithfulness to Israel. Gregersen’s Jesus does not need 
Stoicism; he needs Jewishness. 
Neil Darragh, Denis Edwards, and Elizabeth Johnson 
As I already noted, numerous theologians have taken up the idea of deep 
Incarnation. Neil Darragh, for example, sees the Incarnation running so deep that Jesus is 
not merely connected to other humans and other animals. He is connected to inanimate 
creation as well. “Jesus of Nazareth is not just a human being, he is also a function in the 
carbon and oxygen cycles of the planet, a mammal, an event in the production-
consumption processes of first century Palestine, and so on.”65  
                                                
64 I am not claiming that there were not Jews who took up Stoic doctrines. That would drive too 
sharp of a wedge between “Jewishness” and “Hellenism.” I take it that the primary field of reference for the 
Gospel is the Hebrew Scriptures, and this position is in line with a many biblical scholars, including 
modern interpreters who see Wisdom literature as one of the primary influences on the Gospel. To the 
extent that we read anything Stoic or Platonist into the Gospel of John we have to severely qualify such 
statements with views from Hebrew Scripture, which could be very different, particularly with regard to 
nonhuman animals. 
65 Neil Darragh, “Adjusting to the Newcomer: Theology and Ecotheology,” Pacifica 13, no. 2 
(2000): 171. Saying that Jesus is a “function” in the material world seems to move toward a Christ-
paradigm. Darragh does not elaborate on this idea, however.  
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Likewise, Denis Edwards says that Gregersen’s idea of deep Incarnation faithfully 
reflects Christian tradition and Scripture as well as evolutionary biology, which show us 
that the universe is marvelously interconnected.66 Deep Incarnation suggests that the 
Incarnation of the Word in the human Jesus “can now be understood as, like all of 
humanity, dependent upon the evolution of life from its microbial origins 3.7 billion 
years ago. In the bodily humanity of Jesus, God is made one with all the fruits of 
evolution by means of natural selection. The body of Jesus is made up of atoms produced 
in the nuclear furnaces of stars. It depends upon the cooperation of the billions of 
microbes that inhabit it. It exists only in interdependence with all the other organisms and 
all the systems that sustain life on Earth.”67 
Jesus of Nazareth was a human. That means he was interdependent with all other 
creatures. His body had DNA, DNA shared with chimpanzees and gorillas.68 His body 
                                                
66 Denis Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2006), 59–60. Edwards 
most recently endorsed Gregersen’s thesis in Denis Edwards, Partaking of God: Trinity, Evolution, and 
Ecology (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2014), 58. 
67 Denis Edwards, “Deep Incarnation: The Meaning of Incarnation for the Rest of the Natural 
World,” in Partaking of God: Trinity, Evolution, and Ecology (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2014), 
59. 
68 Humans share 98.4% of our DNA with chimpanzees. That is, 984 out of 1,000 base pairs along 
every double strand of DNA are in the same sequence. A lot of our human DNA is “junk DNA” that we do 
not use at all. If we disregard the junk DNA, humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos share 99.5% on the same 
base sequences. Humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos differ by only a few hundred genes out of 
approximately 100,000. Indeed, humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos can and have receive blood 
transfusions from one another since all our 287 units of hemoglobin are the same. On the very close DNA 
between humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos see Jared Diamond, The Third Chimpanzee: The Evolution 
and Future of the Human Animal (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1992), 20–24; M-C. King and A.C. 
Wilson, “Evolution at Two Levels: Molecular Similarities and Biological Differences between Humans and 
Chimpanzees,” Science 188 (1975): 107–16; Morris Goodman, Lawrence I. Grossman, and Derek E. 
Wildman, “Moving Primate Genomics beyond the Chimpanzee Genome,” Trends in Genetics 21, no. 9 
(2005): 511–517.  
Gorillas and humans share nearly the same amount of DNA as chimpanzees and humans, making 
gorillas our second-most related cousin in the animal kingdom. Researchers completed mapping the 
genomes of a western lowland gorilla in 2012. Their published results revealed that humans and gorillas 
differ by a mere 1.75% of DNA. That is, 982 out of every 1,000 base pairs of DNA are in the same 
sequence between humans and gorillas. See Aylwyn Scally and et. al, “Insights into Hominid Evolution 
from the Gorilla Genome Sequence,” Nature 483 (March 8, 2012): 169–175. 
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takes up the same dust as ours, dust made from exploding stars.69 The Incarnation is deep 
in simply being fully human. It is also cosmic in being fully human. For these 
theologians, there is no separation between the particular and the universal in Christology 
(unlike Fox, McFague, and Keller). Because Jesus is the Logos incarnate, this means God 
has entered into the biosphere in such as a way as to begin to divinize the whole world. 
Jesus is the climactic pivotal point of evolution and represents the entire cosmos as well 
as humanity. 
But the emphasis of these Christologies is not on Jesus’s humanity per se. The 
Word became “flesh.” Flesh is a wider category than humanity. Any Christology that 
focuses mainly or solely on God’s relationship to humans, therefore, misses the way that 
the Logos takes up flesh and all things (Col 1:15–20). Jesus of Nazareth’s body becomes 
“extended” to encompass a social body, the church, as well as the vast expanding 
universe.70 These theologians emphasize Jesus’s physicality and flesh rather than his 
humanity. As Elizabeth Johnson notes: “‘Deep Incarnation’ understands John 1:14 to be 
saying that the sarx which the Word of God became not only weds Jesus to other human 
beings in the species; it also reaches beyond us to join him to the whole biological world 
of living creatures and the cosmic dust of which they are composed. The Incarnation is a 
cosmic event.”71 To focus exclusively on his humanity would be anthropocentric, missing 
the Incarnation’s creation-wide significance. Seeing Jesus as deeply embedded in 
evolutionary history, taking up humanity’s shared DNA with other great apes, stardust, 
                                                
69 See Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam, 1988), 117 and Michael 
Woolfson, Time, Space, Stars, and Man (London: Imperial College Press, 2013), 66–67. 
70 On the idea of Jesus’s extended body see Niels Henrik Gregersen, “The Extended Body: The 
Social Body of Jesus according to Luke,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 51, no. 3 (2012): 234–44. In this 
article, Gregersen reads how the Gospel of Luke, depicts Jesus’s body, looking at how his body is often 
“open” and permeable.  
71 Elizabeth A. Johnson, Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love (New York: Continuum, 
2014), 197. 
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and evolutionary history might seem strange. But according to Darragh, this is because 
we rarely look at ourselves as interconnected with other creatures:  
If we find it strange to describe Jesus of Nazareth in this way, it is presumably 
because we are not used to seeing him as integrated within the events and 
processes of the planet Earth. The core of the issue though is that we are not used 
to seeing ourselves in this way. We do not commonly see ourselves as existing in 
these dimensions. We have rather tended to see ourselves in terms of will, or 
intellect, or consciousness, or reason, or freedom. Thus the many dimensions of 
our existence within the Earth have been reduced to only a few and thereby 
isolated us from the rest of the Earth.72 
Deep Incarnation therefore resists modern anthropology, which sees human persons as 
autonomous, thinking, individuals rather than interdependent, communal, and shaped by 
our environment and bodies. We tend, in the modern world, to think we can overcome 
our physical limitations by sheer will power and hard work. But the kind of Incarnational 
perspective examined here sees Jesus Christ as absolutely dependent and embedded in a 
deep history, a deep time, and deep physicality. Only through that depth do we get to the 
cosmic Christ. 
Elizabeth Johnson has developed these notions even further. If Jesus of 
Nazareth’s flesh is composed of “star stuff and earth stuff” as part of the “historical and 
biological community of Earth” and existed in a relationship of interdependence with the 
physical universe, and if Jesus was raised from the dead in the flesh, then “this signals 
embryonically the final beginning of redemptive glorification not just for other human 
beings but for all flesh, all material beings, every creature that passes through death. The 
                                                
72 Darragh, “Adjusting to the Newcomer,” 171. 
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evolving world of life, all of matter in its endless permutations, will not be left behind but 
will likewise be transfigured by the resurrecting action of the Creator Spirit.”73 
For Johnson, Jesus’s ministry and life also have a bearing upon deep Incarnation. 
If we start, according to Johnson, with cosmology, we will tend to leave behind the 
historical Jesus. Jesus transgressed a remarkable number of boundaries, giving impetus 
for social justice. “Concrete vignettes of Jesus’ teaching and characteristic behavior 
center around the rich Jewish symbol of the reign of God, a biblical expression for the 
very nature of the indescribable holy One, evoking the moment when the loving power of 
God will win through over the powers that destroy. In parables and beatitudes, healings 
and festive meals, some of which were scandalous and rife with conflict, this Spirit-
blessed prophet provided a joyous foretaste of what the arrival of God’s reign would 
entail.”74 Johnson seems to be on the right track. The cosmic Christ, unhinged from the 
historical Jesus, seems to me a recipe for the exact opposite of its intent to ground 
Christology in the physical realm. She is also on the right track in pointing to Jesus’s 
Jewishness, though she does not develop this aspect. Unlike Gregersen, who grounds 
deep Incarnation in Stoic metaphysics, potentially setting up a new anthropocentric 
arrogance, Elizabeth Johnson points to Jesus’s indispensable Jewish particularity. But 
again, she does not develop how this is the case. In my argument, Jesus’s particularity as 
a Jew will be a bedrock for understanding the Incarnation’s significance for nonhuman 
animals. 
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Celia Deane-Drummond 
One approach to grounding the notion of deep Incarnation in Jewish thinking is to 
approach the issue not from the humanity and flesh of Jesus but from the other end: 
Logos Christology, or to put it in terms of Hebrew Scriptures: Wisdom. Celia Deane-
Drummond has done significant work in this area. Deane-Drummond agrees with 
Gregersen and others that the Gospel of John’s prologue is extremely important for 
understanding the Incarnation. But rather than focusing on what σάρξ means Deane 
Drummond starts from the Logos, which she interprets as primarily grounded in Jewish 
tradition first and foremost.75 While Gregersen would emphasize the Greek influence on 
Logos, Deane-Drummond points out that the Hebrew term רָבָדּ, which combines “word” 
and “deed,” seems more suitable for understanding the Gospel since it emphasizes ethics 
in addition to more abstract philosophical notions inherent in the Greek. As she says, “it 
is the concrete, then, rather than the universal that is implied by dabar.”76 But the Logos 
is also associated with Wisdom, an idea with deep roots in Jewish literature. 
Celia Deane-Drummond’s work takes Jesus’s Jewish background seriously but 
from the perspective of Wisdom Christology. If what it means to be a human being is to 
be embedded in an ongoing evolution of life on Earth, then Jesus’s humanity was also 
part of evolution on Earth. God’s transcendence does not place God at odds with creation. 
In a kenotic reading of the Incarnation, Deane-Drummond focuses less on the ontological 
status of the human and divine “natures” of Jesus Christ, and more upon the union of 
                                                
75 Deane-Drummond recognizes a certain amount of blending so that it is difficult to separate 
Greek from Hebrew cosmology in the biblical record. She does not play on the tired trope of Greek versus 
Hebrew influences. But she rightly points to the Scriptures themselves as a primary context for 
understanding the Gospel of John’s prologue.  
76 Deane-Drummond, “Who on Earth Is Jesus Christ?,” 39. 
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divine and human obedience in the one person, Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus’s whole life 
exhibits this theodrama. The “deep incarnation” connects Wisdom to the entire creation 
and whole cosmos. All of created existence contains a hidden mystery that nevertheless 
shows forth beauty, which we humans can appreciate even if we cannot fully understand 
it. We can still wonder at the mystery, which prepares us for the beauty of Christ. Jesus’s 
death on the cross redeems all of creation. Nonhuman animals have their own morality 
and rules, and fall short of the kind of justice and peaceableness that even they sometimes 
aspire to according to the work of modern ethologists like Frans de Waal. So nonhuman 
animals need redemption as well, and the Wisdom of God on the cross redeems these 
creatures, takes them into the divine life to which all of creation is destined in Jesus 
Christ.77 
Deane-Drummond’s Christology powerfully appropriates “deep Incarnation” and 
respects Jesus’s particularity while focusing on cosmic redemption that other theologians 
emphasize. Her Christology is meant to make sense of Christology in an evolutionary 
view without some of the shortcomings of other attempts, which often make evolution 
part of the very being of God so that God “becomes.” The Incarnation and Resurrection 
are not radical breaks with evolutionary history in her theology, but continue the hidden 
sophianic beauty inherent in all things that prepare us for God’s becoming flesh.  
Deane-Drummond critiques cosmic Christologies for the same reasons I have 
done so in this introduction. She says, “Theological descriptions of cosmic Christology . . 
. suffer the disadvantage of detaching Christ from the historical Jesus as understood 
                                                
77 Celia Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom (Minneapolis: Fortress 
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according to the Gospel accounts.”78 She places Jesus in the Jewish Wisdom tradition and 
her appropriation of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theodrama for Christology helps her 
respect the Incarnation’s particularity while also showing a cosmic redemption. 
Nevertheless, I think there is a lot more to say about Jesus’s particularity. By focusing on 
a Logos Christology, Deane-Drummond is able to talk about the Incarnation in broad 
terms that make sense in a world in which evolution of life is the predominant narrative. 
But what happens when we focus on the “historical accounts as understood according to 
the Gospel accounts” where we see Jesus’s maleness, Jewishness, and humanity in full 
view? Does a Wisdom Christology by itself fully address the scandal of particularity that 
these three identities in particular have represented? I am concerned that the sweeping 
theodramatic narrative she develops loses the individual at times. Bypassing Jesus’s 
specific gendered, species, and ethnic/religious identity in favor of a Wisdom Christology 
does not face head on the scandal that these identities present to the modern theologian. 
Nor does it allow us to refocus the particularity in new ways to develop a theology that is 
not only ecological, but begins to reshape the human/nonhuman animal relationship.  
Nonhuman Animals and the Incarnation: Recent Literature 
Long before ecotheologians had taken up the mantle, Christian theologians who 
have written on theology and nonhuman animals have claimed similar things as those 
speaking about a “deep Incarnation.” One of the earliest attempts to see the Incarnation as 
touching on nonhuman creation comes from Andrew Linzey. In his introduction to an 
edited volume titled, Animals on the Agenda, Linzey briefly states that “by becoming 
flesh, the Logos identifies . . . not only with humanity but with all creatures of flesh and 
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blood.”79 He did not elaborate further but clearly argued that the Incarnation should not 
be limited to humans alone, any more than it should be limited to males alone. In another 
book Linzey claims that the λόγος became a mammal: “for the flesh assumed in the 
incarnation is not some hermeneutically sealed, highly differentiated human flesh, it is 
the same organic flesh and blood which we share with other mammalian creatures. There 
is no human embodiment totally unsimilar to the flesh of other sentient creatures.”80 Here 
Linzey uses the concept of “flesh” to broaden the Incarnation to all mammals. Likewise, 
Stephen H. Webb wrote: “animals are a part of the incarnation because traditional 
Christology combines the divine and the human without subtracting anything from the 
physical or material aspects of creation, and humans are mammals, flesh and blood 
creatures with bodily needs and functions.”81 These are clear and early indications that 
theologians working on nonhuman animal issues have seen how fruitful something like a 
“deep Incarnation” theology can be. 
There was a time when Andrew Linzey and Stephen Webb were two of the 
predominant voices in a small cadre of theologians who cared about nonhuman animals 
and theology. Today, however, there are more Christian theologians, biblical scholars and 
ethicists than ever working on this issue. In the past six years or so there has been an 
                                                
79 Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto, eds., Animals on the Agenda: Questions about 
Animals for Theology and Ethics (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998), xvi. 
80 Andrew Linzey, Animal Rites: Liturgies of Animal Care (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2001), 
5. Linzey draws the line at mammals, which would exclude various birds, reptiles and sea creatures in the 
animal kingdom because they live? “Spirit-filled lives which are analogous to human beings.” I wonder 
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81 Stephen H. Webb, On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology of Compassion for Animals (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 170. 
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explosion of books and articles dealing with Christianity and nonhuman animals.82 The 
literature I have reviewed so far is more broadly concerned with ecology and Christianity, 
but all of it has a strong bearing on thinking about nonhuman animals in relationship to 
the Incarnation. Books that deal with Christianity and nonhuman animals often focus 
more narrowly on biblical interpretation and/or ethics. For example, I co-edited a book 
along with Tripp York in which the vast majority of the chapters deal with interpreting 
various passages of Scripture that some Christians use to reject focusing on nonhuman 
animals at all.83 Charles Camosy recently published a book that deals mostly with how to 
think ethically about nonhuman animals as Christians.84 Two books published that bear 
upon the subject of Christianity and animals, Theology on the Menu: Asceticism, Meat 
                                                
82 Although I have noted a couple examples from the past three decades, in this literature review I 
am pointing only to some of the literature published in the past six years. A comprehensive review would 
have to take into account the long career of Andrew Linzey. Linzey’s work crosses a broad range of 
disciplines and trajectories. Starting with his unpublished dissertation on Karl Barth and nonhuman animals 
to his Animal Theology Linzey has focused on theology, the Bible, ethics, and social science. His work 
should probably be seen as helping to create the groundwork for the recent explosion of works on Christian 
theology, Scripture, and ethics in relationship to nonhuman animals. Indeed, Linzey is one of the first 
theologians to point to the prologue of John and the Incarnation in the “flesh” as helpful to expanding our 
purview of the Incarnation.  
Strikingly, however, Linzey’s voice has been completely absent in recent collections on this 
subject. This is the case despite the fact that some of the most popular and widely published authors have 
enthusiastically participated in the projects. I will draw from Linzey in this dissertation at various points to 
make particular points. I have decided not to review his massive corpus for this Introduction since such a 
review could take a chapter of its own, and in any case, he has largely stayed out of the recent 
conversations. What he has said about the Incarnation that is relevant to the current conversation I have 
already noted in the text. 
83 See Andy Alexis-Baker and Tripp York, eds., A Faith Embracing All Creatures (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade Books, 2012). See also Michael Gilmour, Eden's Other Residents: The Bible and Animals 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014). Another collection deals with the Bible and what it means to be 
human, which touches on this issue of the Incarnation and nonhuman animals in a helpful way but 
tangentially. See Jennifer L. Koosed, The Bible and Posthumanism (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 
2014). 
84 Charles Camosy, For the Love of Animals: Christian Ethics, Consistent Action (Cincinnati, OH: 
Franciscan Media, 2013). Camosy touches on a few biblical issues as well, often drawing from and 
interacting with A Faith Embracing all Creatures. But by and large the book’s subtitle about action and 
ethics is the book’s focus. See also Daniel K. Miller, Animal Ethics and Theology: The Lens of the Good 
Samaritan (New York: Routledge, 2011). As the subtitle of his book indicates, Miller uses Scripture but his 
focus in by and large towards action. Laura Hobgood-Oster also focuses on ethics in her book. See Laura 
Hobgood-Oster, The Friends We Keep: Unleashing Christianity's Compassion for Animals (Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2010).  
36 
 
and Christian Diet co-authored by David Grummet and Rachel Muers and Eating and 
Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and Theology co-edited by 
David Grummet and Rachel Muers, largely deal with the issue of vegetarianism and 
Christianity. While these books are helpful and I will draw from them occasionally, they 
do not focus squarely on the Incarnation as the works I reviewed by Gregersen and others 
do.  
Deane-Drummond’s new book, The Wisdom of the Liminal: Evolution and Other 
Animals in Human Becoming, draws extensively from ethological studies to reconfigure 
theological anthropology. But she explicitly leaves aside what her work in this area 
means for Christology per se. Instead she refers readers to her book Christ and Evolution: 
Wonder and Wisdom, which I have already reviewed. But obviously, any theological 
anthropology is tied to Christology in some way. Her conclusions in this new book 
therefore should have some implication for Christology, but she avoids drawing any. 
In Creaturely Theology, editors Deane-Drummond and David Clough bemoan the 
fact that Christian theologians have by and large ignored questions about nonhuman 
animals with any depth. Theologians have based their own anthropology on the 
distinction between humans and all other animals. But these reflections, Clough and 
Deane-Drummond argue, are usually shallow and not conversant with contemporary 
philosophy, science, or political theory, which have all given extended attention to 
questions about other animals, and have been doing so for quite a while. Jacques Derrida, 
Giorgio Agamben, Martha Nussbaum, Mary Midgley, and many others have been 
carrying on a conversation that when coupled with ethological research represents a 
significant philosophical, political, ethical, and scientific challenge for theologians to 
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consider. The idea that the most fundamental distinction in Christianity is that between 
God and all creatures is what underlies the basis for this edited collection, and is what the 
editors believe is a distinctive theological contribution to the ongoing conversation writ 
large. 
 While the essays in this book are all fruitful and challenging, the primary essay 
that is relevant for this dissertation is Denis Edwards’s chapter, “The Redemption of 
Animals in an Incarnational Theology.”85 Drawing on the cosmic Christology he finds in 
the New Testament, Edwards looks to develop a theory of “redemption through 
incarnation” that includes other-than-human animals.86 To do this Edwards turns to 
Athanasius. For Athanasius, the fact that all of creation exists in the precarious state 
between being created out of nothing and falling back into nothing means that all of 
creation exists and is sustained by God’s grace. By becoming a creature, God moves 
beyond simply restoring humanity to an original sinless state. Jesus’s death into the 
precarious state of creatureliness and his resurrection lifts “all things” out of the balance 
and toward a new life. Christ becomes the “firstborn of all creation” (Col 1:15), a sign 
that all of creation will be released from the death struggle (Rom 8:19–20) by a process 
of deification.87  
Edwards moves on to extrapolate from Athanasius’s theology. Edwards wants to 
“develop an ecological theology that is also a theology of animals.”88 Salvation through 
the Incarnation provides an alternative model to atonement theories that focus squarely 
                                                
85 Denis Edwards, “The Redemption of Animals in an Incarnational Theology,” in Creaturely 
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SCM, 2009), 81–99. 
86 Ibid., 83. 
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on human sin. By becoming part of creation God changes the ontological status of 
creation and moves all things toward divinization. Nonhuman animals will also be taken 
up into the life of the Trinity, and indeed already bear the imprint of God’s Wisdom, 
according to various biblical passages. Humans who are aware of their redemption in 
Christ, therefore, are called to live nonviolent lives that help to heal the world rather than 
destroy it.  
What is striking to me about Edwards’ interpretation of Athanasius is how he has 
to extrapolate from Athanasius: Athanasius himself does not focus on nonhuman animals. 
In chapter 2, I will look closely at whether Athanasius and also John of Damascus, who 
takes a similar line using John 1:14, are really all that helpful for thinking about 
nonhuman animals. The “ecological theology that is also a theology for animals” way of 
thinking seems, again, to start with the cosmic Christ and ontological categories that 
bypass the particularities of the Incarnation. I suggest that the focus on the cosmic Christ 
needs strong supplementation with a focus on Jesus of Nazareth in order to be more 
balanced and provide more space than the “also” in Edwards’s statement allows. 
Finally, David Clough’s groundbreaking book, On Animals—the first book on 
systematic theology in relationship to nonhuman animals—has some helpful and 
pertinent sections for this dissertation. Because I will focus on particularity, Clough’s 
chapter on the Incarnation and nonhuman animals is most relevant.89 The Incarnation is 
the central chapter of Clough’s book and the central idea in his systematic theology. In 
the first section of the chapter, “Reading the Particularity of the Incarnation,” Clough 
passes over Jesus’s Jewishness and maleness with a few sentences and quickly moves on 
                                                
89 See David Clough, On Animals: Systematic Theology Vol. 1 (New York: T & T Clark, 2012), 
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to the idea, which we have already encountered, of the Word becoming flesh in John 
1:14. Clough ends his three-page reflection on particularity (heavily truncated because of 
the enormous footnotes) with the assessment that “the particular creature God became 
was a human, male, Jewish, Palestinian, first-century one, but none of these specifics 
seem to have been first in the mind of the New Testament authors who chose the term 
‘flesh’ to characterize the event.”90 
The main purpose of the section on particularity is to show that the wider purview 
of the Incarnation includes nonhuman animals. The Word became an animal. The Word 
became a creature. He then moves on to look at the cosmic Christ in the New Testament. 
This is a familiar way to argue, even though Clough does not interact with Gregersen or 
others who have taken up the deep Incarnation interpretation. But his interpretation of the 
Incarnation is very much in line with Edwards’s statement of desiring to develop an 
ecotheology that also includes nonhuman animals. Clough’s focus is wide: the 
Incarnation is about becoming a “creature” because the most fundamental distinction in 
Christian theology is between God and all creatures.91 And when it comes to distinctions 
within the creaturely realm, Jesus Christ provides the most fundamental distinction. Jesus 
is the image of God. Following Barth’s Christocentric interpretation of the imago dei, 
Clough argues that Jesus rather than humanity writ large is the one to whom Scripture 
points as the image of God. If this is the case, then we can see that “the key distinction is 
that between Christ and all other creatures, rather than particular groups of creatures that 
image God in different ways.”92 Only when we have clarified these theological 
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distinctions can we then begin to look at other differences and see how particular 
creatures image God themselves. 
As with other theologians reviewed so far, I find much that is helpful and fruitful 
in Clough’s analysis. He and other theologians looking at cosmic Christology provide a 
needed theological correction to anthropocentric interpretations of Christology. Clough, 
in contrast to eco-theologians, focuses more squarely on nonhuman animals. He rightly 
sees, I think, that even ecotheologians have tended to bypass other animals in favor of 
ecosystems and universes. 
Yet when it comes to the Incarnation itself, Clough is strikingly similar to all of 
the theologians I have reviewed so far: he bypasses the Incarnation’s particularities in 
favor of cosmic Christology. I am not convinced that dismissing the particularity of the 
Incarnation as unimportant should be done so easily. I agree that the fundamental 
distinction in Christian theology is that between God and all creatures. I also agree with 
the Christocentric interpretation of the image of God found in Karl Barth. But why 
should that somehow mean that the particularity of the Incarnation in Jesus’s Jewishness, 
maleness, and humanity are irrelevant?  
“Deep Incarnation” theologians (as I will call them and which I subscribe to as 
well) only see the particularity as important insofar as it demonstrates embeddedness in 
the matrix of life at its most fundamental levels. I think there is at some level a fear that 
any focus on Jesus’s maleness, for instance, would lead to unhelpful gender stereotypes 
written into the doctrine of God. Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar argue this way.93 
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These theological moves can also underwrite systems of patriarchy within human society. 
But this only has to be the case if we essentialize gender in particular ways. Could it be 
that Jesus of Nazareth’s particular way of being male might actually tell us something 
important for theology concerned about nonhuman animals? I think it might, and I will 
argue why in chapter 4.  
I am also concerned about the long history of Christians erasing Jesus’s 
Jewishness in favor of some more universal Christ images. This tendency has had dire 
consequences for Christian faith and life through the centuries. No theology, even one 
trying to expand the purview toward nonhuman creation, can afford to bypass Jesus’s 
Jewishness. The stakes are too high given how Christians have stereotyped, erased, and 
obliterated Jewish people both figuratively in written texts and actually in real life 
pogroms and concentration camps. If there is anything Christian theologians should have 
learned after the Holocaust, it is to pay attention to Jesus’s Jewishness in more than a 
passing manner. Ecotheology and animal theology do not get a pass on this. 
After all—since Clough uses Barth as a helpful resource in the endeavor to 
develop a theology for animals—Barth did more than highlight the Creator/creature 
divide and the Christocentric reading of the imago dei. Barth also wrote: “The Word did 
not simply become any “flesh,” any man humbled and suffering. It became Jewish flesh. 
The Church’s whole doctrine of the incarnation and the atonement becomes abstract and 
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valueless and meaningless to the extent that this comes to be regarded as something 
accidental and incidental.”94 However, it seems to me that much of the deep Incarnation 
interpretation marginalizes Jesus’s Jewishness in precisely the way Barth warns about: 
Jesus’s Jewishness is incidental to the Incarnation, an accident that shows the particular 
“deep” matrix, but not all that fundamentally important. 
Overview of this Work 
This dissertation is a dialogue with deep Incarnation theologians’ ideas. But 
where they move immediately outward and upward to the cosmic Christ, I go in the 
opposite direction: to the flesh. My question is whether the Incarnation’s particularity, 
specifically Jesus’s Jewishness, maleness, and humanness might be vital aspects of 
Christology so that ignoring these aspects of the Incarnation does not help to develop “an 
ecotheology that is also a theology for animals.” Rather than retreat into the cosmos and 
away from Jesus’s particularity I will address some of the issues directly and turn the 
question around: it is precisely through Jesus of Nazareth that space opens up for the 
other-than-human animals Christians have been so quick to dismiss. This dissertation is 
not a critique of any one person’s theology or, even less, a whole school of theology. I 
find deep Incarnational ideas to be extremely fruitful. My work, again, supplements and 
contributes to the work these theologians are doing. Therefore, most of this dissertation is 
constructive theology. In saying this I align myself with Karl Barth, who claimed that on 
the basis of the Incarnation “the sense and sound of our word must be positive.”95 A 
dissertation that mostly tears down other people rather than building upon their best 
                                                
94 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. IV/1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 166. Emphasis in 
the original.  
95 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. John Newton Thomas (Louisville: John Knox Press, 
1960), 61. 
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insights would be a betrayal of what I wish to do in this work. This dissertation is part of 
a dialogue about how we Christians can recover a sense of our own creatureliness and 
affirm the goodness not only of creation itself, but also those creatures—nonhuman 
animals—who so often go ignored even in ecotheology.  
In the first chapter I will look at the issue of the Word becoming “flesh.” The 
Gospel of John’s claim that the Word became flesh has been a central idea in recent 
literature around ecotheology and theology and nonhuman animals. Some of the authors, 
such as Gregersen, have placed this notion within a Greek philosophical context in order 
to give the notion airs of a wider significance. I do not think such a move is helpful or 
necessary, as I already noted. So in the first chapter I will look at how the notion of God 
becoming “flesh” functions in the New Testament and how it relates to ideas from the 
Hebrew Bible. 
In the second chapter I will examine how two patristic scholars use this notion of 
God becoming flesh. Both Athanasius and John of Damascus use John 1:14 to speak of 
the Word becoming “matter.” Denis Edwards and some other modern scholars think that 
Athanasius therefore offers some hope for modern theologians in recovering a more 
balanced theology that would be more respectful of nonhuman creation. I am not so sure. 
Both Athanasius and John of Damascus point to the cosmic Christ at the expense of 
Jesus’s particularity, as do theologians I have reviewed in this introduction, but 
Athanasius and the Damscene do so in a context decidedly anti-Jewish. As such, their 
thoughts on the Incarnation, while intriguing, are of limited use. They do not pay enough 
attention to Jesus of Nazareth. 
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In the third chapter I begin my positive argument by looking at how Jesus’s 
Jewishness is essential for any theology concerned about nonhuman animals. Jesus stands 
in a prophetic tradition of messianic and eschatological hope. Without the specific Jewish 
eschatological hope that Jesus embodies, in which predators and prey no longer interact 
with one another in a cycle of violence, our theologies of nonhuman animals would be 
much impoverished. But there is much more than eschatology at stake. 
In the fourth chapter I build upon the idea that Jesus’s Jewishness is essential for 
the Incarnation by examining his maleness. Jesus is a Jewish male. His maleness provides 
a very specific challenge to dominant ideas of maleness in antiquity and even in our 
modern American culture. The ideal male only shows a limited range of emotion, like a 
Stoic, but also learns the virtues by becoming a hunter and a warrior. But Jesus’s 
Jewishness challenges these ideological performances of gender. His male body not only 
seems radically transgendered at times, but is also a circumcised male body. This has 
specific ramifications for maleness in antiquity and beyond that make his maleness 
helpful for thinking about how the Incarnation relates to nonhuman animals. 
In the final chapter, I will take up the challenge of Jesus’s humanness. Even if I 
can successfully address the Son’s Jewish and male particularity, it would seem that the 
“humanity of God,” as Barth called it, is the decisive particular that makes theological 
thinking about nonhuman animals at best a weird side-project and at worst a terrible 
distraction from the real work of thinking about how the Son’s humanness saves 
humanity alone. But I think that would be a hasty conclusion. Jesus’s humanity, I argue, 
is a kenosis of humanity: a giving up of human privilege and domination, indeed, giving 
up on the very idea of the human/animal distinction because that quest is one that serves 
45 
 
domination not liberation. Drawing on philosophical currents from Jacques Derrida, 
Giorgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, and others, I see Jesus as 
“becoming-animal” in a way that problematizes all attempts to define anthropology in a 
way that allows humans to dominate other creatures.  
46 
 
CHAPTER 1 
THE WORD BECAME FLESH 
 
 
 
At every Roman Catholic Mass and at many Protestant worship services, 
Christians recite the Creed, part of which states: “I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ . . . 
for us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven and by the Holy Spirit was 
incarnate (σαρκωθέντα) of the Virgin Mary, and became man (ἐνανθρωπήσαντα).”96 This 
is the English version of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed that American Roman 
Catholics repeat. Other churches have modernized the language from “man” to human: 
“and became human.”97 Anselm of Canterbury titled one of his works, “Why God 
became human” (Cur deus homo). There is a long history of Christians affirming Jesus’s 
true humanity and emphasizing it. 
However, the language used in the Gospel of John is that the Word became 
“flesh” (σάρξ —John 1:14). In line with common parlance, modern commentaries on the 
Gospel of John have generally interpreted σάρξ in John 1:14 as a synonym for “human.” 
In his commentary on John, for example, Ben Witherington states that John was 
concerned to “make clear that the Logos really took on human flesh, and that he is the 
only mediator between human beings and God.”98 Witherington gives no attention to 
what σάρξ might mean but assumes it implies humanity exclusively. Likewise, Ernst 
Haenchen’s commentary passes over the meaning of flesh, opting instead to discuss the 
                                                
96 This is the English that Roman Catholics repeat at Mass. I have added the Greek to show the 
original underneath. Greek text in Philip Schaff, The Creeds of the Greek and Latin Churches, The Creeds 
of Christendom, vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1896), 57. 
97 For example, the United Methodist Hymnal (1989) says, ““and became truly human” (p. 880).  
98 Ben Witherington, John's Wisdom: A Commentary on the Fourth Gospel (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 53. 
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absent virgin birth story.99 Raymond Brown, in his groundbreaking commentary on 
John’s Gospel, states that “‘flesh’ stands for the whole man” without inquiring whether 
the term could have broader implications.100 Finally, Rudolf Bultmann attempts to show 
that John’s statement, “the Word became flesh,” counters a common tendency in the 
ancient world to pit the spiritual against the created material world. Yet Bultmann does 
not take this to its logical conclusion by drawing more creation-wide implications from it. 
Instead he states that σάρξ in John 1:14 refers to “the sphere of the human and the 
worldly as opposed to the divine.”101 Σαρξ has to do with what is fleeting, weak, and 
arrogant in the human sphere, but says little about anything else. 
Theologians have generally taken a similar path. Thomas F. Torrance, for 
instance, interprets σάρξ as Jesus taking up humanity’s “fallen flesh.” For Torrance, the 
reason for the Incarnation is atonement.102 Humanity sinned and needed God to heal the 
rupture between humans and God, humans and humans, and human and “nature,” which 
could only happen through the Incarnation. The meaning of the word “flesh” is “that the 
Word participates in human nature and existence, for he became man in becoming flesh, 
true man and real man.”103 Part of being truly human is having flesh “marked by Adam’s 
fall, the human nature which seen from the cross is at enmity with God and needs to be 
reconciled to God.”104  
                                                
99 Ernst Haenchen, Das Johannesevangelium: ein Kommentar (Tübingen: Mohr, 1980), 128–30. 
100 Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel according to John, I–XII (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1966), 13. 
101 Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of John: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1971), 62. 
102 “Even when we begin with his incarnation, and with his birth at Bethlehem, we are beginning 
right away with the atonement, for his birth, as the beginning of his incarnate person, is one end of atoning 
work, with the resurrection and ascension as the other end.” Thomas Torrance, F., Incarnation: The Person 
and Life of Christ (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008), 37. 
103 Ibid., 61. 
104 Ibid. 
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But these commentators assert rather than argue for interpreting σάρξ as “human.” 
Since most of these commentators do not give any arguments for this assumption, readers 
have no good reason to accept their position. In fact, I will argue in this chapter, we have 
very good reasons to think that “the Word became flesh” within a broader perspective on 
the Incarnation. A few modern interpreters have already begun to draw this conclusion.  
As noted in the introduction, Andrew Linzey has long viewed the Incarnation as 
relating to nonhuman animals: “The incarnation is God’s love affair with all fleshly 
creatures.”105 More recently, biblical scholar Richard Bauckham has pointed to “the 
Word became flesh” as a statement with ecological importance. While the passage clearly 
has in mind that Jesus became a human—with all the vulnerability, weakness, and 
mortality that humanity implies—the passage has wider significance. “The Word 
‘became flesh’, the mortal nature humans share with all living things, in order to give the 
eternal life of God to all flesh.”106 Some biblical scholars have argued that John’s Gospel 
devalues creation through a series of dualities.107 But if the prologue can be read as 
having a wider significance than humanity, if “flesh” signifies human and nonhuman 
creation, then the Gospel is about opening up eternity to what is non-eternal broadly. 
Human and nonhuman creation share a common destiny in Christ. 
                                                
105 Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God: Explorations in Animal Theology (New York: 
Lantern Books, 2009), 14. I take it as a little scandalous that people arguing for deep Incarnation (aside 
from Deane-Drummond) have not acknowledged that Linzey spoke many years before them about John 
1:14 and the Incarnation in the “flesh” as significant for nonhuman animals. In addition to what I cited in 
the Introduction and quoted in the text above, see also Andrew Linzey and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, After Noah: 
Animals and the Liberation of Theology (London: Mowbray, 1997), 85, 103–104 and Andrew Linzey, 
Animal Gospel (Louisville: John Knox Press, 2000), 7. 
106 Richard Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology: Rediscovering the Community of Creation (Waco, 
TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), 164. 
107 Bauckham points to Normal Habel in particular. See Norman Habel, “An Ecojustice Challenge: 
Is Earth Valued in John 1?,” in The Earth Story in the New Testament, ed. Norman Habel and Vicky 
Balabanski (New York: Sheffiled Acadmic Press, 2002), 76–82. 
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Denis Edwards has also taken up this line of thought. Concerned that humans 
have done irretrievable damage to forests, water, soil, and the atmosphere, as well as 
written off other animals to extinction, Edwards has worked to place nonhuman creation 
within a Trinitarian framework. He argues that if God is a dynamic of mutual love in 
God’s self, then every part of creation must be an expression of God’s love. For Edwards, 
the second person of the Trinity is best understood as “the Wisdom of God,” through 
whom all things were created and who became incarnate.108 But the Wisdom of God 
became incarnate in a deeper way than merely becoming human: 
The Word becomes flesh in solidarity with all flesh, and this includes not only 
humanity but also the whole of biological life. The cross of Christ represents not 
only God’s identification with suffering humanity and God’s will to bring 
forgiveness and healing to human beings, but also God’s identification with 
suffering creation and God’s promise of new creation that will bring healing and 
fulfillment to all things. The meaning of the incarnation, of becoming flesh, is not 
restricted to humanity, but involves all the networks of interconnected organisms, 
the whole of biological life.109 
Likewise, David Clough has drawn on John 1:14 for a renewed understanding of 
the Incarnation. Commenting on the passage he states that, in essence, this verse means 
that the Word took on “the life-substance common to humans and other animals.”110  
Yet theologians and biblical scholars like Linzey, Bauckham, Edwards, and 
Clough have neither given detailed work on how the Gospel of John uses σάρξ nor have 
                                                
108 See Denis Edwards, Jesus the Wisdom of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: St. 
Paul's, 1995). 
109 Denis Edwards, How God Acts: Creation, Redemption, and Special Divine Action 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 125. 
110 Clough, On Animals, 84–85. 
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they done extended work on the meaning of flesh. Like those who claim that σάρξ refers 
to humanity alone, these theologians also generally assert or too briefly argue their 
counter interpretations. Clough has done more work than others by connecting the term 
σάρξ to its Hebrew counterpart, a move that I will draw from and expand upon in this 
chapter. Connecting σάρξ to Jewish notions is essential for grounding the Gospel in 
Hebrew Scriptures. But on all accounts what is needed is a more extensive survey of the 
Fourth Gospel and a close reading of the text. Furthermore, these scholars have generally 
bypassed other texts that could lend support to their expansive theological agendas such 
as 1 John 4:2, 2 John 4:7, 1 Timothy 3:16, and 1 Peter 3:18 and 4:1.  
Therefore, in this chapter I will closely examine the Gospel of John’s use of the 
term σάρξ as well as these other passages. Throughout, I will attempt to show how 
understanding σάρξ influences how we understand the Incarnation. Because σάρξ carries 
a wider semantic range than being a synonym for human, it could very well be that there 
is strong biblical precedent for seeing the Incarnation in broad terms, and doing so 
precisely from the particularity of σάρξ. But I think it is crucial to remember the Jewish 
roots of “flesh” since divorcing the term from the story of Israel can lead to the opposite 
of respect for life. 
Hermeneutics 
In this chapter I offer readings of various biblical passages. Although I engage 
with historical-critical scholarship, my readings are not bound to these methodologies, 
which sometimes maintain that I must base my readings in what the author originally 
intended or what the original audience must have heard. Modern interpreters who posit an 
authorial intention in the text of the Gospel of John do not agree: which original “author” 
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I choose would seem to depend my own inclinations asmore than on actual fact. Roland 
Barthes announced the death of the author several decades ago. For Barthes, this absence 
frees the text from the contraints of elite scholars.111  
Nevertheless, Barthes may have exaggerated his claims and assessed the author’s 
role too negatively. In response to Barthes, Michel Foucault argues that the author is 
never absent from a text. Authors function in a variety of ways within our discourses. But 
authors always limit interpretation: they use specific genres, employ specific literary 
devices, and write within specific social settings. One authorial function, according to 
Foucault, is as “founders of discursivity.”112 Foucault maintains that Freud, Marx, and 
Engels were not just authors of specific books but also “established an endless possibility 
of discourse.”113 These authors made possible a range of discussions that align with or 
differe from their thinking. Even the differences belong to the discourses that these 
authors founded. They make it possible to diverge from their thinking within the specific 
discourse they founded. For example, Freud founded psychoanalytical discourse. 
Subsequent generations function within this pyschoanalytical discourse even when 
concepts of libido or dream analysis are absent from laer authors’ works.114 
Foucault argues that expanding a specific discourse does not transform the 
discourse a generic form that disrespects the texts. Rather, discursive expansion opens the 
discourse “to a certain number of possible applications. To limit psychoanalysis as a type 
of discursivity is, in reality, to try to isolate in the founding act an eventually restricted 
                                                
111 See Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image-Music-Text (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1977), 142–49. 
112 Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author?” in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-
Structuralist Criticism edited by Josue V. Harari (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 154. 
113 Ibid. 
114 See ibid., 155. 
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number of propositions or statements to which, alone, one grants a founding value, and in 
relation to which certain concepts or theories accepted by Freud might be considered as 
derived, secondary, or accessory.”115 According to Foucault, we do not say that Freud’s 
statements are “false” and therefore dismiss his texts. Rather we set aside and explain 
some statements regardless of their current acceptability. We still use Freud’s work. 
Foucault calls this a “return to the origin,” which is part of the discourse and will modify 
our current discussions. 
Foucault’s analysis of the “author-function” fits well with my reading  of 
Scripture. The author still lurks withing the anonymously authored Gospel of John. This 
Gospel has founded an enormously influential discourse about God.  For instance, the 
Gospel of John’s statement that the Word became flesh has been a theological bedrock in 
Christian history. In one of his catechetical addresses, Pope John Paul II stated that, 
“Truly, we are at the central and decisive point of our profession of faith here: ‘The Word 
became flesh and came to dwell among us.’”116 The idea of the Word becoming flesh has 
created a discourse in itself. Returning to the Gospel text to re-examine this “central and 
decisive” idea is an essential part of the discussion. 
But, as Foucault ably demonstrates, the field of discourse is bound to develop 
beyond simply restating and repeating statements from the Gospel. Sometimes we 
develop ideas that diverge from the Gospel but in the divergence are still within the 
Johannine field of discourse, or more broadly within Christian theological discourse. But 
my reading does not really seek to diverge so much as to expand the Gospel’s horizon. In 
                                                
115 Ibid., 156. 
116 Pope John Paul II, “The Prologue of John's Gospel Synthesizes the Faith of the Apostolic 
Church,”  (June 3, 1987), 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/audiences/alpha/data/aud19870603en.html. (Accessed 
November 8, 2015). 
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Christian discourse, the usual way to speak about the Word becoming flesh has been to 
equate “flesh” with “humanity” or, even more narrowly, to “man.” I will broaden rather 
than narrow the meaning of flesh.  
I do not claim that the following reading is based in the “authorial intentions” of 
the author of John’s Gospel. The Jesus of John’s Gospel shows little interest in other 
animals. Nevertheless, the trajectory of theological discourse that this Gospel sets into 
motion may expand in a direction that makes other animals essential to the discussion. 
Furthermore, we may expand this discussion by returning to the text and re-reading it in 
light of our own questions.  
The text shows us a horizon and therefore limits inerpretive possibilities to some 
degree. Again Foucault is insightful: “The author is not an indefinite source of 
significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the works, he is a certain 
functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, 
by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, 
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction.”117 The author is a “necessary or 
constraining figure.”118 My reading respects this constraint. My reading also sees 
discurive trajectories set into mostion by the Gospel. So I push the theological vision of 
the Gospel of John into different areas. In short, my reading of the texts and my 
hermeneutical assumptions sit within a specific way of seeing texts and authors within 
postmodernity that does not simply discard authors and meaning, but also uses those texts 
to say new things. This is the way Christians have often used Scripture in practice as we 
preach and relate them to everyday life. 
                                                
117 Ibid., 159. 
118 Ibid. 
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The Gospel of John 
The Prologue: The Word Became Flesh 
The Gospel of John introduces the Incarnation in the prologue (1:1–18). Many 
studies on John’s Gospel have argued that this prologue is not a mere opening for the 
narrative. The prologue pervades the entire Gospel narrative as the story repeatedly 
circles back to the opening. John’s prologue sets up a narrative world: a time (the 
beginning), a place (the world), and the setting (among us). All the major characters in 
the Gospel narrative exist within this narrative world that the prologue establishes. 
Compared to Luke’s preface, which is outside the narrative structure, John’s prologue is 
an essential part of the narrative.   
John’s prologue provides a thematic overview to the Gospel, setting out some of 
the Gospel’s major themes: light and darkness; sending; witness; the world; authority; 
rebirth; enfleshment; glory; truth; and revelation. Some important terms in the prologue 
do not appear in the rest of the Gospel, indicating that it likely originated as an early 
hymn within the Johannine community.119 Whatever its origins, however, the Gospel of 
John uses the prologue as a starting place for the story that follows. The prologue is a 
beginning point that is repeatedly re-evaluated by what unfolds in the narrative 
                                                
119 Tightly reasoned, the prologue contains some theological terms that do not appear elsewhere, 
for example, “Word,” “fullness,” “only son,” and “tabernacle.” This has led some scholars to suggest 
another editor added it later. See J. A. T. Robinson, “The Relation of the Prologue to the Gospel of St. John 
“ New Testament Studies 9 (1962–63): 120–29. Ernst Käsemann maintains that the prologue originated 
with Christians outside the Johannine community, and the evangelist incorporated it into the Gospel. See 
Ernst Käsemann, “The Structure and Purpose of the Prologue to John's Gospel,” in New Testament 
Questions of Today (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969), 138–67. More recently, Ben Witherington has 
contended that the hymn is in the style of Jewish wisdom literature. See Witherington, John's Wisdom: A 
Commentary on the Fourth Gospel, 47–58. Regardless of the prologue’s origins, however, the final form in 
the Gospel represents the Johannine reflection on the divinity and Incarnation of the Son in Jesus Christ. 
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sequence.120 The idea that the divine λόγος, who has an intimate relationship with God 
and is God, enters into the creaturely realm to forge intimate relationships within the 
created order pervades the Fourth Gospel. Many commentators see John 1:14 as the high 
point of the prologue: “the Word became flesh (ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο).” The Incarnation 
is something to which the Gospel returns over and over, a theme that makes sense of the 
entire book.  
The Λόγος Rooted in Hebrew Scriptures 
The λόγος has at least four main semantic domains derived from the Hebrew 
Bible, the Gospel’s narrative world. First, the idea connects to the creation narrative in 
Genesis 1 (see also Psalm 34:6). John’s Gospel opens with the same words that the 
Septuagint uses in Genesis 1: Ἐν ἀρχῇ (“In the beginning”). In the well-balanced 
symmetry and movement of Genesis 1, at the beginning of each day of the first week God 
speaks all things into existence (Καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός — LXX), names each thing, tells each 
thing where it belongs, and blesses each thing that God makes. From the initial chaotic 
waters, God makes order, beauty, goodness, lushness, and diversity. On the fifth day God 
creates water creatures and birds that fly through the air. They teem with life. On the 
sixth day God creates land animals and humans.  
Alluding to the narrative world of Genesis 1, the divine λόγος in John’s Gospel 
provides the foundation for all that exists, causes all creatures to flourish, and is the 
source of all that is good. The prologue takes the idea of God speaking things into 
                                                
120 Following the narrative reader-response hermeneutic of Jeff Staley, The Print's First Kiss: A 
Rhetorical Investigation of the Implied Reader in the Fourth Gospel (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988). 
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existence and uses the term λόγος in a different semantic field by giving it its own 
existence. But Genesis 1:1 seems to fit well as for intertextual reading with John 1. 
Against this reading, Norman Habel suggests that the prologue has an anemic 
view of creation compared to Genesis 1, which lavishly describes creation and declares 
everything to be “very good.”121 In contrast to Genesis 1, where the earth brings forth life 
of all kinds, the prologue, according to Habel’s reading, says that the Word—not the 
earth—creates all things, negating the earth’s role in creation and reducing the lavish 
diversity of creation to one word (πάντα in Greek). Therefore, Habel claims that Genesis 
1 and John 1 have “two discrete subjects as the sources or agents of life.”122  
Habel argues that John’s prologue replaces Genesis 1. Rather than replace 
Genesis 1, however, we can just as easily read John 1 as presupposes Genesis 1. The 
Fourth Gospel does not need to repeat the details of Genesis 1. Instead, John sums up the 
account by referring to “all things”  that have been created (John 1:3). The evangelist 
reads Genesis 1 in light of the story he is about to tell about Jesus. Jesus is the one 
through whom all things all things are created. “All things” is a reference to the 
lavishness of Genesis 1. John does not discount the role of the earth in bringing forth 
other creatures. Rather, the evangelist highlights the part of Genesis 1 in which God’s 
word is the primary mover in the narrative. The earth brings forth other creatures only 
because God first verbally summons the earth to do so. That λόγος is Jesus in John’s 
Gospel.123  
                                                
121 Habel, “An Ecojustice Challenge: Is Earth Valued in John 1?,” 78. 
122 Ibid., 79.  
123 Regardless of whether one chooses to follow Habel or not, even Habel agrees that Genesis 1 
provides a background for reading John’s prologue, which is the main point I am making at present. 
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The second Hebrew domain for reading λόγος is the foundational events in 
Israel’s history: the call and promise to Abraham; giving Jacob a new name, Israel; 
telling Moses the divine name and liberating Israel from slavery; giving the Torah at 
Mount Sinai; and the prophets who speak God’s word of judgment and salvation. God’s 
word in the prophets purifies (Mal 3:2–4), renews the covenant (Jer 31:31–34), and 
consoles the suffering (Isa 40:1–11). As in the creation story, God’s word brings life: As 
the prophet Ezekiel looks into a valley of death and destruction, God speaks and long 
dead skeletons begin to rattle, flesh starts to re-form upon them again, and breath enters 
them as they hear “the word of the Lord” (ἀκούσατε λόγον κυρίου — Ezek 37:1–14).  
The λόγος that judges and saves pervades John’s Gospel. The word that judges 
and saves in Hebrew Scriptures has become incarnate in John’s Gospel. In the Hebrew 
Bible the λόγος κυρίου or λόγος θεοῦ (LXX) comes to specific prophets at specific times 
with specific messages. The typical phrase in the LXX— “the word of the Lord came to” 
(καὶ ἐγένετο λόγος κυρίου πρός, e.g., Ezek 21:1 in the LXX)—almost suggests a divine 
visitation. Psalm 33:4, 6 suggest that the λόγος κυρίου has personal characteristics and a 
role in creation: “For the word of the Lord is upright, and all his work is done in 
faithfulness. . . . By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and all their host by the 
breath of his mouth.” But John’s prologue takes the idea of the λόγος a step further: 
rather than a message coming to a prophet the message and the messenger become the 
same.  
58 
 
The third Jewish field for the divine λόγος comes from the wisdom tradition.124 
Raymond E. Brown sees Wisdom personified in the Hebrew Bible as the key influence 
on John’s Gospel. In Wisdom literature, σοφία parallels the λόγος of John’s prologue in 
the following ways: σοφία pre-existed the created order (Prov 8:22–23; Sir 1:4; Wis 9:9; 
cf. John 1:1), was “with God” (Prov 8:30; Sir 1:1; Wis 9:4), actively participated in 
creating all things (Prov 8:27–30; Wis 7:22; and 9:9), reflects God’s glory (Wis 7:25–26), 
is the light and life of the world (Prov 4:18–19, 8:35; and Bar 4:1), enjoys human 
company (Prov 8:31), dwells with humans (Sir 24:8), has grace (Sir 24:16), but some 
reject Wisdom (Sir 15:7 and Bar 3:12). Brown concludes his study by stating that there 
are therefore “good parallels for almost every detail of the prologue’s descriptions of the 
Word.”125 The Wisdom tradition sometimes even uses σοφία and λόγος as synonyms as 
in Wisdom 9:1–2.  
Connecting John’s prologue to Jewish Wisdom literature is nothing new. Already 
in the third century, Origen said that “just as we have learned in what sense wisdom is the 
‘beginning of the ways’ of God and is said to have been created, in the sense, namely, 
that she fashions beforehand and contains within herself the species and causes of the 
entire creation, in the same manner also must wisdom be understood to the Word of God. 
For wisdom opens to all other beings, that is, to the whole creation, the meaning of the 
                                                
124 Celia Deane-Drummond has used “wisdom” to great effect in her treatment of theology and 
evolution. Although she uses the idea of Wisdom in a great many writings, see in particular Deane-
Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom.  
125 Brown, The Gospel according to John, I–XII, 523. See also and Martin Scott, Sophia and the 
Johannine Jesus (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992). Scott acknowledges the similarities and the 
differences between the Wisdom tradition and the prologue, stating, “While we cannot quote a direct 
parallel from any sayings of the Wisdom school, we can nevertheless see that 1:14a stands at the end point 
of a line which stretches back to its origins in the Wisdom tradition.” See ibid., 105. Scott thinks that the 
λόγος of the prologue, which becomes incarnate, is the next stage in a development of the Wisdom 
tradition. Rather than a logical step in the Wisdom tradition, it might be better to speak about the prologue 
offering a commentary or reflection on the tradition that does its own reinterpretation. 
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mysteries and secrets which are contained within the wisdom of God, and so she is called 
the Word, because she is the interpreter of the mind’s secrets.”126 Likewise, Augustine, 
citing the Psalms, claimed that Jesus is “the Wisdom of God” that created all things.127  
But John does not use σοφία but λόγος. Brown and others have given several 
plausible reasons that John’s Gospel uses the masculine noun λόγος in place of the 
feminine noun σοφία. James D. G. Dunn summarizes the reasons: “The concept ‘Word’ 
is given preference over ‘Wisdom,’ perhaps simply because the masculine concept 
seemed more appropriate, but probably mainly because ‘Word’ was the more serviceable 
concept to provide a bridge of communication between Jewish monotheism and Greek 
religious philosophy (as with Philo).”128  
Daniel Boyarin makes a convincing case that there was a “binitarianism” 
circulating in Jewish circles around the time of Jesus and Paul. In his view of the λόγος, 
Philo drew from a Jewish tradition that had absorbed Greek philosophy in such a way 
that one cannot legitimately tell the difference between what is Greek and what is Jewish. 
Philo, Boyarin argues, “oscillates on the point of the ambiguity between separate 
existence of the Logos, God’s Son, and its total incorporation within the godhead. If 
                                                
126 Origen, On First Principles, trans. G.W. Butterworth (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 
1.2.3, p. 16. 
127 See Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1988), 1.16.1, p. 55. 
128 James D. G. Dunn, “Christology (NT),” in The Anchor Bible Dictionary (New York: 
Doubleday, 1992), 987. Others see the change from σοφία to λόγος as already beginning in the Hebrew 
Bible. Craig Evans states that “there is an explicit movement from sophia to logos . . . Wisdom of Solomon 
begins with sophia (Wisdom 1.4; 9.4), it concludes with ὁ λόγος which leaped out of heaven to punish the 
Egyptians.” See Craig Evans, Word and Glory: On the Exegetical and Theological Background of John's 
Prologue (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 109. 
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Philo is not on the road to Damascus here, he is surely on a way that leads to Nicaea and 
the controversies over the second person of the Trinity.”129 
Philo was not an isolated person with esoteric views, nor was he a “Hellenized” 
Jew in distinction from Palestinian Jews. Boyarin demonstrates that the “Memra of God” 
held the same place for Semitic Jews as Greek-speaking ones. He quotes Alfred 
Edersheim stating that “And yet, if words have any meaning, the Memra is a hypostasis,” 
that is, has its own personal identity alongside YHWH.130 These non-rabbinic forms of 
Jewish faith call into question any sharp divisions we might be tempted to make between 
“Christians” and “Jews” at that time. These are simply later constructions, the result of an 
unfortunate split that was far from inevitable. 
Finally, Jewish reflections on the Torah provide another field of meaning within 
which the prologue’s λόγος functions. The Wisdom tradition already connected wisdom 
with the Torah. Sirach 24:1–24 starts with Wisdom, moving to the idea that she “comes 
forth from the mouth of the Most High” (24:3), and then connects Wisdom to “the law 
that Moses commanded us” in verse 23. Connecting σοφία, λόγος, and νόµος (Torah) is 
common in the Septuagint, according to Naomi Cohen. She provides numerous examples 
where the Septuagint uses the term λόγος to mean Torah, for example, Exodus 20:1; 
35:1; Deuteronomy 9:10; 10:4; and Leviticus 8:36.131 As part of the implicit background 
for the λόγος in John’s prologue, we have yet another deep Jewish root for the Gospel, 
but another one that the Fourth Gospel builds upon rather than simply accepts as is.  
                                                
129 Daniel Boyarin, “The Gospel of the Memra: Jewish Binitarianism and the Crucifixion of the 
Logos,” Harvard Theological Review 94, no. 3 (2001): 251. 
130 Ibid., 254. 
131 See Naomi Cohen, Philo Judaeus: His Universe of Discourse (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1995), 
179–80. 
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The reason I have belabored this point about the λόγος and the Hebrew Bible is to 
emphasize the Jewish roots of John’s Gospel because this is important for how we read 
the term σάρξ later. I want to establish a strong Jewish milieu for the Gospel. This Jewish 
tradition is not simply one among many possible lenses through which to read the 
Gospel, but a very plausible lens given the importance of God’s Word in Hebrew 
thought. 
A Narrative Reading 
The prologue unfolds sequentially. Starting with the first verses, we learn more 
and more information about the λόγος, constantly inviting us to rethink what we “know” 
about the λόγος. With each verse the focus narrows from the cosmic origins in the first 
verses to more and more specific aspects until we finally reach the name Jesus Christ in 
1:17. Between the λόγος in verse 1 and Jesus Christ in verse 17 we learn that “all things” 
are created through the λόγος, who gives all things life and light that sustains them (1:3–
5), and that the λόγος was not recognized by “the world” (ὁ κόσµος)—but those who do 
recognize him relate to God in a new way (1:12–13)—has entered the created order in 
material form and has revealed God in this created world (1:14, 16–18), and that grace 
and truth come through the man Jesus Christ, who is “the Word became flesh (ὁ λόγος 
σὰρξ ἐγένετο).” So the final verse of the prologue circles back to the first in which the 
Son, who has an intimate relationship to the Father, turns toward the world and in so 
doing reveals God’s nature (1:18). 
The prologue’s focus keeps narrowing. The λόγος is the one through whom “all 
things” (πάντα) are created in verse 3. As already noted, this is a way of summarizing the 
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lavish, detailed account of Genesis 1. “All things” is the most comprehensive statement 
about what has been created through the λόγος.  
Verse 6 claims that God had already sent “a human” (ἄνθρωπος) named John who 
witnessed to the “light” (φῶς)—the φῶς equated with the divine λόγος.132 This light 
“which enlightens every human” (ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον) “was coming into the 
world” (ἐρχόµενον εἰς τὸν κόσµον—John 1:9), that is, into the creaturely realm created 
through the divine λόγος.133 The juxtaposition of light and darkness could be read in 
dualistic terms of two opposing forces, but given the supremacy of light being associated 
with the  λόγος that would be a misreading. If this passage hearkens back to Genesis 1, 
darkness itself is under divine control, being named “night.” Theologically speaking, 
darkness is created as well and as God’s creation must be good. We need a little darkness 
on this earth. Looking directly into the sun can blind. Our eyes need the contrast between 
darkness and light. John contrasts light with darness, but this contrast does not signal a 
fundamental binary in which light is good and darkness per se is evil. In people’s 
                                                
132 Habel argues that whereas Genesis 1 describes light and darkness as complementary forces 
within creation, with light giving its rays to all creatures, John’s prologue spiritualizes light and darkness 
and makes them into opposing forces, devaluing them as natural elements. Habel, “An Ecojustice 
Challenge: Is Earth Valued in John 1?,” 79. Clearly the Gospel of John uses darkness and light as images of 
spiritual realities. Yet I am not convinced that because the Gospel does this that it devalues creation as a 
whole and makes gnostic-like claims about creation. Darkness and light function in the Gospel’s language 
not as natural elements that are evil, but as lenses through which to see a spiritual reality where wisdom, 
Torah, and ultimately Jesus Christ bring much needed relief to creation as a whole. Merely by using the 
word κόσµος, which often but not always refers to human systems of power, the evangelist reminds us that 
humans are but one mere part of the created order. 
133 I am here taking ἐρχόµενον as agreeing with φῶς as does the NRSV. Ernst Haenchen, however, 
takes the phrase ἐρχόµενον εἰς τὸν κόσµον as referring to “every man,” explaining that in early Judaism 
“every one coming into the world” was synonymous with “every one.” See Ernst Haenchen, A Commentary 
on the Gospel of John (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 117. Peder Borgen acknowledges that there are 
some rabbinic parallels in Hebrew, though they are not exact, but he ultimately rejects them for interpreting 
John because John’s Gospel as a whole makes it clear that it is the coming of the light that is intended (3:19 
and 12:46). See Peder Borgen, “Logos Was the True Light”: The True Light and Other Essays on the 
Gospel of John (Trondheim: Tapir Publishers, 1983), 102–103. Given that most people would have heard 
this text rather than read it and therefore would not have had time to debate the intricacies of the grammar, 
and given Borden’s observation that the light comes into the world in 3:19 and 12:46, Borden’s reading, 
supported by the NRSV, seems best. Barth follows this reading as well in Karl Barth, Witness to the Word: 
A Commentary on John 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 59–60. 
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everyday experience of day and night, light, according to the Gospel, allows “all” (John 
1:9) to see what they would not otherwise be able to see (John 11:9–10). In the final 
chapter, I will argue that prologue allows us to se some very specific things about 
creation and humanity in relationship to the divine λόγος that undercuts some of our most 
cherished self-definitions.  
But for now, it is enough to note that the prologue has moved from an utterly 
cosmic scope at the beginning of all things, to a narrower picture in which the λόγος is 
entering into the κόσµος. The term κόσµος is a narrower term than πάντα in verse three. 
Whereas πάντα signifies a creation-wide statement, κόσµος in verses 9 and 10 more 
likely refers to “the world beneath the sky, excluding the heavens where God dwells.”134  
The Fourth Gospel uses the term κόσµος seventy-eight times. Four of these are in 
John 1:9–10. Raymond Brown suggests that the Johannine literature uses the term with 
three areas of meaning: 1) cosmic order; 2) creation able to respond to God; and 3) 
human society.135 In the prologue, the first three uses of κόσµος have positive 
connotations. “The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into the world” 
(John 1:9) shows the κόσµος as receiving the Light’s attention and being a bearer of light. 
“He was in the world” (1:10a) once again demonstrates a positive use in that the Light 
wills to be in the world. The meaning of κόσµος seems to be Earth. “The world came into 
being through him” (1:10b) is yet another positive association in that the κόσµος is 
created through the λόγος and φῶς, which are good. Again, the meaning of κόσµος seems 
to be the terrestrial planet we inhabit. The final use in the prologue, “yet the world did not 
know him” (1:10c) has different connotations. This is the first time the κόσµος acts on its 
                                                
134 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 162–63. 
135 See Brown, The Gospel according to John, I–XII, 508.  
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own, rather than receiving action from the φῶς. When the κόσµος neglects its Creator it 
fails miserably. Yet the prologue may not expect the world to recognize the λόγος at all 
since it is in darkness. The idea in this fourth use of κόσµος in the prologue suggests the 
text has in view human society.136 But the second and third instances have broader 
implications given that the prologue has spoken about “all things” having been created 
through the λόγος.137  
The overarching idea in John 1:9–10 seems to be that the Creator will enter into 
creation, and perhaps even more specifically, that the Creator is coming to Earth. The 
Creator will become a particular creature, but the prologue moves slowly, steadily 
narrowing to a particular focus. Here the purview seems wider when the evangelist uses 
the term κόσµος, with the first three uses denoting earthly creaturely reality at large and 
the fourth possibly zeroing in on human society. 
Then in John 1:14, the author repeats the idea of the Word entering creation in the 
starkest of terms by unambiguously stating that the divine λόγος has become flesh: ὁ 
λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. The Gospel seems to use the word σὰρξ very deliberately. The text 
does not say that the Word became “human” (ὁ λόγος ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο). To say the 
                                                
136 By restricting the κόσµος in this fourth use to human society I am not denying that nonhuman 
animals need redemption or can be moral. We know that dolphins, chimpanzees, wolves, and a great many 
other creatures have a sense of fairness, forgiveness, trust, and cooperation. See Marc Bekoff and Jessica 
Pierce, Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009); Frans 
de Waal, Peacemaking among Primates (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Mark 
Rowlands, Can Animals Be Moral? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), and for theological 
treatments see Celia Deane-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral? Taking Soundings through Vice, Virtue, 
Conscience and Imago Dei,” in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, ed. Celia 
Deane-Drummond and David Clough (London: SCM Press, 2009), and Clough, On Animals, 105–119. I 
suppose it would not be utterly impossible to stretch the meaning to include nonhuman animals here in the 
prologue, but I think that κόσµος probably signals human society because the narrative to follow places the 
inability to recognize God in Jesus squarely with humans.  
137 Karl Barth also sees a distinction in the different uses of κόσµος in verse 9. Barth says that 
κόσµος has three meanings in John: 1) “The sum of all created things”; 2) a creature that shuts itself off 
from God; and 3) the human world. He thinks that the first two uses of κόσµος in verse 10 follow meaning 
1, but the final use has number 3 in view. See Barth, Witness to the Word, 63–64. See also the analysis of 
κόσµος in the Gospel in Brown, The Gospel according to John, I–XII, 508–509. 
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“Word became human” is too narrow for the moment. Yet the term σάρξ fits with the 
unfolding sequential narrative from a wide panoramic view to focus and refocus to 
particulars. 
“Flesh” Rooted in the Hebrew Bible 
In the prologue, the word “flesh” (σάρξ) appears twice in close proximity. In its 
narrative context within the prologue the second use of σάρξ refers to “Jesus Christ” 
(1:17). The prologue makes a particular claim about Jesus, namely, that he is “the Word 
became flesh.” John’s prologue is rich with scriptural allusion, as I already established by 
looking at the scriptural domains in Hebrew Scriptures for the term λόγος. Indeed, the 
Hebrew Bible provides the principal background for the Johannine literature.138 Just as 
the primary semantic background for λόγος lies in numerous Jewish scriptures, so too 
does the term σάρξ.  
Σάρξ in verse 14 seems to parallel the κόσµος in verse 9. That is, σάρξ represents 
a broader sphere than the merely human. But σάρξ is less broad than speaking about the 
κόσµος as a whole. Such a use of σάρξ comports with the rich allusions to Jewish 
scriptures in the prologue and Gospel. The Greek term σάρξ connects to the Hebrew term 
רָשָׂבּ, which the Hebrew Bible often uses for all living creatures. The Fourth Gospel shows 
influence from both the LXX and a Hebrew version of the Bible, making it necessary to 
                                                
138 See the summary in Raymond Brown, An Introduction to the Gospel of John (New York: 
Doubleday, 2003), 132. Though the Gospel of John contains fewer direct quotations from the Hebrew Bible 
than the Synoptic Gospels, John’s Gospel has more allusions to that literature than the Synoptics. François-
Marie Braun has shown that John’s Gospel reflects the great currents of Hebrew thought even more clearly 
than the Synoptics. See François-Marie Braun, Jean le Théologien: Les Grandes Traditions d'Israel et 
l'Accord des Éscritures selon le Quatrième Evangile, vol. 2 (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1964), 23–45. See also 
Martin Hengel’s comment: The prologue to John’s Gospel, Hengel says, “relates the entire salvation 
history from the very beginning ἐν ἀρχῆ bere šît to the Epiphany of the Logos ἔνσαρκος in the present.” 
Martin Hengel, “The Old Testament in the Fourth Gospel,” in The Gospels and the Scriptures of Israel, ed. 
William Stegner and Craig Evans (Sheffiled: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 386. 
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look at both the Greek and the Hebrew for “flesh.”139 The phrase רָשָׂבּ־לָכּ has particular 
importance. God decides to destroy “all flesh” in a flood (Gen 6.13) and then, after the 
Flood, makes a covenant with “all flesh” (9:17). Jeremiah announced that God is lord of 
“all flesh” (Jer 32.27), while the Psalmist proclaimed that God gives food to “all flesh” 
(Ps 136:25).140 
That the “Word becomes flesh” may also reflect deeper scriptural themes about 
the interconnectedness of animal life in particular. According to Genesis, the waters 
produce creatures that live there (Gen 1:20). The earth produces land creatures of every 
kind (Gen 1:24). God is said to have made them, but they come from their habitat. They 
have deep roots in the places they live. Yet after the water and earth initially produce 
these creatures, they are blessed and told to “be fruitful and multiply.” Initiailly, they 
come from their habitat. Thereafter, however, these animals produce each other. Humans 
are the same. God forms the first man out of the dust of the ground. Humans come from 
the same earth as other animals. But after this God creates the first woman from the first 
man, and subsequent generations of humans come from human procreation rather than 
from new creations out of the earth.  
In Genesis 1:11–12, the earth also produces the plant life that sustains humanity 
and all land animals. Unlike animal and human life, however, plant life continues to 
come from the earth. That God tells humans and other animals to eat a plant-based diet 
continues to connect humans and other animals to the earth. It is through our diet that we 
                                                
139 For instance, Maarten Menken shows that while several scriptural quotes align with the LXX or 
another Greek version others seem to come from the Hebrew version. See Maarten J. J. Menken, Old 
Testament Quotations in the Fourth Gospel (Kampen: Kok, 1996), 99–122 and 171–72. 
140 The phrase “all flesh” occurs throughout the Bible to refer to more than just humans: Genesis 
6:12, 13, 17, 19; 7:15, 16, 2; 8:17; 9:11, 15, 16, 17; Leviticus 4:11; Numbers 16:22; 27:16; Deuteronomy 
5:26; Job 34:15; Psalm 65:2; 136:25; 145:21; Isaiah 49:26; 66:16, 23, 24; Jeremiah 25:31; 32:27; 45:5; 
Ezekiel 20:48; 21:4; 21:5; and Joel 2:28. 
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continue the deep interconnectedness. While maintaining peaceable relations amongst 
animal and human life. Our bodies regenerate our cells because of the food we eat. By 
sticking close to the earth through eating a plant-based diet, Genesis keeps humans and 
other animals rooted in the earth. A peaceable interconnectedness seems written into 
animal flesh from a biblical perspective. 
Hebrew Scriptures also uses “earthy” language for the human body. The human 
body comes from earth and dust and will inevitably become earth and dust again (Job 
21:23–26; Ps 49). The existence of humans is dust (Job 7:21; 10:9; 34:14–15; Ps 90:3; 
104:29; Sir 33:10). Humans share dusty bodies with other animals. Genesis depicts 
nonhuman animals as created by God’s word and the earth’s response to God’s command 
to the earth to “bring forth living creatures of every kind” (Gen 1:24).141  
The creation stories also describe nonhuman animals with the same terms as 
humans: we are all שֶֶׁפנ (for animals see Gen 1:20–24; 2:19; 9:10, 15; for humans see Gen 
2:7; 9:5). All animals have blood and it is in this blood that Hebrew Scriptures say is life. 
Even after God consents to humans eating other animals in Genesis 9, we are still 
forbidden to take in blood. When we add that nonhuman land animals were created on the 
same day as other humans, it is hard to avoid any other conclusion than that Genesis 
envisions other land animals as having very close proximity to humans.142  
Hebrew Scriptures frequently use the term רָשָׂבּ to refer to animal bodies. The 
termרָשָׂבּ refers to cows (Gen 41:2), to oxen (Exod 21:28; 1 Kgs 19:21; Isa 22:13), to 
horses (Isa 31:3), to sheep (Isa 22:13), to pigs (Isa 65:4 and 66:17), to rodents (Isa 66:17), 
                                                
141 Strikingly, nonhuman animals were here first, this place is their home, and God blessed them 
and calls them “good.” God also commands waters to bring forth creatures in Genesis 1:20. 
142 On this idea see Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 
34. 
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to a crocodile or Leviathan (Job 41:23), and to quails (Num. 11:33). The term can also 
refer to nonhuman animals in general (Gen 7:15 or Deut 14:8). So while the term רָשָׂבּ can 
certainly refer to humans (Exod 30:32; 1 Kgs 21:27; Ps 78:39; Isa 63:2), it refers both to 
specific nonhuman animals, to nonhuman animals in general, and to all living animals, 
humans included (Gen 6:17, 19; 7:21; 9:11, 15, 16, 17; Lev 17:14; Num 18:15; Job 
34:15; and Ps 136:25). Hans Walter Wolff has shown that of the 273 occurrences of רָשָׂבּ 
in the Tanak, 104 refer to nonhuman animals.143  
The Septuagint often translates רָשָׂבּ with σάρξ. Of the 267 occurrences of רָשָׂבּ in 
the Hebrew Scriptures that the Septuagint translates, σάρξ is used 146 times.144 For 
example, Psalm 136:25 says that God “gives food to all flesh” (רָשָׂבּ־לָכּ). The Septuagint 
uses πάσῃ σαρκί to translate רָשָׂבּ־לָכּ (Ps 135:6 in the LXX). So the Septuagint used σάρξ 
in the same way the Hebrew Bible used רָשָׂבּ: to refer to both human and nonhuman 
animals, collectively or individually. 
So within one Jewish scriptural use, σάρξ has to do with having a common 
creaturely origin in the earth and soil and having a common destiny to return to dust. Our 
bodies are tied up with certain “spiritual” elements that enliven us and make us move 
around. Moreover, we are originally meant to live on a plant-based diet like all other 
animals, which keeps us connected to the earth. We have all of this in common with other 
animals according to the Hebrew Scriptures.  
Taking on human flesh does not mean other flesh must necessarily be set aside as 
unimportant. Indeed, there is a strong current in the Bible that uses the term “flesh” in 
                                                
143 Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 
26. 
144 Daniel Lys, “L'Arrière-Plan et les Connotations Vétérotestamentaires de Sarx et de Sōma: 
Étude Préliminaire,” Vetus Testamentum 36, no. 2 (1986): 170. 
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such a way as to level out creaturely existence among all animals. The basic stance before 
God of all that exists is that of creation. By referring to all that we know about “creation” 
as distinct from God, the prologue affirms what Colin Gunton calls, “the homogeneity of 
the created order.”145 When “the Word became flesh” the Word assumed a human flesh 
that has lots in common with the flesh of other types of creatures, an idea that has 
resonance within the Hebrew Bible. Using this Jewish scriptural background helps to 
keep us from making anthropocentric assumptions about the Incarnation.  
The divine Word has come “into the world” and has become “flesh” and this 
points directly to a particular kind of flesh. The λόγος cannot enter the κόσµος except in 
some particular way. Nor can the Word become σάρξ in a generic sense. While σάρξ has 
broad implications, enfleshment can only be as a particular kind of creature. The 
prologue clearly makes the claim that Jesus Christ is the enfleshment of the divine Word 
(1:17). So while there is a wider meaning to the term “flesh” rooted in ancient Jewish 
literature, the prologue moves to making a particular claim about Jesus. 
Sinful Flesh 
Karl Barth argues for a significant particularity to the prologue’s use of σάρξ. On 
the one hand, he says that σάρξ in 1:14 “simply denotes the vital animal nature.”146 
Becoming flesh obviously means taking on these general characteristics, according to 
                                                
145 Colin Gunton, “The End of Causality? The Reformers and their Predecessors,” in The Doctrine 
of Creation, ed. Colin Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 76. The idea of ontological homogeneity is 
by no means confined to Gunton. For example, philosopher William Desmond writes, “The notion of God 
as creator gives articulation to this ontological dependency of finite being as a whole.” See William 
Desmond, God and the Between (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 251. 
146 Barth, Witness to the Word, 87. 
70 
 
Barth. The Word becomes human in general, for example.147 However, in Barth’s 
reading, the reason the evangelist uses σάρξ has to do with humanity in its fallen state. 
Simply becoming human was not enough. The Word has to become part of weak and 
sinful humanity.148 This is the reason the evangelist uses σάρξ rather than another 
theologically rich word such as ἄνθρωπος, ἀνήρ, or σῶµα. The Word does not take on 
just any flesh. The Word takes on the flesh that characterizes humans in their sinfulness. 
The λόγος assumes this sinful flesh in order to save it. 
In Church Dogmatics IV/1, Barth calls upon the Hebrew Scriptures as witness to 
his interpretation of John 1:14, stating that “the Old Testament testifies pitilessly what is 
meant by ‘flesh.’”149 But he neither backs up his statement with examples nor analyzes 
the Tanak’s use of “flesh” at all. Hebrew Scriptures definitely use רָשָׂבּ in ways that 
suggests weakness and the fleetingness of all life. For example, Isaiah 40:6–8 says: “All 
flesh (רָשָׂבּ־לָכּ) is grass, and all its beauty is like the flower of the field. The grass withers, 
the flower fades when the breath of the Lord blows on it; surely the people are grass. The 
grass withers, the flower fades, but the word of our God will stand forever” (ESV 
translation).150 I have cited numerous verses in my analysis above that speak about the 
fleetingness of life in general here on Earth. But the Hebrew Bible also uses רָשָׂבּ/σάρξ in 
a fairly wide sense, and does not make a particular claim about humans alone. 
Recognizing this, some theologians have claimed that nonhuman animals sin and 
therefore need salvation. Following Barth’s reading that σάρξ makes a particular claim 
                                                
147 “That the Word became a man is not the primary issue. Nor is it the point that the Word 
assumed human nature in general, although this is also included.” Ibid., 88, emphasis mine. 
148 See ibid., 88–89. 
149 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1, 171. 
150 Some English versions translate רָשָׂבּ־לָכּ as “all people” covering up the wider semantic range of 
the Hebrew. 
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about Jesus’s sinful flesh, Clough tries to show that nonhuman animals can sin. He points 
out that in Genesis 6 God sent a flood in response to the violence that “all flesh” had 
perpetrated. God made a covenant with the nonhuman animals and makes them 
accountable for killing humans (Gen 9:5–17). If sin means “missing the mark” or 
“covenant breaking” then it would seem that Genesis presupposes that nonhuman animals 
can sin. Moreover, the Torah enacts legislation to punish nonhuman animals for various 
actions, particularly if they kill a human or engage in sexual misconduct (Lev 15–16). 
And humans and nonhuman animals all repent when Jonah preached repentance to 
Nineveh (Jon 3:7–10).151 Drawing on ethologists’ observations about nonhuman animal 
behavior, Clough goes on to show how various animals both act altruistically by helping 
other creatures without any immediate reward and also selfishly by doing shocking things 
like killing their young. If sin means to forget God’s command to flourish and multiply, 
then killing one’s own young clearly falls under the rubric of sin, according to Clough.152 
Given that the Hebrew Bible uses “flesh” to speak mostly about all animals, 
human and nonhuman, and given that Jewish Scriptures in particular frequently depict 
nonhuman animals as morally accountable for their actions before God (regardless of 
whether our modern sensibilities want to accept this or not),153 it does not seem 
reasonable on biblical grounds to reduce the meaning of Jesus’s flesh to humanity alone, 
if by flesh the Gospel means human sinfulness.   
                                                
151 See Clough, On Animals, 107–109. 
152 See also Deane-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral?,” 190–210. 
153 On the other hand, many modern ethologists and evolutionary theorists now believe that human 
morality has evolved out of the moralities already developing in our nonhuman kin. On morality in the 
nonhuman animal kingdom see Waal, Peacemaking among Primates; Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The 
Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1996); Frans de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Frans de Waal, The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society (New 
York: Three Rivers Press, 2009), and especially Bekoff and Pierce, Wild Justice. 
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Barth narrows the meaning of John 1:14 too much. He has brought in ideas that 
do not comport well with the prologue or the general trajectory of Scripture concerning 
the term σάρξ. While Clough has made a good case for extending the notion of sin to 
other animals, it is not clear that we must do so in order to make sense of the Word taking 
on flesh in the Incarnation. Within one story of salvation the Incarnation is a response to 
human sin. But the Incarnation might also be read more positively as God’s intention all 
along regardless of human sin. For flesh to be relevant to other creatures, therefore, does 
not depend upon their ability to sin but on God’s willingness to unite with all animal 
creatures through a specifi human form. 
Barth opens up the possibility for extending the Incarnation to nonhuman creation 
without importing notions of sinful flesh onto the Gospel when he states, “‘the Word 
became flesh’ also means ‘the Word became time…’ It does not remain transcendent 
over time, it does not merely meet it at that point, but it enters time; nay, it assumes time; 
nay, it creates time for itself.”154 If “flesh” can mean that God takes up a concept like 
“time” why would “flesh” exclude nonhuman animals? If God even takes up time, then it 
makes sense to say that the Incarnation takes up nonhuman animals as well. Flesh moves 
through time, changing constantly from one moment to the next, shedding cells and 
replacing them with new ones so that flesh is always in a state of becoming in a certain 
sense. Becoming “flesh” does not necessarily indicate a static identity. The notion of 
taking on time signals the vulnerableness of the Incarnation: the Word taking on flesh 
that ages so that even one’s visible identity changes.  
                                                
154 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. I/2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 50. 
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----- 
It makes good sense of the text to read σάρξ as narrower in scope than κόσµος. 
That scope is much narrower in that it refers to animal creatures in particular. The 
evangelist sets up a dramatic prologue that keeps us in suspense until we hear the name 
Jesus Christ. We do not have to positi that the author’s intention was to deliberately 
connect Jesus to other animals to see how well such a reading fits within the prologue and 
Gospel. In this reading, σάρξ is a narrower term than κόσµος, but certainly a wider scope 
than speaking of the Word becoming human or male. Both κόσµος and σάρξ leave open 
the possibility to interpret the Incarnation from the particularity of humanity to 
nonspecies-specific implications. The prologue moves toward the particular claim that it 
is Jesus Christ that is the creator, sustainer, and redeemer spoken of in the first verses. 
The entire dramatic prologue points toward Jesus, who is rooted in the Jewish story that 
forms the background for the Gospel.  
The Jewish scriptural background comes to the foreground after John states that 
the Word became flesh. The Jewish background comes forward in a way that can point us 
toward understanding Jesus’s humanity in a very different way than we may be 
accustomed to doing. His humanity is deeply connected to other animals and the earth, 
because that is what it means to be human. The Word becomes flesh and “dwells among 
us” (ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡµῖν—John 1:14b). The verb σκηνόω recalls yet another idea derived 
from the Hebrew Bible: God setting up a tent and dwelling “among humans” (Ps 78:60; 
οὖ κατεσκήνωσεν ἐν ἀνθρώποις in Ps 77:60, LXX). In Exodus 25:8–9 God tells Moses to 
make a tent (σκηνή, LXX) so that God can dwell among Israel. Christ’s flesh, then, is the 
new dwelling place of God on earth who later in the Gospel replaces the temple (John 
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2:19–22). That the prologue says we see God’s “glory” (δόξα) in Christ’s flesh confirms 
this connection even further since “the glory of the Lord” fills the tabernacle that Moses 
erects in Exodus 40.  
In sum, John’s prologue begins with a wide view to show that the λόγος was the 
one who created all things in Genesis 1, and that this same λόγος has moved to become 
part of creation. With an increasingly narrow focus, the prologue leads its reader from the 
κόσµος, to σάρξ, and finally to Jesus Christ, circling back to the idea of God the Creator 
at the end of the prologue. The statement that the Word became flesh is a wide 
theological statement with broad implications. Its background lies in the Jewish scriptural 
use of רָשָׂבּ to denote all animals, human and nonhuman, and in the idea that human and 
nonhuman animal life (σάρξ) is unable to sustain its own life apart from God’s 
providential care. Even if flesh denotes rebellion as well, this does not limit the term to 
humanity alone as there is plenty of Scriptural warrant—let alone the ethological 
evidence—to see σάρξ as meaning all animal creatures. 
Now I will read other passages from the Fourth Gospel, noting how the Gospel 
uses the term σάρξ in a way that sharpens the Incarnation’s connection with humans and 
other creatures, which makes my reading of the prologue even more plausible.  
John 3: Flesh and Spirit 
Jesus’s “flesh” becomes an important aspect of John’s Gospel. After the prologue, 
the next explicit use of σάρξ in the Fourth Gospel comes in chapter 3. There, Jesus speaks 
of “flesh” in the context of new birth as he responds to Nicodemus’s statements that Jesus 
is a man from God. Jesus responds in a cryptic manner by saying that a person had to be 
“born again” (γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν—John 3:3). Nicodemus fails to see that Jesus is using 
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birth differently than a literal biological sense. John’s Gospel uses ἄνωθεν as “from 
above” rather than “again,” which connects the term to the Holy Spirit (3:6).155 Jesus 
speaks in eschatological tones about how a person must be transformed. Every human is 
born “of the flesh” but to enter God’s kingdom requires a birth from the Spirit (3:6). By 
contrasting σάρξ with πνεῦµα Jesus does not set up a dualism in which spirit and flesh 
compete with one another. Nor does he say that the flesh is evil or imply a pejorative 
meaning for the flesh. A person has to be born in the flesh to even receive the Spirit. That 
is the ground or condition for being “born again.” This use of σάρξ connects to the 
prologue (1:13), where children of God are “not born of blood nor of the will of the flesh 
nor of the will of man but of God.” In both cases, flesh is not evil. Flesh is powerless. 
Only God can rebirth a person in the Spirit. But this transformation does not mean a 
person becomes disconnected from their earthly life. Rather, Jesus suggests that this new 
birth draws out the true meaning of birth in the flesh so that a person can live differently. 
John 6: Eating Jesus’s Flesh 
The next explicit use of σάρξ in the John’s Gospel is in chapter 6 in Jesus’s 
discourse on the bread of life. The larger context connects Jesus’s speech to his 
miraculous feeding of five thousand people (6:1–15). In that miracle, Jesus takes a 
meager offering from a little boy of a few loaves and a couple fishes and somehow Jesus 
is able to distribute a large enough quantity to the crowd that the people were not only 
satisfied but the disciples gathered up twelve baskets full of left-over bread (6:13).  
                                                
155 See the entry for ἄνωθεν in Frederick W. Danker, Walter Bauer, and William Arndt, A Greek-
English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2000), 92. 
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The story is rich with allusion: the time of the feeding is near the Passover (6:4) 
but the people do not go to Jerusalem, but to Jesus, foreshadowing a shift in the locus of 
worship from the temple to Jesus.156 The place is on a mountain (6:3, 15), bringing to 
mind the various stories taking place on mountains such as Moses and the burning bush 
(Exod 3:1–4:17), the Mount Sinai theophany (Exod 24:15–18; 32:15–16), Elijah’s 
theophany where God comes in a silence or quiet wind (1 Kgs 19:8–18), and Elijah being 
fed bread by ravens (1 Kgs 17:89). The food calls to mind the bread from heaven in 
Exodus 16–17 but also a Jewish eschatological banquet in which the elect would “eat and 
rest and rest with that Son of Man forever and ever” (1 Enoch 62:12–14). The Messiah 
would gather “from the four quarters of the world” the kingdom of Israel to eat with him 
(1 Enoch 48:10). The food at this eschatological banquet is often bread, which they refer 
to as manna or “heavenly food” (2 Bar 29:8).  
While the meals seem to be largely vegetarian (bread and grapes), 2 Baruch thinks 
that the elect will also eat the great sea monsters of chaos, Leviathan and Behemoth (2 
Bar 29:4–5, see also Psalm 74:13 where God gives the sea monsters as food for wild 
animals but not for humans). The fish, then, are part of the traditional imagery of an 
eschatological banquet that is otherwise plant-based.157 But the fish in John’s telling play 
a minor part and disappear entirely once Jesus speaks. The bread (ἄρτος) plays the most 
important role. Both in the leftovers and in the later telling about why the crowds have 
followed Jesus, the evangelist emphasizes the bread alone (John 6:23, 26). 
                                                
156 On the chronological problems with the Passover in the Gospel of John see Michael Daise, 
Feasts in John (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 104–52. Lining up John’s Gospel with actual historical 
events is difficult. But my analysis is not dependent upon any historical reconstruction of Jesus’s life from 
the Gospel of John. I am more interested in how the Johannine community used the word σάρξ in an 
expansive manner that is not anthropocentric, thus opening up the possibilities for seeing the Incarnation 
more broadly than many theologians have. 
157 Perhaps this eschatological image is one reason we find Jesus using fish to feed others and even 
eating a piece of some kind of fish in Luke 24:42–43. 
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After this miracle, Jesus retreats in solitude so the crowd cannot “take him by 
force and make him king” (6:15). After walking on water to find the disciples, according 
to John’s Gospel, Jesus and the disciples go to the other side of the lake, but the crowd 
followed them in boats. Jesus accuses the crowd of following him only because he gave 
them bread (6:26). The crowd responds by asking for more bread, this time explicitly 
calling upon the manna story from Exodus 16 (John 6:31). At this point Jesus gives the 
famous bread of life speech. 
Jesus tells the crowd that he is “the bread of life” and that the manna people ate in 
the wilderness did not keep them from dying. But Jesus is the bread of life that can keep 
people alive forever: “the bread that I will give for the life of the world is my flesh (ἡ 
σάρξ µου)” (6:48–51). This confuses the crowd: “How can this man give us his flesh to 
eat?” (6:52). Undeterred, Jesus declares the necessity of eating his flesh and drinking his 
blood (6:52–58).158 In the discourse, the word σάρξ comes up six times, the word αἷµα 
(blood) four times, and each time that Jesus speaks the words have the pronoun “my” 
attached, making it clear that the “flesh and blood” the people must consume is Jesus 
himself.159 Jesus’s flesh dies and rises again. It gives and sustains life. But Jesus does not 
mean that his flesh and blood only give and sustain our physical lives in the present, but 
that his flesh gives us an eschatological life (eternal life). Jesus’s flesh becomes “meat.” 
                                                
158 Bultmann sees John 6:51–58 as a later insertion that we can delete from the text without taking 
anything away from the narrative flow. Instead of ἐσθίω, this section uses τρώγω for “eating” and connects 
Jesus’s flesh with the Eucharist like other New Testament passages (Mark 14:23; Matt 26:27; Luke 22:17; 
and 1 Cor 11:24). So the discourse is a patchwork of redaction rather than a unity. See Bultmann, The 
Gospel of John, 234–37. Other commentators, however, resist Bultmann’s suggestion seeing the entire 
discourse as an increasing disclosure with repetition. Peder Borgen, for example, sees the entire discourse 
as a commentary on Exodus 16:15, “It is the bread that the Lord has given you to eat.” See Peder Borgen, 
Bread from Heaven: An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the Writings 
of Philo (Leiden: Brill, 1965), 40–42. 
159 In particular, the idea of “drinking blood” would have been offensive to Jewish hearers. 
Leviticus 17:10–14 explicitly forbids drinking blood. The covenant between God and Noah forbids Noah 
and his family to consume an animal’s blood (Gen 9:4–5). See Charles Kingsley Barrett, The Gospel 
according to St. John, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978), 303. 
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The Word becomes “meat.” This meat replaces the paschal lamb. This grotesque imagery 
begins to problematize the divisions between human flesh and nonhuman animal “meat.” 
Here in John 6, σάρξ has a broad significance as Jesus speaks about himself as 
“bread.” Jesus, the risen Christ, becomes present to the community as they partake in the 
Eucharist.160 John does not associate the Eucharist with the Last Supper as do the 
Synoptic Gospels (see Mark 14:12–21; Matt 26:17–25; Luke 22:14–23). Instead John’s 
Gospel associates the Eucharist with the feeding of the five thousand and the subsequent 
bread of life discourse. In John 6:11 we read, “Then Jesus took the loaves, and when he 
had given thanks, he distributed them to those who were seated; so also the fish, as much 
as they wanted” (ἔλαβεν οὖν τοὺς ἄρτους ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εὐχαριστήσας διέδωκεν τοῖς 
ἀνακειµένοις ὁµοίως καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀψαρίων ὅσον ἤθελον). Key words from this verse 
appear in the Synoptic accounts: ἔλαβεν . . . τοὺς ἄρτους and εὐχαριστήσας. All three 
Synoptic Gospels use εὐχαριστήσας (Matt 26:27; Mark 14:23; Luke 22:17; see also 1 Cor 
11:24). The Synoptics and 1 Corinthians 11 depict Jesus as claiming the bread is his body 
and the wine is his blood, while John 6 parallels the idea about bread saying that his 
“flesh” is the bread of life.161  
The most important point is that σάρξ in the Gospel of John can readily be 
interpreted in a way that severely problematizes any attempt to focus on Jesus’s humanity 
as set apart from other types of creatures. In this case, Jesus’s flesh becomes the plant-
based diet that sustained Israel during a trying time of sojourn through a hostile 
                                                
160 On the Eucharistic undertones see ibid., 84–85; Brown, The Gospel according to John, I–XII, 
248; R. Alan Culpepper, The Gospel and Letters of John (Nashville: Abingdon, 1998), 163 and Craig 
Koester, Symbolism in the Fourth Gospel (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 99–100. 
161 In the Synoptics, Jesus tells the disciples to eat (ἐσθίω) his body (σῶµα) while John heightens 
the language by saying that followers must “crunch” (τρώγω) his “flesh” (σάρξ). On τρώγω see the entry in 
Danker, Bauer, and Arndt, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian 
Literature, 1019.  
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environment. In the Exodus story as well, God sends some quail at one point, and in the 
evening God sends “manna” which the Israelites ate for forty years (Exod 16:35). The 
narrative emphasizes the bread. The quail barely get a mention and have no real 
importance in the story since it is the heavenly bread that sustains the Israelites. It is 
important to note that Jesus does not compare his flesh to the fish or the quail, a natural 
thing to do with the word σάρξ given how it is used in Hebrew scriptures to refer to 
nonhuman animals. Instead, Jesus speaks about his flesh as bread that does not require 
the disciples to intentionally kill other animal creatures for human spiritual survival.  
Jesus, in the Gospel of John’s telling, uses σάρξ in a very different way than the 
Hebrew Bible normally used it for human and nonhuman animal life. But this does not 
mean that σάρξ in this context has no bearing on nonhuman animal life. It is noteworthy 
that Jesus does not compare his flesh to dead animal flesh that people might have eaten as 
well. His flesh, in some sense, saves nonhuman animals from becoming ritual victims in 
the worship life of the community and re-establishes “bread” from Exodus 16 and the 
plant-based diet from Genesis 1 as the important element for sustaining life.162 I will 
return to this theme in later chapters. 
John 17: All flesh 
The next reference to σάρξ in the Fourth Gospel comes in Jesus’s long prayer in 
chapter 17. In the prayer’s opening, Jesus says, “Father, the hour has come; glorify your 
Son so that the Son may glorify you, since you have given him authority over all flesh 
(ἐξουσίαν πάσης σαρκός), to give eternal life to all whom you have given him” (John 
                                                
162 Clement of Alexandria compared the Word become flesh to the Tree of Life in Genesis 2. See 
Stromateis, 5.11.72.2–4. It is not unheard of or novel, therefore, in Christian reflection, to refer back to the 
accounts of creation in the first chapters of Genesis when thinking of Jesus’s flesh. 
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17:1–2). The phrase “all flesh” could refer to all humans or more broadly to all living 
creatures. The NRSV makes human beings alone the focus of Jesus’s words, translating 
πάσης σαρκός as “all people.” Yet the phrase echoes the Hebrew רָשָׂבּ־לָכּ that the 
Septuagint translates with πᾶσα σάρξ. To give yet another example, Leviticus 17:14 says 
that when a person hunts an animal and kills it for food, the person should not eat or 
drink the creature’s blood because the blood of “every creature” or of “all flesh” is its life 
(ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἲµα αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, LXX).  
The NRSV masks another problem with its translation of the next phrase: “to give 
eternal life to all (πᾶν) whom you have given him.” The underlying Greek word for “all” 
is in the neuter case. But we would expect a masculine form if the phrase referred solely 
to humanity (ὁ ἄνθρωπος). Brown and other commentators resolve the discrepancy by 
saying that the neuter “all” in 17:2 refers to the later neuter “one” in John 17:21–23.163 
But other commentators suggest that the neuter πᾶν in 17:2 suggests, like “all flesh,” a 
wider scope than humans alone.164 Dorothy Lee argues that a wide purview makes sense 
because of parallels between John 17:1–5 and the prologue. Authority, life, glory, 
preexistence, and an intimacy between the Father and Son preoccupy both passages.165 
Lee comments that Jesus “turns toward” (John 1:18) the Father in prayer, addressing the 
Father intimately as the source of life who gives the Son authority over all things.  
Reading the prayer in light of the Prologue thus makes a difference to the way we 
interpret 17:2. Apart from anything else, it is clear that there is nothing negative 
                                                
163 Raymond Brown, The Gospel according to John, XIII-XXI (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1970), 741. See also Barrett, The Gospel according to St. John, 502. 
164 See Dorothy Lee, Flesh and Glory: Symbolism, Gender and Theology in the Gospel of John 
(New York: Herder and Herder, 2002), 44. 
165 See ibid and Pheme Perkins, The Gospel according to St. John (Chicago: Franciscan Herald 
Press, 1978), 198. 
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about the understanding of flesh as it is presented here. As with the Prologue, 
Johannine Christology is rooted in creation as the fundamental manifestation of 
the Son’s dominion. Thus, while at one level, flesh in 17:2 refers to human beings 
and their capacity to enter a knowing relationship with God through Jesus, at the 
same time, understood more comprehensively, “all flesh” is synonymous with “all 
things” in creation, for which the Logos is the source of life.166 
Following Lee and other commentators’ reading, therefore, Jesus’s words about 
“all flesh” in John 17 hearken back to the prologue, which states that ὁ λόγος σὰρξ 
ἐγένετο. The same Redeemer who has taken on flesh has authority over all flesh. “Flesh 
addresses flesh in this cosmic context,” writes Lee.167 
The most compelling case, however, from within the Fourth Gospel for 
interpreting σάρξ in a non-species specific manner comes from the bread of life discourse 
in which Jesus explicitly expands the meaning of σάρξ to refer to nonhuman creation: 
bread. That Jesus’s flesh becomes bread, and the bread becomes Jesus’s flesh, confounds 
a species barrier and opens up the Incarnation to a broader purview than saving humanity 
alone. All of this has resonance with the interpretation of John 1:14 beginning with 
Andrew Linzey’s insight that the passage would surely have relevance to all mammals 
and to more recent interpretations of a “deep Incarnation.” 
1 John 4:2 
Other passages in Johannine literature also speak of σάρξ in connection to the 
Incarnation. 1 John 4:2 states: “Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in 
                                                
166 Lee, Flesh and Glory, 44–45. 
167 Ibid., 45. 
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the flesh is from God (ὃ ὁµολογεῖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ 
ἐστιν).” Commentators and translators have read the statement in 4:2 in several ways. 
The debate surrounding the passage centers on two issues: first, the grammatical 
construction, which bears on what content a person should confess, and second, whether 
the author intended to emphasize an aspect or rule out other expressions. Scholars have 
interpreted the passage in four primary ways: 
1. That Jesus is the Messiah who has come in the flesh. The emphasis here is 
on confessing that Jesus is the Messiah. The secessionists from the Johannine 
community, in this view, were denying that Jesus the man was the Messiah. The issue is 
Jesus’s identity. Some interpreters think that the author is opposing a group that 
distinguished between the historical Jesus and the heavenly Messiah. The author of 1 
John is saying that the historical fleshly Jesus is the divine Messiah. The problem with 
this translation is that it adds both a definite article to Christ and the verb “is” neither of 
which are in the Greek. Instead, “Jesus Christ” seems to function as a proper name itself 
in 1 John (1:3; 2:1; 3:23; and 5:6, 20).168 
2. That Jesus Christ has come/having come in the flesh. The emphasis is on 
Jesus Christ coming to us. There is more stress in this translation in the belief in the 
Incarnation as a fact. The Son’s “coming into the world to bring salvation” is what is 
most important in the confession.169 
                                                
168 See Neil Alexander, The Epistles of John (London: SCM Press, 1962), 103; C. H. Dodd, The 
Johannine Epistles (New York: Harper, 1946), 100–101 and John Stott, The Letters of John (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1988), 157–59. This is an older view out of favor with modern interpreters who all argue for one 
of the following three options. 
169 David Rensberger, The Epistles of John (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 69. 
See also J. L. Houlden, The Johannine Epistles, 2nd ed. (London: A & C Black, 1994), 106–107; I. Howard 
Marshall, The Epistles of John (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 205; Jay E. McDermond, 1, 2, 3 John 
(Harrisonburg, VA: Herald Press, 2011), 208–209; Rudolph Schackenburg, The Johannine Epistles (New 
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3. That Jesus Christ has come in the flesh. This interpretation stresses that 
Jesus took on flesh. The secessionists the author is preaching against may have denied 
that the Son could take on the material world but only “appeared” to be human. Because 
these opponents treat the material world as evil, the author of 1 John is making the 
fleshiness of Jesus a confessional issue.170 
4. Jesus Christ has come in the flesh. In this view the entire statement is the 
confession. The emphasis is on the confession itself, highlighting the person of Jesus with 
no separation from the role of Christ, and Jesus’s ministry in the flesh.171 
Regardless of which interpretation(s) one finds most compelling, the text still 
states that Jesus Christ came ἐν σαρκί (“in flesh”). Commentators who view the third 
option as most plausible have said the most about why the author might have used the 
term σάρξ. For them the issue is Docetism. Raymond Brown, by contrast, argues that 
there is very little textual evidence for a docetic teaching to which the statement would be 
responding.172 The issue is not that some people are denying the material reality of the 
Incarnation, but that “they are denying that what Jesus was or did in the flesh was related 
to his being the Christ, i.e., was salvific.”173  Nevertheless, σάρξ still has to be interpreted 
even if the other interpretations are plausible readings. 
The only other place the term appears in this letter is in 2:16, where it carries a 
negative connotation: “lust of the flesh” (ἐπιθυµία τῆς σαρκός). Lust of the flesh belongs 
                                                                                                                                            
York: Crossroads, 1992), 200–201; Stephen Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John rev. ed. (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 
2007), 212. 
170 Rudolf Bultmann, The Johannine Epistles (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), 38, 62; Thomas 
Johnson, 1, 2, and 3 John (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 95; Colin Kruse, The Letters of John (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 15–18; D. Moody Smith, First, Second, and Third John (Louisville: John Knox 
Press, 1991), 99 and Robert Yarbrough, 1-3 John (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 223. 
171 Raymond E. Brown, The Epistles of John (New York: Doubleday, 1982), 492–94 and Peter 
Rhea Jones, 1, 2, and 3 John (Macon, GA: Smyth and Helwys, 2009), 165–66. 
172 Brown, The Epistles of John, 493–94. 
173 Ibid., 505. 
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to what is in the world and is fleeting. According to Bultmann, 1 John 2:16 uses flesh in a 
way that opposes God and is incompatible with what is of God.174 But God has 
challenged the oppositional way of seeing the world and flesh by sending the Son “into 
the world” (4:9, 14). Just as the false prophets went “into the world” (4:1) and the 
antichrist “came” and “went” in the world (2:18-19; 4:1, 3), so too God has sent the Son 
into the world, removing any doubt about what any appearance from the Son might mean. 
Jesus Christ was here in a physical form, in this world. But this is a different use of σάρξ 
from what we find in 1 John 4:2. 
In my view, “flesh” in 1 John 4:2 should be interpreted within a broader range of 
biblical and early Christian affirmations in which “flesh” denotes the sphere of creaturely 
activity. In addition to the passages already examined above, 1 Clement uses the term 
σάρξ in ways that have bearing on biblical interpretation because they show us a sphere 
of use in the ancient world. 1 Clement speaks about the way God as “Creator of the 
universe” and the “primal source of all creation” can forgive sins and save people from 
their destructive tendencies. “You alone,” Clement prays, “are the Benefactor of spirits 
and the God of all flesh” (θεὸν πάσης σαρκός).175 Through God’s works God has 
“revealed the everlasting structure of the world” (τὴν ἀέναον τοῦ κόσµου).176 Because of 
this God is able to give “harmony and peace” to “all who dwell on the earth” which 
includes every creature.177 The “Lord of all flesh” (κύριος πάσης σαρκός) is a God of 
peace and will grant it to creatures.178  
                                                
174 Bultmann, The Johannine Epistles, 33–34. 
175 1 Clement, 59 in Michael W. Holmes, ed. The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English 
Translations, 2nd, updated ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999), 94, 95. 
176 1 Clement, 60, in ibid., 96, 97.  
177 Ibid. 
178 1 Clement, 64, in ibid., 100, 101. 
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Regardless of which interpretation makes the best sense of 1 John 4:2, σάρξ 
should not be strictly limited to Jesus’s humanness as most commentators have done. For 
instance, David Rensberger says that this “rather obscurely worded formulation” seems to 
mean “Jesus, the divine Christ and Son of God, entered the world as a physical, mortal 
human being.”179 In other words, the main point for the author of 1 John is that Jesus 
became human. 
Jesus was human. But focusing exclusively on the Word becoming human as an 
interpretation obscures how the term σάρξ connotes something broader than the word 
ἄνθρωπος. Even if Brown is correct that the original context involved denying Jesus’s 
earthly ministry any salvific value, not denying the material reality of the Incarnation, 
that does not preclude theologians today from seeing in this passage a further pattern. 
Humans are part of a larger material world. Georg Strecker, for example, suggests this 
when he interprets “flesh” as “the sphere of the tangible and mutable.”180 Humans are 
part of this sphere but not the only part.  
Whether at the time of 1 John or later, some Christians saw the material world as 
too problematic for the Son to truly assume. Brown argues that the docetic denial of 
Jesus’s bodily reality is a later phenomenon. Later Christians used the Johannine 
statements about “flesh,” which originally were not about denying physical reality but 
                                                
179 Rensberger, The Epistles of John, 5. See Johnson, 1, 2, and 3 John, 95; Smith, First, Second, 
and Third John, 99; Marianne Meye Thompson, 1-3 John (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 114 
and Yarbrough, 1-3 John, 223. 
180 Georg Strecker, The Johannine Letters (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 134-35. Peter Rhea 
Jones, 1, 2, and 3 John (Macon, GA: Smyth and Helwys, 2009), 165-66 steers clear of any anthropocentric 
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Johannine Epistles 2nd ed. (London, A and C Black, 1994), 106-107. Judith Lieu, likewise, avoids 
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salvific value to Jesus’s earthly ministry, in this new context. The later interpreters were 
not misreading the text, but using it for different purposes. The later patristic arguments 
were, according to Brown, arguments with those who did not identify Jesus of Nazareth 
with the Son of God and regarded the bodily form of Jesus as a mere apparition. The Son 
of God only “seemed” to be in a material body. The Son of God could not become 
trapped in a body and soul, which were made by lesser, demonic spirits. Instead the Son 
of God appeared as a human, without truly becoming part of the material world, so as to 
release true human spirits from their imprisonment in bodies and souls. The human spirit 
is related to the Son by virtue of its light nature and once released would fly to the 
heavens. But only the spirit that knows how to break free would do so.181 
For these later Christians, the issue was not simply whether the Son could or 
would become a human body, but whether God created this material world, whether this 
material world is therefore good, and whether salvation means redeeming this material 
world or escaping from it. Patrisitic authors used the Johannine Epistles and the Gospel 
of John to combat this view, regardless of its original intent. It meant something new in 
this new context. 
We should not be bound today by the original intent, about which we are unsure 
in any case. We can follow the patristic method of using these Scriptures in our own 
context. We can admit and respect the texts for what they were, while still pressing them 
into service today for a broader argument in light of new insights and new problems. 
Today, in light of what we know about the deep biological and evolutionary connection 
humans share with other creatures, we can legitimately say that those who deny Jesus’s 
                                                
181 On these ideas in relation to Johannine literature see Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New 
Testament, Vol. 1 (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2007). 
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connection to all other creatures are in some sense denying his “flesh,” even if that is not 
the original meaning of the passage. 
Flesh stands in for a larger material reality. Today we can even interpret it as 
having to do with the bodies we have in common with all other animals. God created this 
animal flesh and took it on so that we might have a chance to move beyond such things as 
murder, a sin Cain committed (1 John 3:12). If there is any term in 1 John that refers 
primarily to the human world it is “world” (κόσµος). In 1 John, unlike the Gospel of 
John, which has a more complex use of the term κόσµος, here it seems to mean human 
society and culture over against “flesh,” which is the material reality that God created. 
Flesh can serve the κόσµος or God. Jesus shows us the way of the flesh within God’s 
reign. 
So here in John’s First Epistle, σάρξ stands in for a reality that includes humanity 
but is also beyond humanness and refers to creaturely animality in general. Animality can 
be something that is joyous, but it can also be painful and community breaking. The Son 
took on this animality and redeemed this flesh so that we can have joy and fellowship.  
2 John 7 
2 John reaffirms what 1 John states about the Incarnation. “Many deceivers have 
gone out into the world, those who do not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh 
(ἐν σαρκί); any such person is the deceiver and the antichrist!” (2 John 7). One way to 
read this is that these are people who “do evil” as a result of their denying the 
Incarnation’s material reality.  
Once again, Raymond Brown argues that the issue is not docetic views that deny 
Jesus’s material body, but that some people denited his earthly ministry had any salvific 
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value. The Johannine community insists that “the coming was not completed by the 
incarnation but continued in the kind of life Jesus lived (‘in the flesh’).”182 Moreover, the 
opponents who deny “the coming one” in the flesh also deny the eschatological second 
coming, according to Brown. 
This is a very short letter to a group of believers that centers on this exhortation to 
confess that the Word has come in flesh and to deny fellowship to those who do not. 
Even if Brown is correct that the opponents of the Johnannine community were denying 
Jesus’s ministry salvific value and perhaps also denying the second coming, theologians 
have always used this passage and parallels like it in new contexts to address new 
concerns without necessarily distorting the sense of the passage. We can do so today as 
well. Jesus’s flesh connects with other creatures in a larger creaturely reality. This 
respects the context and brings in Jewish notions of this connection into our own time, 
where it is desparately needed in theological debate. 
1 Timothy 3:16 
Johannine literature is not the only place that refers to the Incarnation in terms of 
“flesh.” 1 Timothy 3:16 contains an early seventeen-word Christological hymn.183 The 
author presents the hymn as if it is well known in the community rather than as a novel 
                                                
182 Brown, The Epistles of John, 686. 
183 Once again the commentators generally read “flesh” in a purely anthropocentric way. See 
Raymond Collins, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 108; 
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composition. The author says that the community confesses this hymn as part of their 
traditional worship. In his commentary, Robert Wall says that 1 Timothy 3:16 “is 
arguably the passage of gravitas in this letter, if not of the Pastoral Epistles as a 
collection.”184 Philip Towner says that this hymn is a “capsule summary of the gospel.”185 
The hymn begins with a basic affirmation: “he was manifested in the flesh (ὃς 
ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί).” The earliest Christians interpreted this phrase as referring to the 
Incarnation. The Epistle of Barnabas, for instance, uses this phrase several times (5.6; 
6.7, 9; 12.10).186 On the one hand the phrase indicates that the Son pre-existed the 
Incarnation. On the other hand, the phrase emphasizes Jesus’s bodily reality. The phrase 
could both refer to the life of Jesus and also the bodily Resurrection.187 There is no good 
reason to exclude either, nor is there any good reason to see them as mutually exclusive. 
As a form of poetry, the references run deeper than single referents.  
But the hymn uses the term “flesh” rather than “human.” “Flesh” contrasts with 
the “vindication” the Son receives in “the Spirit” (ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύµατι). So the hymn 
uses “flesh” to refer to a material reality writ large, and “spirit” to refer to another reality 
that bears upon the material. Jesus was both “flesh” and “spirit.” Flesh and spirit do not 
oppose one another per se in this letter. 
So the term σάρξ in this hymn refers to something broader than humanity. The 
Son was “manifested” in the realm of “flesh” which would include all kinds of creatures.  
                                                
184 Wall, 1 and 2 Timothy, 111. 
185 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 276. 
186 See The Epistle of Barnabas in Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers. 
187 Collins presents both views. See Collins, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, 108–109. 
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1 Peter 3:18 and 4:1 
1 Peter contains some further clues to seeing the Incarnation in broader terms than 
just dealing with humanity. 1 Peter 3:18–22 contains early hymn material.188 Like the 
hymn in 1 Timothy 4, this hymn-like passage also speaks of Jesus’s “flesh”:189 
For Christ also suffered for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous, in 
order to bring you to God. He was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the 
spirit, in which also he went and made a proclamation to the spirits in prison, who 
in former times did not obey, when God waited patiently in the days of Noah, 
during the building of the ark, in which a few, that is, eight persons, were saved 
through water. And baptism, which this prefigured, now saves you—not as a 
removal of dirt from the body, but as an appeal to God for a good conscience, 
through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, who has gone into heaven and is at the 
right hand of God, with angels, authorities, and powers made subject to him.  
This passage contains some of the most enigmatic Greek in the New Testament and is the 
most debated passage in 1 Peter due to some of the doctrinal issues that arise (for 
instance, whether the dead can repent). Even the line that is most pertinent for my 
argument—“He was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit”—is much 
debated. 
                                                
188 On this passage as an early hymn that has been redacted and pressed into prose see M. Eugene 
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For most of Christian history, theologians have interpreted this passage as 
referring to different aspects of Jesus. “Flesh” refers to Jesus’s human aspect while 
“spirit” refers to his soul, or more precisely, his soul united with his divinity. Augustine, 
for instance, wrote a long letter dealing with the issues in 1 Peter 3:18-22. He was 
particularly disturbed by the ideas of Jesus preaching only to those up to the time of Noah 
and the idea that the dead might repent of their sins. But Augustine also took pains to 
make sure his reader did not interpret Jesus’s death “in the flesh” to mean that his “soul” 
died as well. “When Jesus was put to death for us in the flesh, who would dare assert that 
His soul was also killed, that is, his life-giving principle as man, when there is no death 
for the soul except through sin.”190 Peter meant only that Jesus’s body died, but Jesus’s 
soul lived on to preach to the dead. Jesus’s body was revived when his soul was reunited 
to the body by an action of the Spirit. But the Son “created a soul for Himself as He 
creates for the rest of mankind, but His did not mingle with sinful flesh . . . For He took 
the true substance of flesh from the Virgin.”191  
Modern scholars have largely abandoned the traditional reading that sees the flesh 
and spirit as different aspects of Jesus. To modern readers, this way of reading 1 Peter 
imports an anthropology that too sharply splits a person into two “parts.” That split is 
foreign to the biblical thought. Instead modern scholars read, “He was put to death in the 
flesh, but made alive in the spirit” in several different ways: 
1. Some scholars interpret “in the flesh” as a dative of agency so that σάρξ 
refers to “humanity.” Read this way, the passage would say that Jesus was “killed by 
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191 Ibid., p. 396. 
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humans, but made alive by the Spirit.”192 Although this interpretation reads the datives in 
a parallel manner and gives personal agency to the term “spirit,” σάρξ appears a few 
more times as a dative in 1 Peter 4:1, and the clear meaning is not to “humanity” but to 
Jesus’s material body. 
2. Most contemporary scholars interpret “in the flesh” to mean Jesus’s mortal 
nature as a creature in general. The datives are datives of “sphere” that denote ways of 
living: in the flesh or in the spirit. These are modes of existence not parts of Jesus.193 
William Dalton states this view well: “the flesh-spirit distinction . . . refers to two orders 
of being, the flesh representing human nature in its weakness, its proclivity to evil, its 
actual evil once it opposes the influence of God; the spirit representing the consequence 
of God’s salvation, the presence and activity among us of the Spirit of God.”194 In this 
reading, we should interpret the datives σαρκί and πνεύµατι in different ways. But 1 
Timothy 3:16 most likely does this as well. 
3. A slightly modified view of the second reading interprets “flesh” as 
referring to Jesus’s body, without it being an issue of mortality per se.195  
4. Some modern scholars interpret the fleshly “sphere” in decidedly 
anthropocentric terms. Joel Green states, “‘human’ translates σάρξ (sarx), which for Peter 
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has to do with ‘life as it is reflects and/or pertains to this world’ (1:24; 3:18, 21; 4:1, 2, 
6).”196 Likewise, J. N. D. Kelly says, “By flesh is meant Christ in His human sphere of 
existence, considered as a man among men.”197 For these scholars, σάρξ means “human” 
and they do not discuss what this dative of “sphere” might mean for other creatures. 
5. Other scholars either avoid making such anthropocentric statements, or 
better, connect “flesh” to a wider issue beyond humanity. Commenting on this passage, 
Fred Craddock states, “When the church seeks to express in today’s terms and categories 
the convictions of this hymn, it suffers the poverty of language. Christ is Lord of all life. 
The truth about God revealed in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is that no 
one—past, present, or future—lies outside or beyond that seeking and saving love. In 
fact, not only human life but also all life is the object of God’s care. Thoughtless 
exploitation of the earth, sea, and sky are therefore acts contrary to the love and 
providence of God.”198 While Craddock brings out a reading that has implications for 
how humans treat inanimate creation, it is striking that he says nothing about the main 
creatures that would have “flesh” in common with humans: nonhuman animals. Instead 
Craddock highlights environmental concerns.  
Indeed, the hymn as a whole beckons the hearer beyond his or her personal 
suffering, beyond their own community, beyond the Mediterranean world to consider the 
cosmic significance of Christ’s death and resurrection.199 1 Peter 3:20 mentions that eight 
humans were saved in Noah’s ark and then oddly compares this to Christian baptism. The 
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mention of the ark, in which God not only saved humans, but also saved all other 
animals, coincides well with interpreting “flesh” as a term that includes but also reaches 
beyond the human body. 1 Peter does not mention that God also saved other creatures, 
but then his use of the ark story is not systematic. He merely refers to the larger story. 
While the author may have overlooked the other creatures, in light of his own reference it 
is neither illegitimate to point out that the God of all flesh saved humans and nonhuman 
animals alike in the ark, nor to point out that this idea coincides well with his own use of 
σάρξ, regardless of whether he intended to bring this wider meaning to the foreground.200 
Excursus: 1 Corinthian 15:38–41 
Although the passage from 1 Corinthians 15:38–40 does not deal directly with the 
Incarnation, it is possible that somebody might object to my reading based on this lone 
passage. In it the apostle Paul says: “Not all flesh is alike, but there is one flesh for 
human beings, another for animals, another for birds, and another for fish. There are both 
heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, but the glory of the heavenly is one thing, and that of 
the earthly is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and 
another glory of the stars; indeed, star differs from star in glory” (1 Cor 15:39–41). One 
way to read this is to make a sharp distinction between humans and all other creatures. 
Each type of creature has its own “flesh” so that the Word takes on this particular human 
flesh, not other flesh. The issue is about identity. We can be recognized by our flesh. 
Yet by talking about flesh at all, Paul has recognized that there is a category or 
genus called flesh. He uses the term flesh to describe different types of animals: humans, 
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leave out the other creatures that are so important to the story of Noah and the ark. 
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“animals,” birds, and fish—the various categories from Genesis 1 (and uses the term 
“body” for inanimate creation). This is in line with the Jewish scriptural use of “all 
flesh.” Flesh here is nearly equivalent to the term “animal.” Paul is only saying there are 
different kinds or species of the genus flesh. There are different types of animals. Not 
everyone is the same. Paul is making a fairly basic claim that in no way overshadows the 
all-encompassing sense of flesh that we see in the Tanak and that I am arguing is present 
elsewhere in the New Testament with regard to the Incarnation and flesh. Flesh is the 
genus of the different types: human flesh, “animal” flesh, and bird flesh, fish flesh. But 
human, animal, bird, and fish are modifiers, that is, they are not the genus but the species. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the use of σάρξ in key biblical passages that deal 
with the Incarnation or confessing the Incarnation in church life. The Gospel of John 
provides the most useful material for grounding all of creation in Christology and the 
Incarnation. Opening with broad strokes, John’s Gospel states that the λόγος who created 
all things has become part of the world in which we live. From there the evangelist 
narrows the focus further stating that the “Word became flesh,” a statement with exciting 
possibilities since the term σάρξ connects so well with Jewish scriptural ideas about flesh 
and animality being unable to sustain its own life without God’s care. Flesh has Jewish 
roots. 
The Gospel of John uses σάρξ fairly consistently with these broad outlines. 
Jesus’s bread of life discourse explicitly opens up σάρξ to the nonhuman world by 
connecting his flesh to a plant-based food. By doing so Jesus connects his own life as the 
Incarnate Son of God to a wider purview than humanity alone. But it is not just in what 
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Jesus says his flesh is (bread), but what he does not say: σάρξ in the Tanak connects to 
animality. It would have been easy for Jesus to connect his flesh to eating other animals, 
since σάρξ generally has that connection. But Jesus replaces animals with bread, 
hearkening back to the manna episodes in Exodus 16 and the plant-based diet mandate in 
Genesis 1. In Christian worship, killing other animals whom the Hebrew Bible connects 
with humans in very intimate ways has no place in Christian worship. This is an issue I 
will return to in chapter 3 when I look at animal sacrifices in Jewish thought. 
First, however, it seems useful to look at how a few patristic authors used the 
statement that the “Word became flesh.” So in the next chapter I will look at Athanasius 
and John of Damascus who explicitly used the prologue’s central statement to talk about 
the Incarnation in ways that open up the possibility to see the Incarnation’s particularity 
as having relevance for how we think about other animals theologically. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE WORD BECAME MATTER 
 
 
 
In the first chapter I looked at how the New Testament uses the idea that the 
“Word became flesh.” I argued that the term has deep roots in Old Testament notions that 
connect human and nonhuman animal life, along with ideas that connect the Incarnation 
to nonhuman creation: Jesus is the bread of life, which not only connects him to plant life 
but also has relevance for nonhuman animals in that consuming them is no longer the 
focus of messianic life. Flesh is a term that covers the deeply interconnected layers of all 
life: human life cannot exist without the rest of creation. So the Incarnation must touch 
upon and have relevance for nonhuman animals for humans to be saved: we are all in this 
together. This is a deeply Jewish idea rooted in Scriptures. But the idea seems radically 
new today. If it is such a traditional idea, how did the early Christians see the idea of the 
Word becoming flesh?  
In the patristic era, authors often cited John 1:14. So in the first section of this 
chapter I will describe the how patristic authors used the Gospel of John’s statement that 
the Word became flesh. Broadly speaking, when Christian authors in the first three 
centuries used “the Word became flesh” they do so in a polemical setting to demonstrate 
the reality of the Incarnation over against other Christologies. That is, they generally used 
it in apologetics rather than in constructive theology. This, I believe, kept the doctrine of 
the Incarnation from developing its fullest potential. 
Yet there were two theologians who attempted to broaden constructively the idea 
of the Word becoming flesh to include the nonhuman world: Athanasius (ca. 296–373 
CE) and John of Damascus (d. 754 CE). For Athanasius, the statement that the Word 
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became flesh had special prominence. For example, in his Orations against the Arians, 
Athanasius quotes John 1:14 at least 42 times.201 He uses John 1:14 as hermeneutical key 
to scriptural interpretation against the Arians. Yet my interest in Athanasius is not in his 
explicit quotations of “the Word became flesh” but in how he expanded from the Gospel 
of John to speak about the Incarnation in a way that can include more than humanity. 
Similarly, John of Damascus uses John 1:14 as a key element in his defense of using 
icons in Christian worship. But he does so in a way that suggests that the particularity of 
the Incarnation is not tied to humanity alone. Both of these authors provide a resource 
and example of Christological thinking on the Incarnation that moves beyond 
anthropocentricism. Nevertheless, at the same time that they represent a direction toward 
an expansive Incarnation, they both make moves that undermine their best theological 
trajectories. They do this, I will argue, by not paying enough attention to Jesus’s 
particularities. So they stand as examples of positive directions that deep incarnation 
theology is now taking, but their theologies are also a warning about ignoring the 
Incarnation’s particularities. 
The Word Became Flesh: Early Christian Uses 
When Christians in the first three centuries used John 1:14 they did so within the 
context of debates about God’s relationships to creation. How could God have created a 
world so full of evil? Various Gnostic groups came up with slightly different answers to 
this question, but all of them distanced the Creator from creation through some kind of 
mediating entities. These Christians attempted to make sense of Jesus within a 
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philosophical framework. I will briefly review the Valentinians as a good example of 
Gnostic thinking. 
Valentinians radicalized Plato’s cosmology in the Timaeus.202 Plato maintained 
that a benevolent deity, the Demiurge (craftsman), created the Cosmic Soul to animate 
the body that the Demiurge had fashioned from eternal, unformed material.203 As a 
superlative principle, the Cosmic Soul is another deity: “a perceptible god which is an 
image of the intelligible, as the greatest and best, the most beautiful and most 
complete.”204 The Demiurge created other lesser deities to populate the heavens and 
charged them to fashion animal bodies to populate earth, leaving to the Cosmic Soul the 
single task of animating and giving rationality to its cosmic body as a whole. But the 
Demiurge did not then withdraw and watch the lesser deities make earthly beings. 
Instead, the Demiurge created and implanted rational souls—made from a similar mix as 
the Cosmic Soul and united to a star—into the earthly bodies. Therefore, all souls are 
immortal. Well-trained souls will return to their native star; those that failed to adequately 
live rightly and contemplate the forms would be reincarnated as women, the first time, 
and thereafter would become suitable animals according to the vices the souls had 
                                                
202 Irenaeus accused Valentinus of being more Platonist than biblical. See Irenaeus, Against the 
Heresies, vol. 2 (New York: Paulist Press, 2012), 2.14.3–4. Third-century theologian, Hippolytus also 
charged Valentinus of being a Platonist. Citing the Timaeus, Hippolytus says, “Valentinus’ heresy is 
certainly, then, closely associated with the Pythagorean and Platonic theory.” See Hippolytus, Refutatio 
Omnium Haeresium, ed. Miroslav Markovich (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 6.21.1 (p. 229):. Ἔστι µὲν 
οὗν ἠ Οὐαλεντίνου αἴρεσις Πυθαγορικὴν ἕχουσα καὶ Πλατωνικὴν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.  
203 See Plato, Timaeus, trans. Desmond Lee and T. K. Johansen (New York: Penguin Books, 
2008), 30a; 52d–53c; and 69b–d. For an overview of the various interpretations of the Timaeus and creation 
see Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 268–75. For a recent and compelling interpretation, see 
Sarah Broadie, Nature and Divinity in Plato's Timaeus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7–
26. Philosophers in Antiquity argued about whether Plato meant this creation myth literally so that the 
world was created in time, or metaphorically to describe relationships upholding the world to be eternal. 
204 Plato, Timaeus, 92c. 
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developed as humans.205 Thus Plato thought the world was good, but that the Demiurge’s 
good will finds a limit in the physical world since material bodies cannot fully mimic the 
Demiurge’s or the Cosmic-Soul’s eternal goodness (otherwise the body itself would be 
God) and therefore has a tendency toward evil due to the ways in which the world’s laws 
cause bodies to crash around, interrupting rationality. Indeed, Plato thought the world we 
live in requires every kind of living animal possible so that it would be complete. Cosmic 
completeness, therefore, seems to necessitate moral imperfection and predation.206 
For the Valentinians, a world that necessitates moral imperfection and predation 
cannot come from a good God. Attempting to uphold God’s goodness and transcendence, 
these Christians contended that God did not create the physical world, which is rife with 
evil. Another deity, who is part of a long chain of deities between the true God and the 
world, created physical reality, but did so out of fear, ignorance, and grief, all of which 
characterize the physical world: “irrational animals, wild beasts, and people came from 
fear.”207 With Jesus, however, we learn about the highest and true God as well as other 
deities above the Creator-God in the Tanak, whom they identified with the Demiurge of 
Platonist cosmology. One of those higher deities had planted “seeds” in the world, which 
meant that some elite humans, the spiritual (πνευµατικοί), possess a divine spark that 
makes them outsiders to the world’s creaturely community. Spiritual people are by nature 
saved, regardless of how they behave.208 Earthy people (χοϊκοί), however, correspond to 
Cain and are ontologically evil. Jesus came to save rational people (ψυχικοί), the 
common church person who fits between the spiritual and earthy classes and who must 
                                                
205 Ibid., 42b–d.  
206 See Broadie, Nature and Divinity in Plato's Timaeus, 105n47. 
207 Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, vol. 1 (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), 1.5.4—translation 
slightly altered. 
208 Ibid., 1.6.2. 
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behave well to get the knowledge necessary for salvation.209 The common rational person 
must take a huge leap of faith in an effort to focus on spiritual things, becoming less at 
home in this world as the person travels spiritually upwards back to their true home: we 
are pilgrims and nomads on this earth. People are born into one of these three classes.210 
This low view of creaturely life led popular Christian leaders like Marcion (85–
160 CE)—who was not a Gnostic per se, but he agreed with them on important points—to 
view animal life negatively. For example, Marcion considered insects such as 
mosquitoes, flies, gnats, and others to have no other purpose than destruction and 
annoyance. A benevolent God would not create such creatures; they either come from a 
lesser, malevolent deity or arise from the nature of matter itself.211 The true God has 
nothing to do with the material world. Such a view leads Marcion to excise New 
Testament passages where God cares about anything beyond spiritual and rational souls. 
For example, he removed Luke 12:6–7, which states that God loves sparrows.212 
The Valentinians divided God into different deities. They also divided humanity 
into the spiritual, rational, and earthy people. Further, they divided the individual person 
into the soul and the material body. Finally, they divided creation into the spiritual and 
the material. In each case, good and evil characterize one side or the other in such a way 
that by its very nature only a portion of creation merits salvation and only a portion of the 
divine deserves worship. Creation and salvation are completely separate.  
                                                
209 Ibid. 
210 On the three classes of people see ibid., 1.7.5. Greek text from Irenaeus, Contre les Hérésies, I, 
Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979)—it also contains the Latin. 
211 See Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, ed. Ernest Evans, Latin text with English translation 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 1.14. 
212 See Sebastian Moll, The Arch-Heretic Marcion (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 94. 
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Against Valentinian divisions, Irenaeus and Tertullian stressed unity. God is one. 
Humanity is one. The individual is one. Creation is one. Jesus is the creator, and there is 
no other God.  
Irenaeus and Tertullian found Valentinian and Gnostic cosmological Christologies 
and explanations of creation out of step with what the tradition they received had taught. 
But the Valentinians and the Marcionites helped shape what would become “orthodox” 
theology by forcing thinkers like Irenaeus and Tertullian to wrestle with the nature of 
creation, God’s goodness, and how these come together in Jesus of Nazareth. 
Gnostic Views of the Incarnation 
The Valentinians could affirm that the Word became flesh, but they interpreted 
“flesh” as a “spiritual flesh.” Irenaeus claims that the Valentinians teach that the Word 
“enclothed himself with a body of the ensouled substance . . . but he did not take on any 
material element, since material substance is incapable of receiving salvation.”213 
Irenaeus’s summary lines up with Valentinian sources from the Nag Hammadi Library. 
The Tripartite Tractate, for instance, claims that the Word conceived of Jesus’s flesh in 
such a way that it would not share in the passions of human flesh; Jesus has a spiritual 
flesh.214 Valentinus purportedly wrote about Jesus: “A body, therefore, was spun for him 
out of invisible psychic substance, and arrived in the world of sense with power from a 
divine preparation.”215 We find a similar teaching in Marcionite theology. The Marcionite 
                                                
213 Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, 1, 6.1 (p. 36). 
214 About the flesh of the Incarnation the text says, “above all that it derives from the spiritual 
logos.” See Einar Thomassen, “The Tripartite Tractate from Nag Hammadi: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary” (PhD Dissertation, University of Saint Andrews, 1982), 173. 
215 Clement of Alexandria, The Excerpta Ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1934), 59 (p. 79). 
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Apelles, for example, claimed that though the Word took on flesh, that flesh was derived 
from stars.216 In other words, the Word only seemed to take on human flesh.  
Sometimes these Christians change the wording of John from “flesh” to another 
term. I already quoted Valentinus who said that Jesus had a “body” made from a “psychic 
substance.” The Gospel of Truth, a Valentinian text, says, “When the Word appeared, the 
one that is within the heart of those who utter it—it is not a sound alone but it became a 
body—a great disturbance took place.”217 This shift from the language of “flesh” to the 
language of “body” may seem insignificant on first read. There are Gnostic texts that 
make even more dramatic changes in terminology. For instance, the Trimorphic 
Protennoia, has the Word saying, “the third time I revealed myself to them [in] their tents 
as Word and I revealed myself in the likeness of their shape. And I wore everyone’s 
garment and I hid myself within them, and [they] did not know the one who empowers 
me.”218 Here the change from flesh to “tents” and “the likeness of their shape” is far more 
dramatic than the shift to “body.” The theology underneath the shift in the Trimorphic 
Protennoia is easier to discern. The shift to “body,” however, is subtler. Jacquelin 
Williams believes, however, that the shift from “flesh” to “body” represents the shocking 
theology of the Gospel of John to the Gnostics, “who intentionally substituted the word 
‘body’ for ‘flesh.’”219 They probably did this, according to Williams, to make their 
theology more palatable to ordinary Christians. 
                                                
216 See Tertullian, De Carne Christi, 6. 
217 “The Gospel of Truth (I, 3 and XII, 2),” in The Nag Hammadi Library in English (Leiden: 
Brill, 1996), 26:4–9. 
218 “Trimorphic Protennoia (XIII, 1),” in The Nag Hammadi Library in English (Leiden: Brill, 
1996), 47:13–19. 
219 Jacquelin Williams, Biblical Interpretation in the Gnostic Gospel of Truth from Nag Hammadi 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 203. 
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Irenaeus notices the subtle shift in language as well. He says of the shift from 
“flesh” to “body”: “For, according to them, the Word did not directly become flesh; but 
Savior put on an ensouled body, they say, which was fashioned out of the Economy by an 
unutterable forethought, so that he might become visible and tangible. Flesh, however, is 
the ancient handiwork made by God out of the earth as in Adam. But it is this which John 
point out that the Word of God became.”220 Consequently, Irenaeus claims, “they speak 
the same language we do, but intend different meanings.”221 Irenaeus insists, however, on 
the language of flesh from the Gospel of John since the term “body” means something 
very different in the Valentinian interpretation. 
Likewise, Tertullian goes to great lengths to argue that Jesus was born from 
Mary’s womb. She was truly his mother if that word is to mean anything at all. He also 
claims that the Valentinians and Marcionites who denied Jesus’s true humanity also “yet 
they deny the inferior substance of Christ, though he declares himself not even a man but 
a worm’ [Ps. 22:6].”222 In other words, Marcionites and Valentinians deny humanity’s 
common origins in the earth with other animals when they deny Christ a true human 
nature. They deny that God’s creation is good. They deny that animal life is good.  
These are important points for modern theology. When Sallie McFague—whom I 
introduced in the Introduction—for example, claims that the cosmos is God’s body, this 
is not the same as the Gospel of John’s statement that the Word became “flesh.” The 
language is similar but the meaning is very different. The change from “flesh” to “body” 
in this instance signifies a shift away from the particularity of flesh, upon which 
                                                
220 Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, 1, 9.3. 
221 Ibid., Preface, 2. 
222 Tertullian, De Carne Christi, 15. I am working from the following translation that also contains 
the Latin text: Tertullian, Tertullian's Treatise on the Incarnation, trans. Ernest Evans (London: SPCK, 
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Christians like Irenaeus insisted. To update Irenaeus: flesh signals solidarity with all 
animal creatures in a way that the langauge about a cosmological “body” does not. 
Moreover, the term “became” is different from “is” in the two theologies because the 
Gospel of John suggests that the later doctrine of two natures (divine and human) in one 
person (Jesus) is perfectly in line with the intention of “the Word became flesh.” 
McFague collapses these in a way that seems to blur the lines between the Creator and 
created. 
Where Gregersen would be helpful in this discussion is to point out that the flesh-
in-solidarity-with-all-animal-creatures does not exist in isolation from cosmology either. 
According to some of the most current cosmological theories, our universe began 
approximately 14 billion years ago from an unfathomably compact zero size yet infinitely 
hot state with no space or time.223 From that searing, dense state, what we know of the 
universe has been expanding and cooling ever since. Our sun emerged as one of the stars 
in the Milky Way galaxy around 4.6 billion years ago. From the dust and gas that circled 
the Sun, planets began to form. Earth is made from these particles that collided and were 
held together by gravity. More and more collisions with comets and asteroids revolving 
the Sun slowly built up the Earth’s mass and the impacts caused the mass to become 
hotter. The heavier elements such as iron sank toward the center and the lighter elements 
rose toward the surface. Catapulted from supernova explosions, comets carried ice and 
organic material to the surface where oceans formed. Around 4 billion years ago, the 
bombardment slowed, the Earth had a steady crust, the surface had cooled, the seas were 
formed, and an atmosphere developed. Our planet is made from stardust that was 
catapulted out from the explosions of older stars. 
                                                
223 See and Woolfson, Time, Space, Stars, and Man, 66–67.  
106 
 
In this modern scientific story, humans, like all other creatures, are literally made 
from stardust. Paul Davies says that “our bodies are therefore built from the fossilized 
debris of once-bright stars that annihilated themselves aeons before the Earth or sun 
existed.”224 Our bodies are 65% oxygen, 18% carbon, 10 % hydrogen, and 3.3% nitrogen. 
Except for the hydrogen that predates the stars, all of the elements come from the atoms 
hurled into space by aged stars. This is our common story. It is a story we share with all 
living creatures, planet Earth, and the cosmos in general. 
So the flesh-that-all-animal-creatures-share has its common origins in cosmology 
and links with our habitat here on Earth. But connecting the statement “the Word became 
flesh” to a narrative of interdependence so that humans never exist in isolation is very 
different from claiming that all of this “is” God’s body in some kind of metaphysical 
sense. What Gregersen and others who use the language of “deep Incarnation” are doing 
is a kind of narrative theology in which the Gospel story links up with stories we tell 
about ourselves in the modern world. The two stories are not the same, yet the science 
story helps us see Genesis and the Gospel of John in a way that makes us more aware of 
our common creatureliness. McFague’s story takes away the common creatureliness to a 
large extent, since everything is divine somehow. 
So the debates about language derived from the Gospel of John in early 
Christianity have relevance to our modern ecological debates. But the links go further. 
Gregersen and others suggest that “flesh” signals a radical interdependence and 
commonality amongst all of creation. Yet they do not begin with the particularity of 
animal flesh and rarely point out this commonality as the actual starting point. It is not 
that this negation is wrong and that we cannot find it in the tradition—Irenaeus and 
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Tertullian both emphasize the commonality of all creatureliness without specifically 
focusing on flesh as a common animality. What I will argue is that this shift away from 
the particularity of flesh in all animals does not do full justice to the commonality that the 
Christian tradition argues for vis-à-vis God. 
The Word Made Flesh: Body, Matter, and Particularity 
The issue of nonhuman animals and the Gospel of John’s flesh became more 
acute over the centuries. The change in language away from the particularity of flesh, and 
hence common animality, began to show up in those who took up Irenaeus’s theology. 
While Irenaeus insisted on “flesh” against Valentinians, his successors in the fourth and 
sixth century changed their language to take up the Valentinian language and subvert it. 
Athanasius and John of Damascus affirmed that God became human. But they went 
further: against Irenaeus and with the majority of philosophers they accepted a material 
substrate for creation. God became that too. This will have some widespread 
implications. They use the idea of John 1:14—the Word became flesh—in a slightly new 
way. So I will turn to a more detailed account of both Athanasius and John of Damascus 
in order to show both the promise of this turn, which relates directly to modern theologies 
of a deep Incarnation in relationship to nonhuman animals, and to show some potential 
drawbacks in this shift, historically speaking. 
Athanasius 
In modern ecological theology Athanasius has become a source of inspiration and 
a way to connect modern concerns for creation deep within the Christian tradition. 
Athanasius’s On the Incarnation generally serves as a theological foundation for thinking 
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about Christology. So connecting ecological concerns with Athanasius’s view of the 
Incarnation helps modern theologians make the case for the orthodoxy of their positions. 
In what follows I draw from some of this research. What modern theologians have done 
with Athanasius is needed in a context in which Christian care for the environment can be 
seen as heterodox at best. That one of the great thinkers of Christianity argued for the 
redemption of all creation and pointed to a common creatureliness is a welcome addition 
to ecological theology in the modern world.  
While I think theologians have now shown what we can learn today from 
Athanasius in terms of theology and creation, I also think that they have sometimes 
missed the moves in Athanasius’s work that are less than good when it comes to 
developing a theology that cares for creation and nonhuman animals in particular. 
Athanasius’s Theology of Creation 
In Against the Greeks, Athanasius discusses how humans lost their ability to 
know God and then began to worship idols. In his second part, On the Incarnation, 
Athanasius focuses on how the Incarnation brings redemption and restoration. Both 
books begin with a preface in which he explains his purpose for writing each book. In the 
preface to Against the Greeks he states that people who have mocked the cross “do not 
see that its power has filled the whole world, and that through it the effects of the 
knowledge of God have been revealed to all. For if they had applied their minds to his 
divinity they would not have mocked at so great a thing, but rather have recognized that 
he was the Saviour of the universe and that the cross was not the ruin but the salvation of 
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creation.”225 So from the outset Athanasius speaks of Jesus as “the Savior of the 
universe” and the cross as “the salvation of creation,” suggesting that he has more than 
humanity in view.226  
Athanasius primarily focuses on God and God’s relationship to humanity. Yet 
Athanasius did not see humanity as something completely set apart from the rest of 
creation. Every created thing needs another created thing: “If one were to take the parts of 
creation by itself and examine each one separately—like the sun alone by itself, or the 
moon separately, or again earth or air, or the hot and cold, the dry and moist—and isolate 
them from their mutual connection, and take each one by itself and examine it separately, 
then he would find no one of them self-sufficient, but all in need of mutual service and 
only subsisting through mutual support.”227 Creation is composed of parts, and humans 
are part of creation who cannot live without the rest. Creation stands as a whole in a 
relationship to God.228 In this sense, there is a decidedly non-anthropocentric logic to 
Athanasius’s focus.229 
                                                
225 Athanasius, Contra Gentes, trans. Robert Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 1, p. 3–5. 
226 Michael Northcott seems to miss this type of statement when he charges that: “when we come 
to his treatment of redemption in De Incarnatione, we find no mention of the redemptive purposes of God 
for the created order as a whole, which, according to De Incarnatione, is inherently unstable and 
corruptible because of its contingency, its finitude, its creation out of nothing. Instead, humanity is the 
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redemption to rational humans. See Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 211. 
227 Athanasius, Contra Gentes, 27, p. 74. 
228 This distinction between God and creation, between created and uncreated, is basic for 
Athanasius’s ontology, according to Khaled Anatolios. On the centrality of the Creator/creature distinction 
in Athanasius see Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought (New York: Routledge, 
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Athanasius’s overall project. Anatolios may very well agree with this point by saying that his view does not 
deny that other elements are also important. 
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In Against the Greeks, Athanasius examines the origins of evil from the vantage 
of the cross. God created humans to commune with God by contemplating the Word. God 
did not intend for evil to fill the world. Evil did not exist from the beginning of creation 
but came through human sin. Instead of contemplating the Word in creation, humans 
committed idolatry by making creatures into gods. Christians, however, do not worship 
creatures but recognize the one true God who created all things through the Word. “Who 
then is he, if not the all-holy Father of Christ, beyond all created being, who as supreme 
steersman, through his own Wisdom and his own Word, our Lord and Saviour Christ, 
guides and orders the universe for our salvation, and acts as seems best to him.”230 This 
Wisdom/Word is not a creature but “the living and acting God, the very good God of the 
universe, who is other than created things and all creation.”231 
Athanasius states that “the power of God and wisdom of God, turns the heavens, 
has suspended the earth, and by his own will has set it resting on nothing. Illuminated by 
him, the sun gives light to the world, and the moon receives its measure of light. Through 
him water is suspended in the clouds, rains water the earth, the sea is confined, and the 
earth is covered with verdure in all kinds of plants.”232 The universe was created out of 
nothing and now tends toward dissolution into nothing. But since God is good and does 
not compete with the created order for existence, God has acted to keep everything from 
falling into nothingness.233  
                                                
230 Athanasius, Contra Gentes, 40, p. 111. Emphasis mine. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid., 40, p. 113. 
233 In modern times, several theologians have queried whether the confession that God created 
everything from nothing implies a God of love or a God of pure power and might. John Caputo, for 
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But God does more than this. God brings all things into harmony. God is like “a 
musician, tuning his lyre and skillfully combining the bass and the sharp notes, the 
middle and the others” producing a “single melody.”234 God “reconciles opposites” in the 
created order “producing in beauty and harmony a single world and a single order within 
it.”235 Yet every individual within this harmony retains its individual identity, just like 
individual instruments retain their identity in a symphony. This “wonderful and truly 
divine harmony” has a divine director, the “Wisdom of God,” who is “unmoved with the 
Father.”236 Because humans are created from nothing, according to Athanasius, we 
cannot know God who is beyond all being. Because God loves humans, however, God 
has created the world in such a way that rational creatures like humans can know of God 
through looking at the harmony in creation. Once again, Athanasius’s ontology in which 
the fundamental distinction in Christian faith is between the uncreated Word and 
everything created forms the backdrop for his anthropology and creation theology as a 
whole. 
Creation, including humanity, comes from nothing and tends to return to nothing. 
But God does not want to see creation dissolved and so resolved to become a human in 
order to save the “universe.” Athanasius is worth quoting at length at this point: 
                                                                                                                                            
“creation is not an exercise of divine power” since power is exercised over something. To be a creature is 
not defined by a struggle against God’s attempts to impose roles upon us rather than ones we would 
naturally choose. Furthermore, Williams argues, creation does not entail a monarchy since God creates 
freely and doesn’t need that kind of power anyhow. Williams calls our attention to the fact that the idea of 
God’s transcendence inherent in creation ex nihilo does not posit an antagonistic dualism. Creation is not in 
a competitive relationship with God, because God is completely and totally other than created reality. 
Because God does not need to struggle against and compete with creaturely beings, God can be present to 
and with creatures without violence and domination. See Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), 67–69. 
234 Athanasius, Contra Gentes, 42, p. 117.  
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
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For the nature of created things, having come into being from nothing, is unstable, 
and is weak and mortal when considered by itself; but the God of all is good and 
excellent by nature. Therefore he is also kind. For a good being would be envious 
of no one, so he envies nobody existence but rather wishes everyone to exist, in 
order to exercise his kindness. So seeing that all created nature according to its 
own definition is in a state of flux and dissolution, therefore to prevent this 
happening and the universe (τὸ ὅλον) dissolving back into nothing, after making 
everything (τὰ πάντα) by his own eternal Word and bringing creation (τὴν κτίσιν) 
into existence, he did not abandon it to be carried away and suffer through its own 
nature, lest it run the risk of returning to nothing. But being good, he governs and 
establishes the whole world (τὴν σύµπασαν) through his Word who is himself 
God, in order that creation (ἡ κτίσις), illuminated by the leadership, providence, 
and ordering of the Word, may be able to remain firm, since it participates in the 
Word who is truly from the Father and is aided by him to exist, and lest it suffer a 
relapse into nonexistence, if it were not protected by the Word. “For he is the 
image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation, because through him and 
in him subsist all things, visible and invisible, and he is the head of the church,” 
as the servants of the truth teach in the holy writings.237 
In this passage near the end of Contra Gentes, Athanasius forefronts the 
fundamental distinction between the Creator and creation. God transcends creation but 
God’s love manifests itself in acts that sustain and ultimately redeem creation from 
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nothingness.238 It is God’s loving nature to be involved with creation, a love that 
culminates in the Incarnation. God’s goodness and love are not impersonal principles that 
generically pervade all things, but are manifest in acts of providential care that reach a 
pinnacle in the Incarnation.239  
So Athanasius gives a first hint as to the reason for the Incarnation: so that 
creation/the universe/the whole world might not fall into nothingness. In this first 
intimation from Athanasius in his two-part work, the reason for the Incarnation has to do 
with God’s action on behalf of creation as a whole. Creation is “weak and mortal” in 
itself and needs God’s providential care to keep it in existence at all and keeping the 
entirety of creation from falling into utter dissolution is ultimately the wondrous reason 
“why the Word of God really came to created beings.” There could hardly be a stronger 
statement about the Incarnation that focuses on creation as a whole rather than humanity 
alone.  
In Orations against the Arians, Athanasius claims that “creation itself will at a 
certain point be delivered ‘from the bondage of corruption in the glorious freedom of the 
children of God’ (Rom 8, 19, 21). The Lord will be the firstborn of this creation which is 
delivered and of all those who are made children, so that by his being called ‘first,’ that 
which is after him may abide, united to the Word as to a foundational origin and 
                                                
238 This relates to the importance Athanasius attaches to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. For a 
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beginning.”240 Creation itself will be transformed and liberated along with human beings 
in Christ, who became a human being, but in so becoming also became matter and a 
material body. 
Athanasius’s participation language, however, is also grounded in his doctrine of 
God, according to Anatolios.241 In the background is a relationship between the Father 
and the Son. The Son does not participate in the Father: “He is the power of the Father 
and his wisdom and Word; not so by participation, nor do those properties accrue to him 
from outside in the way of those who participate in him and are given wisdom by him, 
having their power and reason in him; but he is absolute wisdom, very Word, and himself 
the Father’s own power, absolute light, absolute truth, absolute justice, absolute virtue, 
and indeed stamp, effulgence, and image. In short, he is the supremely perfect issue of 
the Father, and is alone Son, the express image of the Father.”242 Because the Son is the 
perfect image of the Father, the Son contains all the meta-qualities that sustain creation.  
Creation participates in the Son and thereby has access to the Father without any 
hint of subordination within God. Creation exhibits the order and Wisdom of the Son that 
leads to knowledge of the Father and Son. Creation shows this inner relationship within 
God.243 Creation, therefore, has a twofold character: on the one hand creation comes from 
nothing and rests on the abyss of nothingness. On the other hand, by God’s sheer grace 
creation participates in God’s own inner life. Athanasius’s view of the nature/grace 
distinction, according to Khaled Anatolios, belongs within his wider understanding of the 
                                                
240 Athanasius, Orations against the Arians, 2.63. In Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 157. 
241 See Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought, 104–109. 
242 Athanasius, Contra Gentes, 46, p.131. 
243 In his great double-work, Athanasius has a binary description of God and God’s relationship to 
the world. He focuses on the Father-Son relationship and creation’s participation in the Son. He ignores the 
role of the Holy Spirit. 
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distinction between the Creator and created.244 Creation by its very nature tends toward 
the nothingness from which it came, but by grace participates in the divine life. All of 
creation participates, but humans are able to participate in our own particular manner 
because we are “rational” and therefore have a special affinity to the Word. Yet the 
proper context for interpreting humanity’s relationship to God is in the radical 
dependency that all creatures have for God’s grace and providential care. Even though 
God has a “special care” for humans, it is fitting to describe the Incarnation in terms of 
the Word becoming matter since this prior Creator/creation distinction undergirds 
theological anthropology as well.  
Athanasius makes the ontological status of creatureliness vis-à-vis God the basis 
of his anthropology very clear in his work, Orations against the Arians.245 The Arians, 
according to Athanasius, call Jesus a “creature” but then go on to say he is a special 
creature that is unlike other creatures. For Athanasius this kind of statement 
misunderstands the basic ontological distinction between what is made and what is not 
made, between the Creator and creation. No “creature” has a special mediator status in 
this relationship. Athanasius says: 
But even if the Son has a relative precedence over the others, he would still be 
nonetheless a creature, just as they are. For even among those who are creatures 
by nature, there is to be found those who have precedence over others; thus ‘star 
differs from star in glory’ (1 Cor 15:41) and everything else differs from the 
others when one makes comparisons. But that does not mean that some are lords 
and others do service to those who are superior; nor that some are efficient causes 
                                                
244 Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought, 55–56. 
245 On Athanasius’s theological anthropology see ibid., 53–67. 
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and others come to be through their agency. Rather, all have a nature which 
comes to be and is created, and they acknowledge, of themselves, their own 
creator.246  
The basic ontological status of humanity is as a creature before God. In this sense, 
Athanasius could have spoken of the Word becoming a creature. He shied away from that 
language because the Arians claimed that Jesus was merely a creature with a special 
status. They did not maintain the proper Creator/creature distinction according to 
Athanasius and therefore their Christology was flawed.  
The Matter of Christology 
In On the Incarnation, the second part to his Against the Gentiles, Athanasius 
continues to explicate the Incarnation’s purpose as significant for more than humans. He 
opens with a reference to the Word’s “Incarnation.” The Greek word Athanasius uses, 
however, is ἐνανθρώπησις, more properly translated as the Word “becoming human.”247 
He starts with ἐνανθρωπήσεως because he wants to clarify why the Word would become 
human rather than some other created being or “body.” So in the second chapter he 
explains that God created matter (ὕλη) out of nothing (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων)—contrary to 
Platonic notions that God created things from some eternal but formless matter by putting 
“forms” to it.248 Athanasius carefully explains that he had to give an account of the origin 
of all things rather than launching straight into a Christological reflection because he 
needed to say why the Word would become human of all other creatures.  
                                                
246 Athanasius, Orations against the Arians, 2.20, in Anatolios, Athanasius, 115. Emphasis is 
mine. 
247 Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 1, p. 50. 
248 Ibid., 3, p. 54. 
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First of all, matter stands in a Creator/created relationship with God and as such it 
was important for the body of Jesus to be from “matter” (ὕλη). In this context, Athanasius 
uses ὕλη in a philosophical sense. In one meaning of the word, ὕλη is the stuff out of 
which something is made: clay is the matter out of which a bricks are made, and in turn, 
bricks are the matter out of which houses are made. “Matter” is a relative term.249 Matter 
is what survives change from one form to the other. It is what remains the same when all 
the properties (size, weight, color, etc.) are taken away. There is also a substratum to all 
things, which philosophers called “prime matter” that has no form and only really exists 
in specific things.250 While Aristotle and others considered this prime matter to be 
eternal, Athanasius maintains that God created this primal material substrate, which 
means that prime matter also stands as creation in relationship to the Creator. As he 
already stated at the end of Against the Gentiles, God’s very nature is such that God 
becomes present to and active in creation for creation. In this sense, the reason for the 
Incarnation is fundamentally grounded in God’s desire to bridge the difference between 
creation and God so that creation as a whole can flourish. Becoming the fundamental 
stuff of all creation thus signals God’s good and loving nature that manifests in action 
toward creation as a whole. In becoming a body the Word becomes matter: “Therefore 
the body, as it had the common substance of all bodies, was a human body.”251 
The question arises immediately as to what it would mean for the Word to 
become “matter.” Athanasius seems to accept a kind of Aristotelian sense of matter as the 
substratum of all that exists. But Aristotle’s definition of matter leaves as many questions 
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Aristotle,” Phronesis 19, no. 2 (1974): 168–88. For Plotinus and matter see his Enneads, 2.4. 
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as it might answer. He says that matter is that which is left when we take away all the 
properties like color, shape, and weight: “If all attributes are removed, nothing but 
material appears to remain.”252 Matter is that which transcends all individuals. Matter is 
“that which is in itself not a particular thing or a quantity or anything else by which 
things are defined.”253 In other words, matter is not something anybody can see, hear, 
taste, smell, or touch. According to Aristotle, we cannot even define it negatively because 
“the negations, too, would belong to it only accidentally” and matter has no “accidents” 
at all.254 What then is matter if it is not anything we can really know? For Aristotle it is a 
concept that explains continuity in a world of change, but it has no real existence. Ὕλη is 
pure potentiality. It is something we can imagine if we think away all properties.255 
Perhaps this is why, long before Athanasius, Irenaeus denied the existence of 
matter. The Cappadocian fathers, Basil of Caesarea (330–379 CE), Gregory of Nyssa 
(c.332–395 CE), and Gregory of Nazianzus (329–389 CE), denied the existence of matter 
as well. Basil’s statement is paradigmatic:  
These same thoughts, let us also recommend to ourselves concerning the earth, 
not to be curious about what its substance is; nor to wear ourselves out by 
reasoning, seeking its very foundation; nor to search for some nature destitute of 
qualities, existing without quality of itself; but to realize well that all that is seen 
around it is related to the reason of its existence, forming an essential part of its 
                                                
252 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
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253 Ibid., 1029a20. 
254 Ibid., 1029a25. For Plato, matter was something different. It was the way the Demiurge 
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255 This is what led Plotinus to argue that material existence is something of an illusion since all 
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substance. You will end with nothing if you attempt to eliminate by reason each 
of the qualities that exist in it. In fact, if you remove the black, the cold, the 
weight, the density, the qualities pertaining to taste, or any others which are 
perceptible, there will be no basic substance.256 
In Athanasius, by contrast, the Λόγος both creates ὕλη and takes it on in his body, 
since all bodies are made of matter. Matter (ὕλη) plays a rhetorical role in his theology to 
unite all creaturely existence. There is something unchangeable that underlies all 
individual physical bodies. That unchangeable element is ὕλη. But philosophically, it has 
no existence, and this is one reason why some of the early Christian theologians rejected 
the concept. This empty concept, according to Irenaeus, actually functions as a mediator 
between God and all individual creatures since it is this potentiality that God originally 
creates, not individual creatures. Matter removes God from individual creatures and calls 
into question God’s loving sustaining presence in this world. 
But ὕλη does more than this. Matter, as a “shadow upon a shadow,” becomes a 
synonym for the body. Because, according to Athanasius, what is unique to the human 
person is our rationality what ends up being real about the human person is our thoughts 
and concepts. According to Richard Sorabji, there is an early idealism in some of the 
Eastern theologians precisely because this idea of ὕλη is so shaky.  
Athanasius could have claimed that matter, as the underlying but formless 
substance under creaturely physical reality, is taken up in Christ so that it no longer 
functions as a mediator, as Irenaeus charged. The nothingness that is ὕλη is taken up in 
Christ’s body and the threat that it represents is neutralized. Athanasius says exactly this 
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about “nothingness,” though he does not apply it to matter. But matter is not “nothing” 
for Athanasius, but a real thing of some sort underlying all physical bodies, since it was 
“created out of nothing” in Athanasius’s theology.  
In terms of the Incarnation and creation, therefore, it is hard to know how the 
Word becoming or taking up “matter” does much good for a theology of creation. Matter 
is a far cry from the positive physical flesh we share with nonhuman animals. Matter is a 
step removed from direct contact with other creatures since it is an empty concept, as 
Basil of Caesarea argued. Moreover, when coupled with the idea that humanity is really 
defined by rationality the idea of the Word taking up matter starts to lose its potency. For 
if in reality “matter” is a pure concept to describe what remains the same despite change, 
but has no actual existence, then the “flesh” of the Hebrew Bible is reduced to human 
thought. Matter and flesh are simply not equivalent concepts. 
By contrast, Irenaeus argued that God created humans “taking the purest and 
finest of earth, in measured wise mingling with the earth His own power; for He gave his 
frame the outline of his own form, that the visible appearance too should be godlike—for 
it was as an image of God that man was fashioned and set on earth— and that he might 
come to life, he breathed into his face the breath of life, so that the man became like God 
in inspiration as well as in frame.”257 The earth that humans are made from is stamped 
with a form that is somehow divine. It was a common argument in early Christian 
theologians that our human bodies somehow reflect the divine image; whereas later the 
divine image became associated with our thoughts and concepts rather than the body. The 
mud and clay, the “finest of the earth,” from which God made humans is the same earth 
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that produced all of the living nonhuman animals in Genesis. This same earth is the 
precondition for creatures who can glorify God. This is not the pure potentiality of 
philosophical speculation but a story rooted in Jewish tradition and shows a kind of 
radical interdependence of all creatures. The concept “matter” is far less rich in that 
sense. 
Embodied Christology 
After arguing that God created the common element underlying all creation 
(matter) Athanasius then states that “we were the purpose (ὑπόθεσις) of his embodiment 
(ἐνσωµάτωσις).”258 By switching from ἐνανθρώπησις to ἐνσωµάτωσις, Athanasius 
signals a wider issue in Christology: by becoming human the Word also takes on a body. 
As I noted earlier in the chapter, Valentinians and some Marcionites had claimed that the 
Word became a “body.”259 Their chnage in terminology from “flesh” to “body,” however, 
signaled a theological shift away from earthly human flesh: Jesus’s body was not like 
ours. Athanasius shifts meanings as well, but not in a Gnostic direction. 
Here Athanasius seems to take up this idea and turn it around. The Word took a 
body, which is common to all created existence. Bodies are necessarily subject to death. 
He even affirms that the Son could have taken on a sidereal body just as some Gnostics 
had claimed. If God only wanted to become part of creation in a body, God could have 
done so “through some better means.”260 God could have become one of the “more noble 
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parts of creation” or used “some nobler instrument, as the sun or moon or stars or fire or 
air.”261  
But God was not trying to show off. Rather the Son came “to heal and to teach 
those who were suffering” because humans had sinned and had lost their way in this 
world.262 No other part of creation, according to Athanasius, had gone astray. “Neither 
the sun nor moon nor heaven nor stars nor water nor air altered their course, but knowing 
their Creator and King, the Word, they remained as they were made.”263 Humans alone 
have sinned. Such a picture hardly reflects a triumphistic view of humanity in relation to 
other creatures. 
Greek philosophers, Athanasius claims, “speak truly” when they say that the 
whole of creation is one big body.264 And since the philosophers affirm that somehow the 
divine has “come into the whole, and illumine[s] and move[s] all things” by providence, 
they affirm that the universe as a whole, as a large body with parts, is somehow a fitting 
way for us to know the divine. Athanasius argues that just as God can be known through 
the whole, so too it is fitting for God to become a particular part of the whole. For “if the 
part is unsuitable to be his instrument towards the knowledge of his divinity, it would be 
most absurd that he should be made known even through the whole cosmos.”265 Although 
the Word became human because only humans had sinned, God also touches every other 
part of creation, bringing redemption to the whole.266 As Athanasius stated at the end of 
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Against the Gentiles, the totality of God’s good creation needed God to become a 
creature so that God could overcome the nothingness into which all creatures slide. 
Athanasius assumes that the only way for the Incarnation to happen is through a 
particular part of creation. Humans have sunk to the lowest depths, and it was therefore 
fitting that God become human to rescue that which has fallen farthest away. 
Athanasius uses σῶµα throughout De Incarnatione Christi, which helps him to 
establish, yet again, a common creatureliness. The body is subject to death by its very 
creatureliness. Σῶµα is one of Athanasius’s more important words for the Incarnation. He 
uses some form of σῶµα 185 times in De Incarnatione Christi.267 Some representative 
statements include:  
ὁ Λόγος . . . ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ σώµατι ἡµῖν πεφανέρωται (1). 
ὁ Λόγος . . . ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ γενέσθαι καὶ φανῆναι σώµατι (4). 
ὁ Λόγος . . . λαµβάνει ἑαυτῷ σῶµα (8). 
ὁ Λόγος . . . ἔλαβε σῶµα θνητόν (13) 
The Word “appeared” and “took” a body: these verbs represent Athanasius’s normal way 
of speaking about the body in relation to the word. The Λόγος assumes a body to 
Godself, which is the part of humanity that is closest to us, according to Athanasius.268 
Anatolios notes that Athanasius here departs from philosophical tradition, which 
would treat the soul as that which defines our humanness, the body being its prison.269 
Here Athanasius makes the body the definition of humanity. When humanity turned away 
from contemplating God, we fixated on what is most properly our own: our bodies. 
Bodies are not evil as in Gnosticism. But fixating on ourselves does not allow the kind of 
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self-transcendence needed to live a good life. In focusing on our bodies and its sensations 
we then become trapped in a tragic cycle.  
The Word takes a human body to break this cycle of self-indulgence. Anatolios 
notes that the redemption offered in Christ is not one that transcends the body, which is 
what is “closest to us,” but one in which the whole person becomes oriented toward God 
and the body becomes divinized.270 So σῶµα has great importance for Athanasius’s 
Christology. 
But again, though there is a sense in which σῶµα could be equivalent to σάρξ, 
they are not the same. In De Incarnatione Christi, Athanasius only uses a form of σάρξ 
seven times. Three of these are in biblical quotations.271 Three others uses occur in 
chapter 37 and he uses the term once in chapter 40. It is σῶµα that dominates 
Athanasius’s Christology. Outside of this work, however, Athanasius does use σάρξ 
though again only about half as much as σῶµα.272 In Athanasius, σῶµα is what all of 
creation must have. It is the precondition for any relationship to God. The entire cosmos, 
he claims, could be said to be one large body. Σῶµα is never a synonym for human.273 By 
contrast, Athanasius uses σάρξ as a synonym for human. Here Athanasius is forthright: 
“For ‘the Word,’ as John says, ‘became flesh’ (it being the custom of Scripture to call 
man by the name of ‘flesh’).”274 And again in his letter to Epictetus, Athanasius writes, 
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“For to say ‘the Word became flesh’ is equivalent to saying ‘the Word became man.’”275 
Athanasius does not use the verb “became” with σῶµα as he does with σάρξ in 
relationship to the Incarnation, implying that the Word takes up σῶµα in a different way 
than σάρξ. 
In either case, both terms, σῶµα and σάρξ, have little connection to nonhuman 
animals for Athanasius. In the previous chapter I demonstrated that the Septuagint uses 
σάρξ in such a way to connect human life with all nonhuman animal life. The same could 
be said for σῶµα. While the primary translation in the Septuagint of רָשָׂבּ is σάρξ, 
sometimes the Septuagint translates רָשָׂבּ as σῶµα.276 In the Septuagint, according to 
Eduard Schweizer, σῶµα is a concept that is not very developed. It does not mean σάρξ. 
“For one thing it [σῶµα] does not have intrinsically the character of creatureliness or 
corruptibility or even sin. Angels, too, have σῶµα . . . but no σάρξ.”277 In the Septuagint, 
σῶµα does not reflect the “realm” of creatureliness or a part of humanity in distinction 
from another part. When Jewish apocryphal literature use the term they use it to mean 
human or animal bodies only, never plants or inanimate creation.278 
Athanasius, however, uses the term differently than Jewish Scriptures. For him it 
is a philosophical issue of how the immaterial and incorporeal can relate to the material 
and body. This is not an illegitimate concern, but it is not the focus of John 1:14. The 
language also changes from a common kinship in animality to largely a focus on 
humanity with some commonality in “matter,” which turns out to be a vacuous concept. 
                                                
275 Athanasius, Ad Epictetum, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, vol. 4, A Select Library of 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), 8 (p. 573). 
276 Approximately one out of every seven uses of רָשָׂבּ is translated with σῶµα in the LXX. See 
Edward Schweizer, “σῶµα,” in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. 7, ed. Gerhard Friedrich 
(Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 1971), 1045. 
277 Ibid., 1047–1048. 
278 Ibid., 1049. 
126 
 
Equating “flesh” with “human” in John 1:14 is equally problematic. In the first chapter I 
showed that this is not at all what John’s prologue did by using flesh.  
While it is true that the Word took on human flesh in the Gospel of John, it is 
simply not true that “human” exhausts the meaning of “flesh” in the prologue. Indeed, 
when Athanasius makes his statements about σάρξ being equivalent to ἄνθρωπος in John 
1:14, in both cases he citedsJoel 2:28, which declares that God will pour out the Spirit on 
“all flesh.” Athanasius takes this as a reference to humanity alone. But, in Joel 1:18–20 
we read this:  
How the animals groan! The herds of cattle wander about because there is no 
pasture for them; even the flocks of sheep are dazed. To you, O Lord, I cry. For 
fire has devoured the pastures of the wilderness, and flames have burned all the 
trees of the field. Even the wild animals cry to you because the watercourses are 
dried up, and fire has devoured the pastures of the wilderness. 
Joel is not concerned with humanity alone, and the term “all flesh” in Hebrew Scriptures 
quite often refers to all animal creatures. There is no reason to see it as referring to only 
humans in Joel 2:28 given what we read in the first chapter of the common human and 
nonhuman animal travails. 
To the extent that Athanasius speaks about creation he tends to speak in large 
sweeping terms, dealing with planets as more perfect bodies than human bodies and the 
universe as a whole body in relationship to the particular human body that Word 
assumed. Other creatures, creatures more related to human animals, get no mention at all. 
Again, I believe this has to do with his change away from the language of the Gospel of 
John, which says ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. It does not say ὁ λόγος ὕλη ἐγένετο or ὁ λόγος 
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σῶµα ἐγένετο. Both of these ways of speaking abstract humanity from their animality in 
ways that the language of σὰρξ does not because σὰρξ is connected with Jewish 
scriptural notions of רָשָׂבּ־לָכּ. Athanasius’s shift in language from σάρξ to ὕλη, when 
combined with the idea that humans have a special status because of our rationality 
(λόγος), undermines some of his best insights. 
It is easy, in sum, to see how modern ecological theologians would be drawn to 
Athanasius’s theology. His theology makes a clear distinction between God and creation. 
Humanity stands with all other creatures in this regard. The rest of creation will be 
delivered from suffering because of Christ’s work as well. But the change in language 
from a biblical understanding of the World became flesh to notions of “matter” and 
“bodies” and an exclusive interpretation of “flesh” as meaning “human” tends to 
undermine some of Athanasius’s best insights. 
Life of St. Antony and Following Christ 
Fortunately, however, Athanasius is better at showing what the Incarnation means 
with regard to human-nonhuman animal relationships. Later in his career Athanasius 
came under the influence of desert monasticism, and he was especially drawn to Saint 
Antony the Great. In honor of the ascetic master, Athanasius wrote Life of St. Antony to 
promote the discipline that Antony and his followers lived. In his own letters, Antony 
repeatedly refers to the spirit-filled life of prayer in the Holy Spirit and how it trains a 
person to overcome their self-centered temptations.279  
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Seemingly influenced by the Spirit-fueled vision of desert monasticism, 
Athanasius clarifies the Holy Spirit’s sanctifying role in creation in his Letters to 
Serapion on the Holy Spirit. He says: “It is in the Spirit that the Word glorifies creation 
(τὴν κτίσιν) and presents it to the Father by divining (θεοποιῶν) it and granting it 
adoption. But the one who binds creation (τὴν κτίσιν) to the Word could not be among 
the creatures (τῶν κτισµάτων) and the one who bestows sonship upon creation (τὴν 
κτίσιν) could not be foreign to the Son.”280 Strikingly, Athanasius speaks of the Holy 
Spirit divinizing creation as a whole. What we can see in this renewed interest in the 
Spirit is a view of the Incarnation that becomes more fully Trinitarian than Athanasius 
had been in his On the Incarnation. What the Word became and did was through the 
power of the Holy Spirit, uniting the Son to the Father in a kind of embrace that was wide 
enough to include every part of creation.  
For Athanasius, Saint Antony’s life is “an adequate guide in asceticism” that 
others should earnestly desire to imitate.281 Simply reading about Saint Antony’s life will 
help nonChristians to believe that Jesus is God and help Christians to more fully imitate 
Christ in this life.282 
Part of Antony’s discipline involved what Danielle Nussberger calls “a spiritually 
germinated vegetarianism” that trained a person to control “selfish human appetites that 
wage violence against the peaceable kingdom by halting its all-inclusive solidarity and 
thereby impeding union with God in Christ.”283 In Nussberger’s reading, Saint Antony 
                                                
280 Athanasius, Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit, 1.25. In Anatolios, Athanasius, 225. The 
Greek text is in Migne, Patrologia Graeca, vol. 26, 589B. 
281 Athanasius, “Life of St. Anthony,” in Early Christian Biographies, ed. Roy J. Deferrari 
(Washington D.C.: Fathers of the Church, 1952), 133. 
282 Life, 94 
283 Danielle Nussberger, “Vegetarianism: A Christian Spiritual Practice,” in A Faith Embracing 
All Creatures, ed. Andy Alexis-Baker and Tripp York (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 167. 
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embarked on a spiritual path of self-emptying that allowed others to be God’s beloved 
creatures rather than objects for Antony’s desires and plans. How Antony treated other 
animals—letting them be, not using them for his own passions and lusts (as food or 
entertainment, for example), and refusing to harm them even when they threatened him—
was an integral part of the monastic discipline of imitating Christ’s kenosis. 
As part of his Spirit-filled Christocentric life, Antony eschewed using other 
animals for food. Athanasius states that it was unthinkable that Antony would eat an 
animal. Instead he lived on a frugal plant-based diet consisting of mostly bread and water, 
but also vegetables and fruits. “His food was bread and salt; his drink, water only. Of 
meat and wine there is no need to even speak, since nothing of the sort was found among 
the other holy men.”284 But even in this plant-based diet, Antony did not demonstrate a 
tendency to lavishness. After all, it is possible to live on a vegetarian diet and eat 
extremely well with a wide variety of fruits, vegetables and nuts to combine. As 
Nussberger tells it, part of Antony’s discipline was to purge himself of the common 
temptation to see another as here for his purposes rather than having goodness in its own 
right as created by God. This certainly applied to nonhuman animals. But the ascetic diet 
extended even to his vegetarian diet. He refused, it seems, to satisfy his desires for newer 
and greater tastes and lived a contented life on what he could either grow in his own 
garden or on the bread and vegetables that people brought to him. (There is no hint in 
Antony that he would eat a dead animal if somebody brought it out of hospitality). 
Creation is filled with God’s good beings. Antony, it seems, felt he had no right to 
take “possession” of anyone or anything. This included the land upon which he lived. At 
one point in Athanasius’s narrative, Antony plants a garden in the wilderness where he 
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had gone to live. He raised his own vegetables because he noticed that people were going 
to great lengths and hardship to bring him food and he did not want to use them in this 
way.285 Instead, he grew vegetables for himself and to feed people who came to him, not 
using them for his own purposes but giving to them instead.  
Because he had settled near water, wild animals would come and drink the water 
and occasionally they would eat or trample the vegetables that Antony had planted for his 
own sustenance. So Antony caught one of the wild creatures. The narrative lumps all of 
them together and does not differentiate kinds. Was it a rabbit that Antony caught? A 
woodchuck? A deer? A bear? The narrative does not say. He caught one of the wild 
creatures and said to it and its companions: “Why do you harm me when I do you no 
harm?”286 Just as he did not want to harm his human companions, so too Antony sought 
to do no harm to the nonhuman animals that surrounded him. He did not seek to own 
other human and nonhuman animal creatures. Antony’s only weapon against even the 
more threatening wild animals was prayer: “at night they saw that hill filled with wild 
beasts, and they saw him fighting as with invisible foes, and praying against them.”287 
In telling Antony’s story, Athanasius recounts Antony’s daily habits with 
particular care and detail. Unlike his musings on the Incarnation, which do not really 
delve into the narratives as told in the Gospels and where Athanasius speaks in broadly 
philosophical and theological terms, here Athanasius speaks about a particular habit 
designed to purge the believer of self-centered behavior toward others so that they might 
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hear and experience God more fully. And this habit, Athanasius argues, is extremely 
worthy of imitation because it conforms to Christ’s life, lived in the Spirit in communion 
with the Father.  
Athanasius was aware that Jesus did not live in the desert as a hermit. Antony 
exhibited “a patient disposition” and was “humble of heart.”288 We are supposed to look 
at Antony’s “virtues” and discern “what kind of man Anthony, the man of God, was.” 
Antony did not fall into the trappings of fame and glory, even exhorting the emperors to 
remember “the judgment to come, and to know that Christ alone is the true and 
everlasting King. He begged them to be lovers of their fellow men, to show concern for 
justice, and to care for the poor.”289  
For Athanasius, it was the disposition that Antony exhibited toward others and his 
prayer life that truly demonstrated his Christ-like life that others should imitate. Antony’s 
virtues and habits involved an attitude that eschewed seeing others as his possessions, 
there to be exploited for his self-centered pleasures. So Athanasius ends the Life with an 
admonition to his readers about believing and worshiping Jesus Christ. Antony’s life 
provides a pattern of Christ-like behavior that lead us to contemplate the Incarnation 
because the life of the monks continues the attitude and disposition of Jesus.  
So Athanasius at first tended to speak of the Incarnation in broad strokes: The 
Father sends the Son to take up matter in a human body and lift up the basic “stuff” of 
creation so that the good work of God might not fall back into the nothingness from 
which it came. The Son becomes a human because humans have sinned and have 
therefore fallen to the lowest depths that a creature can fall. In these broad sweeps 
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Athanasius speaks grandly, starting from the “stuff” of all creation to the planets that 
orbit the skies. Very little about other creatures comes into Athanasius’s sight. The switch 
in language from “flesh” to “matter” and “bodies” in On the Incarnation allows 
Athanasius to bypass them. In the Life of St. Antony, Athanasius becomes more focused 
on the lived experience of God in a person’s life as he or she follows Christ through a 
Spirit-filled prayer life. The Incarnation, no longer cut off from the Holy Spirit, leads 
directly to an ethic of “letting-be” with regards to other humans and nonhuman 
animals.290 
However, it is not clear that this “letting-be” is really grounded in a real respect 
for nonhuman animals. Sometimes it is hard to tell the difference in the story between the 
wild animals and the demons with which Antony supposedly wrestled. Moreover, 
Athanasius’s change in language from flesh to matter and bodies signals a fundamental 
shift in Christianity more broadly toward an anti-Jewish position. In his Festal letters, 
Athanasius repeatedly expressed anti-Jewish sentiments. While these statements were 
directed toward Christians, and aimed primarily at Christian who disagreed with 
Athanasius, the characterization of “the Jews” in these letters is troubling:  
Therefore, my beloved, since we have our souls nourished with divine food, that 
is, the Word, according to God’s will, and we are fasting bodily with respect to 
external things, let us keep this great and saving feast as is fitting for us. Even the 
ignorant Jews received this divine food, through the pattern, when they ate a lamb 
in the Passover. But since they do not understand the pattern, they eat the lamb 
                                                
290 Coakley points us to Athanasius’s more Trinitarian view of the Incarnation in his encounter 
with asceticism, but she misses how this translates into a robust theology and ethic toward creation in 
general and toward human and nonhuman animals in particular.  
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even to this day, going astray since they are without the city and without the 
truth.291 
In this passage, Athanasius draws a distinction between Jewish practice and 
Christian practice: Christians no longer eat the flesh of a dead lamb on Passover, but the 
“flesh” of Christ in the bread and wine; whereas Jews eat a real lamb. This polemic, 
however, did not reflect reality. Many believers in the Messiah Jesus thought that Easter 
was a type of Jewish Passover, “suitably interpreted with Jesus as the Lamb of God and 
paschal sacrifice.”292 Moreover, in 70 CE the Romans destroyed the temple where the 
Passover lamb had to be sacrificed. After this catastrophe, Jewish rabbis reconfigured the 
Jewish celebration of the Passover without a lamb. The celebration would go on but 
without a lamb: it was the bitter herbs and other elements that would be central going 
forward. Athanasius’s polemic, therefore, was not based in a lived experience with real 
Jewish celebrations and practices. Instead he characterized “the Jews,” who became a 
trope for those who focus on earthly matters rather than the spiritual ones. To be Jewish 
was one thing, to be Christian another, for Athanasius.  
David Brakke argues that Athanasius depicts the Jews as clinging “to what is 
‘fleshly’ (terrestrial, material, temporal) while the Christians look to what is ‘spiritual’ 
(heavenly, immaterial, eternal). In other words, the Jewish Passover is ‘unseasonable and 
parochial’; the Christian, ‘timely and universal (ecumenical).’”293 This anti-Jewish 
polemic corresponds in some ways to his change in language from σάρξ to ὕλη. It is a 
shift from a deep rootedness in the Jewish story and its particularity to a more universal 
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philosophical story that Christians supposedly embody.294 Without embedding the 
Incarnation in the Jewish story, there is a strong temptation to lose the particularity of the 
Incarnation, and with it the universal as well. Even in the Life of St. Antony, it is not 
Jesus’s Torah observance that grounds St. Antony but something less grounded in 
Scriptural narrative. If Athanasius were less bent on attacking Jewish laws and practices, 
he may have found in them something that pointed to Christ’s redemption of all 
creatures. Athanasius does not draw out the radical potential in the Life. Antony follows 
Jesus by becoming a hermit in the wilderness and living at peace with the wild animals, 
much like Jesus in Mark 1:14, a passage I will examine in chapter 4. 
The Word Becomes Matter: Christian Philosophy and Anti-Judaism 
While there is much in Athanasius to admire and work from, the problems in his 
work only become stronger as subsequent theologians took on some of the ideas that he 
developed. In particular the idea that somehow the Incarnation takes up “matter” became 
a way for John of Damascus to interpret the Word becoming flesh.  
John of Damascus 
 Not much is known about John. Historians are fairly sure that his grandfather, 
Mansur ibn Sarjun, not only negotiated Damascus’s surrender to the Umayyad caliphate 
in 635 CE but also was in charge of fiscal administration in Damascus under the new 
Muslim rule. John’s father, Sarjun ibn Mansur, succeeded his father in the public office 
and John inherited the high public office when his father died. But John retired around 
                                                
294 Daniel Boyarin argues that this shift was fairly typical in the fourth century: “The place of 
difference increasingly becomes the Jewish place, and thus the Jew becomes the very sign of discord and 
disunity in the Christian polity.” Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 230. 
135 
 
706 CE to a monastery in Muslim-ruled Palestine, where he finally took the name “John” 
instead of his birth name Yanah ibn Mansur ibn Sarjun. John lived out the rest of his days 
as a monk and prolific theologian.295 
During John’s lifetime an iconoclast controversy began, lasting from 726 to 843 
CE.296 Somewhere between 726 and 730 CE, Emperor Leo III forbade churches from 
using icons in worship. “Icons” meant any representation of Jesus, Mary, or the saints 
“made from colors, pebbles, or any other material that is fit, set in the holy churches of 
God, on holy utensils and vestments, on walls and boards, in houses and in streets.”297 
Leo removed and destroyed an image of Christ that hung above a palace gate in 
Constantinople. In its place he hung a cross and the following inscription: “The Lord God 
does not allow the fashioning of an image of Christ that is lifeless and without breath, 
made of earthly matter despised by the sacred writings. Leo, together with his son the 
new Constantine, signs the royal portals with the thrice-blessed sign of the cross, the 
glory of all believers.”298  
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In this inscription Leo outlines three reasons for taking down the icons. First, God 
forbids images. Leo clearly has in mind Scriptural injunctions such as Exodus 20:4: “You 
shall not make for yourself an idol, whether in the form of anything that is in heaven 
above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.” Second, 
icons do not have life. The synod at Heireia (754 CE) elaborated this claim by stating that 
lifeless icons tempt believers to replace “depicting in ourselves the virtues of the saints as 
told in the writings, and thus becoming living icons.”299 Living humans are icons. 
Inanimate handmade icons distract from virtuous living. Finally, Leo III says that icons 
are made of “earthly matter” that Scripture “despises.” This reason seems to deny the 
goodness of all creation by making “matter,” the stuff people like Athanasius believed 
humans are made from, a thing from which humans need to be saved. Perhaps Leo had in 
mind older platonic notions that matter imprisons the soul and the goal of life is to escape 
from it and return to a more spiritual source. Leo does not say that, but given the history 
of the belief in matter as a prison-house for the soul it seems reasonable to infer that 
something like this lies behind the statement about matter.300 Shortly after Leo II banned 
the icons, John wrote Three Treatises on the Divine Images to articulate a defense of 
icons.  
The Three Treatises are really three different versions of the same defense. The 
second and third treatises lift word for word from his first treatise. The second treatise is 
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a simplified version of the first treatise, and the third is more of a systematic treatment of 
the issue than the first and second. Yet there are important differences. 
First Treatise 
John begins his first treatise by discussing prohibitions in the Hebrew Bible 
concerning idolatry and citing several New Testament passages that distinguish Christ’s 
revelation from that of the prophets in the Hebrew Bible. He then confesses that by 
worshiping the Incarnate Son of God, he worships the one true God who reveals love for 
creation in the Incarnation. Then John asserts the orthodox position that although it is 
impossible to make an image of God in Godself, it is possible and necessary to depict 
God as incarnate. After this, John begins to answer the iconoclast objections to images, 
which were largely based in Jewish prohibitions against idolatry. John’s first reply is to 
note that the Hebrew Bible was concerned with idolatry, not with images as such. The 
Hebrew Bible prohibited the people of God from worshiping creation rather than the 
Creator. He briefly mentions that this prohibition was necessary because Jews as a whole 
were prone to idolatry. He develops this argument at length in the second and third 
treatises, and it is one to which I will return. But it shows up even in his first treatise. 
John claims that Christians show respect and honor for certain special created 
things by bowing down (προσκυνέω [v.] and προσκυνητής [n.]). This veneration is not 
the total worship (λατρεία) due to God alone, and has a basis in Jewish veneration for the 
tabernacle and respect for other people. The old covenant allowed material images such 
as the tabernacle, the mercy seat, the utensils, the altar and its basin and other artistic 
elements for worship. All of these were acceptable though they were made of what 
iconoclasts like Leo called “contemptible matter.” In doing so, John said that his 
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opponents “abuse matter and call it worthless.”301 In response to the objection about 
matter, he cited Genesis 1:31, in which God declares everything very good.302 In addition 
to icon-like items in the Hebrew Bible such as the ark, the staff, and the mercy-seat, 
which all came from matter, John pointed to Exodus 31:1–10, in which God told Moses 
that Bezalel and Oholiab had been gifted with skills “to devise artistic designs, to work in 
gold, silver, and bronze, in cutting stones for setting, and in carving wood, in every kind 
of craft.” They would make the Ark of the Covenant and the other worship 
instruments.303 John also cited Exodus 35, in which Moses asks the Israelites to give their 
precious metals and jewels so the artistic elements could be made.304 John goes on to 
proclaim that if such lowly elements as color—made then from what we today call “earth 
pigments” because they were found in common and not-so-common minerals305—were to 
be part of the cherubim in the temple, then matter could not be “detestable.”306  
But John’s central argument that matter is an acceptable vehicle for seeing the 
divine is the Incarnation:  
Of old, God the incorporeal and formless was never depicted, but now that God 
has been seen in the flesh and has associated with human kind, I depict what I 
have seen of God. I do not venerate matter, I venerate the fashioner of matter, 
who became matter for my sake and accepted to dwell in matter and through 
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matter worked my salvation, and I will not cease from reverencing matter, 
through which my salvation was worked.307 
If people wanted to take matter out of worship, they would have to take down their 
crosses, shun the holy places, throw out their Bibles, pitch their Eucharist tables and 
elements, and deny the body and blood of Jesus itself. “Either do away with reverence 
and veneration for all these or submit to the tradition of the Church and allow the 
veneration of images of God and friends of God, sanctified by name and therefore 
overshadowed by the grace of the divine Spirit.”308 According to John, the Christian 
gospel cannot be separated from matter because the Son became matter and his entire 
ministry was in and through the material world. Scripture repeatedly attests to matter 
being good and useful for gaining knowledge about the spiritual world.  
The Incarnation, which bridges the ontological divide between the Creator and 
creature, is for John a crucial aspect of venerating icons. In Jesus, the created world has 
been united with God via Christ’s humanity. Therefore the material world is due respect 
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and honor because it is through this material world, says John, “that my salvation 
came.”309 
In other places, John speaks about the nonhuman world as having a great 
significance for our knowledge of God. For instance, in his greatest theological 
achievement, The Fount of Knowledge—consisting of three different books: the 
Dialectica, On Heresies, and On the Orthodox Faith310— John quotes Wisdom 13:5, “for 
by the beauty of his own creatures the creator is by analogy discovered” and Romans 
1:20, “the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being 
understood by the things that are made.”311 Though God is completely other than 
creation, God created all things out of an overflowing love and imprinted beauty, truth, 
and goodness in all things. As such, it is possible to see hints of the divine in created 
beings. 
Indeed, through the act of creation, God has made all things in such a way that by 
existing they participate in God’s goodness. There is no such thing as creation apart from 
God’s activity. John says, “All things participate in his goodness by the fact that they 
have being. For he is being to them all, since ‘in him are all things,’ not only because he 
has brought them from nothing into being, but because it is by his operation that all 
things he made are kept in existence and held together.” 312 God has created out of the 
sheer overflowing love within God’s own inner life. Because of this abundant goodness, 
God “was not content to contemplate himself, but by a superabundance of goodness saw 
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fit that there should be some things to benefit by a participation in his goodness. He 
brings all things from nothing into being and creates them both, both visible and 
invisible, and man, who is made up of both.”313 
The goodness of created things and the distinction between God and creation is 
the bedrock for John’s view of the Incarnation. If created material were “detestable,” as 
the iconoclasts have said, then the Incarnation itself would be impossible. God would not 
be Creator. God would not have fellowship with creation because it would be a type of 
second evil god rather than an expression of God’s goodness and love. 
Moreover, for God to become incarnate, God had to become a particular creature. 
God could not become creation in general or a species in general. In his Dialectica, the 
primary term with which John was concerned was ὑπόστασις.314 John says that there are 
two distinct uses of ὑπόστασις, which he draws from earlier Christian theologians. The 
first use means οὐσία (being), the second use means “the individual and the distinct 
person.”315 Greek philosophers, according to John fought about the difference between 
οὐσία and φύσις, but the church Fathers ignored the philosophers and simply 
distinguished between the common and the particular. The common they called οὐσία 
(substance or being), φύσις (nature), µορφή (form), and εἶδος (species). They called the 
particular ἴδιος (individual), πρόσωπον (person), or ὑπόστασις.316 John goes on to say 
that “substance which is devoid of form does not subsist of itself, nor does an essential 
difference, nor a species, nor an accident. It is only the hypostasis, the individuals, that is, 
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that subsist of themselves, and in them are found both substance and the essential 
differences, the species and the accidents.”317 In other words, the primary ontological 
reality for John and the Greek fathers was in the particular individual, not in the abstract 
universals like “being” and “species.” Species exist because there are individuals that 
share some common characteristics. In other words, universals like species only exist in 
specific creatures (ὑποστάσεις).318 
The Incarnation, therefore, has to be particular. God could not become a “species” 
in general or “creation” in general because these abstract universals do not exist apart fro 
individual ὑποστάσεις. For John, reality is fundamentally hypostatic; everything exists in 
relationship to a ὑπόστασις. When John defended use of icons this philosophical 
commitment was in the background: we do not start from universals and work our way to 
the particular. We start from the particular and see how the individual instantiates more 
universal and common things like species and such. John does not restrict the term 
ὑπόστασις to humans. He applies it across the board to all individual creatures.  
Second Treatise 
Though John used large parts of his first treatise to complete the second, there are 
some significant differences between the two. John stated that he wished to simplify his 
arguments. But he does more than this. In the first ten chapters, John argued that Satan 
invented idolatry, which had special power over Jewish people. John points to Exodus 32 
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and 33, where a Jewish crowd melted down their precious metals and made idols for 
themselves as Moses met God on Mount Sinai.319 Because Jews were prone to idolatry, 
John argued, Moses had to legislate against making any images. Jewish people were “still 
infants and ill with a diseased inclination to idolatry.”320 With the advent of Christ, 
however, things change. Christians know that it is impossible to make an image of the 
invisible God and also know that the Creator alone is due worship.  
John goes on to accuse the emperor and iconoclasts of Manichaeism. “You abuse 
matter and call it worthless. So do the Manichees, but the divine Scripture proclaims that 
it is good.”321 Scripture proclaims everything that God has created to be good. Since 
“matter is something made by God” matter is also good, according to John.322 If the 
emperor wants to call matter evil, he would need to say that God did not create it, or else 
say that God creates evil. Even Moses knew that matter was good and could be honored 
when he took up a free-will offering of “gold, silver, bronze, aquamarine, porphyry, 
scarlet twill and twisted flax and goat’s hair and rams’ skin dyed red and spices for 
incense and carnelians and precious stones for engraving and for the shoulder-piece and 
the robe.”323 Therefore, John said, Christians can honor matter by veneration. 
But John once again brings the Incarnation into the argument as the most 
powerful example. Quoting John 1:14—“For the Word became flesh and dwelt among 
us”—John states, “It is clear to all, that flesh is matter and is a creature.”324 Because the 
Son took on a body of flesh, which is matter and created, John says he reverences matter. 
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Moreover, the cross, the holy places, the “ink and parchment” of the Gospels, the 
Eucharist table, and the bread and wine of the Eucharist are all matter. The Law was for 
the Jews. The Incarnation changed things. 
Yet in the Tanak, according to John, God made an image and showed images. 
God made humans in the image of God. But God also used images to reveal Godself. 
“Abraham and Moses and Isaias and all the prophets saw images of God and not the very 
being of God. The [burning] bush is an image of the Divine Mother, and God said to 
Moses when he was about to approach it, ‘Loose the sandals of your feet, for the ground, 
on which you stand, is holy ground.’ If, therefore, the ground on which the image of the 
Mother of God was seen by Moses is holy ground, how much more is the image 
itself?”325  
Yet John once again falls into an anti-Jewish polemic, stating that Moses forbade 
Jews to make images. “Moses, on account of the hardness of heart of the sons of Israel, 
ordered them not to make images, for he knew their tendency to slip into idolatry.” But 
things have changed since the Incarnation and Christians “stand securely on the rock of 
faith enriched by the light of the knowledge of God.”326 In this second treatise defending 
icons, John has a much more thoroughgoing anti-Jewish polemic as well as a more 
developed anti-Manichaean argument than he did in the first. Even John’s argument from 
the Incarnation takes on an anti-Jewish tone in this second treatise. 
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Third Treatise 
The third treatise differs from the previous two in structure and format. It is a 
slightly more “systematic” presentation. In the first ten chapters of this treatise, John 
reproduces large sections from his second treatise. These sections vehemently argue that 
Christianity superseded Judaism. John then recounts his anthropology: humans, being 
body and soul, stand midway between heaven and earth. Based on this anthropology, 
John surmises that Christian faith mediates between heaven and earth.327 
Repeating from his first Treatise, John says, “We see images in created things 
intimating to us dimly reflections of the divine; as when we say that there is an image of 
the holy Trinity, which is beyond any beginning, in the sun, its light and ray, or in a 
fountain welling up and the stream flowing out and the flood, or in our intellect and 
reason and spirit, or a rose, its flower and its fragrance.”328 These statements lead John to 
claim that God was the first maker of images. He develops at length his brief statement 
from the second treatise that God made and used images in the Tanak.  
The Father “begat” the Son, “his living and natural image.”329 Here he grounds 
images in the Trinity. From this eternal image, God made humans. God also used images 
in the theophanies. Jacob wrestled with God, who appeared like a human. Moses saw 
God but only as a “human back.” Isaiah saw God as like a human seated on a throne. 
Daniel too saw God in the likeness of a human. But none of these prophets saw God’s 
nature. They only saw an image of the Son who would later become incarnate. Daniel 
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and Jacob saw an angelic being, and they venerated the angel. But “God did not become 
an angel, but in nature and truth God became a human being.”330 
Humans partake in the divine nature in ways that angels cannot, according to 
John, because humans consume the Eucharist. The bread and wine become the body and 
blood of the Son. This hypostatic union allows those who consume the bread and wine to 
“share in the two natures, in the body in a bodily manner, and in the divinity spiritually, 
or rather in both in both ways, not that we have become identical [with God] 
hypostatically (for we first subsisted, and then we were united), but through assimilation 
with the Body and Blood.”331 In this way, Christians are “images” of the Son in ways that 
are not open to other creatures. 
John’s Eschatological Vision 
One of John’s most powerful statements has to do with his claim that the Word 
became matter and a creature by becoming flesh. In the Incarnation God overcomes the 
most fundamental ontological distinction: that between God and all creatures. John uses 
this argument to defend the use of images of Jesus, Mary, and the saints in Christians 
worship. 
However, John does not argue the fuller significance of his own argument at least 
partly because he falls into anti-Jewish polemic. In the first treatise John speaks 
disparagingly about how Jewish people have adorned their temples and synagogues with 
“cherubim and phoenixes both inside and out . . . and also oxen and lions and 
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pomegranates.”332 But Christian churches have “much more valuable” images because 
Christian churches are “adorned with the forms and images of saints, rather than animals 
and trees.”333  
What John misses is the Jewish eschatological vision that might undergird such 
images in Jewish worship. For example, a synagogue in Meroth (in Galilee) had a mosaic 
installed on its hall floor in the early seventh century. The central panel depicts a scene 
with a wolf and a lamb along with a quotation in Hebrew of Isaiah 65:25: “The wolf and 
the lamb shall graze together.”334  
In addition to the creation-wide peace vision from the Isaiah 11 and 65, Jews 
sometimes depicted peace between and with nonhuman animals in other ways that were 
equally messianic and eschatological. For instance, a synagogue in Gaza-Maiumas 
installed a floor mosaic between 508–509 CE that depicts a huge lion bowing its head 
before the King David playing his harp. Nearby, a cobra peaks up its head to watch the 
psalmist.335 Next to the lion and cobra stands a giraffe. Giraffes, according to Moshe 
Barasch, were widely seen as “particularly tame and peaceful” and highlight the 
peaceableness of the scene as it stands next to an otherwise carnivorous lion and 
venomous snake.336 In the original mosaic there were likely other animals listening to 
David play the lyre, but the damaged mosaic now only shows these three.  
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Likewise, Jews at Dura Europos, a city destroyed in 256 CE, depicted King David 
as bringing a creation-wide peace to the world. In the middle of the synagogue, the 
congregation installed a mosaic that depicts King David playing a harp. Again, in the 
surviving mosaic nonhuman animals surround him and listen to the music. A lion and a 
dove are the only two that scholars can surely identify, but that is enough to see the role 
that nonhuman animals played in Jewish art and imagination sometimes.337 The scholarly 
consensus is that Jews had recast King David as an Orpheus-like character who could 
tame wild creatures by playing music. In the background to the art is the Jewish 
messianic and eschatological hope for a creation-wide restoration and peace.338 
Jews not only depicted nonhuman animals as part of an eschatological vision but 
also painted nonhuman animals to tell biblical stories. Noah’s ark and Daniel in the lion’s 
den are stories that require nonhuman animals to tell the biblical stories in images. 
Nonhuman animals also often appear next to depictions of the Torah in panels, which 
may also reflect some eschatological hope that when the Torah is fulfilled the earth will 
be transformed. 
Though John of Damascus derides Jews for depicting nonhuman creatures in their 
places of worship, such images were in fact not uncommon in Christian churches either. 
For example, the Church of the Acropolis at Ma’in, Jordan, installed a floor mosaic 
around 719–720 CE. Though only portions of the original scene now survive, the mosaic 
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depicted a lion and a zebu (a type of ox) near a tree. Inscribed in Greek above the scene is 
Isaiah 11:7: καὶ λέων καὶ βοῦς ἅµα φάγονται ἄχυρα (“And the lion shall eat straw like the 
ox”). Michele Piccirillo maintains that this scene depicts “the messianic reign of peace as 
foretold by Isaiah and thought to have been realized by Christ.”339 At least four other 
mosaics on church floors survive that explicitly depict Isaiah 11:6–8 and its creation-wide 
peace vision where predator and prey gather in harmony, leading archaeologist Rachel 
Hachlili to the conclusion that “This group of mosaics shows episodes in which pairs of 
animals that are acknowledged enemies are peacefully portrayed; they are depicted facing 
each other, accompanied by the inscribed verses of Isaiah 11:6 or Isaiah 65:25; the scene 
apparently illustrates biblical verses relating and emphasizing peace on earth. This is an 
unusual rendition, expressing a conceptual perception of a messianic vision of peace 
rather than a biblical story.”340 
Likewise, Christians depicted biblical stories such as Jonah and the whale, Noah’s 
ark, Daniel in the lion’s den, and Adam naming the animals in Genesis 2. Jonah and the 
whale is by far the most popular early Christian story for images, followed by the story of 
Noah’s ark.341Adam naming the animals, for example, is depicted in the North Church in 
Haouarté, Syria, which installed a mosaic somewhere between 486 and 502 CE. The 
mosaic is mostly destroyed but what survives depicts Adam surrounded by birds, snakes, 
a lion, a phoenix, and a griffon all of whom he gives names (Gen 2:19–20).342 Adam 
naming the animals is also beautifully depicted on an early fifth-century Christian 
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diptych. Lions, a leopard, a wild boar, an elephant, a donkey, a mountain goat, a stag, a 
doe, a bull, a snake, a lizard, a grasshopper, a fox, an eagle, and a small bird surround 
Adam, whose right hand gestures in such a way as to indicate naming them. At the 
bottom of the frame, four rivers flow through the garden.343 
In addition, two persons of the Trinity—the Son and Holy Spirit—have often 
been depicted as or with nonhuman animals. The single most popular way to depict the 
Holy Spirit was as a dove. This image appears in numerous Christian images ranging 
from early catacombs to later carvings of Jesus’s baptism.344 Moreover, Jesus was often 
depicted in ways that required other animals. In the catacombs and in later art Jesus was 
often depicted as the Good Shepherd, bringing home a lamb that was lost and carrying 
her on his shoulders.345 Another popular image for Jesus was to depict him as Orpheus, as 
Jews did with King David. In these depictions, Jesus plays music to nonhuman animals, 
pleasing and taming them.346 Yet another widely popular and very ancient way to depict 
Jesus was to substitute an image of a lamb for the human Jesus. This way of depicting 
Jesus drew directly from the Gospel of John, where John the Baptist declares Jesus to be 
“the Lamb of God” (John 1:29, 36; see also Rev 5:6, 12; 12:11; and 22:1).347 
John of Damascus missed these ways of depicting nonhuman animals not only to 
tell a biblical story but also to depict an eschatological hope for the renewal of all 
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creatures, including nonhuman animals, and even to depict the Incarnation and the Holy 
Spirit. To be sure, the Damascene thought it was acceptable to depict any creature: “we 
can make images of everything with a visible shape.” Only the divine nature is unable to 
be rendered into an image.348 Yet it is the realm of the saints and images of Jesus that he 
thought are the high and proper form of iconography. Depicting nonhuman creatures is a 
“Jewish” and “infantile” thing.349  
For John, God could not become creation in general. God became a particular 
hypostasis. God became a human. But John did not emphasize the particular enough. God 
became a male, Jewish human, and, as I will argue in the following chapters, these have 
special importance for how we interpret Jesus’s humanity. Just as God could not become 
creation in general, so too God could not become “humanity” in general but had to 
instantiate a particular hypostasis within a particular time and place and amongst a 
particular people. John does mention that Jesus came from the “tribe of Judah,” but this is 
within a discussion of his being born from Mary and having fully human and fully divine 
natures hypostatically united into one person.350 He gave no attention at all to the 
significance of Jesus’s Jewishness. He used the fact of his birth to show his full humanity 
and to defend a Chalcedonian Christology. But Jesus was a Jewish person within a 
tradition that looked toward a time when peace will run so deep that even lions, bears, 
wolves, and other predators will experience a transformation in their bodies to be able to 
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eat the lush vegetation God provides. Deer and lambs will no longer fear being killed and 
eaten. Humans and nonhuman animals will be able to live at peace with and unafraid of 
one another. 
Nonhuman Animals and Rationality 
However, John excluded nonhuman animals from eschatological renewal by 
denying that they could experience resurrection because they do not have “rational 
souls.”351 Human beings are rational mortal animals who die when their souls separate 
from their bodies. Nonhuman animals are irrational and simply die without the hope of 
resurrection. For this reason, humans who lack knowledge and who act contrary to reason 
are worse off than nonhuman animals because they will burn in hell forever rather than 
simply dying like the irrational animals.352 But nonhuman animals do not share in the 
resurrection because they do not have rational souls; they simply die without hope for a 
new life in God. 
The purpose of nonhuman animals on this earth is to serve humans in various 
capacities. Because humans are rational and are microcosms of the created order who 
image God on earth, humans should “rule like kings” over other creatures. According to 
the Damascene, God created everything for human use: “At the Creator’s command there 
came forth every sort of animal: creeping things, and wild beasts, and cattle. Everything 
was for the suitable use of man. Of the animals, some were food, such as deer, sheep, 
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horses, asses, and the like; still others for diversion, such as monkeys and such birds as 
magpies, parrots, and the like.”353  
For John of Damascus, nonhuman animals are good because they participate in 
the Creator’s goodness: “all things participate in His goodness by the fact that they have 
being.”354 In the Damascene’s view, the Christian doctrine of creation also includes 
God’s continued providential care. By God’s activity “all things are sustained and held 
together by the power of the Creator.”355 Following John’s logic about creation and 
providence, if nonhuman animals have inherent goodness by the mere fact that they exist 
and participate in God’s goodness and sustaining care, then it follows that God is also 
concerned for their continued well-being as Scripture repeatedly attests (for example, Ps 
104; Job 38–39; and Matt 6:26). God cares about these creatures who even in John of 
Damascus’s view can feel physical and emotional pain and suffering. It follows from 
John’s own view of creation, providence, and his limited view of what other animals are 
capable of (sentience), that a loving God would want them to flourish and lead joyous 
lives rather than to suffer. Therefore, even if John of Damascus were right that animals 
simply die without hope for resurrection and eschatological renewal, then it would seem 
all the more prudent for humans to make their short and hopeless lives as good as 
possible in our “kingly” rule. It would seem that Genesis 1:29–30, where God tells 
humans to eat a plant-based diet ,would be the best way to ensure this. Ignoring the 
Genesis passage does not really do justice to God’s good creatures. 
John of Damascus’s argument seems to be that because nonhuman animals lack 
rationality this proves that they do not have souls, which is the basis for the kind of 
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immortality necessary to participate in eschatological renewal and resurrection. But if 
eschatological renewal is a gift from God every bit as much as creation itself, then Jesus’s 
reconciling and redeeming work is the deciding factor of resurrection, not any natural 
human possession or attribute.  
Moreover, the Damascene unjustly denies souls to nonhuman animals. Even on 
the basis of Aristotle, upon whom John draws heavily, nonhuman animals have irrational 
souls, but souls nonetheless. The kind of soul a creature has does not necessarily dictate 
whether they participate in the resurrection and eschatological renewal. There is plenty in 
the Jewish and Christian traditions to argue for nonhuman animal souls. 2 Enoch 58, for 
example, claims that not only do nonhuman animals have souls, but also on Judgment 
Day they will accuse humans for the things we have done to them. Furthermore, 
Ecclesiastes 3:19–21 says, “For the fate of humans and the fate of animals is the same; as 
one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and humans have no advantage 
over the animals; for all is vanity. All go to one place; all are from the dust, and all turn to 
dust again. Who knows whether the human spirit goes upward and the spirit of animals 
goes downward to the earth?”356 
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John of Damascus certainly understood that Jesus’s particularity matters. But he 
abstracted the Incarnation from Jesus’s actual particularity. His Jesus was not Jewish. 
Because of this the Damascene does not emphasize the particular enough. His anti-Jewish 
polemics reflect a lack of understanding of just how important particularity is. His 
particularity is against some people and creatures rather than being for them. His Jesus is 
less of a light for the nations (Isa 49:6) and more of a polemic against the nations: nations 
here including human and nonhuman creatures.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at some patristic uses of the notion of the Word 
becoming flesh. Many patristic authors, I argued, used this notion within an apologetic 
polemic. Their purpose was to demonstrate that Jesus’s humanity was real. He had a 
physical body and was not a mere phantom. Nor was Jesus a “ghost in a machine” in that 
his divinity somehow filled his body like air fills a balloon. While these apologetics were 
necessary to defend the goodness of creation as a whole, these uses seem to have 
impeded more constructive theological ideas that could expand the idea of “flesh” to 
more than just humans. Yet the kernel for this move is already present in these authors as 
they argue for the goodness of creation based on Jesus’s physical body. 
Athanasius and John of Damascus are the theologians who began to take John 
1:14 in new and creative directions beyond apologetics. Their use of the Incarnation can 
broaden our understanding of the doctrine so as to include other creatures. I chose them 
because they explicitly speak about the Incarnation in its particularity as having creation-
wide implications and provide a way to speak that draws upon John 1:14. 
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For Athanasius, the Incarnation is best seen within an ontological divide between 
the Creator and creation. The first significance, then, is that the Son overcomes this 
ontological divide in order to deify all creatures and renew all to its intended purpose of 
communion with God. So he speaks about the Word becoming “matter” and the Son 
taking on a “body” well before he speaks about the Word becoming human.  
Giving priority to the rest of creation is a crucial move in Athanasius because the 
Word becomes human specifically because humans sinned. Our disobedience has left us 
far from God moving in the direction of nothingness, which is not fitting for God’s good 
creatures. Our sin has wreaked havoc on the rest of creation, and coming to humans is a 
way to restore humanity to its rightful place in communion with God. Through Jesus all 
creation will be restored. Jesus Christ, in this view, had universal significance by 
becoming the basic building blocks of all creation.  
Yet Athanasius largely ignored what this might mean for nonhuman animals. He 
focused on Christ’s redemption of humanity from the bondage of sin. He never really 
looked at what this might mean in terms of eschatological renewal for all creation, but 
given his debt to Irenaeus, who explicitly taught that creation as we know it would be 
renewed rather than recreated, and a great sign of this renewal would be peace between 
nonhuman animals, it would not be a stretch to say that he probably envisioned Isaiah’s 
peaceable kingdom in a similar way. Humans would be the first fruits of this creation-
wide peace, but the Incarnation is not limited to humans. Precisely in the Word becoming 
a particular creature to restore us from our lostness to communion with God, the Word 
takes up all the rest.  
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We begin to see this view come forward when he encountered the desert fathers 
and mothers in his later years. In his later writings Athanasius comes to a more 
Trinitarian account of the Incarnation, where he could advocate a specific discipline and 
attitude toward all other animal creatures based on a prayerful life of learning about one’s 
own self-centeredness and turning toward the other.  
Yet his anti-Jewish polemics abstract Jesus from the particularity within which he 
moved and breathed. By switching from the biblical language of the Word became 
“flesh” to statements about the Word becoming “matter” Athanasius abstracted the 
Incarnation out of its deep connections to nonhuman animals and the Jewish story 
connecting all creatures. Instead he opts to speak about large “bodies” like planets and 
stars, and does not indicate that humans and other creatures are interdependent in the way 
Hebrew Scripture does. By ignoring Jesus’s Jewishness, Athanasius impoverished his 
Christology and theology of the Incarnation, making it less helpful than it might 
otherwise have been for modern theologians. 
John of Damascus, likewise, speaks eloquently about creation participating in 
God’s goodness. He developed the idea of God becoming matter in some helpful ways 
when it came to defending the goodness of creation for pointing people toward God. 
Icons are literally made of the earthy “stuff” that so many iconoclasts explicitly despised, 
and that very “stuff” made up the body of Jesus Christ as it does every other creature.  
But John did not see how this view might translate into a more robust account of 
other creatures. Instead, he mimics his critics at times by dismissing depictions of other 
animals as “Jewish” infantile behavior, ignoring contemporary Christian practices and 
robust Jewish eschatology. The Incarnation, for the Damascene was largely cut off from 
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the Gospel stories and from Jewish eschatology. Once again, an early Christian 
theologian stands as a warning to all of us who would develop a theology for creation and 
nonhuman animals more specifically: we ignore Jesus’s Jewish particularity at our own 
peril. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE WORD BECAME JEWISH 
 
 
 
In the first chapter I examined the idea stressed by Andrew Linzey, David 
Clough, Elizabeth Johnson, Niels Gregersen, and others (each in his or her own way), 
that the “flesh” the Word becomes has roots in the Tanak, connecting the Incarnation to 
nonhuman animals in particular. Throughout the New Testament, when statements are 
made about the Word becoming flesh there is a larger-than-human purview that connects 
to a long story within Jewish tradition. So taking on human flesh is not necessarily an act 
that privileges humanity over other creatures.  
In the second chapter I looked at two prominent patristic theologians who took up 
the idea of the Word becoming flesh. Athanasius and John of Damascus took the idea 
from the Gospel of John and used it in more philosophical ways, often disconnected from 
the rich Jewish tradition. They spoke of the Word becoming “matter.” But flesh is not 
matter. The switch in terminology reflected a shift away from human connection to other 
animals at the same time that it reflected a de-Judaizing of the Incarnation. It is possible 
the two shifts are connected given how Jewish people have historically been depicted as 
“beastly.” The second chapter, therefore, stands as a kind of historical warning to 
theologians to work through the Incarnation’s particularities rather than pass them by 
quickly or outright dismiss them as unimportant. 
The Incarnation is specific. The Son became a Jewish, male human who lived in 
first-century Palestine. Do any of these specific aspects mean that we must limit the 
Incarnation’s significance to only specific groups? The scandal of particularity—
especially the Son’s humanity—seems to preclude including nonhuman creatures as 
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important for Christian faith. But my argument is that the Incarnation’s particularity 
opens up room for nonhuman creatures. This claim seems so counterintuitive that most 
theologians working on the issue have emphasized Christ’s cosmic lordship over Christ’s 
humanity. 
What significance for Christian life and doctrine, for example, does the fact that 
Jesus was Jewish have for Christian life? Did Jesus only come to save Jewish people or, 
at best, those who undergo conversion into the Jewish life and rituals (Matt 15:21–28)? In 
his monumental, two-book theological anthropology, Eccentric Existence, David Kelsey 
has no major reflection on Jesus’s Jewishness. One of Kelsey’s concerns in the work is to 
counter a tendency in Christian theology to view humans as superior to other creatures.357 
Yet Jesus’s Jewishness seems to have no role to play in Kelsey’s admirable endeavor. 
Likewise, David Clough, concerned to expand our view of the Incarnation in 
relation to nonhuman animals, claims: “even within the New Testament canon, the 
church argued about the significance of the Jewishness of Jesus Christ and of his 
disciples, but it eventually came to the conclusion that the religious identity of the 
incarnate God should not be construed as defining a boundary of salvation.”358 With this 
one statement on Jewishness, Clough moves on to broader concerns. Clough states his 
case negatively: “the religious identity of the incarnate God should not be construed as 
defining a boundary of salvation.” However, the New Testament Church, including the 
apostle Paul, concluded that it is precisely through the Jews and through Jesus’s 
Jewishness that non-Jews can be part of God’s salvation. Gentiles are “grafted” onto the 
                                                
357 See David Kelsey, Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology, vol. 1 (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2009). 
358 Clough, On Animals, 83. 
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vine already growing, according to Paul (Rom 11:17).359 While the New Testament 
church did eventually conclude that Jesus’s Jewishness does not exclude non-Jews, 
Clough may overlook ways in which Jewish particularity helps to make the case for 
expanding our view of the Incarnation in a positive manner.  
The Fluid Boundaries of Jewish/Christian Identity 
The first thing modern readers have to wrestle with in the question about whether 
Jesus’s Jewishness offers a positive impact on a theology of the Incarnation in 
relationship to nonhuman animals, however, is the notion that the boundaries between 
Jew and Christian in the first three centuries were fluid. They were not a binary 
opposition. Daniel Boyarin writes, for example, that “the evidence that we have for the 
presence of Christians and other sectarians in the synagogue and the efforts of the Rabbis 
to detect them and prevent them from serving as precentors suggests that the problem of 
‘Who is a Jew?’ was as fraught for the Rabbis as the question of ‘Who is orthodox?’ was 
for the Christians. Jerome’s important notice that the sect of Nazarenes are to be found 
‘in all of the synagogues of the East among the Jews’ and that they consider themselves 
‘neither Christians nor Jews,’ is highly revealing.”360 Boyarin notes that the 
Jewish/Christian schism was a later split read back into early Jewish history in the first 
centuries CE. For the first several hundred years (or more) a person did not necessarily 
                                                
359 I also wonder about describing Jesus’s Jewishness as a “religious identity.” Does Clough mean 
that Jewishness is part of some broader phenomenon called “religion”? By describing Jesus’s Jewishness as 
a “religious” part of his identity, does this not mark off his Jewishness as just some disposable set of ideas 
and practices that have no bearing on the rest of his life? Did Jesus have a nonreligious identity that would 
be more important that his religious one? Moreover, all the problems that come up with trying to define 
“religion” come to bear on Clough’s statement: what is it that Jewishness has in common with all the 
“world religions” that make them part of the same genus of religion? On the problem with defining 
religion, see William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of 
Modern Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 57–122. 
360 Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 17. 
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have to leave the synagogue if he or she believed that Jesus was the Messiah. Boyarin 
quotes Jerome in full noting that Jerome acknowledged that the Nazarenes who were 
neither Jew nor Christian in Jerome’s mind could confess the Nicene Creed sincerely. But 
the mere fact that they worshiped in synagogues disqualified them from Christianity in 
this post-Nicene faith.361 The question about Jesus’s particularity, therefore, is not about a 
binary between Judaism and Christianity, which are later constructions. Jesus’s particular 
faith and culture relate to the relationship between Jews and Gentiles. The question of 
how Jesus’s Jewishness may expand or constrict our understanding of the Incarnation 
relates to the particular way in which Jewish-Christian faith envisioned the good life and 
embodied that vision within the context of an ever-expanding Gospel from Jewish people 
to Gentiles. This particular vision may point us toward ways we can include nonhuman 
animals in our theological reflections. 
A further preliminary caution relates to how we conceptualize Jewishness. It is 
important not to homogenize Jewish people. Of the many expressions of Jewish faith, 
Jesus seems to have embodied some particular ways and not others. Scholars do not agree 
about what kind of Jew Jesus was. Second Temple Judaism had at least twenty different 
types, including baptist groups (e.g., John the Baptist); Essenes; Pharisees; Qumranites; 
scribes; various armed revolutionary movements; and many other groups.362 And, of 
course, each of these groupings had still further differences within themselves in beliefs 
and behaviors. Scholars still debate whether Jesus had more or less affinities with some 
                                                
361 Boyarin, The Jewish Gospels, 15–20. Boyarin ably demonstrates that even “the ideas of Trinity 
and incarnation, or certainly the germs of those ideas, were already present among Jewish believers well 
before Jesus came on the scene to incarnate in himself, as it were, those theological notions and take up his 
messianic calling.” Ibid., 102. 
362 James H. Charlesworth, The Historical Jesus: An Essential Guide (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
2008), 46. 
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of these groups. Perhaps Jesus and his disciples represented their own particular brand of 
Jewish life and adopted ideas and practices from a variety of Jewish people as they saw 
fit rather than fitting into any preconceived mold.363  
Jesus’s Eschatological Messianism 
The particular strand of Jewish faith and life that Jesus embodied may have more 
to do with a trajectory than a particular sect within Jewish faith. John Howard Yoder 
thought that Jesus lived out a particular vision of Jewish life that had large ramifications 
for interfaith dialogue as well as our ethical vision for the faithful life.364 
It was the Jewishness of Jesus, the rootage of His message in the particular 
heritage of Abraham, Moses, and Jeremiah, which as we have seen made it good 
news for the whole world. There were other peace philosophers and peace 
prophets in the Ancient Near East. Only the Jewish world vision, effective in 
Jochanan and the entire stream of nonZealot rabbinism which he catalyzed, could 
make of accepting powerlessness not only a viable compromise but an identity, to 
make Jewry, beyond the collapse of the Jerusalem polity, into a new kind of 
culture viable without a state. Only the Jew Jesus, by announcing and 
accomplishing the fulfillment of God’s promises to the Jews, could send out into 
the world a people of peace open to the Gentiles. Only the Jewish claim that the 
one true God, known to Abraham’s children through their history, was also the 
                                                
363 See ibid. 
364 I am using John Howard Yoder’s work with caution and a critical eye in this section. Given the 
public record in which it has been demonstrated that he sexually assaulted a number of women, I only turn 
to Yoder’s work here because I find it to have a unique contribution to the discussion. Having read much of 
Yoder’s published and unpublished work, as well as having edited several of his posthumously published 
works, I cannot completely disentangle my thought from his work. What I am offering here, however, is 
not an exercise in exegeting his work but in showing his contribution and limitation to thinking about 
Jesus’s Jewishness. He provides a particularly instructive example on both accounts. 
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Creator and sustainer of the other peoples as well, could enable mission without 
provincialism, cosmopolitan vision without empire.365 
For Yoder, because Jesus was enmeshed in the Hebrew Scriptures and Jewish 
tradition—out of all the other possibilities through time and space—his life, death, and 
resurrection have universal relevance; the Jewish trajectory he embodied expands to 
include everyone. Yoder wanted to avoid a supercessionist understanding of Christianity 
vis-à-vis Judaism and did not want to use Jesus’s particularity to exclude categories of 
people.366 We are unable to dismiss Jews as irrelevant after Jesus. For Yoder, the Hebrew 
Bible includes many different voices that generally point in a particular direction: trust 
God for leadership; do not put trust in any single human ruler; avoid the nations’ ideas of 
power and responsibility, which leads God’s people to unfaithfulness; embrace humble 
service as a posture of global witness; and accept diasporic existence as God’s missional 
stance toward the world.367 This particular vision for God’s people culminates with 
Jesus’s ministry and the Holy Spirit scattering the disciples.368 The New Testament starts 
with a particular story rooted in God’s relationship to a particular people.  
                                                
365 John Howard Yoder, The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited, ed. Michael Cartwright and Peter 
Ochs (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 75. 
366 Ironically, Peter Ochs lays the charge of supercessionism on Yoder as well. However, I do not 
know what he means by that charge with regard to Yoder. Simply because Yoder wanted to lift up one 
form of Judaism over others does not make him a supercessionist, but a good interfaith dialogue partner. It 
seems to me that Ochs mainly dislikes the diaspora model that Yoder put forward. But Yoder never says or 
implies that Christianity supersedes Judaism in such a way that Judaism should not exist any longer. See 
ibid., 40 and 68. 
367 For a similar summary of Yoder’s narrative based from the Hebrew Bible see John Nugent, The 
Politics of Yahweh: John Howard Yoder, the Old Testament, and the People of God (Eugene, OR: Cascade 
2011), 87. 
368 On the Holy Spirit’s role in Christian mission for Yoder see John Howard Yoder, Theology of 
Mission, ed. Gayle Gerber Koontz and Andy Alexis-Baker (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Academic, 
2013), 75–90. Of course, there are ways of living into the diaspora existence of Jewishness that do not 
include Jesus. Daniel Boyarin makes this point. So the difference Jesus makes to a diaspora vision that is 
eschatological becomes part of the discussion. Paul Martens charged that for Yoder, Jesus made no 
difference to the larger Jewish vision I am pointing toward. I think that charge is a bit stretched when 
applied to Yoder. He was not arguing that Jesus fit into a preconceived notion of diaspora, but that the 
trajectory of eschatology and diaspora Jesus inherited gets taken up and shifted anew with Jesus. For 
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This particular people has a particular task according to this vision: to be a “light 
to the nations” (Isa 49:6). At first this mission was passive: the prophets and even the 
early church in Acts expected the Gentile nations to come to Jerusalem to learn how to 
make peace and to follow the Torah. The nations would learn justice from Israel by 
coming to Israel. Johannes Blauw has deemed this view a “centripetal” view of missions 
because of the expectation that non-Jewish people would come to Israel.369 By their 
peaceful way of life in which everybody prospered and treated each other as equals 
(nobody ruled over anybody else like the Gentile kings), Israel would attract attention. 
They would be a lighthouse in a dark and stormy night so that people could find their 
way safely. By simply following God’s law, Israel would be an attractive example that 
other nations could follow and in this way other nations could learn what it means to be 
God’s creatures. 
From early on, therefore, Jewish Scripture narrates Jewish particularity and 
mission as related to the Gentiles. The Jewish mission was to tell the Gentiles who they 
are: God’s creatures, created in God’s image to love and serve others, not to dominate 
them. Jews would communicate this divine love by their very existence, first and 
foremost. Once their lifestyle and politics attracted attention, people would come to learn 
more. At that point, so it seems, Jews could speak about the God who led them out of 
slavery and set up this just and peaceable society. 
                                                                                                                                            
example, even in the Jewish scriptural vision of including Gentiles, the prophets still thought that the 
nations would have to come to Israel to learn peace. This was a “centripetal” vision in that everything falls 
to the center: Jerusalem. With Jesus and the church, however, the Jewish believers go out to the nations 
because the Holy Spirit pushes them, despite themselves, to do so. This is a “centrifugal” outlook. See ibid. 
Martens did not have Yoder’s Theology of Mission available when he wrote his book critiquing Yoder. See 
Paul Martens, The Heterodox Yoder (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012). 
369 Johannes Blauw, The Missionary Nature of the Church: A Survey of the Biblical Theology of 
Mission (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 38–41. 
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According to Yoder’s reading, the first-century community had this centripetal 
view of missions as well. Acts consistently narrates the early Jewish messianic believers 
as refusing to go beyond their borders, expecting an in-gathering instead. They never 
planned to go out to the nations. They did not set up missionary organizations. They did 
not have missionary strategy meetings on how to reach the whole world. Instead, the 
Holy Spirit pushed the early messianic Jews out of their comfort zones, despite their own 
resistance. It is at this point that the Jewish messianic mission to be a “light to the 
nations” takes on its full implications where Jewish believers would live amongst 
Gentiles as communities of peace and justice that followed God’s way in Jesus, attracting 
their neighbors by their lives. They were to live in the messianic age that Jesus had 
inaugurated, as colonies of peace in a world of violence. These early followers knew that 
their community was imperfect and that conflicts and other such things would arise. But 
they chose not to handle the conflicts with violence. Paul gave up violence as a way to 
resolve inner Jewish disputes and became one of the leading advocates for the new 
community. The community would be imperfect, but it would be a sign of the fuller 
manifestation that they expected when Jesus would return. The community, therefore, 
was marked by an eschatological character that moves from Jesus’s particularity to God’s 
presence to and with other humans. This is how Yoder describes Jesus’s eschatological 
messianism and the political community that witnesses to it.370 
                                                
370 Yoder may verge on characterizing Jewish identity as inherently pacifist and exclude that 
which does not fit his viewpoint. I am not sure that is his intention, but it might be an inadvertent flaw in 
his reading. But again, to hold up one way of being Jewish, one way in tension and dialogue with other 
ways, is not necessarily wrong. I am using this way of reading to say that Jesus stands in this particular 
tradition and particular way of being Jewish and not in some other way such as the Maccabees or even 
Jesus’s own disciples who sometimes seemed bent on violence. For a good reading on all of this see Alain 
Epp Weaver, Mapping Exile and Return: Palestinian Dispossession and a Political Theology for a Shared 
Future (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 66–82. 
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By focusing exclusively on human-on-human violence, however, Yoder ignored 
the way in which the Jewish eschatological vision has far more significance than political 
peace amongst humans who are in conflict with each other. Limiting the Incarnation to 
one particular creature is just as provincial as limiting it to Jews. God is not only the God 
of “other peoples as well,” as Yoder states, but as Job and many Scriptural passages make 
clear, God is God of other animals and ultimately of all creation. Yoder uses Isaiah’s 
peaceable kingdom vision from Isaiah 2:2–4, which speaks of nations beating their 
“swords into plowshares” and refusing to study war any longer.  
Nowhere in his published writings does Yoder use Isaiah’s more expansive, 
creation-wide vision in Isaiah 11, which says “The wolf shall live with the lamb, the 
leopard shall lie down with the kid, the calf and the lion and the fatling together, and a 
little child shall lead them. The cow and the bear shall graze, their young shall lie down 
together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. The nursing child shall play over the 
hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put its hand on the adder’s den. They will not 
hurt or destroy on all my holy mountain; for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the 
Lord as the waters cover the sea” (Isa 11:6–9). Nor does Yoder use the shorter creation-
wide statement in Isaiah 65:25: “The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, the lion shall 
eat straw like the ox; but the serpent—its food shall be dust! They shall not hurt or 
destroy on all my holy mountain, says the Lord.”371 For Yoder, Jesus’s expansive peace-
                                                
371 In only one unpublished essay did Yoder address creation care with any significance. He 
originally delivered this essay as a talk at a conference on Human Values and the Environment at the 
University of Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters in 1992. His talk, “Cult and Culture in and 
After Eden: On Generating Alternative Paradigms,” is published as “Are there Alternative Paradigms for 
Creation Care?” in Tripp York and Andy Alexis-Baker, eds., A Faith Encompassing All of Creation 
(Eugene, OR: Cacscade, 2014), 130–43. He does not address Isaiah’s vision in that essay either. 
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vision only includes our relationship with other humans. He completely ignores biblical 
and extra-canonical precedents for peaceableness with other creatures.  
But Isaiah’s expansive vision for peace has been important for some Jewish 
people. In chapter 2 I noted several congregations that had decorated their synagogues 
with imagery from Isaiah’s peaceable kingdom vision. Additionally, the Jewish Targum 
adds a new clause to the beginning of Isaiah 11:6, which reads, “In the days of the 
messiah of Israel peace shall be multiplied in the land,” clearly connecting the creation-
wide peaceable kingdom vision to messianic hopes.372 The Septuagint translates the 
Hebrew in 11:6, which claims that the wolf will “live” with the lamb, as the wolf will 
“graze” with the lamb. The image of a wolf having a vegetarian diet clearly hearkens 
back to Genesis 1, in which God’s intention for creation was peaceable existence among 
all animals. But the Greek is in the future tense; clearly looking forward to a time when 
the Messiah will bring increased peace across the entire creation.  
Isaiah’s vision inspired other such peace visions in which nonhuman animals 
lived in a state of peaceableness. For example, the Third Book of the Sibylline Oracles 
(163–45 BCE) states, “Wolves and lambs will eat grass together in the mountains. 
Leopards will feed together with kids. Roving bears will spend the night with calves. The 
flesh-eating lion will eat husks at the manger like an ox, and mere infant children will 
lead them with ropes. For he will make the beasts on earth harmless. Serpents and asps 
will sleep with babies and will not harm them, for the hand of God will be upon them.”373 
Philo, writing in the first century CE, also depicted a peaceable kingdom vision in which 
                                                
372 See The Targum of Isaiah, trans. J. F. Stenning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 40. 
373 “The Sibylline Oracles,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, ed. James H. Charlesworth (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), 3.788–95, p. 379. 
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nonhuman animals would live at peace with one another, and humans would give up war 
and domination of other animals. Philo describes a future where 
bears, and lions, and leopards, and those beasts which are found only in India, 
elephants and tigers, and all other animals whose courage and strength are 
invincible, will change from their solitary and unsociable habits, and adopt a more 
gregarious life, and, by a gradual imitation of those animals which live in troops, 
will become softened and accustomed to the sight of men, being no longer in a 
constant state of excitement and fury against him, but rather feeling awe of him as 
their ruler and natural master, and will behave with proper respect to him; and 
some of them, with an exceeding greatness of tameness and affection for their 
master, like Maltese dogs, will even fawn upon them and wag their tails with a 
cheerful motion. Then the species of scorpions, and serpents, and other reptiles 
will keep their venom inoperative; and the Egyptian river will produce those 
animals, which are at present carnivorous and which feed on man, called 
crocodiles and hippopotami, in a tame and gentle condition; and the sea too will 
produce innumerable kinds of animals, among all of which the virtuous man will 
be sacred and unhurt, since God honours virtue and has given it immunity from 
all designs against it as a proper reward.374 
Likewise, 2 Baruch, written in the first century CE after Jerusalem was destroyed, 
imagined a time when there would be “eternal peace” that would entail not only the 
                                                
374 Philo of Alexandria, “On Rewards and Punishments,” in The Works of Philo, ed. Charles 
Yonge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 89–90. There is a hint in Philo’s vision, however, of human 
superiority and domination. He does not say that humans will not harm other creatures, but that those 
creatures will not harm humans. Philo had taken up Stoic ideas of human superiority based on reason and 
language. 
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demise of disease and death, but peaceableness amongst people and with people and 
nonhuman animals (2 Bar. 73). 
Yoder clearly saw how the Jewish vision of the end should change human 
relationships with one another into peaceable living. But he completely ignored a long 
Jewish tradition in which the messianic age brought about a much wider peaceableness 
that includes other animals. But the trajectories and patterns Yoder sees for an ever-
widening mission apply to a more expansive viewpoint that can include other animals.  
The long tradition of interpreting Isaiah 11 in terms of eschatological peace 
carried forward from early times through the Middle Ages to the modern era. Some 
interpreters have seen the verses are purely figurative. Ibn Ezra (1089–1164 CE), for 
example, commenting on Isaiah 11:6 states that “This is a metaphor for peace that will 
reign in his time.”375 Likewise, Moses Maimonides (1138–1204 CE) interpreted the 
passage as an allegory for the world peace that would reign in the messianic era. The 
lions and other dangerous animals represented wicked people who would no longer harm 
other people.376 However, Maimonides allegorizes the animals by making them human. 
This allegorizing is part of a process of animal erasure that comes into Judaism and 
Christianity over time. The same applies to Ibna Ezra. By contrast, Saadia Gaon (882–
942 CE) interpreted Isaiah 11 in such a way as to deny that the messianic age had come 
since not only do nations still war against each other but predators still kill other animals 
to survive: there has been no change in their nature as the messianic age promises.377 
                                                
375 Abraham ben Meïr Ibn Ezra, Commentary of Ibn Ezra on Isaiah, trans. M. Friedländer, vol. 1 
(New York: Philipp Felheim, Inc., 1873), 60. 
376 See Yael Shemesh, “Vegetarian Ideology in Talmudic Literature and Traditional Biblical 
Exegesis,” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 9 (2006): 164n61. 
377 Saadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel Rosenblatt (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1976), 318–19 (treatise 8.8). 
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Rabbi Nahmanides (1194–1270 CE) and Isaac Abravanel (1437–1508 CE) also interpreted 
Isaiah 11 as indicating that predators would be transformed into peaceable animals. So 
the idea of a messianic creation-wide peaceable kingdom has a long and venerable 
history in Jewish thought, though it weakens somewhat with some major medieval 
figures. Nevertheless, God is the Creator and Redeemer of all creatures. 
So one of the primary reasons that Jesus’s Jewishness matters is because the 
particular Jewish view that God is Creator and Lord of all that exists—and that all that 
exists is good—serves as the bedrock for considering ways to include nonhuman animals 
and the rest of creation in the reconciling work that Jesus did in his life, death, and 
resurrection. This view of God as Lord of “all flesh” fueled the Jewish sense of identity 
as a “light to the nations” and is the particular vision that Jesus upheld, expanded, and 
will ultimately bring to fulfillment. This particular vision always had a larger-than-human 
purview and in particular saw peace amongst nonhuman animals and between humans 
and nonhuman animals as a central aspect of the messianic age. The place of nonhuman 
animals is therefore an important part of theological reflection. If we move too quickly 
past Jesus’s particularity we miss how the eschatological character of Jesus’s particular 
Jewish vision opens the door to creation-wide renewal, particularly amongst animal 
creatures.  
This eschatological peace is largely missing from deep Incarnation literature. And 
when it is there, it is not there as a particularly Jewish stance. It is important to note that 
this is Jesus’s specifically Jewish heritage because it is from this particular Jewish 
vantage that we move to the more “cosmic” notions. If we take the position of a deep 
Incarnation but start from Jesus of Nazareth’s particularity as a Jew, peace comes to the 
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foreground. If we start with Stoicism, by contrast, an anti-animal view comes forward 
very quickly. It is the Jewish community’s witness to the eschatological peace of the 
Messiah that allows the rest of the world to see the universal in the particular.378  
Jewish Visions of an Original Peace 
Eschatological peaceableness is not the only aspect of Jewishness that we miss by 
ignoring Jesus’s Jewishness. Jewish vision also pointed backward to the opening chapters 
of Genesis. In the first chapter we find a depiction of a God who created all of creaturely 
existence in an ordered fashion and does so by merely speaking. Biblical scholars 
routinely point to the Babylonian context within which Genesis 1 arose. The text of 
Genesis stands in stark contrast to the violent creation narratives Jews would have 
encountered at that time. For instance, the Babylonian myth Enuma Elish depicts a 
struggle amongst the gods, who are the offspring of Apsu and Tiamat. The divine 
children are too noisy for Apsu so he tries to kill all of them. But Apsu’s divine children 
kill him first. Tiamat, upon learning of Apsu’s death, wages her own war against her 
children. Finally, Marduk kills his mother Tiamat and uses her body to create the sky and 
the earth. He caused the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to flow out of her body. He created 
the mountains and established the bounds of creation. He goes on to create the sun, the 
stars, and the moon from one half of her corpse and sets them in motion. Once Marduk is 
enthroned as king of the gods, he kills Tiamat’s husband Kingu, and creates humans out 
of Kingu’s blood: “Blood I will mass and cause bones to be. I will establish a savage, 
                                                
378 In emphasizing the Jewish community I am not denying that individuals have their own 
particular witness. Indeed, sometimes it is the individual person that bears witness despite the whole 
community, as we can see in the prophetic books. However, these individual prophetic voices witness only 
in relationship to the community, however faithful or unfaithful the community may be. Even if the 
individual is only on the margins of the community, the margins matter. 
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‘man’ shall be his name. Truly, savage-man I will create. He shall be charged with 
service of the gods that they may be at ease.”379 Clearly there are direct parallels between 
Genesis 1 and the Enuma Elish that strongly suggest the author of Genesis 1 used the 
Enuma Elish. 
The contrast, however, between Genesis 1 and the Enuma Elish creation myth 
could hardly be starker. The gods of the Enuma Elish wage war on each other in a 
competition of the strongest, whereas the God of Genesis has no rival with whom to wage 
war. In the Babylonian tale, the universe results from war and violence, whereas all of 
creaturely existence comes about by the mere word from God in Genesis. In the Enuma 
Elish, humans come about as a result of divine violence for the purpose of working as 
slaves for the gods. In Genesis, God creates humanity in God’s own image and lets them 
be free. In short, the violence and oppression of the Enuma Elish is entirely absent from 
Genesis. To the extent that the Hebrew Bible uses the struggle against chaos themes from 
Babylonian culture, Jewish Scripture does so by depicting God as overcoming human 
military might rather than struggling with creation per se.380 So God’s peaceable 
relationship to the world is prior to and more fundamental than violence. In fact, the very 
creatures that are often associated in Ancient Near Eastern creation myths with chaos and 
violence such as dragons are, in the Genesis story, according to J. Richard Middleton, 
“part of God’s peaceable kingdom.”381 
This Jewish vision of an original peace, according to Middleton, has significant 
implications for how we think about human actions within creation. There are 
                                                
379 For the English translation see “Enuma Elish,” in Stories of the Beginning: Genesis 1-11 and 
Other Creation Stories, ed. E. J. van Wolde (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse, 1997), 189–94.  
380 On this see J. Richard Middleton, “Created in the Image of a Violent God? The Ethical 
Problem of the Conquest of Chaos in Biblical Creation Texts,” Interpretation 58, no. 4 (2004): 344. 
381 See ibid., 352-53. 
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implications for theological anthropology that I will develop in another chapter. But for 
now, the vision of original peace is what I want to emphasize. This original peace is 
perhaps most explicitly stated in Genesis 1:29–30: “God said, ‘See, I have given you 
every plant yielding seed that is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in 
its fruit; you shall have them for food. And to every beast of the earth, and to every bird 
of the air, and to everything that creeps on the earth, everything that has the breath of life, 
I have given every green plant for food.’ And it was so.” Carol J. Adams has noted that 
the parallel structure of creation in Genesis culminates with these verses. That the parallel 
ends with this peaceable intent reveals God’s intention for all animals to live at peace 
with one another rather than in competition and violence.382 
Jewish commentary on Genesis largely supports this interpretation of original 
peace. The Babylonian Talmud reports that Rabbi Judah (d. 217 CE) said:  
As to the first man, he was not permitted to eat meat. For it is written, “Therefore 
I have given you all the herbs, to you it shall be for food and to all the beasts of 
the earth” (Gen 1:29–30) — [herbs], and the beasts of the earth shall not be for 
you [to eat]. And when the children of Noah came, [God] permitted [meat] to 
them. For it is said, “[Every moving thing that lives shall be meat for you;] even 
as the green herbs [now] have I given you all things” (Gen 9:3).383  
Genesis Rabbah 34:13 claims something similar: 
                                                
382 Carol J. Adams, “What about Dominion in Genesis?,” in A Faith Embracing All Creatures: 
Addressing Commonly Asked Questions about Christian Care for Animals ed. Andy Alexis-Baker and 
Tripp York (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 4.  
383 Bavli Sanhedrin, 59B. The edition I have worked from is The Talmud of Babylonia: An 
American Translation XXIIIB: Tractate Sanhedrin Chapters 4–8, trans. Jacob Neusner (Chico, CA: 
Scholars Press, 1984), 171. 
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“Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you. . . . Only you shall not eat 
flesh with its life, that is, its blood” (Gen 9:3f). R. Yose b. R. Avin said in R. 
Yohanan’s name: Adam, to whom flesh to satisfy his appetite was not permitted, 
was not admonished against a limb torn from the living animal. But the children 
of Noah, to whom flesh to satisfy their appetite was permitted, were admonished 
against eating a limb torn from the living animal.384 
 While these passages support the idea of an original vision of peace that included 
nonhuman animals, there are Midrashim that suggest an original peace in a different way.  
In the Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 59B, one objection to the idea that Adam 
was a vegetarian was the claim that the angels tossed meat down for him to consume: “R. 
Judah b. Tema said: ‘The first man reclined in the Garden of Eden, and the ministering 
angels roasted meat for him and strained wine for him.’”385 The text even suggests that 
carnivorous animals like snakes and lions learned to eat flesh from watching all of this 
because they were jealous. As long as Adam ate meat that came down from heaven and 
not flesh from an animal he had killed, the consumption was acceptable. He had not 
broken the peace.386  
                                                
384 Midrash Rabbah: Genesis 1, trans. Rabbi H. Freedman (New York: The Soncino Press, 1983), 
278. I modified the translation to update the English from such words as “liveth” to “lives” so it is easier to 
read. 
385 Bavli Sanhedrin, 59B. The Talmud of Babylonia: An American Translation XXIIIB: Tractate 
Sanhedrin Chapters 4–8, 172. 
386 Perhaps this story would lend support for the idea of in vitro meat. In vitro meat is grown in a 
laboratory from the cells of a slaughtered cow much like a yeast culture can be grown to make bread. Aside 
from the initial culture, the meat that is grown has never been part of a nonhuman animal. The idea of in 
vitro meat and the “magic meat” some Talmudic rabbis argued Adam ate are similar to the extent that both 
try to consume flesh without breaking peace and causing harm to other animals. On the idea of in vitro 
meat see Tasmin Dilworth and Andrew McGregor, “Moral Steaks? Ethical Discourses of In Vitro Meat in 
Academia and Australia,” Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics 28, no. 1 (2015): 85–107; T. O. 
M. Foster, “The Meat Lab,” Popular Science 283, no. 5 (2013): 56–78 and Carolyn Mattick and Brad 
Allenby, “The Future of Meat,” Issues in Science & Technology 30, no. 1 (2013): 64–70. 
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Later commentators suggested that Adam was allowed to eat the flesh of 
nonhuman animals as long as they died a natural death. Adam was not allowed to kill 
nonhuman animals. Some later commentators even denied that nonhuman animals died 
before humans sinned; therefore, Adam could not have eaten flesh. Even after the Fall 
Adam was not permitted to eat animal flesh because that would have “rewarded” Adam 
for his sin. 
In most of these peace visions God did not create nonhuman animals for human 
consumption. Most Jewish commentators believed that God created nonhuman animals to 
serve humans. Genesis gives humans dominion over all nonhuman animals. “Were they 
not created for naught else but to serve me?” opines Rabbi Simeon ben Eleazar.387 Rabbi 
ben Eleazar’s comment comes within a larger discussion of what kind of work is 
appropriate for a human, suggesting that his view was in line with others who thought 
nonhuman animals were created to help humans with their work, but not necessarily for 
food. Sanhedrin 59B relates an objection to the idea that Adam was a vegetarian, citing 
Genesis 1:28 and the mandate to “rule over the fish of the sea.” The objector asks, “Is this 
not for the purposes of eating?” The Rabbis reply, to the contrary, that dominion has to 
do with labor and goes on to give some rather implausible example of how even fish 
work for humans.388 But there were other views as well. For example, one sixteenth-
century commentator, Rabbi Judah Löw, wrote that God created nonhuman animals for 
their own sake: 
                                                
387 Kiddushin 4:14. The Mishnah, trans. Herbert Danby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), 
329.  
388 Sanhedrin, 59B. In The Talmud of Babylonia: An American Translation XXIIIB: Tractate 
Sanhedrin Chapters 4–8, 171.  
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Everything, like grasses and fruits, were created for the sake of animals, which are 
flesh, for He gave them everything to eat, as the verse states, “I give you” etc. 
From this you see that everything else was created for the animals, while the 
animals were created in the world for their own sake. Even though animals serve 
as food for human beings, this was not the case when the world was created, for 
human beings were not permitted to kill an animal and eat it until the time of 
Noah.389 
The Babylonian Talmud tells a remarkable story about Rabbi Judah the Prince (d. 
217 CE), a highly revered rabbi who edited the Mishnah. A calf that was being led to 
slaughter ran to Rabbi Judah and hid under his robes, to which he responded, “Go your 
way, for this is why you were created.” Because of his compassionless response to the 
calf, heaven decreed that he should suffer bodily pain. He appealed to God’s mercy to 
release him from the afflictions, which he suffered for thirteen years. The Prince of Judah 
was only released from these sufferings when he prevented his housekeeper from 
harming and evicting a few weasel kits she found hidden away.390 Because he showed 
compassion for these helpless nonhuman animals he was shown mercy from heaven. This 
story does not teach vegetarianism, but it does show a general teaching toward being 
compassionate and not doing harm to other animals. Nothing could release this revered 
rabbi from his afflictions—which resulted from action rooted in a theological view that 
                                                
389 Quoted in Shemesh, “Vegetarian Ideology in Talmudic Literature and Traditional Biblical 
Exegesis,” 146. 
390 Bava Mesia 85A. The edition I worked from is The Talmud of Babylonia: An American 
Translation XXID: Tractate Bava Mesia Chapters 7-10, trans. Jacob Neusner (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1990), 31. 1.21–22. 
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nonhuman animals are created for humans—except an act of compassion toward 
nonhuman animals.391  
This vision of original and primal peace is integral to the Jewish notion of God. 
From the depictions of the origins and intentions of God for creation to the prophetic 
visions of creation’s telos, therefore, peaceable relationships among all animals is the 
ideal and that peaceableness precludes devouring one another. This peaceableness was 
already established as humanity comes on the scene according to Jewish Midrash on 
Genesis 1. God in fact consulted with all the nonhuman animals to create humanity: “the 
Creator therefore turned to the animals and said, ‘cooperate with me in forming a higher 
being to whom each of you shall donate a desirable characteristic. . . . the tiger, courage; 
the lion, bravery; the eagle, diligence, and so forth. Thus will man not only be akin to you 
but will also represent the finest in you.’”392 This deep kinship with other animals meant 
not only that other animals were invested in the flourishing of humanity, but also that 
humanity was responsible for treating its nonhuman animal kin with respect and dignity, 
which the Torah seeks to establish. If humanity were to be come “too pompous and 
proud,” according to the Talmud, “he may be reminded that even the gnats preceded him 
in the order of creation.”393 
Jesus stands in this peaceable vision of origins. Nonhuman animals even helped to 
create humanity as a reminder of their own best telos, according to some versions of the 
                                                
391 For a commentary on this story see Kimberley Patton, “Animal Sacrifice: Metaphysics of the 
Sublimated Victim,” in Communion of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics, ed. Paul Waldau 
and Kimberley Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 398–99 
392 Quoted in Noah Cohen, Tsa'ar Ba'ale Hayim—The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals: Its Bases, 
Development and Legislation in Hebrew Literature (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 
1959), 33. This quote would allow Jewish believers to accept evolution in a way that later Christian 
fundamentalists in the United States could not. The animals “cooperate” and “help” to make humans in this 
ancient Jewish Midrash.  
393 Quoted in ibid., 32. 
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vision. Humanity is not to dominate but to live in harmony with other creatures. Without 
a focus on his Jewishness and the particular way this ideal functions in Jewish life, which 
I will detail in the next section, we miss important aspects of the Incarnation as they 
relate to how we think about the Incarnation in relationship to creaturely life.  
Deep Incarnation theologians focus on the ontology of the Incarnation: Jesus’s 
body takes up all that “flesh” would signify and in the resurrection and ascension raises it 
all up to the inner life of the Trinity. This is good. But the ontological focus is not always 
well grounded in Scripture or a larger Jewish vision for peaceableness in creation. The 
Word takes up a story, and that story, from beginning to the end, is about God’s peace. 
The Incarnation, therefore, is a story of peaceableness primarily. When this relates to 
nonhuman animals we see an eschatological renewal and an original intent of peaceable 
action. By focusing squarely on an ontology divorced from the story, deep Incarnation 
theologians can largely bypass the way this story points toward peaceable action and 
living. It allows, in other words, a separation of ethics and theology.394 But the Jewish 
story does not make this separation the way modern deep Incarnational theology seems to 
do. The first chief rabbi of Palestine, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865–1935), says, 
“Peace in all realms of being is the concern of the heritage of the Jewish people.”395 The 
                                                
394 I suggest that even David Clough falls prey to this tendency despite his Barthian proclivities. 
By writing a systematic theology first in order to provide a theoretical underpinning for ethics, he seems to 
accept that theology comes first and is a separate issue from ethics. Not only this, but I am suspicious of the 
idea that we must first get all of our theological and dogmatic ducks in a row before we can know how to 
act rightly. Life is more complicated than that. There is no way to provide a firm and indubitable 
foundation for “right” action by means of doing theology “first.” The same might be said of biblical 
interpretation. The separation of disciplines here is problematic. It is not as if we must first get all of our 
theology and biblical readings exactly right, and only then can we really know how to behave properly 
toward other creatures. Why not reverse this at least sometimes: here is a creature looking at me, seeming 
to demand and call for my compassion, care, and respect. Now let’s do some theology and Bible reading in 
light of this gaze and otherness. Ultimately, I suspect Clough would agree with this even though his written 
work does not say it. 
395 Abraham Isaac Kook, “Fragments of Light: A View as to the Reasons for the 
Commandments,” in Abraham Isaac Kook, ed. Ben Zion Bokser (New York: Paulist Press), 310. In this 
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commandments, Kook argues, helped people to bridle their lust for blood and 
consumption and teach more positively respect for all life, with an ultimate vision of 
peace between all animal creatures, starting with humans refusing to consume their 
nonhuman animal kin. 
Law and Sacrifice of Nonhuman Animals in Jewish Tradition 
One of the greatest tragedies of Christianity is the way in which Christians have 
dismissed Jewish laws as legalistic hindrances to the Gospel. In particular, Jewish laws 
concerning human relationships to nonhuman animals of all sorts had vast ramifications 
for how Jews lived in relationship to other creatures and these laws relate specifically to 
the Jewish vision of foundational peaceableness. In the Talmud, Bava Mesia 32A–32B, 
the principle of not causing animals to suffer is explicitly promoted (in Hebrew the 
phrase is םִייַּח יֵלֲעַבּ רַעַצ, translated literally as “pain of living beings”). The law preventing 
cruelty to nonhuman animals, moreover, is not simply an optional rabbinic law. Rather, 
this law against causing animal suffering is based on the “authority of the Torah.” Laws 
commanding Sabbath rest for nonhuman animals (Exod 20:10, 23:12; Deut 5–12) and 
Proverbs exhorting the virtues of compassion toward animals (Prov 12:10) form the basis 
for the rabbinic teaching. Moreover, Rebekah was chosen to be Isaac’s wife because she 
showed kindness to camels (Gen 24:14–27). Jewish tradition holds that Moses was 
                                                                                                                                            
regard Mark Sameth argues that the Jewish diet is not an ethnic description but an ethical one. In other 
words, what characterizes Jewish habits is not he particular foods they eat but the ethical considerations 
that matter. See Mark Sameth, “‘I’ll Have What She’s Having’: Jewish Ethical Vegetarianism,” in The 
Sacred Table: Creating a Jewish Food Ethic, edited by Mary I. Zamore (New York: Central Conference of 
American Rabbis, 2011), 229. This book, published by the Central Conference of Jewish Rabbis, is 
characteristic of Jewish literature. Nearly every book of ethics in Jewish literature has something about 
treatment of nonhuman animals, including this 520 page book by Jewish rabbis, which includes  six 
dedicated chapters to animal welfare issues. Compare this to books by Christian authors who rarely have 
such chapters, including statement from conferences and bishops from Protestantism to Catholicism. At 
best one finds in this Christian literature random rare statements within larger tomes. 
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chosen to lead God’s people from Egypt after helping women water their flocks in the 
desert and later being compassionate to sheep (Exod 2:16–17): 
When Moses our teacher was tending the flocks of Jethro in the wilderness, a 
lamb scampered off, and Moses ran after it, until it approached a shelter under a 
rock. As the lamb reached the shelter, it came upon a pool of water and stopped to 
drink. When Moses caught up with it, he said, “I did not know you ran away 
because you were thirsty. Now you must be tired.” So, he hoisted the lamb on his 
shoulder and started walking back with it. The Holy One then said, “Because you 
showed compassion in tending the flock of mortals, as you live, you shall become 
shepherd of Israel, the flock that is Mine.”396 
The rabbis go on to conclude that the law of not causing suffering to nonhuman animals 
is so important that Jews are allowed to break other laws in order to avoid it, including 
the Sabbath laws and ones governing the festivals (Yom Tov).397 
What avoiding causing pain to animals means is that faithful Jews are obligated to 
be concerned about the welfare of nonhuman animals; it is not an added “extra” to Jewish 
life. In fact, one must be just as concerned with the well-being of their own animals as 
those of Gentiles: “One must get involved with the condition of a beast belonging to a 
gentile as much as one belonging to a Jew,” declares the Talmud.398 The rabbis claim that 
even if the nonhuman animal belongs to an enemy and one sees it in distress, a faithful 
Jew must relieve the nonhuman animal of its burdens and help her (based on Exod 
                                                
396 Sh’mot Rabbah, 2:2, quoted in Rayna Ellen Gevurta, “Kindness to Animals: Tzaar Baalei 
Chayim,” in The Sacred Table: Creating a Jewish Food Ethic, edited by Mary I. Zamore (New York: 
Central Conference of American Rabbis, 2011), 220. 
397 See  the Babylonian Talmud Shabbat, 128B. See other commentators on this cited in Gevurta, 
“Kindness to Animals,” 223n2. 
398 Bava Mesia, 32B. The Talmud of Babylonia: An American Translation XXID: Tractate Bava 
Mesia Chapters 7-10, 227. 
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23:33–34). The well-being of a nonhuman animal takes precedence over human 
animosities toward one another. This suggests nonhuman animals have intrinsic value 
apart from humanity. Indeed, based on Deuteronomy 1:15, the Babylonian Talmud 
claims that Jews are obligated to feed their animals before they feed themselves.399  
Concern for the well-being of and avoiding cruelty and pain to nonhuman animals 
is such a well-known aspect of Jewish thought that Noah Cohen has said that for the 
classical rabbis mercy and compassion for nonhuman animals was “categorical and 
undeniable . . . not a proposition to be proved; it was a postulate, it was axiomatic and 
part of daily living.”400 The Jewish tradition does not mandate vegetarianism, but it does 
mandate concern for their well-being in life and death. The break-away Christian 
tradition, by contrast, has far less concern and sometimes even sets up practices based on 
animal death that are specifically organized in opposition to Jewish practices, such as 
eating pigs on Easter Sunday. 
It is also well known that priests sacrificed cows, lambs, birds, and a few other 
nonhuman animals in the temple, as commanded in the Torah. This is an important aspect 
to note for the Incarnation because the particularity of the Incarnation has traditionally 
included the notion that Jesus was killed in some sense as a sacrifice. If his death is a 
sacrifice—which is one way to view it, but not the only way—then it is in a long line of 
nonhuman animal sacrifice, a depiction that Christian tradition has readily used and 
depicted. 
                                                
399 See Gitten, 62A. The Talmud of Babylonia: An American Translation XXIII.B: Gittin Chapters 
4–5, trans. Jacob Neusner (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 122. 
400 Cohen, Tsa'ar Ba'ale Hayim—The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals: Its Bases, Development 
and Legislation in Hebrew Literature, 70. 
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In general, scholars usually write about sacrifice as a universal religious 
phenomenon.401 But for the purposes of this chapter and argument, I will focus on the 
ontological status that nonhuman animals generally have within Jewish scriptural rituals 
with an eye toward the Incarnation. If Jesus’s death is a sacrifice, then Jesus’s human 
death is within the tradition of nonhuman animal sacrifice. 
Ancient Jewish writers bound up the notion of sacrifice with a sense that humans 
and nonhuman animals share a deep common life. Behind the Levitical laws about clean 
and unclean animals as well as which ones were suitable for sacrifice lies the notion of 
covenant. In Genesis 9, God made a covenant with Noah and his descendants “and with 
every living creature that is with you, the birds, the domestic animals, and every animal 
of the earth with you, as many as came out of the ark” (Gen 9:10). God emphasizes that 
this covenant is also one with other animals, repeating what was said in verse 10 four 
more times: “This is the sign of the covenant that I make between me and you and every 
living creature that is with you, for all future generations” (Gen 9:12); “I will remember 
my covenant that is between me and you and every living creature of all flesh” (Gen 
9:15); “the everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is 
                                                
401 I have questions about this focus on “religious” sacrifice as opposed to what? Why is it 
“religious” sacrifice to kill an animal at an altar and then consume it but not religious killing in a modern 
industrial slaughterhouse? Catherine Bell maintains that rituals are not actions separate from ordinary 
routines. Rituals are just ordinary actions that take on a kind of “ritual” involving formalism, traditionalism, 
disciplined invariance, rule governance, sacral symbolism, and performance. Modern killing and 
consumption of nonhuman animals is not something we normally thing of as ritualized religious activity. 
Yet a close look at the routinized killing in a slaughterhouse would reveal that the killing is formalized, part 
of a tradition of factory work, rule-governed and invariable (anybody can do these tasks if they follow the 
rules). It also has its own sense of the sacred. While modern Westerners denounce animal sacrifice to a god, 
it is not much of a stretch to see how nonhuman animals are “sacrificed” in an all-encompassing economic 
system that gives meaning to life every bit as much as the old gods. While a good sacrifice in Leviticus had 
very specific rules, a good sacrifice in the modern world is one that is the cheapest. Money governs killing. 
See Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). For 
a detailed look at how modern killing compares to ancient Jewish sacrifice see Wesley Bergen, “Animal 
Sacrifice Today,” in Reading Ritual: Leviticus in Postmodern Culture (New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 13–
26. 
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on the earth” (Gen 9:16); and “This is the sign of the covenant that I have established 
between me and all flesh that is on the earth” (Gen 9:17). Five times the text emphasizes 
that the scope of the covenant extends to both human and nonhuman animals.  
Earlier in the chapter God has given at least a provisional permission for Noah 
and his family to eat other animals. However, God forbade them from eating an animal’s 
blood, the sign of God’s animating providence in creation (Gen 9:1–6). Scholars 
generally consider this section of Genesis 9 to be from the P source.402 These verses 
struggle to depict nonhuman animals and humans as having deep connection while at the 
same time setting humans apart. Both humans and nonhuman animals share the blood 
that signifies God’s life-giving presence and care, which puts “every living creature” or 
“all flesh” under God’s protection. The ontological distinction between humans and other 
animals is quite blurred in Genesis 9.  
The P source continues to link humans and nonhuman animals throughout the 
Levitical laws regulating which nonhuman animals that humans are allowed to consume 
and sacrifice. Leviticus 3:17 and 7:26–27 reiterate the prohibition against consuming an 
animal’s blood. The Levitical laws regulating diet leave no room for unbridled human 
exploitation of nonhuman animals.  
Leviticus even forbids touching dead nonhuman animals that have not been 
properly sacrificed in the temple. Such regulations have nothing to do with 
                                                
402 See John J. Collins, A Short Introduction to the Hebrew Bible, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2007), 33. Judith Barad interprets this permission as provisional sense, in a literal reading of the 
narrative there would have been very little vegetation to consume after the Flood. See Judith Barad, “What 
about the Covenant with Noah,” in A Faith Embracing All Creatures: Addressing Commonly Asked 
Questions about Christian Care for Animals ed. Andy Alexis-Baker and Tripp York (Eugene, OR: Cascade 
Books, 2012), 13–22. 
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squeamishness about death or fear of contagions as some scholars surmise.403 Rather, as 
Mary Douglas states:  
In effect the rule against touching a dead animal protects it in its lifetime. Since its 
carcass cannot be skinned or dismembered, most of the ways in which it could be 
exploited are ruled out, so it is not worth breeding, hunting, or trapping. These 
unclean animals are safe from the secular as also from the sacred kitchen. The 
rule is a comprehensive command to respect the dead body of every land 
animal.404 
These animals are not to be used for fur and leather. Their bones cannot be made into 
combs and jewelry. Their inner organs cannot be turned into strings for instruments or 
purses. These laws stringently protect the lives of nonhuman animals declared unclean. 
Moreover, these laws protect the overwhelming majority of land animals from human 
killing and consumption. Douglas puts it succinctly: “To be classified unclean ought to be 
an advantage for the survival of the species.”405  
While the Israelites were wandering in the desert, to kill or consume an animal 
outside of the sacrificial system, according to Leviticus 17, was a capital crime: “If 
anyone of the house of Israel slaughters an ox or a lamb or a goat in the camp, or 
slaughters it outside the camp, and does not bring it to the entrance of the tent of meeting, 
to present it as an offering to the LORD before the tabernacle of the LORD, he shall be held 
guilty of bloodshed; he has shed blood, and he shall be cut off from the people” (Lev 
                                                
403 See, for example, E. P. Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah (Philadelphia: Trinity 
Press International, 1990), 145. 
404 Mary Douglas, Leviticus as Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 141. 
405 Ibid., 142. 
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17:3–4).406 The majority of rabbis interpreted this as meaning that the Jews wandering the 
desert were not allowed to consume the flesh of any animal unless it had been sacrificed, 
which limited their consumption severely.407 Jacob Milgrom argues that the passage 
certainly prohibited all nonsacrificial consumption of nonhuman animal flesh.408 
Leviticus 17:7 states that the laws in Leviticus are a permanent statute to be with 
them “forever.” This material from the P source probably did not last long, however. 
Deuteronomy 12:13–16 and 20–28 allow Jews settled in Palestine to consume animal 
flesh that was not sacrificed: “Yet whenever you desire you may slaughter and eat meat 
within any of your towns, according to the blessing that the Lord your God has given 
you; the unclean and the clean may eat of it, as they would of gazelle or deer” (Deut 
12:15). Deuteronomy 12:20–22 elaborates further: “When the Lord your God enlarges 
your territory, as he has promised you, and you say, ‘I am going to eat some meat,’ 
because you wish to eat meat, you may eat meat whenever you have the desire. If the 
place where the Lord your God will choose to put his name is too far from you, and you 
slaughter as I have commanded you any of your herd or flock that the Lord has given 
you, then you may eat within your towns whenever you desire. Indeed, just as gazelle or 
deer is eaten, so you may eat it; the unclean and the clean alike may eat it.” According to 
Milgrom, evidence suggests that the Deuteronomist relaxed the priestly law of Leviticus 
                                                
406 On the other hand, Philo may suggest that Alexandrian Jews sacrificed Passover lambs in their 
homes, and Josephus records a city council decree in Sardis that suggests Jews offered sacrifices in the city 
hall. Yet the evidence is much more abundant that Jews did not offer sacrifices anywhere but the temple, 
and with its destruction, the rabbis clearly reinterpreted sacrifice as referring to behavior and spirituality, 
not actual killing of animals. See James Rives, “Animal Sacrifice and Political Identity in Rome ad 
Judaea,” in Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries, ed. Peter Tomson and Joshua Schwartz 
(Leiden: Brill, 2014), 112. 
407 Martin Lockshin, ed. Rashbam's Commentary on Leviticus and Numbers: An Annotated 
Translation (Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, Brown University, 2001), 93n20. 
408 Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, 1st ed., The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 
1452–453. “This law prohibits all common, nonsacrificial slaughter and, instead, demands that meat for the 
table initially be offered up as a sacrifice.” Ibid., 1453. 
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17:3–4. Yet this relaxation does not give Jews free reign. They must still maintain the 
distinction between permissible and forbidden animals, and later rabbis strictly regulated 
this nonsacrificial slaughter.409 
Scholars regularly recognize the ontological connection that the Levitical laws 
make between humans and nonhuman animals by declaring that for an Israelite to kill a 
nonhuman animal outside the sacrificial system was simply murder: “In P’s view, until 
the time of the flood it was a capital crime to shed the blood of any animal; thereafter it 
was permissible as long as the blood was not ingested. Now that the Tabernacle has been 
erected, Israelites may slay sheep and cattle for food only as well-being offerings; if they 
fail to present the animal as an offering, it is as if they had slain an animal in the 
antediluvian period when such an act was considered murder.”410 Jacob Milgrom also 
argues that this legal pronouncement points Jews back to the “primordial law” in which 
humans were not to kill nonhuman animals.411 Likewise, Karl Barth extrapolates that 
killing any animal even in modern times is very close to murder. Barth says that a person 
is “already on his way to homicide if he sins in the killing of animals, if he murders an 
animal. He must not murder an animal.”412 This idea that we can illegitimately kill 
nonhuman animals that are not killed within the strictly regulated system of sacrifice 
explains why the laws even against touching an unclean animal are within a moral code 
in Leviticus that demands atonement (see Lev 5:5–6). Killing a nonhuman animal outside 
of the sacrificial system, for the priestly source of Leviticus 17, is as serious a moral sin 
                                                
409 See, for example, the extensive laws in the Babylonian Talmud, particularly those in the 
massive Tractate Hullin. 
410 Baruch Schwartz, “Leviticus,” in The Jewish Study Bible, ed. Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi 
Brettler (New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2004), 248. 
411 See Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, 1456–457. 
412 See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III/4 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961), 355. 
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as any other. The Deuteronomist’s prohibition on consuming blood and later regulation 
on nonsacrificial slaughter also point in the direction of taking seriously the killing of any 
nonhuman animal.413 
These are not simply ethical issues but doctrinal ones on the ontological status of 
humans and nonhuman animals before God.414 In fact, the doctrinal and the ethical are 
hard to distinguish here. Douglas chronicles the way in which modern English 
translations reflect biases against the purity and sacrificial laws of Leviticus as well as a 
view of nonhuman animals that is less than the good creatures they are. For example, 
many translations of Leviticus 11:41 use the English word “swarm” to describe a class of 
unclean creatures that “swarm upon the earth.” The connotations here are of creatures 
that menace and threaten.  
But Douglas brilliantly demonstrates that the underlying Hebrew word connects 
fertility and “bringing forth.” In Genesis, God “brings forth” creatures that “swarm.” God 
tells the creatures to be fruitful and multiply, using the same root term under “swarm” 
and “brings forth.” Unfortunately, as Douglas points out, commentators typically opt for 
                                                
413 I therefore disagree slightly with Jacques Derrida who claims that the Decalogue only prohibits 
homicide, and thereby sets up a Jewish structure in which the human has a self-designated transcendent 
quality. He is correct to state that the prohibition against killing has generally been most strident when it 
comes to killing another human. But Jewish law allowed for killing humans under certain circumstances, 
and the prohibition is general: Thou shall not kill. The direct object must be supplied if we want to narrow 
this commandment. So there is a way of reading the commandment that subverts the majority reading. The 
sacrificial system as a whole, I think, points in this direction. If we want to find a relaxing of the general 
prohibition it is in Deuteronomy 12. See Jacques Derrida, “'Eating Well' or the Calculation of the Subject,” 
in Points . . . : Interviews 1974–1994, ed. Elisabeth Weber (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1995), 279. 
414 See Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 150. Douglas is unequivocal that the issue of nonhuman 
animals and their status in Leviticus is important: “This is a serious and central doctrinal problem,” in ibid., 
135. Douglas charges that many theologians and biblical scholars have unjustly declared that Leviticus sees 
unclean animals as “abominations” that are somehow not the good creatures God creates in Genesis. These 
ideas pit the God of Genesis and the rest of the Tanak against the obsessive God of Leviticus. That 
Levitical God is supposedly obsessed with sex, purity, and food. Such views can lead directly to 
supercessionist Christian and Marcionite-like claims. For Douglas, however, Leviticus is not calling upon 
feelings of detestation or abhorrence. Rather the law is to avoid and shun, not to hate. These laws protect 
most creatures from human exploitation and recognize that theologically speaking, with Psalm 50:10–11, 
that every living creature is God’s. See ibid., 157. 
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a far more sinister interpretation that ignores its connection to fertility and abundance. 
Likewise, English translations that speak about some creatures that “creep” upon the 
earth have negative connotations in that the word connotes secretive actions like stalking 
and avoidance. But the Hebrew term has a much broader application. Even the ground 
can “creep.” In general the term simply means “moving” as a sign of life. Instead of 
“swarming” Douglas recommends “teeming” and instead of “creeping” she recommends 
simply “moving.”415  
With these far more positive words in English, we can recover the more positive 
Levitical sense in the prohibitions to touching a dead animal carcass. These translations 
connect with the signs of life that are so important in Genesis. “Tracing the idea through 
the classifications of Leviticus, teeming is fulfilling God’s command to multiply, it is 
fertility exemplified; the rule that teeming things cannot be presented on the altar derives 
from this fact. . . . Remember that the holy of holies is traditionally a place of fertility. 
There can be protection for, but no covenant with, teeming things. If they cannot be 
offered to God, it is that they are his already: ‘All that moves is mine’ (Psalm 50:11), 
which is: ‘All that has life in it is mine.’”416 The regulations in Leviticus are meant to 
foster respect for all life because God gives it.417 
                                                
415 Ibid., 163. 
416 Ibid. Douglas also thinks that the translation “abominable” is unfortunate and does not capture 
the positive connotations in the Levitical laws. Such a word connotes that some of God’s creatures are 
somehow inherently bad. She wisely recommends “to be shunned” because “contact with these creatures is 
not against purity, harming them is against holiness.” See ibid., 168, emphasis mine. Killing and eating 
these extremely fertile creatures offends God’s concern for fertility. 
417 Noah Cohen points, additionally, to some of the ways the Talmudic rabbis viewed the laws. For 
instance, Rabbi Yehuda apparently said about Exodus 22:30: “The Torah ordains that man not consume 
flesh torn by wild beasts, that the dog be given it in payment for its defense of the herd and flock against 
the wolf.” In other words, the rabbis taught that Jews should not only avoid causing harm to nonhuman 
animals, but learn to appreciate them as well. See Cohen, Tsa'ar Ba'ale Hayim—The Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals: Its Bases, Development and Legislation in Hebrew Literature, 51–52. 
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Douglas also argues that the translation “abominable” in the purity codes 
regarding nonhuman animals is unfortunate. The English term “abominable” does not 
capture the positive connotations in the Levitical laws. This word connotes that some of 
God’s creatures are somehow inherently bad. She wisely recommends “to be shunned” 
because “contact with these creatures is not against purity, harming them is against 
holiness.”418 Killing and eating these extremely fertile creatures offends God’s concern 
for fertility. The emphasis in Leviticus is on God’s love and mercy toward creatures by 
telling humans to avoid teeming creatures. These are important insights into the status of 
forbidden animals as good and protected by God’s law. Unclean animals are not 
ontologically evil or abominable.  
Permissible animals have an even more interesting ontological status, however. 
The distinction between permissible and forbidden animals is not between morally good 
and evil creatures or ontologically detestable creatures and animals deemed “good.” 
Permissible animals are the ones that humans must bring to the temple and offer as 
sacrifices. Permissible animals are very limited. Cattle, sheep, and goats as well as a few 
species of domesticated birds make up the potentially clean animals for sacrifice. All 
other domestic and wild animals are forbidden. Jonathan Klawans points out that 
“Israel’s sacrificial offerings involved animals that are by nature docile, defenseless, and 
communal (living and reproducing in flocks and herds).”419 If Jesus’s death is in 
continuity with the ancient Jewish notion of sacrifice, then his death is as one of the 
                                                
418 See Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 168. Emphasis is mine. 
419 Jonathan Klawans, “Sacrifice in Ancient Israel: Pure Bodies, Domesticated Animals, and the 
Divine Shepherd,” in A Communion of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics, ed. Paul Waldau 
and Kimberley Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 70. 
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“docile, defenseless, and communal” nonhuman animals that the Tanak sees fit for 
sacrifice. 
Klawans also argues that Tanak animal sacrifices functioned within a theological 
drama in which Israel was to the sacrificial animals as God was to Israel. That is, Israel 
imitated God in its sacrificial system. The shepherd creates a bond with his flock and 
knows them extremely well. Only a few animals out of flock would be without blemish, 
and the good shepherd would try to keep blemishes (wounds, becoming lame, etc.) from 
occurring. Moreover, since a mother and her child could not be sacrificed together, the 
shepherd would have to pay close attention to the familial relationships in his flock, 
knowing the sheep and lambs intimately.420 Moreover, Klawans argues, the shepherd 
himself must be ritually pure. Though some scholars have argued that this is a function of 
“death avoidance,” Klawans argues that the ritual purity is better understood as a 
heightened sense of the divine: the offerer must be ritually pure because God is pure.421 
Klawans points to ancient Jewish language of God as a shepherd and Israel as 
God’s flock.422 Psalm 23, for example, provides a good example of a pervasive idea in 
the Tanak: 
The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want.  
He makes me lie down in green pastures;  
he leads me beside still waters; 
he restores my soul. 
He leads me in right paths 
for his name’s sake.  
                                                
420 Ibid., 71. 
421 Ibid., 68. 
422 See ibid., 70. 
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Even though I walk through the darkest valley, 
I fear no evil;  
for you are with me; your rod and your staff— 
they comfort me. (Ps 23:1-4)423 
The intimate relationship between a shepherd and each individual sheep is here depicted 
as a relationship between God, the divine shepherd, and Jewish people, God’s sheep. The 
Psalmist here imagines himself as a sheep in a flock. Is he a sheep without blemish who 
will end up on the altar? Some Psalms admit sin and therefore blemish. But more 
significantly, as a nation Israel was to be “docile, defenseless, and communal” trusting in 
God alone for their security.424 To characterize the sacrificial animals as docile, 
defenseless, and communal is to describe their way of living, not their manner of death 
by itself.425 
Jesus’s Death as an Animal Sacrifice 
Understanding Jesus’s death within the framework of a sacrificial lamb is a very 
fruitful task for those of us concerned about how Christian theology views nonhuman 
animals. The Gospel of John in particular depicts Jesus’s death as an animal sacrifice. 
Jesus’s bones remained intact as Exodus 12 required (Exod 12:46; John 19:33, 36). 
Jesus’s body was taken away before the next day (Exod 12:10; John 19:31). Jesus was 
offered liquid on a branch of hyssop, the same plant used to smear the lamb’s blood over 
the door at Passover (Exod 12:22; John 19:29). David Clough notes, “Jesus’s body is 
pierced with a spear (John 19:34) just as the body of the Passover lamb would have been 
                                                
423 See also Gen 49:24; Pss 44:12, 23, 40:11, 49:10–11, 53:7, 63:13–14; Jer 12:3, 13:17, 23:3–4, 
31:10, 50:19, 40; Ezek 34:13–16; Hos 4:16; Mic 2:12, 7:14. 
424 This is my point, not Klawans’s. 
425 Again, this is my point rather than Klawans’s. 
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pierced to be roasted over the fire (Exod 12:9).”426 Many biblical scholars argue that 
Jesus died at the exact time that lambs would have been killed in the Temple.427  
Seeing the Incarnation in this way has a number of implications for theology. First 
of all, Mary Douglas has pointed us to the fact that the sacrificial system of ancient Israel 
actually protected the vast majority of species from human (and largely male) aggression 
and exploitation. Only a few species were fit for sacrifice and only a few individuals 
within those species could ever be offered.428 
In light of these severe restrictions, several biblical scholars have claimed that one 
function of the sacrificial system may very well be that it pointed Israel back to the 
peaceable vision found in Genesis 2, where humans and animals live in relative harmony 
and to Genesis 1:28, where all humans and nonhuman animals are given plants for their 
diet. Walter Houston claims that “Between the utopian vegetarianism of the original 
creation intention . . . and the unrestrained violence of the Flood period, the restricted diet 
laid down for Israel in the Torah can be seen as a mediating line accepting the human 
craving for flesh but restraining it sufficiently to enable God to dwell in the midst of his 
people.”429 Likewise,  Jacob Milgrom argues that the dietary laws in Leviticus were 
specifically meant to remind Israel of the vegetarian ideal. Milgrom interprets the 
prohibition against consuming a nonhuman animal’s blood in Leviticus 17 in the context 
                                                
426 Clough, On Animals, 128. 
427 See Dorothy Lee, “Paschal Imagery in the Gospel of John: A Narrative and Symbolic 
Reading,” Pacifica 24, no. 1 (2011): 25. 
428 The vast majority of Jews living away from Judea would have experienced animal sacrifice 
only upon a visit to Jerusalem, and for most people that, as one scholar notes, “would no doubt have been a 
once-in-a-lifetime event . . . something that even the wealthy would not have done frequently.” Rives, 
“Animal Sacrifice and Political Identity in Rome ad Judaea,” 113. 
429 Walter Houston, “What Was the Meaning of Classifying Animals as Clean or Unclean?,” in 
Animals on the Agenda, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (London: SCM, 1998), 24. See also 
his statement in another essay: “the dietary laws mediate the contradiction between the ideal of a non-
violent world and the fact of unrestrained violence against animals.” Walter Houston, Purity and 
Monotheism: Clean and Unclean Animals in Biblical Law (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 77. 
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of the original vegetarian ideal and the subsequent “concession” after the flood to 
consuming animal flesh. The concession is in the form of a law that no human should 
consume an animal’s blood (Gen 9:3-4). In the case of Israel, there is further restriction 
than this, according to Milgrom. Animals must be brought to the sanctuary for sacrifice. 
If this is not done, “Leviticus contains the clear, unambiguous statement that whoever 
slaughters an ox, sheep, or goat anywhere except at the authorized sanctuary is guilty of 
murder (17:3–4.)”430 Only by pouring out the blood and giving the life back to God can a 
human be acquitted of illicitly killing a nonhuman animal according to Leviticus 17 (and 
Deuteronomy 12 also prohibits consuming blood), which, according to Milgrom, reminds 
Israel that flesh-eating is not God’s intention for human or nonhuman animal creation. 
If the sacrificial system protected most nonhuman animals from human (and 
again, largely male) violence, and if the sacrifices themselves were reminders of the 
peaceable kingdom ideal in Genesis 1, then understanding Jesus’s sacrifice within this 
framework becomes crucial. Christians have long interpreted Jesus’s death as an animal 
sacrifice. Paul calls Jesus’s death τὸ πάσχα (1 Cor 5:7). The Gospel of John, as noted, 
repeatedly compares Jesus’s passion with the slaughter of lambs at the Passover. In 
Christian art, Christians have routinely depicted aspects of the passion as directly 
comparable to the slaughter of nonhuman animals at the temple. For example, in the 
twelfth-century Mosan Floreffe Bible, an illuminated manuscript, Jesus’s crucifixion is 
depicted above the sacrifice of a calf directly below with the inscription: “For the blemish 
of sin a calf is given, worship’s sacrifice; this inscription teaches that Christ is the 
                                                
430 Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 251. 
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calf.”431 In these and other renditions Jesus is pulled and pushed over a “rough and stony 
way” as a sacrificial animal (Deut 21:3–4). Jesus is dragged, pushed, and kicked. He is 
led by ropes. Morrow notes that in one twelfth-century tract from the Netherlands Jesus is 
depicted as being pushed so hard that his feet did not even touch the ground on the way to 
the cross, a reference to Jeremiah 11:19 in the Vulgate: Ego quasi agnus mansuetus qui 
portatur ad victimam (I was like a gentle lamb that is carried to be a victim).432 
So understanding Jesus’s death as an animal sacrifice of sorts is not unheard of in 
Christian tradition. But what I want to highlight is that if the sacrifices spared most 
species and pointed Jewish people back to God’s peaceable kingdom intentions, then 
Jesus’s crucifixion within that system of animal sacrifice does something similar. The 
Epistle to the Hebrews maintains that Jesus’s death ends all animal sacrifice and cleanses 
those who believe from sin (Heb. 10:1–18). Jesus’s death does not just end the need for 
sacrifices to cover human sin but spares the lives of other creatures, pointing humans, by 
means of this single sacrifice, back to the original vegetarian vision of Genesis and 
forward to the peaceable kingdom of Isaiah 11 and 65 in Jewish eschatology.  
 I will return to Jesus’s death and the notion of sacrifice in another chapter dealing 
with Jesus’s maleness and humanity, but in this chapter Jesus’s death functions in a 
particular Jewish trajectory and tradition in which sacrifice reminds Jewish people of the 
original peaceableness and severely limits any human violence toward them. Indeed, it is 
far easier to follow many of the dietary restrictions from the Torah and subsequent kosher 
                                                
431 Quoted in James H. Morrow, Passion Iconography in Northern European Art of the Late 
Middle Ages and Early Renaissance (Kortrijk, Belgium: Van Ghemmert, 1979), 99. See a reproduction of 
the image in Figure 72 at the end of the book. There are many other such depictions that compare Jesus to a 
sacrificed calf. See ibid., 293n424 and n425. 
432 Ibid., 98. The translation from the Latin is mine. Morrow does not translate Latin (or any other 
language) into English in his work. 
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regulations in Judaism when one is a vegetarian. Jewish dietary laws, which Jesus kept—
Jesus was kosher—certainly point in this direction.433 In modern Judaism, some Jewish 
thinkers have pointed out: 
All of the holidays in the Jewish year are (or can be) vegetarian occassions. For 
instance, every one of the obligatory foods and beverages at the Pesah seder is 
vegetarian (in fact, vegan). Many Jewish communities around the world follow 
the custom of eating dairy foods for Shavuot. Dishes comtaining oil, as well as 
cheese or milk (such as latkes with sour cream), are traditional for Hanukkah. The 
“Good luck” foods eaten (with special ‘wishes’ for the year) by many on the first 
night of Rosh HaShanah, including apples dipped in honey, are vegetarian (except 
for those who eat the head of a fish or goat). Even the prescribed menu of the 
Seudah Mafseket meal immediately before the fast of Tisha B’av, a hard boiled 
egg (which some dipp in ashes), is vegetarian fare, if hardly a feast. . . . there is no 
food made from meat which is currently required on any occasion, nor even one 
which is widely associated with a particular day. And in the absence of a Holy 
Temple in Jerusalem and of animal sacrifices (which, by the way, Rav Kook, the 
great chief rabbi of pre-state Israel and advocate of vegetarianism, wrote would 
not by reinstituted in the rebuilt Third Temple . . . ) there is no obligation that 
anyone who finds it objectionable should eat meat of any kind on any holy 
occasion—Sabbath or festival.434 
                                                
433 Daniel Boyarin has a brilliant chapter on Jesus’s defense of the Torah on diet in Boyarin, The 
Jewish Gospels. See chapter 3, “Jesus Kept Kosher” which argues from Mark 7, which a great many 
Christian scholars have mistakenly read to mean Jesus rejected the Torah’s dietary laws. Boyarin ably 
refutes these interpretations.  
434 Jonathan Wolf and Richard H. Schwartz, “Judaism, Vegetarianism, and Tu B’shvat,” in Trees, 
Earth, and Torah edited by Ari Elon, Naomi Mara Hyman, and Arthur Waskow (Philadelphia: The Jewish 
Publication Society, 1999), 403. 
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In any case, the Word-became-flesh stands through and through in a Jewish 
tradition that is deeply connected to nonhuman animals. Once again, setting aside Jesus’s 
Jewishness lets one forget the deeply Jewish vision of respect for life that even their 
sacrificial system embodied. Jesus’s death as a sacrificial lamb points back, like animal 
sacrifice in the Torah, to Genesis 1 and the peaceable vision narrated there. His death is 
not just any sacrifice. It is not a “religious” sacrifice broadly speaking but a very 
particular death connected to a very particular system meant to reduce human avarice and 
gluttony and thereby help to protect nonhuman animals. Jesus’s death simply fulfills the 
intention of animal sacrifice in the Tanak by bringing an end to the killing entirely. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at a number of ways that Jesus’s Jewish identity 
plays an important role in thinking about the Incarnation in relationship to nonhuman 
animals. In the first place, there is a particular eschatological trajectory envisioned in the 
prophets that places Jesus in a messianic peaceable kingdom motif. This Jewish 
eschatology is essential for understanding the Incarnation. It is not simply an 
eschatology; it is a Jewish vision. Jesus embodied a particular way of being Jewish in this 
regard in that he seems to have rejected all violence in favor of a diasporic existence. But 
beyond the particular eschatological vision that Jesus seems to embody, he also stood in 
line with a particular Jewish vision of original peaceableness that stood in stark contrast 
to the foundational creation myths of the Ancient Near East, in which violence was more 
primary than peace. The priestly author of Genesis 1 directly counters these violent 
assumptions with a vision of a world in which creatures do not live off the backs of each 
other and competition for resources does not have the first or last word.  
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While those working on issues related to nonhuman animals and Christian 
theology routinely point to Isaiah’s peaceable kingdom and Genesis’s mandate for a 
vegetarian diet, they have not really connected these areas with Jesus’s Jewish roots. 
Instead they have stood apart as big ideas that we can take up quite apart from the 
particular identity that Jesus had as a Jewish person. But the Incarnation was rooted in 
Jewish faith and could not happen apart from it. Peace begins the vision and ends the 
vision that Jesus embodied as a Jewish, male human. Without specifically pointing out 
Jesus’s Jewishness in these regards we run the risk of abstracting the Incarnation away 
from Jesus of Nazareth, whom Athanasius and John of Damascus very much wish to 
uphold, and who at first glance seem to be helpful for my purposes. Yet in chapter two 
these authors turned out to be largely negative examples primarily because they 
abstracted Jesus from his Jewishness. By doing so they could bypass the issue of other 
animals, indeed, of human animality as well. In this chapter I have sought to show a few 
ways that the Incarnation connects to nonhuman animals. 
The Incarnation also stands in a line of sacrifice whose intent was to curb human 
violence toward nonhuman animals. Jesus’s death is explicitly compared to an animal’s 
death in the New Testament, connecting his death to the Jewish story of human-
nonhuman relationships. The Jewish vision of original peace stands firmly at the center of 
these sacrificial rituals and laws regulating human-nonhuman animal relationships 
according to some biblical scholars. If this is so, then Jesus’s death is far more connected 
to nonhuman animals than modern theology has depicted. 
Moreover, the Incarnation itself stands in a long line of divine self-revelation in 
the Jewish tradition in which God reveals Godself by means of other than human 
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creation. Jewish people were not afraid to speak about God in terms of nonhuman 
creation. Any theology that wants to include nonhuman animals in any deep sense would 
be wise not to do so at the expense of grappling with its Jewish roots. As Oliver 
O’Donovan asks: “How can the church be clothed with Israel’s name and vocation if the 
possessor of that vocation is remote from it?”435 Jesus was close to Jewish visions of 
peaceableness with other animals.436 
  
                                                
435 Oliver O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 286–87. 
436 In this regard it would be prudent to note Peter’s vision in Acts 10. I mention it in a footnote 
because it probably has less bearing on the Incarnation than other literature that I will examine. In Act 10 
Peter goes up on a rooftop to pray and is hungry. He then sees a vision of a “sheet” with “all kinds of four-
footed creatures and reptiles and birds of the air.” A voice then tell Peter, “Get up, Peter; kill and eat.” Peter 
replied, “By no means, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is profane or unclean.” The voice replied, 
“What God has made clean, you must not call profane.” The entire cycle, Acts claims, happened three 
times (Acts 10:9–16). Before this vision God sends a Gentile centurion named Cornelius to find Peter. 
After this vision Cornelius’s servants find Peter and ask him to come to Cornelius’s home to preach to him, 
so Peter did this.  
The text, however, does not say that Peter ate unclean animals, only that he went into a Gentile’s 
home. Peter himself interpreted the dream as meaning that “God shows no partiality, but in every nation 
anyone who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him” (Acts 10:34–35). Afterward, the 
Jerusalem council asked Peter “Why did you go to uncircumcised men and eat with them?” Peter tells them 
about the vision and the voice saying that the Spirit commanded him not to distinguish between Jew and 
Gentile. The council interpreted this as God giving “repentance that leads to life” to Gentiles who were 
God-fearing. 
Most likely Cornelius was a Jewish proselyte who would not have eaten unclean animals. Peter is 
not said to have broken his dietary restrictions, only that the vision uses this imagery to make the point that 
Gentiles are not “unclean” and can be “saved.” Indeed, when the Jerusalem council gave Paul instructions 
Peter again appealed to his experience in support of Paul (Acts 15:7–11). The council sent a letter to the 
Gentile believers telling them to “abstain from what has been sacrificed to idols and from blood and from 
what is strangled and from fornication” (Acts 15:29). These are dietary restrictions about eating nonhuman 
animals that seem to place their eating within Jewish restrictions for the most part. Paul later seems to mock 
these restrictions saying that are for “weak” brethren but should be followed for the sake of not causing 
anybody to be offended (1 Cor 8). 
It seems to me that there is nothing in this passage that actually contradicts Jewish teaching. As 
noted in this chapter Genesis Rabbah 34:13 claims something similar to the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15 
when it quotes Genesis: “Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you. . . . Only you shall not eat 
flesh with its life, that is, its blood.” This general Noahic law, according to Jewish teaching, is for all 
humans. The more specific dietary restrictions are for the people of God in Israel to witness to the more 
profound peaceableness toward which all creation is moving. The Noahic law is not more basic; Jewish 
Torah is more basic. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE WORD BECAME A JEWISH MALE 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that Jesus’s Jewishness is essential for thinking 
about how the Incarnation incorporates and is related to human and nonhuman animal 
life. But Jesus was a Jewish male. At first glance it would seem that Jesus’s maleness has 
little do with developing a theology capable of underpinning human peaceableness with 
nonhuman animals. After all, theologians have used Jesus’s maleness as a particularity to 
exclude women from ministerial roles and to underwrite a variety of patriarchal values. 
Focusing on Jesus’s maleness in the name of “animal theology” would then seem to be a 
step backward in the quest for gender equality within Christian churches. Here ethics and 
theology come together in a way that suggests a conflict between feminist theology and a 
new focus on peaceableness with nonhuman animals.437 
While I am sympathetic with theologians who continue to critique patriarchal 
theologies and practices, I argue that Jesus’s maleness is important for a theology about 
the Incarnation and nonhuman animals. I am convinced, along with many other 
theologians, that Jesus’s maleness can critique patriarchal theologies and worldviews 
                                                
437 In his monumental On Animals, David Clough notes that some theologians still use Jesus’s 
maleness as an argument to exclude women from ministry. He rapidly moves, however, to the idea that 
most theologians would not use Jesus’s maleness to argue for any systematic prejudices against women. 
After this brief statement he then moves on to a more “cosmic” vision without passing through Jesus’s 
particularity. Clough’s book on the whole is a masterpiece in systematic theology that seeks to deepen 
traditional orthodox Christian theology on behalf of nonhuman animals. In passing over Jesus’s gender, I 
think Clough missed an opportunity to go even further in that process of deepening the Christian tradition, 
which does not detract from the positive things he does do in that book or diminish its value overall. My 
work in this chapter and in this dissertation is a deepening of Clough and others. See Clough, On Animals, 
83–84. 
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rather than underwrite them. Likewise, Jesus’s particular gender might actually help 
rather than hinder expanding our theological vision toward nonhuman animals.438 
In the first section of this chapter I will look at some prominent ways theologians 
in the last few decades have argued that Jesus’s maleness is of no theological 
consequence. For some, Jesus’s maleness is an irredeemable aspect of the Incarnation 
that must be quickly bypassed. For others, however, Jesus’s maleness signals a 
potentially positive impact for all people. Indeed, his maleness may not be a fixed 
“essence” to reject in an either/or dichotomy at all. 
In the second part of this chapter, building on trajectories from the first section, I 
will look at Jesus’s maleness as a Jew in the context of the Roman Empire. Jews were 
subject to an imperial government that defined masculinity in particular ways that 
included domination over animals. Jewish people from the Tanak onward have resisted 
these ways of being male. But the Romans also connected circumcision with a certain 
“beastliness,” which I will argue that Jesus appropriates in resistance to Roman imperial 
colonization. In all of these ways, Jesus’s Jewish maleness has some bearing on how to 
think about the Incarnation and nonhuman animals. 
                                                
438 Most theologians who are concerned about the issue of animals and theology do not deal with 
the particularity of the Incarnation as a Jewish male. To the extent that gender comes up it is as a concept in 
discussing less “down-to-earth” issues than Jesus’s concrete cultural identity as a male born in Nazareth. 
Usually the discussion veers in the direction of divinity related to Wisdom literature and critiques of ‘Logos 
Christology’ as a male concept, examining whether there is another way beyond replacing a male principle 
with a female one and reinforcing stereotypes. See Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and 
Wisdom, 95-107. Deane-Drummond, I think, does an excellent job of explaining and discerning along these 
lines. However, she does not deal with Jesus’s masculinity more specifically. Her discussion is about 
Christ’s divinity and issues of gender in that discussion rather than discussing Jesus’s actual biological and 
cultural identity as “male.” 
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Jesus’s Destabilizing Maleness 
For nearly thirty years, feminist theologians have critiqued the idea that Jesus’s 
maleness has any ultimate significance. Rosemary Radford Ruether, for example, asks, 
“Can a male savior save women?” 439 Sort of, answers Ruether. Because Jesus, as a 
savior, recognized that his maleness came with power and privileges that he should 
renounce, he can participate in women’s salvation. Jesus critiqued oppressive structures 
and embodied liberation, which demonstrates a redeemed male and female humanity. 
Jesus upturned patriarchal, racist, class-based societal norms. By doing so he brought a 
new way of living and a new regime of power into the world that liberates the oppressed 
and helps heal the environment.  
However, human existence is always particular and limited, so this male savior 
Jesus is not enough. There has to be a female savior as well. Only God is transcendent 
and universal. Our particulars relate dialectically to the universal God. So we need many 
saviors, including a female Christ to reveal how women can find a “redemptive 
personhood” from their own experiences.440 Jesus is a Christ-symbol and a paradigm. 
There are others. Women need other Christ-symbols. Jesus’s maleness is important as a 
“kenosis of patriarchy,” which frees men from their violence and women from the system 
of patriarchy. But this is a very limited model of salvation, according to Ruether. Jesus’s 
maleness limits redemption to only one aspect of life. Particularity, according to Ruether, 
means we need many Christs. One has to ask why Jesus really needs to be like us in 
every detail to be relevant. This is exactly how humans treat other animals: if they are not 
                                                
439 See Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 116. 
440 Ibid., 115. 
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“like us” by having “reason” and “language,” for example, many argue that they 
therefore do not deserve any consideration at all.  
Other theologians have likewise tried to push aside Jesus’s maleness. Jacquelyn 
Grant, for example, sought to displace Jesus’s historical whiteness in Christian history by 
imaging Jesus as a black woman.441 What is important for these theologians is Jesus’s 
message of redemption. His maleness is incidental to that message. Jesus’s message, 
including what he said and did, is something that women can follow, unlike his maleness. 
Jesus’s liberating practices speak into the circumstances of contemporary women. Susan 
Ross sums up the general consensus while commenting on Elizabeth Schüssler 
Fiorenza’s Christology: “The fact that this incarnation was in a particular person who was 
male is simply indicative of historical particularity, not of lasting significance.”442 Given 
that women continue to experience less power in decision-making and leadership within 
Christian churches broadly speaking, and such things as unequal pay within society as a 
whole, these efforts at refocusing on other aspects of the Incarnation are understandable. 
Another strategy has been to focus on the various women in the Bible and recover a sense 
of positive models for women.  
More recently, however, New Testament scholarship has shifted away from 
focusing on biological sex differences to examining the broader concept of gender. Yet 
“masculinity” has only recently became a focus for Christian biblical scholarship. 
Beverly Gaventa and Susan Eastman, for example, have written about masculinity and 
Paul, focusing on ways that Paul uses female imagery for himself, undermining 
                                                
441 See Jacquelyn Grant, White Women's Christ and Black Women's Jesus: Feminist Christology 
and Womanist Response (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989). 
442 Susan Ross, “Christ as Bride: Toward a Christology of Diversity,” in God, Science, Sex, 
Gender: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Christian Ethics, ed. Patricia Beattie Jung, Aana Marie Vigen, 
and John Anderson (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois, 2010), 216. 
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masculinity stereotypes in his day and ours.443 Other scholars have recently begun a 
reexamination of Jesus’s masculinity.444 In general, the studies of Jesus’s maleness tend 
to perpetuate earlier feminist readings of Jesus’s maleness as a body of oppression 
against women: the Gospels depict Jesus, they argue, as an ideal male in order to 
persuade people to join the Jesus movement. In what follows I will offer a different 
account with a view toward seeing Jesus’s maleness as helpful in thinking about theology 
and nonhuman animals. 
Jesus’s Theological Body: Neither Male nor Female in Jesus’s Body 
In one of the most enlightening pieces on Jesus’s body in terms of sexual 
differentiation and gender roles—“The Displaced Body of Jesus Christ”—Graham Ward 
notes that Jesus’s body and maleness has many peculiar aspects that undermine attempts 
to use his gender for purposes that would make Jesus’s “maleness” a determining factor 
for differentiating male and female roles in church and society. From the outset, Jesus’s 
male body differs from other male bodies because his body does not issue forth from 
another human, male father. In modern parlance, Jesus must have had one X and one Y 
chromosome like any other male. More specifically, he must have had the SRY gene that 
the Y chromosome normally carries. But human males get their Y chromosomes and the 
resultant SRY male-making gene from their human fathers, which Jesus did not have 
                                                
443 See Susan Eastman, Recovering Paul's Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in Galatians 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007). See also Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel eds. Anderson, eds., New 
Testament Masculinities (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003); Jennifer Larson, “Paul's 
Masculinity,” Journal of Biblical Literature 123 (2004): 85–97 and Jennifer Glancy, “Boasting of Beatings 
(2 Corinthians 11:23-25),” in Corporeal Knowledge: Early Christian Bodies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 24–47. 
444 Brittany Wilson, Unmanly Men: Refigurations of Masculinity in Luke-Acts (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
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according to the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. The female egg can only provide an X 
chromosome.445  
Did God create the Y chromosome and the SRY gene for Jesus “out of nothing”? 
Or, even more drastically, did God create Jesus’s entire DNA structure out of nothing, 
making Mary a mere vessel? Such de novo creation would arguably make Jesus a mere 
copy of humanity, the first clone. Jesus would be a creature that resembles a human but 
who does not share in our evolved humanity. Docetism lurks in this idea of Jesus’s 
maleness, especially if we follow the nativity stories in Matthew and Luke. For Karl 
Barth, the virgin birth narratives draw a kind of boundary around Jesus that forbid us to 
explain him in generally accessible principles. These narratives, then, point to Jesus as a 
spiritual mystery not an intellectual puzzle we can solve through DNA analysis.446 
Somehow, in a way we do not know, God’s Word has a bearing upon our physical 
reality, and Jesus’s Y chromosome, his maleness, becomes charged with a spiritual 
meaning that makes his maleness an important particularity with which to wrestle. 
Luke 2:21 marks Jesus as biologically male by narrating that he was circumcised 
as any male Jewish child would have been. Yet Jesus’s circumcision has a decidedly 
eschatological character, according to Ward, who points to a long historical trajectory of 
such interpretation. Theologians have long interpreted this event as the beginning of the 
passion, when Jesus first shed his blood.447 But the circumcision also prefigures the 
                                                
445 Males can contribute either an X or a Y chromosome. If an X then the child will be female. If a 
Y, then the child will be male. For a discussion see Robert Goss, Jesus Acted Up: A Gay and Lesbian 
Manifesto (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 64. In all mammals the father must provide a Y 
chromosome if the child is to be a male. But not all animals work this way. For example, the Y 
chromosome in birds means the chick will be a female, not a male. In some reptiles, the sex of the infant is 
not determined by DNA but by how warm or cold the egg is during incubation. 
446 See Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 275. 
447 However, anti-circumcision polemic against Jews may underlie the connection between 
circumcision and the passion: evil and carnal Jews harming a baby Jesus easily crucify the full-grown man, 
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resurrection by taking place on the eighth day. Jesus’s maleness, even as a little boy, has 
weighty theological significance in that it carries the cross, the resurrection, and even 
new creation as his body becomes “transfigured” theologically. 
Ward speaks about the mystery of the Incarnation in relation to Jesus’s maleness 
by pointing out that Jesus’s identity becomes increasingly unstable in the Gospels. From 
the birth narratives, in which Jesus’s maleness becomes a mystery, through the Last 
Supper, when Jesus’s body crosses a species divide, to the Resurrection where his body 
becomes unstable so that he can walk through walls and conceal his identity from close 
friends, shows us that it is in the mystery that we find revelation: “The appearance / 
disappearance structure of Christ’s resurrected body serves to emphasize the mediation of 
that body – its inability to be fully present, to be an object to be grasped, catalogued, 
atomized, comprehended. The appearance / disappearance serves as a focus for what has 
been evident throughout – the body as a mystery, as a materiality which can never fully 
reveal, must always conceal, something of the profundity of its existence.”448 Jesus’s 
maleness, therefore, cannot be all determining because that very maleness, lacking in 
Ward’s account a Y chromosome at all, is unstable and hard to pin down. Said more 
positively, Jesus’s maleness becomes theologically significant to the extent that his 
maleness explodes our preconceived notions of what it means to be a male. 
Jesus’s male body subverts our ways of thinking about maleness. In the 
crucifixion, a soldier pierces Jesus’s body with a spear and blood and water gush forth. In 
John’s Gospel, this description seems to carry a theological weight by deliberately 
                                                                                                                                            
the argument would seem to run. Nevertheless, if divorced from the anti-Semitic Christian sentiments, the 
theological idea that there is a connection between Jesus’s visible sign of maleness as a Jew and his life 
leading to death has ramifications worth considering. 
448 Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/2, 172–202. 
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comparing this event with a mother’s birthing. A male soldier pierces Jesus’s male body. 
Jesus’s body then becomes feminine, giving birth through blood and water to the 
ecclesial community (John 19:31–37). John sees water as a sign of birth. In John 3:5, 
Jesus says that a person must be “born of water and the Spirit” to enter God’s kingdom. 
Jesus’s male body gives birth like that of a female. But, I would add, this female body is 
more like that of a nonhuman animal in producing multiple offspring. His body is like a 
cat, birthing many offspring: to a large litter called the church. Jesus’s male body 
therefore transgresses the male/female divide that we normally think demarcates what it 
means to be gendered. 
If this portrait of Jesus’s maleness is compelling, then Jesus’s maleness is every 
bit as problematic for modern males as it is for women. Those of us men who have grown 
up in cultures where our masculine identities are tied to various social constructions of 
what it means to be male—men do not show fear or sadness, for example, or that men are 
characterized by certain types of aggression and sexual proclivities—comes sharply into 
question. Jesus’s theologically transgendered body falsifies the notion that men simply 
“are” a certain way. These questions, as I will argue, have direct bearing on how to think 
of the Incarnation in relationship to nonhuman animals in which not only is the 
male/female binary far more fluid in Jesus’s body but also the human/nonhuman. Jesus’s 
body challenges these divisions. Ward’s analysis opens up the discussion away from an 
exclusive focus on Jesus’s gender in relationship to women alone and begins to focus on 
Jesus’s gender in relation to men as well.449 Likewise, the same thing happens at the 
species divide, an issue rarely, if ever, touched upon in feminist and gay theologies.450 
                                                
449 Issues of men and masculinity need to come farther into the foreground in these discussions. It 
is simply not enough to talk about feminist theology without at the same time looking at male spirituality 
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Maleness in a Hyper-Masculine Roman Empire 
What I find missing in most of the discussion of Jesus’s maleness, either from 
early feminist discussions about whether a male Jesus could really be the savior of 
women or from more up-to-date post-colonialist readings that challenge the male/female 
binary and essentialism of much previous scholarship, is that these discussions ignore 
that Jesus was a Jewish male.451 Even Ward treats Jesus’s body as if it were ahistorically 
transgendered. Jesus’s body, in Graham Ward’s reading, moves fluidly between the 
binary of male/female in ways that challenge our conceptions of what it means to be a 
man or a woman in society. Yet Ward does not connect this theologically-transgendered 
Jesus to his Jewishness. There is no “male,” “female,” or even “body” as such but only 
very particular instantiations of embodiment. Jesus was embodied as a Jewish male, 
whose maleness challenges patriarchal structures of his own time and ours. This becomes 
                                                                                                                                            
and such things. In other words, Christian theology needs to take into account the new discipline of critical 
men’s studies. “Studies in this new field are, on the one hand, critical of normative models of masculinities 
and, on the other, also supportive of men struggling to find their place in religion and society” Björn 
Krondorfer and Philip Culbertson, “Men's Studies in Religion,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Lindsay 
Jones (Detroit: Macmillan, 2005), 5862. The type of work I am advocating here is not the same thing as the 
more popular Christian men’s movement seen in such groups as Promise Keepers or in the hyper-masculine 
ministries of people like Mark Driscoll. Much of what critical men’s studies does is a subset of feminist 
theology rather than a new push for men to take their “rightful” places at the head of the table as Promise 
Keepers imagines. 
450 This is not the case in feminist work in general. See, for example, Carol J. Adams, The Sexual 
Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (New York: Continuum, 1990). Nevertheless, the 
number of non-Christian feminists working on issues of speciesism is still relatively small. Yet this does 
not have to be the case. Feminist theologians, for example, regularly point out the intersection between 
patriarchy, racism, heterosexual normativity, and Western/non-Western prejudices. It is hard to argue, 
many such as Delores Williams’s claim, against patriarchy without also challenging racism because of the 
way in which white males have defined what is culturally normative in theology and society for so long. 
Yet, underneath some of these issues lies a fundamental notion that divides humans from nonhumans and 
so without also addressing the binary of humans and nonhumans, it seems to me that feminist, anti-racist, 
anti-colonialist work is missing a very important element. I will address this more fully later in the 
dissertation, but note the issue here. 
451 For a critique of Ruether, whose own work critiques anti-Semitism in Christology and yet 
decides for some ultimately more universal category of Incarnation that ultimately relativizes Jesus and 
Judaism (which is a very ironic way for somebody concerned about anti-Semitism), see D. Stephen Long, 
Divine Economy: Theology and the Market (New York: Routledge, 2000), 149–50. 
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important for those of us who want to think theologically about how nonhuman animals 
can enter into the theological scene by way of the Incarnation. Before reflecting on how 
Jesus’s Jewish maleness helps in that endeavor, however, I need to look at Jesus’s 
maleness in its particular historical context: Jesus was a Jewish male in the context of 
hyper-masculine ideologies. 
Scholars have published many works on gender identity in the Greco-Roman 
context.452 Generally, these scholars have maintained that masculine identity was a social 
construction in which one’s biological sex played less of a role than how a biologically-
sexed person fulfilled cultural and societal expectations of the ideal male. Even if a 
person had the right genitals, if that person failed to “act like a man” according to the 
social norms of the time, he would lose status and social benefits. Masculinity was not a 
fixed matter of birthright based on biology, but a matter of social discernment and 
observation. Jennifer Larson states, “Masculinity was viewed as an attribute only 
partially related to an individual’s anatomical sex.”453  
Elite males knew that slaves, clients, and women were subject to their sexual 
demands. That elite males had the right to penetrate their inferiors was a mark of their 
political and social power over others. Elite men who allowed other males to penetrate 
them sexually were ridiculed as slave-like or lowborn, willingly giving up their social 
dominance and becoming effeminate. 
Since a male’s gendered identity was culturally unstable, men had to defend their 
masculinity and exhibit it publicly. A social hierarchy in which freeborn elite men ranked 
                                                
452 Among the many relevant studies are: Lin Foxhall and John Salmon, When Men Were Men: 
Masculinity, Power, and Identity in Classical Antiquity (New York: Routledge, 1998). In this paragraph I 
am drawing from the general portrait of masculinity these authors paint in far more detail from the 
historical records. 
453 Larson, “Paul's Masculinity,” 86. 
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above everybody else related to their ability to dominate, sexually and otherwise, 
anybody below them. Larson again describes the situation:  
Because masculinity was all but identified with social and political dominance, 
there was no assumption that all males must be masculine. The masculinity of 
slaves, for example, was by definition impaired. Personal dignity, bodily integrity, 
and specific details of one’s appearance were all factors in individual self-
assessment and in men’s evaluation of one another’s masculinity. Elite men of the 
day were constantly concerned with the maintenance of their masculinity, because 
it both displayed and justified their positions of power. Unlike noble birth, which 
was immutable, masculinity was a matter of perception. While elites always 
represented their masculinity to outsiders as innate, among insiders it was 
implicitly recognized that masculinity was a performance requiring constant 
practice and vigilance.454 
Beyond this sexuality, men also showed their manliness by other displays of 
dominance, often connected to self-discipline. What constituted a true man (vir)—in 
distinction from mere homines, the generic term for males—had to do with a person’s 
manner of displaying courage, influence, and self-control, which society uses to evaluate 
whether a man is a “true man” or an “ideal male” quite separate from having correct 
anatomical parts (and again, the biological issues are theologically complicated by 
Jesus’s fluid body, as Ward notes). Manliness consisted in acting rationally and 
controlling one’s emotional responses that were generally considered effeminate. 
This self-mastery exhibited itself in mastery over nonhuman animals lives as well. 
Warfare and hunting were male activities par excellence in which a male could 
                                                
454 Ibid. 
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demonstrate the virtues. Xenophon (ca. 430–354 BCE), for instance, repeatedly connected 
warfare to hunting, in his book Cyropaedia: hunting is a preparation for war (1.2.9–11), 
Cyrus told his general about a battle, “Think of it like hunting” (2.4.25–26), and Cyrus 
promoted men to higher military rank who were also good hunters (8.1.34–39). 
Xenophon said that Cyrus had been trained in the art of hunting from an early age, which 
helped him become such a great warrior and ruler (1.4.7–15).455  
In the Roman world Livy (64 BCE–17 CE) believed that hunting trained young 
men in the virtues and skills they would need to engage in warfare. He claimed that 
Rome’s founding fathers, Romulus and Remus, began to “confront wild beasts” from an 
early age and from these hunts learned how to attack thieves and robbers as well. 
Through these early hunts they became mighty warriors.456 Likewise, Horace (65–8 BCE) 
believed that hunting was training for the Roman military, a male occupation.457 Cicero 
(106–43 BCE) claimed that wild animals provide not only food but also an occasion to 
“mimic warfare” as humans chase and kill them.458  
The virtues, inextricably tied to manliness, were armed: armed against nonhuman 
animals and other humans.459 First hunting and then war were the crucibles in which the 
manly virtues were honed. Courage—that quintessentially Greco-Roman military 
virtue—was first nurtured in killing relatively defenseless animals, overcoming the 
                                                
455 See Xenophon, Cyropaedia, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
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456 See Livy, The Rise of Rome: Books 1–5 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 8–9 (bk 1, 
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emotional recoil at bloodshed, and then later honed on the battlefield. The Greco-Roman 
hero-warrior was the ideal male. As Myles McDonnell argues, virtue derived from killing 
one’s enemies and winning a war “was a powerful political slogan, not the virtus of 
Cicero the new man, nor that of popular philosophy, but virtus imperators, virtus militia, 
the martial virtus of Roman tradition.”460 To penetrate bodies sexually or with weapons 
was the right and sport of elite Romans (indeed, the difference between a “weapon” and 
the male penis disappears). 
Jesus’s Unmanly Maleness 
David Clines argues that the Gospels depict Jesus as “a man’s man, by any 
standard, ancient or modern.”461 Commenting on the Gospel of Luke’s portrayal of Jesus, 
Mary Rose D’Angelo claims, “Jesus is depicted as ἀνήρ after God's own heart, a heroic 
prophet, cast in the mold of Elijah and Moses. A worthy heir to David’s royalty, he is 
shown to have achieved, indeed excelled in, all the steps toward public manhood in his 
own nation, but in terms that are comprehensible to an imperial public. He shows himself 
to be a learned reader and interpreter, a skilled and powerful speaker.”462  
Yet Brittany Wilson has argued that Jesus performed his maleness in ways that 
simply did not live up to Greco-Roman standards of manliness.463 “Jesus’s masculinity,” 
                                                
460 Myles Anthony McDonnell, Roman Manliness: Virtus and the Roman Republic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 383. 
461 David Clines, “Ecce Vir, or, Gendering the Son of Man,” in Biblical Studies/Cultural Studies: 
The Third Sheffield Colloquium, ed. J. Cheryl Exum and Stephen Moore (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1988), 374. 
462 See Mary Rose D’Angelo, “The ANHP Question in Luke-Acts: Imperial Masculinity and the 
Deployment of Women in the Early Second Century,” in A Feminist Companion to Luke, ed. Amy-Jill 
Levine and Marianne Blickenstaff (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 68. 
463 See in particular her chapter on Jesus in Wilson, Unmanly Men, 190–242. 
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agrees Maud Gleason, “was a problem.”464 Even though Jesus spoke well and could 
gather a crowd as “real men” were able to do, the kind of crowd he held were country 
people, whom the Roman elite despised. According to Gleason, the Roman elite “were 
actually suspicious of speakers who were excessively popular with audiences of low 
degree, stigmatizing them as illegitimate players at the game of words.”465 So in the 
minds of the Greco-Roman elite males, that Jesus could captivate an uneducated crowd of 
rural people did not make him masculine. Jesus used his masculinity in ways that Roman 
elite males would have deemed effeminate. 
The Gospels mark Jesus as a male. Jesus is an ἀνήρ, for example (Luke 24:19 and 
John 1:30). The New Testament uses male titles for Jesus like υἱός and κύριος, which 
were exclusively used for men. Nevertheless, there are some strikingly “effeminate” 
images of Jesus in the Gospels that not only undermine his authority as a “manly man” 
but also relate specifically to nonhuman animals.  
Jesus in the Temple: The Doves 
Colleen Conway argues for a way of reading Jesus as a “manly man” by using his 
action in the temple. She claims that in general Jesus displayed the kind of self-mastery 
over his emotions that would be expected of a “manly man” in the ancient Greco-Roman 
world. The one place where he lets his passions guide him is in the temple, when Jesus 
makes a whip that he uses on “unsuspecting cows and sheep. He makes a big mess of 
coins and tables.”466 Jesus lost his temper, Conway argues, which was perfectly in line 
                                                
464 Maud Gleason, “By Whose Gender Standards (If Anybody's) Was Jesus a Real Man?,” in New 
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with some strands of Roman thought that saw anger as one of the only acceptable male 
emotions for men to display. A long history of Christian interpretation would seem to 
agree with Conway. From just war to Crusades to executing heretics, Jesus’s action in the 
temple has provided fuel for righteous male violence and killing.467 
In response, the first thing to point out about Jesus’s temple action is that he did 
not angrily beat the animals in the temple with a “whip” as Conway and many other 
suggest.468 Borrowed from the Latin term flagellum, the φραγέλλιον that Jesus used could 
indeed refer to an instrument “consisting of a thong or thongs, frequently with metal tips 
to increase the severity of the punishment.”469 As an instrument of torture, its primary use 
can be seen in its verb form φραγελλόω, which appears in the passion narratives (Mark 
15:15; Matt 27:26), and was “a punishment inflicted on slaves and provincials after a 
sentence of death had been pronounced on them.”470 It is unlikely, however, that Jesus 
had this kind of weapon or inflicted that kind of punishment on those in the temple. First, 
weapons were forbidden in the temple area. The Mishnah, though it is a later document 
than the Second Temple, states that, “One should not enter the Temple mount with his 
walking stick, his overshoes, his money bag, or with dust on his feet.”471 Jesus did not 
bring the instrument into the temple; he fashioned an ad hoc instrument from whatever 
                                                
467 The earliest interpretation of this passage, however, in Origen, interprets Jesus as being 
nonviolent. The view that Jesus was angry and used violence became prominent only after Augustine. For a 
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materials were available, which was not likely to include metal shards or leather for 
thongs. Thus, the narrative depicts him fashioning the tool ἐκ σχοινίων (from reeds), a 
word Josephus used to describe some of the garb used when mourning with sackcloth and 
ashes.472 The type of material available would have been animal bedding473 or fodder and 
ropes with which animals were tied up. An ad hoc “whip” of this sort hardly rises to the 
level of a Roman instrument of torture.474 It hardly constitutes doing violence to the 
sheep and cattle. 
The image many Christians have painted of Jesus, however, is one where Jesus is 
so angry in the temple that he uses this makeshift instrument to drive human and other 
animals out of the temple. Jesus, as Conway claims, “loses his temper.”475 The proper 
display for this masculine anger is controlled violence. David Brakke puts it, in the 
Greco-Roman context, “Because anger motivated a man to action in righting wrongs to 
himself and others, because its opposite appeared to be passivity in the face of challenges 
from other males, because—to put it simply—it raised the body’s temperature, anger 
appeared to be a characteristic of masculinity, a sign that a man was indeed a manly 
man.”476 David Clines argues that Jesus is not only strong like a man was expected to be 
                                                
472 See Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, Books 7–8, trans. Ralph Marcus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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anchor. 
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but also violent. One piece of evidence he gives for this masculine violence is that Jesus 
“overturns the tables of the changers of money and the seats of the pigeon sellers (Mt. 
21.12; Mk 11.15). In John, he makes a whip to drive the merchants and the animals out. It 
may be a good cause, but it certainly uses violence.”477 Yet this use of the temple action 
does not square well with a close reading of the text. Jesus did not use a “weapon” on any 
human or nonhuman animal.  
However, the strongest challenge to the idea that Jesus threw an unrestrained 
tantrum is how he treats the doves. The Gospel of John says that after fashioning his 
broom to get the animals moving out the door, Jesus began turning over tables and 
pouring out the vendor’s money purses. But suddenly Jesus stopped and told the dove-
sellers to take their caged birds out of the temple. A person who was blind with rage and 
who did not much care for nonhuman creatures would have knocked the caged birds over 
like the tables and money jars. If these birds did not matter any more than metal coins or 
wooden tables, then Jesus would have overturned their cages, sending them fluttering in 
panic while banging against a falling cage. However Jesus took deliberate care not to 
overturn the birdcages. He did not put them through any further distress. Rather he 
protected them. He paused in the middle of his nonviolent demonstration to act 
graciously toward these little creatures.478 
Careful examination, therefore, of how Jesus treated the doves in the temple as 
well as the supposed “whip” he used reveals that his supposed masculine anger, strength, 
and violence would be pretty pathetic by Roman standards. When the Romans “cleaned” 
                                                                                                                                            
to right wrongs, which is appropriate expression. The violence should be controlled, but it is an expression 
of male superiority. 
477 Clines, “Ecce Vir, or, Gendering the Son of Man,” 356. 
478 See my article Andy Alexis-Baker, “Jesus in the Temple: Remembering other Creatures,” The 
Mennonite, October 2013, 27. 
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the Jewish temple, Josephus tells us the Romans crucified so many people in the Jewish 
revolt of 70 CE they could hardly make room for them all outside the city walls.479 That is 
Roman male strength. Jesus telling a merchant to take his little doves out of the temple 
after shooing the cattle and sheep out is more like an old lady with a broom by 
comparison. This is not, we will see in a later section, how the ideal Roman male 
behaved toward nonhuman animals. 
Jesus the Mother Hen 
In the Gospels of Matthew and Luke Jesus compares himself to a “mother hen” 
(Matt 23:37–39 and Luke 13:31–35). In Luke’s story some Pharisees tell Jesus he should 
flee because Herod wanted to kill him. He then speaks in the first person, but as a mother: 
“Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to it 
(αὐτήν)! How often have I desired to gather your children (τὰ τέκνα σου) together as a 
hen (ὄρνις) gathers her brood (τὴν ἑαυτῆς νοσσιάν) under her wings, and you were not 
willing!” (Luke 13:34). Matthew’s version of this saying is almost identical. The 
reflexive pronoun ἑαυτῆς in Luke intensifies the personal intimacy of Jesus’s words. 
Jesus wants to gather “her own” chicks.480 
The avian image that Jesus’s uses to describe himself has deep roots in Scripture. 
The Psalms repeatedly depict God with the wings of a bird. In Psalm 17:8–9, the Psalmist 
implores God to “hide me in the shadow of your wings, from the wicked who despoil me, 
                                                
479 Josephus, The Jewish War, Books 5–7, trans. J. Thackeray (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1928), 5.446-451. 
480 For more interpretations and insights into Jesus as a mother hen see Wilson, Unmanly Men, 
199–200. 
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my deadly enemies who surround me.”481 In Psalm 57, the psalmist declares that he takes 
refuge with God, “in the shadow of your wings.” Psalms 36:8 and 61:5 also depict God as 
protecting others under the “shadow” or “shelter” “of your wings.” Psalm 61 refrains 
from any anthropomorphic imagery for God. The only reference to God’s form is to the 
wings. This Psalm highlights God’s protective role, not God’s power to fight enemies. In 
Psalm 63, the psalmist once again refers to God’s wings, under which he “shouts for joy” 
(Ps 63:7). The Psalmist “looks for” God (v. 1) and “sees” God in the sanctuary. 
According to some commentators, these verbs connote theophany.482 Finally, Psalm 
91:1–4 invokes God’s wings:  
You who live in the shelter of the Most High,  
who abide in the shadow of the Almighty, 
will say to the Lord, “My refuge and my fortress;  
my God, in whom I trust.”  
For he will deliver you from the snare of the fowler  
and from the deadly pestilence;  
he will cover you with his pinions,  
and under his wings you will find refuge;  
his faithfulness is a shield and buckler. 
                                                
481 Hans-Joachim Kraus argues that the wing-imagery references the wings of the cherubim within 
the temple sanctuary (see 1 Kgs 6:23–28 and 2 Chron 3:13). Hans-Joachim Kraus, Psalms 1–59 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). The prayer, according to Kraus, belongs within the temple confines as 
the petitioner seeks a verdict on his own righteousness. Erhard Gerstenberger, on the contrary, argues that 
such a setting is unknown. So Kraus’ suggestion lacks any real merit outside of a tautological argument that 
makes reference to Psalm 17 as proof of such a ritual. Erhard Gerstenberger, Psalms, Part 1 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1987), 95. The precise Sitz im Leben of this Psalm is therefore unclear. But Kraus’s suggestion 
raises the possibility that the reference to being hidden under “wings” does not refer to God per se, but to 
another aspect of Jewish worship. But clearly the psalmist seeks to depict his own character as righteous, 
his enemies as blameworthy, and God as able to defend him as well as able to judge and attack his guilty 
enemies. 
482 See Hans-Joachim Kraus, Psalms 60–150 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 19. 
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This is the most developed imagery about God and wings. The word behind 
“Almighty” is  לֵאיַדַּשׁ  “God of the Mountain Wilderness.”483 This name occurs 48 times in 
the Hebrew Bible (Gen 17:1; 28:3; 35:11; 43:14; 48:3; 49:25; Exod 6:3; Num 24:4,16; 
Ruth 1:20,21; Isa 13:6; Ezek 1:24; 10:5; Ps 68:15; 91:1, and 31 times throughout Job). So 
while the imagery is of a God on high,  לֵאיַדַּשׁ  also signals something about the nonhuman 
world. God is God of the nonhuman parts of the world. Parallels in the Ancient Near East 
include a “goddess of animals” who was also called the “goddess of the wilderness.”484 
Ostriches in particular became associated with this goddess. So behind the English word 
“Almighty” in Psalm 91 stands a rich tradition of associating God with nonhuman 
animals, appropriated to Yahweh.  
Yet Jesus’s avian image for himself is feminine, unlike the avian images in 
Hebrew Scriptures.485 While ὄρνις is a neuter case, the pronouns Jesus used for himself 
(and his “brood”) are all feminine. By using female imagery of a hen rather than a male 
image, Jesus shows little regard for the masculine gender norms for males. 
Jesus the Hunted; Herod the Hunter 
Moreover, in addition to Jesus depicting himself and his followers as female 
chickens, Jesus depicts himself as hunted. When the Pharisees tell Jesus he should flee 
because Herod wants to kill him, Jesus answers: “Go tell that fox (τῇ ἀλώπεκι) for me . . 
                                                
483 See Ernst Knauf, “Shadday,” in Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible, ed. Karel van 
der Toom, Bob Becking, and Pieter van der Horst (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 749. The English translation, 
“almighty,” reflects the influence of the Septuagint and Vulgate, which translated the Hebrew as 
παντοκράτωρ and omnipotens respectively. The Greek and Latin do not reflect the “wildness” of the 
Hebrew. 
484 Ibid., 752. 
485 2 Esdras 1:30—“I gathered you as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings”—is part of 
chapters 1 and 2 which are sometimes called 5 Ezra. Scholars believe that Christians wrote these chapters 
around the middle of the second century CE. See John J. Schmitt, “2 Esdras,” in Eerdmans Commentary on 
the Bible, ed. James D. G. Dunn and Rogerson John William (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 876. 
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.” (Luke 13:31). John Darr argues that in Luke’s Gospel Herod is a dangerous predator. 
Herod arrested and killed John the Baptist (Luke 3:20; 9:9). Now Herod was threatening 
to kill Jesus. Jesus’s answer acknowledges the danger by pitting Herod “the fox” against 
Jesus “the mother hen” (Luke 13:34).486 Jesus portrays himself as one of the weakest prey 
animals that a middle-chain predator could attack. Jesus is not even a rooster, who might 
fight back, but a mother hen. The feminine imagery combined with the idea that Jesus is 
the hunted one, not the hunter, serves to undermine the ideal male image for Jesus in 
Greco-Roman culture. Real men are not prey. Real men hunt. 
Josephus tells us that Herod was an excellent hunter (κυνηγέτης).487 Josephus 
describes how Herod supposedly was so skilled at bow hunting, javelin throwing, and 
horsemanship that he supposedly once killed “forty wild beasts” in a single day. Josephus 
connects these hunting skills to Herod’s skill in war: “seldom was he defeated in war.”488 
Josephus portrays Herod as a manly man, whose virtues in violence and physical prowess 
demonstrate his superiority. According to Josephus, Herod’s sons were taught to hunt and 
were skilled in the art as well (and one of them even plotted to have his father killed 
while hunting). Herod and his sons enacted an idealized masculinity within the Roman 
imperial context. 
Herod’s treatment of nonhuman animals ran against the customs and sensibilities 
of his fellows Jews at the time. Again, Josephus relates a story: “There was also a supply 
of wild beasts, a great many lions and other animals having been brought together for 
                                                
486 See John Darr, Herod the Fox: Audience Criticism and Lukan Characterization (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1998). Darr argues against previous scholarship that interprets the label “fox” as 
signifying Herod’s powerlessness. Since Herod had killed and was threatening to kill, Herod was by no 
means harmless. 
487 See Josephus, The Jewish War, Books 1–3, trans. J. Thackeray (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1927), 1.429–430. 
488 Ibid., 1.430. 
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him, such as were of extraordinary strength or of very rare kinds. When the practice 
began of involving them in combat with one another or setting condemned men to fight 
against them, foreigners were astonished at the expense and at the same time entertained 
by the dangerous spectacle, but to the natives [Jews] it meant an open break with the 
customs held in honour by them.”489 Around his theater Herod had inscribed the great 
war feats of Emperor Augustus, Josephus tells us.  
The New Testament, of course, has a different but similar portrait of Herod, the 
mighty warrior and hunter, than does Josephus. Herod wanted to kill Jesus in his infancy 
and in his effort to do so killed “all the children in and around Bethlehem who were two 
years old or under” (Matt 2:16). Herod was a bloodthirsty and ruthless tyrant. If Herod is 
an example of Roman maleness it is one of unfettered rejection in the New Testament.  
Luke’s depiction of Jesus taking up the position of a feminine prey bird in 
relationship to a masculine predatory puppet-king signals also that Jesus stands in a long 
line of Jewish rejection of hunting. Herod seemed to relish in killing nonhuman animals. 
We see nothing like that in the patriarchs and prophets of Jewish Scripture. Before 
examining this idea, however, I will look at evidence from Scripture that permits hunting 
for Jewish people. 
Hunting in the Jewish Tradition 
Leviticus 17:13 permits some hunting amongst Jewish people: “anyone of the 
people of Israel, or of the aliens who reside among them, who hunts down an animal or 
bird that may be eaten shall pour out its blood and cover it with earth.” Jews were not 
                                                
489 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, Books 14–15, trans. Ralph Marcus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1963), 15.273–75. Here Josephus indicates that even killing nonhuman animals for 
enjoyment was not acceptable to the local Jewish population. A modern equivalent of these games would 
be bullfighting, which attracts large crowds in Spain, cockfighting, or dogfighting. 
222 
 
allowed to hunt just any nonhuman animal, however. Deer, gazelle, roebuck, wild goats, 
antelopes, mountain sheep, and the ibex are permitted, according to Deuteronomy 14:4–
5.  
When we read the histories of the great kings and emperors of the ancient world 
there are often accounts of their hunting feats (as Josephus records for Herod). There is 
evidence that the royal courts engaged in hunting. Josephus recorded Herod’s hunting 
obsessions. 1 Kings states that Solomon’s daily provisions included deer, gazelles, and 
roebucks (1 Kgs 4:23). These are nonhuman animals that could have been hunted 
lawfully according to Leviticus 17:13. Yet this list comes in an account of Solomon’s 
extravagant reign and how Solomon’s opulence came about: Solomon militarized 
Hebrew society and enslaved Israelites to build the temple, fulfilling a prophecy from 1 
Samuel 8 in which God warned the Israelites that having a king over them would mean 
rejecting God and becoming the king’s slaves. Given that at the end of his reign Solomon 
was a hunted man himself, since God, according to the text, ripped the kingdom from him 
due to his greed, it is not clear that 1 Kings 4 praises Solomon for his ostentatious reign. 
As Barth says, “in Solomon’s glory as such we are not really dealing with beauty but 
rather its preconditions: riches, brilliance, magnificence, inexhaustible possessions and 
the lavish development of material means for it. There is such a thing as cold 
magnificence, and, if we are not wholly deceived, Solomon’s glory appears to have 
possessed more of the nature of this cold magnificence than true beauty.”490 For the most 
part, the accounts of the kings—even King David and his son Solomon—are tragic 
                                                
490 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. II/1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 664. 
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stories of how the kings become ensnared in the trappings of power and prodigal 
living.491  
These depictions stand in stark contrast to the triumphalist narratives of non-
Jewish rulers. The royal Assyrian court went out on annual campaigns to conquer other 
lands. Likewise, they developed an annual royal hunt, which was so important to the 
Assyrian rulers that it was the basis of the royal seal for two centuries.492 During the reign 
of Ashurbanipal (668–627 BCE), the annual lion hunt was particularly important, as it was 
staged so that the population could watch the king kill lion after lion. The reliefs 
displayed at the British Museum show lions in various stages of dying, pierced with 
arrows. The lions did not die quickly. Ancient Greek hunting was also associated with the 
elite “and not necessity.”493 Later Roman imagery featured the emperor hunting. A statue 
of Domitian on horseback lancing a lion may be the earliest imperial hunting imagery, 
reinforcing Domitian’s status as the ideal Roman male.494 
All of the rulers surrounding Palestine from Assyrian days to the Roman era 
depicted their rulers as great warriors, and these kings and emperors relished the idea of 
their hunting prowess. By contrast, Jewish Scripture never depicts its kings as great 
hunters.495 Some of them were great warriors like David, but they are not depicted as 
                                                
491 The best account of this, in my view, is in Jacques Ellul, Anarchy and Christianity (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991). 
492 See Michael Dick, “The Neo-Assyrian Royal Lion Hunt and Yahweh's Answer to Job,” 
Journal of Biblical Literature 125, no. 2 (2006): 246. 
493 Judith Barringer, The Hunt in Ancient Greece (Baltimore: The John's Hopkins University Press, 
2001), 7. 
494 See Steven L. Tuck, “The Origins of Roman Imperial Hunting Imagery: Domitian and the 
Redefinition of Virtus under the Principate,” Greece & Rome (Second Series) 52, no. 2 (2005): 221–45. 
495 1 Samuel 14 narrates Samson killing a lion that threatened him. But the story, while displaying 
Samson’s masculine violence and strength, also critiques him. Samson breaks Jewish law: “he tore the lion 
apart barehanded as one might tear apart a kid” (1 Sam 14:6). Samson not only kills the lion in an unclean 
manner, but later returns to use the carcass, violating the Torah’s injunctions about touching dead creatures, 
which I examined in the previous chapter. This was not a hunting story, but it is a story of masculine 
224 
 
being trained in the art of hunting.496 David, in fact, grew up as a shepherd. The only hint 
that the Jewish royalty engaged in hunting is from 1 Kings 4, which lists Solomon’s daily 
provisions. But this does not seem like a story that simply brags about Solomon’s wealth. 
Moreover, Jacob Milgrom argues that hunting was not an important part of the 
Israelite economy and life in the monarchical period because most Jews had become 
farmers at this point. Because of this, “hunting changed from a necessity to a sport, one 
that could be indulged in only by a leisure class, namely the royal aristocracy. 
Nevertheless, this law and the one specifying permitted game . . . demonstrate that since 
hunting continued to be practiced—even by the relatively few—it had to be controlled by 
legislation.”497 I would add that later rabbinical abhorrence of hunting for “sport”—which 
I will examine in a later section—reflects Milgrom’s view as well. The fact that an elite 
group of men could hunt down and kill nonhuman animals for pleasure was and remains 
anathema in Jewish circles. Once Jewish people settled into a society in which they did 
not need to hunt, to continue to do so was a sign of bad character and bloodlust. Solomon 
is no exception to this rule. 
                                                                                                                                            
violence. And Samson’s is not a story that ends well: he commits suicide as he kills more people in this 
final act than he did during his lifetime. His is a cautionary tale. 
496 David boasted to King Saul that he had killed a lion and a bear when these creatures attacked 
his flock. David claims that he would chase these predators away and rescue his lambs. But if the lion or 
bear attacked, he would “catch it by the jaw, strike it down, and kill it” (1 Sam 17:35). David depicts his 
actions as swift and just, unlike Samson’s extreme violence, or the violence from the Assyrian kings. But 
David is not describing a lion or bear hunt. He depicts his actions as that of a young shepherd defending his 
flock. Yet the larger story depicts David displaying an extreme male heroic violence by decapitating 
Goliath (1 Sam 17:51). And while this is a story of masculine heroism, later in the narrative God rejects 
David for his bloodshed. 
497 Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, 1480. 
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Anti-Hunting in the Tanak 
Jewish Scriptures mention hunting in a few other significant places outside of 
Leviticus 17. The two great hunters in Scripture are Nimrod and Esau.498 Nimrod is said 
to have been a “mighty hunter” who started a kingdom beginning with the rebellious city 
Babel (Gen 10:8–12). Nimrod’s family lineage stretches back to Cain through a series of 
warriors and kingdom-makers to Babel. This heritage does not paint Nimrod in a good 
light. Being a “mighty hunter” in the genealogy from Cain, the first murderer, is not a 
badge of honor. The label is a mark of shame in this context. 
The second great hunter in the Hebrew Bible, Esau, was Jacob’s twin and was a 
“skillful hunter.” Isaac, their father, favored Esau because of his hunting skills. Esau’s 
name itself denotes his masculinity: hairy-man. Jacob is said to have preferred to stay at 
home rather than enjoying the manly hunt. Jacob even coaxed Esau into selling his 
inheritance to Jacob for a bowl of stew that Jacob had prepared (Gen 25:29–34). Jacob 
clearly enjoyed the more “female” activities of homemaking rather than the “manly” 
activities of killing animals.499 The boys’ mother, Rebekah, favored Isaac as a result. She 
tells Jacob to follow her instructions, dresses him in clothes so that Isaac will think Jacob 
is Esau, and Jacob receives Isaac’s blessing meant for Esau. While Esau was out hunting 
and killing nonhuman animals, being a “mighty hunter,” Jacob was home with his mother 
                                                
498 There is a third character that might be a hunter in the Bible: Genesis describes Ishmael, 
Abraham’s son as “an expert with the bow” (Gen 21:20). After Abraham sent him and his mother Hagar 
away, they lived in the wilderness and the text states that in this context he was a skilled archer. This is 
likely a reference to hunting. But the covenant with Abraham was passed to Isaac who was a shepherd like 
his father, not Ishmael. 
499 In contrast to hunting, the occupation of a shepherd was available to women as well as men. 
Rachel, Jacob’s wife, was a shepherd (Gen 29:9), likewise for Moses’s wife Zipporah and her sisters (Exod 
2:16). The attachment of masculinity to hunting is very strong, whereas shepherding is something open to 
females and males. 
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engaging in stereotypical women’s activities of trickery and cunning rather than violence 
to get something done.500 Esau, the mighty hunter, turns his stalking and killing skills 
toward his brother to kill Jacob when he learned of the deception. Jacob, however, 
escaped due to his mother’s cunning, once again (Gen 27).501 In the story of Jacob and 
Esau, the masculine hunter, is portrayed as dim-witted and troublesome, while the male 
who stayed home with his mother and learned to cook and get his way nonviolently 
(through words, costumes, etc.) finds himself blessed by God.502 So while all hunting is 
not explicitly forbidden in the Hebrew Bible, it is not an activity associated with men of 
good character. The masculinity involved is not heralded as praiseworthy but depicted as 
bloodthirsty and stupid. 
Moreover, the story of Jacob and Esau demonstrates that hunting was more about 
status and masculinity than subsistence. In the story, Isaac asks Esau to hunt and kill 
some game and make Isaac some “savory food, such as I like” (Gen 27:4). From the story 
it is clear that Isaac and his family already had enough of food. They did not need to hunt. 
So Isaac’s request does not arise from necessity but a vice of his own. Moreover, Isaac is 
depicted as foolishly caught up in his meat-eating in this passage. He is so concerned 
                                                
500 On trickery see Adrien Janis Bledstein, “Binder, Trickster, Heel and Hairy-Man: Rereading 
Genesis 27 as a Trickster Tale Told by a Woman,” in Feminist Companion to Genesis (Sheffield: JSOT, 
1993), 282–95. 
501 I am reminded of the way in which female mothers like gazelles in the animal kingdom hide 
their young or lure predators away from nests and the young so that the younger ones can escape. Jacob 
was Esau’s prey at this moment, yet his mother protected him from this predation. 
502 Compare Jacob and Esau’s actions to Philo’s later comments: “Market-places and council-halls 
and law courts and gatherings and meetings where a large number of people are assembled, and open-air 
life with full scope for discussion and action—all these are suitable to men both in war and peace. The 
women are best suited to the indoor life.” See Philo of Alexandria, “De Specialibus Legibus, Books I–III,” 
in Philo, Vol. VII (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937), 3.31.169. 
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with the flavor of his stew that he cannot discern that he is about to bless Jacob rather 
than Esau.503 
Furthermore, since Jacob slaughters two goats and cooks them for Isaac, and Isaac 
accepts the food without noticing the difference, we can discern yet again that the issue is 
status, not the actual food. The story of hunting is not about providing food for the 
family, which is more easily done through more domestic activities, but about the risk 
and danger associated with hunting, thereby giving the hunter a higher social status 
(courageous, etc.). But Jacob subverts this social status through domestication: hunting as 
a sign of one’s masculinity and worth becomes subservient to the cunning arts of the 
domestic household where females are skilled (in that culture).504 
In Exodus, as the Israelites wandered the desert for forty years, the story says that 
God provided them with a heavenly vegetarian meal each day of manna (Exod 16). The 
story mentions quail, but they are entirely eclipsed by the manna. Numbers 11 retells the 
story in parallel, perhaps trying to explain the presence of quail in the Exodus account. In 
this account the people had been eating manna for some time and started to complain: 
“The rabble among them had a strong craving; and the Israelites also wept again, and 
said, ‘If only we had meat to eat! We remember the fish we used to eat in Egypt for 
nothing, the cucumbers, the melons, the leeks, the onions, and the garlic; but now our 
strength is dried up, and there is nothing at all but this manna to look at’” (Num 11:4–
                                                
503 This stands in stark contrast to the way Genesis depicts Isaac as shrewdly taking care of his 
sheep so that he eventually marry Rachel. In the passage where he blesses Jacob rather than Esau, that 
shrewdness is gone, blinded by a stupidity bent on getting a hunted meat for stew. 
504 This is a lesson and observation from the text that I have not found in a single commentary. 
The question becomes how Isaac can be so easily fooled. He clearly asked for hunted animal flesh cooked 
in a particular way, but was given domestic flesh instead and did not know the difference. So the story 
cannot be used to buttress mythologies that hunting is primarily about subsistence. It is not. It is about 
status and privilege. Hunting is a symbolic act more than it is an effective one for providing food. 
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6).505 Moses told them that God would grant their disobedient request but it would not be 
fun: “You shall eat not only one day, or two days, or five days, or ten days, or twenty 
days, but for a whole month—until it comes out of your nostrils and becomes loathsome 
to you—because you have rejected the Lord who is among you, and have wailed before 
him, saying, ‘Why did we ever leave Egypt?’” (Num 11:19–20). The text goes on to say 
that as soon as the people tasted the flesh of the quail, “while the meat was still between 
their teeth, before it was consumed,” God sent a plague upon them (Num 11:33). So in 
this tale, hunting quail in the desert rather than eating God’s provision of vegetarian food 
was seen as disobedient and liable to judgment. God even says there would not be enough 
sheep or cattle to satisfy the gluttony (Num 11:22), connecting meat-eating to vice.  
Hunting and consumption of animal flesh in Numbers is connected subtly to 
masculinity as well. Moses complains to the Lord that he is being made to look womanly 
to the people: “Did I conceive all this people? Did I give birth to them, that you should 
say to me, ‘Carry them in your bosom, as a nurse carries a sucking child,’ to the land that 
you promised on oath to their ancestors? Where am I to get meat to give to all these 
people? For they come weeping to me and say, ‘Give us meat to eat!’” (Num 11:12–13). 
This is a subtle complaint, in which Moses complains of being seen as feminine because 
of the vegetarian food he provides. It is a deep story connecting consumption, hunting, 
and gender in ways that denounce typical masculinity connected to hunting and 
consuming other animals.506 
                                                
505 Though the “riffraff” (that is, non-Israelites) also “remembers” the diverse vegetables they had 
as slaves in Egypt, the emphasis of the story really on the animal flesh (meat, fish, quail).  
506 Strikingly, I have not found a single commentator who makes these types of connections. A 
few commentators note the feminine imagery but all of them note that it is unusual for Tanak to imagine 
God as a mother as Moses implies. They do not generally connect the issue of gender roles in hunting, 
killing, and consuming nonhuman animals. For a representative comment see Dennis Olson, Numbers 
(Louisville: John Knox Press, 1996), 66. 
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The biblical depictions of hunting, in which Nimrod, Esau and the “rabble” come 
across negatively, are part of a general pattern of rejecting wanton violence toward 
nonhuman animals in the Tanak. In the previous chapter I noted how some biblical 
scholars see the Levitical laws about touching or consuming nonhuman animals actually 
protects them from human avarice and points people back to a more peaceable vision in 
Genesis 1. The negative portrayals of Esau and Nimrod in Genesis stand in contrast to the 
attitude toward nonhuman animals in other cultures in which hunting and killing those 
creatures is a rite of passage to manhood or in which rulers demonstrate their power and 
might through wanton killing of nonhuman creatures. The symbolic nature of hunting as 
a form of status and privilege comes to the foreground in the Hebrew Scriptures and the 
Jews rejected that mode of status: the ideal Jewish male would become one who studies 
Torah, not one who kills human and nonhuman animals.  
Anti-Hunting in Rabbinic Tradition 
Jewish literature through the ages simply does not praise hunting. Outside of the 
Scriptures, as far back as the first century, Philo depicted hunting unfavorably. 
Commenting on Nimrod, Philo says that his skill as a hunter should be condemned 
because “hunting is as far removed as possible from the rational nature.”507 According to 
Philo, hunting is “a sort of prelude to and representation of the wars and dangers that 
                                                
507 Philo of Alexandria, “Questions and Answers on Genesis,” in Philo, Supplement I (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 2.82. Commenting on Esau, Philo says, “Why was Esau a hunter and 
man of the fields and Jacob a simple man, living at home? This passage admits of allegorizing, for the 
wicked man is (so) in a twofold way, being a hunter and man of the fields. Wherefore? Because just as a 
hunter spends his time with dogs and beasts, so does the cruel man with passions and evils, of which some, 
which are like beasts, make the mind wild and untamed and intractably and ferocious and bestial; and some 
(are like) dogs because they indulge in immoderate impulses and in all things act madly and furiously.” 
Ibid., 4.165. 
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have to be encountered against the enemy.”508 He claims that Gentiles who kill 
nonhuman animals even with a skill and precision that does not make them suffer should 
be ashamed of themselves because God even “forbade the enjoyment of bodies which 
died a natural death or were torn by wild beasts.”509 Killing other creatures is not 
something to celebrate or that one does for enjoyment and leisure, according to Philo.  
Philo also says that Jews should not even touch the carcasses of nonhuman 
animals killed in a hunt, “thus learning from his dealing with irrational animals what he 
should feel with regard to human enemies” who are only killed in self-defense and for no 
other reason.510 Philo clearly had a very low view of (male) hunting. For him, the ideal 
male is a citizen of the city and can read and write (presumably to study Torah). Again, 
the only kind of hunting Philo would really know is that of hunting for pleasure. Esau and 
Isaac were engaged in the sport for pleasure, not because they had to do it. Alexandrian 
Jews would not have been skilled at hunting, either. So Philo’s comments really attack an 
entire culture of hunting dominated by men seeking to prove themselves. 
Later rabbinic literature has a generally low view of hunting as well. On the one 
hand, Tractate Shabbat (106B–107A) in the Babylonian Talmud analyzes in detail what 
is acceptable in terms of “hunting” on the Sabbath and what is not. The means of 
capturing different animals matters. In general, the rabbis forbade any kind of “hunting” 
on the Sabbath, including hunting predators like lions and snakes (presumably because 
they are menacing one’s lands, because these are not kosher animals).511  
                                                
508 Philo of Alexandria, “De Specialibus Legibus, Book IV,” in Philo, Vol. VIII (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1939), 4.23.121. 
509 Ibid. 
510 Ibid. 
511 See The Talmud of Babylonia: An American Translation IID: Tractate Shabbat Chapters 11-
17, trans. Jacob Neusner (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 106B–107A (pp. 58–67). 
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On the other hand, the Talmud Tractate Avodah Zarah comments on Psalm 1:1—
“Happy is the man who has not walked in the counsel of the wicked . . . nor sat in the seat 
of scoffers”—by interpreting it as referring to Jews who refuse to attend the amphitheater 
games in which nonhuman animals and humans kill one another or participate in hunting. 
The rabbis condemned even the act of attending such spectacles. Indeed, they said that a 
Jew who attends the amphitheater or hunts is “guilty of bloodshed.”512 The only way a 
Jew was permitted to attend these events is if they went with the explicit intention to save 
life: to shout for the life of the loser. Tractate Avodah Zarah pronounces a severe 
judgment on hunters: “He who is a clever hunter will not live or have the length of days.” 
The rabbis move quickly though to spiritualize “hunting” by transforming the male 
hunter into one who studies Torah. These rabbis have a generally low view of killing 
nonhuman animals in hunting, and replace such violence with a vision of masculinity that 
searches out the Torah. “Real men” they seem to say, hunt for wisdom in the Torah. This 
is a radical transformation of maleness. 
An eighteenth-century rabbi may express the traditional view of hunting best. A 
man once asked Rabbi Ezekiel Landau (1713-1793) if he could hunt on the rabbi’s large 
lands, which included forests and fields. In response Rabbi Landau said: “In the Torah 
the sport of hunting is imputed only to fierce characters like Nimrod and Esau, never to 
any of the patriarchs and their descendants . . . . I cannot comprehend how a Jew could 
even dream of killing animals merely for the pleasure of hunting. . . . When the act of 
                                                
512 The Talmud of Babylonia: An American Translation XXIII.B: Abodah Zarah Chapters 1–2, 
trans. Jacob Neusner (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 18B, (p. 85). This is an interesting rabbinical opinion 
because it makes watching violence the equivalent of committing it. 
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killing is prompted by that of sport, it is downright cruelty.”513 In his Code of Jewish 
Ethics, Rabbi Joseph Telushkin claims that although hunting is a popular sport in the 
United States and other Western countries, hunting “is rarely practiced among Jews. I 
have never seen a statement in Jewish religious literature that speaks of hunting for sport 
in a positive manner.”514 The article on hunting in the Encyclopedia Judaica details a 
long history, from antiquity through the Middle Ages to modern times, of rabbinic 
opposition to hunting per se as cruel. One early eighteenth century figure, for instance, 
said that those who engage in hunting “have taken hold of the occupation of Esau the 
wicked, and are guilty of cruelty in putting to death God’s creatures for no reason. It is a 
doubled and redoubled duty upon man to engage in matters which make for civilization, 
and not in the destruction of creation for sport and entertainment.”515 The authors 
conclude with a concise statement: “The rabbis looked askance at hunting as a sport and 
strongly disapproved of it.”516 The idea, however, that most Jews could engage in hunting 
without it being a sport (that is, it being about necessity) was and is a myth. The hunting 
described in the Bible and Jewish literature is done with a net to capture the animal 
before killing it. A bow and arrow was considered cruel because it could wound the 
animal without killing it, which actually renders it unusable by giving the animal a defect 
or blemish.517 
                                                
513 Quoted in Richard Schwartz, “Tsa'ar Ba'alei Chayim—Judaism and Compassion for Animals,” 
in Judaism and Animal Rights: Classical and Contemporary Responses, ed. Roberta Kalechofsky 
(Marblehead, MA: Micah Publishers, 1992), 64. 
514 Rabbi Jospeh Telushkin, A Code of Jewish Ethics: Volume 2: Love Your Neighbor as Yourself 
(New Yorl: Bell Tower, 2009), 339. 
515 Laurentino José Alfonso, S. David Sperling , and Louis Isaac Rabinowitz, “Hunting,” in 
Encyclopaedia Judaica, ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan, 2007), 622. 
516 Ibid., 621. 
517 See Rabbi Natan Slifkin, Man and Beast: Our Relationship with Animals in Jewish Law and 
Thought (New York: Zoo Torah, 2006), 177. 
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Jesus’s masculine identity is, therefore, wrapped up in a tradition that largely 
rejected notions of maleness conditioned on hunting down nonhuman animals. Jesus, 
rather, identified with a female chicken who would protect her brood from a cunning fox. 
Jesus identified with a prey animal, and in line with a long and venerable tradition 
rejected the position of the hunter. 
Jesus with the Wild Animals 
There is another passage that suggests a positive relationship between Jesus and 
nonhuman animals. The Gospel of Mark records that Jesus began his ministry by 
retreating to the “wilderness,” where Satan tempted him. While in the wilderness, Mark 
states, Jesus “was with the wild animals; and the angels waited on him” (Mark 1:13).518 
Scholars have interpreted the statement that Jesus was “with the wild animals” (καὶ ἦν 
µετὰ τῶν θηρίων) in one of three ways. First, some have thought that the animals are 
simply part of the wilderness setting.519 The wild animals stress Jesus’s separation from 
human society. Second, some scholars see the wild animals as a threat and associate them 
with the satanic temptations Mark mentions.520 The wild animals and Satan tempt and 
threaten on the one side, while the angels stand with Jesus on the other side. But the 
                                                
518 Scholars are divided as to how much historical credence to give the story of Jesus in the 
wilderness. Some think that the story does not record any actual memory of Jesus’s actions. Without trying 
to decide whether the story is historically accurate, it is enough to see the Gospel as preserving a memory 
of Jesus’s significance for nonhuman animals. 
519 See Paul J. McCarren S. J., A Simple Guide to Mark (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2013), 4 and John Paul Heil, “Jesus with the Wild Animals in Mark 1:13,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 
68 (2006): 63–78; Adela Yarbro Collins, Mark: A Commentary (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 152–
53  
520 See Abraham Kuruvilla, Mark: A Theological Commentary for Preacher's (Euguene, OR: 
Cascade Books, 2012), 22 and David Rhoads, “Who Will Speak for the Sparrow? Eco-Justice Criticism of 
the New Testament,” in Literary Encounters with the Reign of God, ed. Sharon H. Ringe and H. C. Paul 
Kim (New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 74–75. Though Rhoads reads the animals as a threat, however, he 
acknowledges Richard Bauckham’s interpretation that the wild animals who would normally be a threat are 
brought into harmony with Jesus. See ibid., 74.  
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angels are not mentioned as protecting Jesus, but simply providing for him. Moreover, 
Mark does not portray the animals as hostile to Jesus. Indeed, the Gospel seems to put 
them in a light of companionship with the phrase “with the animals.” Mark uses the same 
phrase to denote association and agreement several places:  
• And he appointed twelve, whom he also named apostles, to be with him (ἵνα 
ὦσιν µετʼ αὐτοῦ), and to be sent out to proclaim the message (3:14); 
• As he was getting into the boat, the man who had been possessed by demons 
begged him that he might be with him (ἵνα µετʼ αὐτοῦ ᾖ — 5:18);  
• When she saw Peter warming himself, she stared at him and said, “You also 
were with Jesus, the man from Nazareth (καὶ σὺ µετὰ τοῦ Ναζαρηνοῦ ἦσθα 
τοῦ Ἰησοῦ)” (14:67). 
So in Mark’s use, the phrase “and he was with the wild animals” (καὶ ἦν µετὰ τῶν 
θηρίων) seems to connote a positive association or relationship and not a hostile threat in 
this case. While the term θηρία certainly includes predatory animals that pose a threat to 
humans, such as lions, leopards, snakes and other carnivorous creatures, θηρία can also 
include nonhuman creatures that are not a threat such as mountain goats, gazelles, wild 
donkeys, rabbits, and other creatures. The θηρία are simply nonhuman creatures over 
which humans usually have no control.521 
The third interpretation, which many scholars now follow, sees Jesus as 
inaugurating the peaceable kingdom that Isaiah 11:6–9 and 65:25 depict.522 According to 
                                                
521 Danker, Bauer, and Arndt, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early 
Christian Literature, 455. 
522 Richard Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures: Green Exegesis and Theology (Waco, TX: 
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2006), 48; R. Alan Culpepper, Mark (Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys, 2007), 50–51; Robert Guelich, Mark 
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Richard Bauckham, Mark’s prologue, within which the statement about being with the 
wild animals occurs, immediately sets Jesus as the messianic son who inaugurates God’s 
kingdom. The wilderness is the nonhuman sphere where humans do not control the land 
or its creatures. It is a place that humans do not inhabit. So the Spirit send Jesus intot he 
wilderness where he encounters the nonhuman world and recapitulates Israel’s desert 
wanderings: “He must establish his messianic relationship to these before he can preach 
and practice the kingdom of God in the human world.”523 Mark’s text does not say that 
Jesus dominated or in any way harmed them. He did not hunt them. He did not cry out for 
“meat” in the desert as the Hebrew people did in Numbers.  
According to Bauckham, the phrasing that Jesus was “with” the wild animals 
suggests he went there to make peace and inaugurate the kingdom of God. He does this 
first among the nonhuman world, then he comes back to civilization and Satan, wild 
animals, and the angels, are no longer part of the story.524 Nevertheless, as Robert Murray 
pointed out before Bauckham: “If the phrase is pregnant with implications, it must be 
                                                                                                                                            
1-8:26 (Dallas: Word Books, 1989), 39; Morna D. Hooker, The Gospel according to Mark (London: A & C 
Black, 1991), 50. 
523 Richard Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures: Green Exegesis and Theology (Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2011), 117. Bauckham likely gets this interpretation from Moltmann, whom 
Bauckham studied under. For Moltmann’s view of Jesus “with” the wild animals see Moltmann, The Way 
of Jesus Christ, 308. Moltmann’s interpretation is far less developed than Bauckham’s. 
524 A. B. Caneday argues against the dominant way of reading Mark 1:13 by saying that Mark 
contrasts the wild animals to the angels, that Mark does not use a “new Adam” motif that most scholars 
who follow the third interpretation use, that θηρία is a negative term not a positive one, and that a 
Messiah/Israel motif is better suited to Mark than a new Adam motif. See A. B. Caneday, “Mark's 
Provocative Use of Scripture in Narration: 'He Was with the Wild Animals and Angels Ministered to 
Him',” Bulletin for Biblical Research 9 (1999): 19–36. 
That θηρία does not have to be a negative term can be seen by all the different creatures to which 
it can refer and so the meaning is in the use not a static dictionary definition. Whether Mark contrasts θηρία 
with the angels is exactly what is at dispute. Furthermore, translating the fourth καὶ as “but” so as to make a 
contrast between the wild animals and angels while the others are translated “and” seems based on an 
imposed interpretive grid. Finally, the Messiah motif does not stand in contrast to the new Adam motif. For 
Isaiah, the Messiah will bring peace with wild animals, so there is no problem with that motif and the third 
interpretation that most scholars follow. Richard Bauckham, for example, does not stress a new Adam 
approach to Mark 1:13. So Caneday sets up a false choice in his interpretation. 
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admitted that Mark does not make them clear; a stronger clue would certainly be 
desirable.”525  
Bauckham’s interpretation might seem novel but there is at least one precedent in 
Christian history. Saint Ephrem (c. 306–373 CE) preached that “He went about with the 
animals which knelt and worshiped him; and the angels praised him on earth as in 
heaven.”526 Christian poets and artists have also seen a peaceable symbolism of Christ in 
the desert “with” the animals. Murray cites Stanley Spencer’s series of paintings in the 
Art Gallery of Western Australia in which Jesus reclines near a fox den as the kids play 
around him and another in which Jesus holds a scorpion in his hands as he sits alone in 
the desert. In his poem “In the Wilderness,” Robert Graves also depicts Jesus at peace 
with wild creatures.  
He held communion 
With the she-pelican 
Of lonely piety.527 
Graves continues depicting flocks of birds coming to Jesus to listen to his sermons. The 
sick, the blind, and the ugly animals came to Jesus to find comfort. But his greatest 
companion in the desert was the scapegoat:  
And ever with Him went, 
Of all His wanderings 
Comrade, with ragged coat, 
Gaunt ribs—poor innocent— 
                                                
525 Robert Murray, The Cosmic Covenant: Biblical Themes of Justice, Peace and the Integrity of 
Creation (London: Sheed & Ward, 1992), 127. 
526 Cited in ibid., 128. 
527 For the full poem see Robert Graves, Selected Poems, ed. Paul O'Prey (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1986), 28–29. 
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Bleeding foot, burning throat, 
The guileless old scape-goat. 
Graves’s poem connects Jesus’s desert wandering with the scapegoat of the Leviticus 16, 
who is sent out into the wilderness to bear the sins of Israel. The goat is innocent but 
chosen by lot to wander the desert. Jesus befriends one of these goats as it struggles for 
survival. This is not an image of masculine dominance but of human compassion and 
fellow creatureliness. 
In line with Bauckham we can also read Jesus being “with the wild animals” as a 
recapitulation of the Edenic story. Jesus is the second Adam (1 Cor 15:45). In Genesis 2 
Adam is set within a garden in which the trees were pleasant to view and were “good for 
food” (Gen 2:9). Adam was to act like a gardner by tilling and keeping the garden, being 
able to eat from any tree except the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Because God 
wanted Adam to have companions, God formed all of the land animals and birds from the 
dust of the ground, just like God had done with Adam. Then God “brought them to the 
man to see what he would call them” (Gen 2:19).  
Some interpreters see this passage as a violent act of dominion. For example, 
Jean-Luc Marion states:  
Adam gives a name, and thus a definition to the animals, which thus become 
subject to him, because in general all knowledge by concept reduces what is 
known to the rank of object. Adam thus names in the manner by which the I 
knows—by concepts of objects. However, Adam has the power thus to name only 
that which can legitimately become for him an object: the animals (and the rest of 
the world), and perhaps the angels, but not God, and not himself. If, moreover, he 
238 
 
claimed to name them, either this name would have no validity, or, if it had 
validity, what he named would not be man as such (as the unrivaled thinker) but 
merely a thought-object like all others.528 
For Marion, the practice of naming objectifies the other into an object under one’s power 
to dominate: “Man has the power to name, to understand, and thus to dominate.”529 
According to his interpretation, that is why humans do not name themselves or God, but 
do have a divine permission to name (dominate) all other creatures. Language defines us 
as human beings, but it is dangerous when we turn it on ourselves.  
If Marion is correct, Jesus does not rename the wild animals who he is “with” in 
the wilderness in the Gospel of Mark. One way to read that passage within Marion’s 
interpretation is that Jesus does not exercise such dominion.Yet it is far from clear that 
Marion’s analysis of naming is the violent domination he claims. 
The naming-story in Genesis 2 does not suggest that Adam somehow 
“objectified” other creatures. In fact, God brought them to Adam because God considered 
them to be suitable companions. The story does not indicate that Adam’s naming 
ceremony began a slippery slope toward killing and eating the animals, which would 
violate God’s mandate of a vegetarian diet (Gen. 1:29–31; 2:9, 16).  
Equally important, interpreting the act of naming as inherently violent and 
domineering seems misguided for several reasons. First, naming serves many different 
purposes in Scripture, including dominion, and we cannot reduce every instance of 
                                                
528 Jean-Luc Marion, "Mihi magna quaestio factus sum: The Privilege of Unknowing," Journal of 
Religion 85, no. 1 (2005): 10. Marion cites Hegel, who wrote, “The first act, by which Adam established 
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529 Ibid., 15. 
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naming to any one purpose. While kings sometimes gave subjects new names, thereby 
signaling royal authority over the persons (for example, Gen. 41:45 and 2 Kgs. 23:34; 
24:17), we cannot generalize from these instances to all instances of naming.  
In Genesis 16, Hagar fled from Sarah. Finding her in the wilderness, God 
comforted her with a promise of descendants. So Sarah “named the LORD who spoke to 
her, ‘You are El-roi’” (Gen. 16:13). We can hardly imagine the author of Genesis 
envisioning that Hagar has exercised dominion—understood as domination— in naming 
God. Moreover, Hagar’s naming of God directly contradicts Marion’s claim that humans 
cannot name God just as much as Adam’s naming of Eve contradicts his claim that 
humans cannot name humans (and the absent sea creatures also challenge his thesis that 
nonhuman creation is under dominion through the act of naming). In his detailed study of 
naming in the Old Testament, George Ramsey concludes: “Taken all together, the 
evidence indicates that, instead of thinking of name-giving as a determiner of an entity’s 
essence, the Hebrews regarded naming as commonly determined by circumstances. The 
naming results from events which have occurred. This is a generalization which has more 
basis in the actual naming-passages of the OT.”530 
Judith Barad suggests that rather than domination, naming creates relationships. 
Commenting on the naming ceremony in Genesis 2, Barad observes: “we do not name 
the animals we eat, for in doing so, they become more personal to us.”531 Rather than 
naming, namelessness sometimes signals a broken relationship between creatures created 
to be companions. On the other hand, Tripp York maintains that “If Christians and non-
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240 
 
Christians are to see a world that is intelligible in light of our claims, then we must speak, 
and perform, a very particular kind of language. For instance, as a thought experiment, 
what if we ceased using descriptions that label animals as products, cosmetics, food, 
clothing, entertainment, and pets and decided to call them, first and foremost, ‘our 
covenant partners’? Wouldn’t that be profoundly more biblical than the previous 
alternatives?”532 In other words, how we name or do not name other creatures either 
establishes relationships or dominance. 
Rather than diminishing the creatures and relationships already established, God 
completes the circle began with Adam, continued with the land, sea, and air creatures, 
and completed with the woman. So the naming ceremony simply causes God to create yet 
another creature: woman. Therefore, the Genesis story is about a circle of relationships, 
not about which creatures are inferior and superior to others, and which has the right to 
dominate another.  
John Eaton suggests that Adam and Eve form a “protective envelope around” the 
nonhuman creatures, who “have a companionship to offer, and in their own way are 
necessary to human happiness.”533 Likewise, Bauckham states that the naming ceremony 
in Genesis 2 is about Adam acknowledging the other animals’ place in the world, in 
which naming is a “presupposition for relationship. Parents naming children are 
recognizing them as persons in their own right and giving them the wherewithal to be 
identified as persons by other persons and thus to enter interpersonal relationships.”534 
Naming does not result in alienation from other animals, as Marion suggests (following 
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Hegel). Rather, Bauckham claims, “alienation from wild animals is the consequence of 
the loss of Eden.”535 Moreover, animal otherness is a good that humans should “take 
pleasure and delight in.”536  
While the animals not suitable “helpers,” a word the text does not explain, God 
did not fill that role either. Yet we do not assert human superiority over God because 
Adam needed a female human to fill an undefined helper role. So why assert human 
superiority over nonhuman animals on that basis? The text does not make that leap. 
If we can read Jesus as recapitulating the story of Adam in the garden of Eden, 
then how Jesus interacts with the other creatures is important. The Gospel of Mark does 
not say that Jesus named the other animals. But, with Bauckham, it does suggest a 
relationship of peaceableness rather than violence. But even if we imagine Jesus to give 
names to other creatures, in a way reminscent of Adam, this type of activity does not 
seem to be to be one of domination but one of respect. 
Circumcision as a Jewish Identity Marker 
Jesus’s maleness can be a lens through which to begin rethinking 
human/nonhuman relationships and their place in Christian theology. That Jesus, as a 
male, identifies with a female prey bird and stands with rather than against nonhuman 
animals, rejecting hunting with his tradition, tells us something about the Incarnation: 
God is not one who “lords it over” others. But there is more to Jesus’s maleness. In the 
Greco-Roman world, beauty was highly valued. Dale Martin claims, “In popular 
Greco-Roman culture, bodies were direct expressions of status, usually pictured as a 
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vertical spectrum stretching from inhuman or barbaric ugliness to divine beauty. The 
gods, of course, were beautiful; and people of aristocratic birth or upper-class origins 
were expected to manifest their proximity to the divine by possessing a natural beauty 
and nobility.”537 The Greek ideal of male beauty can be seen in their statues. Polycleitos 
of Argos (5th century BCE) set the standard for male beauty in his treatise “Canon” and a 
statue known as the “spear-bearer” or doryphoros, sculpted to illustrate the ideal 
principles. Polycleitos discussed the ideal proportions of the body, seeing it as a 
mathematical balance of relaxed and tense body parts in a symmetry. Balance, rhythm, 
proportion, harmony, and symmetry characterize the ideal body. His sculptures depicted 
“a heavily muscled sharply articulated scheme of the naked male body.”538 Each element 
of Polycleitos’s statue was “constructed according to a set of precise set of measurements 
calculated to represent perfection.”539 A later statue, “The Hunter” (300–100 BCE), 
depicts a naked youth in motion as he is about to spear an animal, again representing the 
ideal male body in action.540 The naked male body in action is beautiful. 
We do not know what Jesus looked like. The Gospels are silent as to his actual 
appearance. This stands in contrast to how ideal males of Greco-Roman culture are 
depicted in literature and art. They are always beautiful. The first-century rhetorician, 
Aelius Theon, for example, taught that a good rhetorician would detail the “health, 
strength, beauty, [and] quick sensibility” of noble men in their encomiums.541 Depictions 
of Jesus do not follow this advice. Drawing on Isaiah 53:2—“he had no form or majesty 
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that we should look at him, nothing in his appearance that we should desire him”—
Christian theologians through the ages have not seen Jesus as a handsome male. 
Tertullian went so far as to claim that Roman soldiers would not have spit on Jesus if he 
had not been so ugly.542 Jesus’s masculinity, therefore, would not have come from his 
attractiveness. His body in action, with precise proportions, balance, and harmony did not 
define his beauty as a male. Indeed, the ugliness of his crucified body would have been 
off-putting to those seeking an ideal male. His already ugly body now disfigured from 
torture would in no way inspire masculine ideals. His maleness is the opposite of the 
hunter/warrior. 
For the Romans and Jews themselves, one of the primary markers of Jewish 
identity was circumcision.543 Horace and Persius sarcastically referred to the “clipped 
Jews.”544 Martial jealously chided a Roman woman for preferring Jewish men to Roman 
ones.545 Circumcision signifies Jews. Roman authorities could even require a man to 
display their genitals in order to determine whether the person was subject to the Jewish 
tax the Romans imposed on all Jewish people to pay for the Jewish War (64–73 CE).546 
“The rite of circumcision was central to the creation of visible Jewish difference in 
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antiquity, a form of ‘otherness’ physically inscribed in the flesh.”547 Sometime between 
120 and 132 CE, Hadrian forbade Jews from circumcising anybody, including their male 
infants. In the 150s Antonius Pius relaxed Hadrian’s prohibition stating that Jews could 
circumcise only their own babies, but not non-Jews.548 Male Jewish circumcision, 
therefore, was part of a system of signs within the Roman economy of signs to signify 
their otherness. 
Unlike the Greeks who forced those they conquered to Hellenize, the Romans 
prided themselves in their ability to absorb other peoples and their cultures.549 Roman 
stereotypes, like all stereotypes, divide others into distinct groups—rather than one big 
group called “the other”—so that that dominant group doing the stereotyping can place 
different people into distinct groups. Stereotyping, in other words, involves a discourse of 
power and knowledge. Stereotyping is one of the most prominent forms of colonial 
discourse.550 These stereotypes, according to Homi Bhabha, recognize difference at the 
same time that they reinscribe that difference within a discourse of power that subsumes 
the colonial subject (in this case Jews) into the dominant system: difference exists but 
only on Roman terms that establishes the Romans as superior. 
So how did Jewish circumcision as a stereotype in Roman colonial discourse 
function to establish Roman superiority in the minds of the Romans? Romans had a 
                                                
547 Ra'aan Abusch, “Circumcision and Castration under Roman Law in the Early Empire,” in The 
Covenant of Circumcision: New Perspectives on an Ancient Jewish Rite, ed. Elizabeth Wyner Mark 
(Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 2003), 76. 
548 See Amnon Linder, ed. The Jews in Roman Imperial Legislation (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1987), 99–100. 
549 On this idea see Andrew Jacobs, Christ Circumcised: A Study in Early Christian History and 
Difference (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 17. 
550 On stereotyping see Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 
2004), 94–120. “The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonised as a population of 
degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of 
administration and instruction” (p. 101). 
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picture of the “ideal” male penis. Galen speaks about the beautiful ornamentation that 
nature provided men with their foreskin.551 A boy’s nurse was to help mold his penis into 
a more ideal type by various techniques.552 Foreskin was part of the ideal male in 
antiquity. 
Jews were often ridiculed in Roman literature for circumcision. Romans ridiculed 
Jews because cutting off the foreskin of the male penis made Jewish men less masculine. 
It made them ugly as well, more akin to nonhuman animals. Even the Greeks believed 
this. In a fifth-century BCE painting, a Greek painter depicted Egyptian priests who had 
been circumcised. Frederick Hodges describes the scene: “The painter has taken great 
pains to depict the priests as having fat, ugly, wrinkled, circumcised penises with a 
bulbous externalized glans, which contrast sharply with the neat and attractive penis of 
Herakles, with its elegantly long and tapered prepuce. Likewise, the snubbed noses and 
monkey-like faces of the Egyptians could hardly be more dissimilar to the heroic Greek 
profile of Herakles.”553 That is, if an uncircumcised penis goes with a certain type of face, 
long and tapered, and a circumcised penis goes with a hideous nonhuman animal-like 
face, then it is clear which type goes with the ideal male. 
To be more like a nonhuman animal is to be more like a female in these 
stereotypes as well. Men have self-control, are rational, able to dominate their opponents, 
and show virtue on the battlefield and the hunt. For the Romans, as for the Greek before 
                                                
551 See Frederick Mansfield Hodges, “The Ideal Prepuce in Ancient Greece and Rome: Male 
Genital Aesthetics and Their Relation to Lipodermos, Circumcision, Foreskin Restoration, and the 
Kynodesme,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 75, no. 3 (2001): 376. 
552 See Soranus, Gynecology, 2.34: “If the infant is male and it looks as though it has no foreskin 
she should gently draw the tip of the foreskin forward or even hold it together with a strand of wool to 
fasten it. For if gradually stretched and continuously drawn forward it easily stretches and assumes its 
normal length, covers the glans and becomes accustomed to keep the natural good shape. In addition, she 
should shape the scrotum from where the thighs meet.” 
553 Hodges, “The Ideal Prepuce in Ancient Greece and Rome,” 386–87. 
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them, “barbarians” were routinely characterized as effeminate and unmasculine. Non-
Romans lacked discipline and self-control especially in sexuality, a characteristic that the 
Romans thought they shared with all women.554 Non-Romans were effeminate and let 
their women rule over them. Romans were masculine and ruled over women. Jews were 
often singled out in particular as sexually licentious, which placed them into the 
effeminate category, and this had to do with their circumcision. 
In the New Testament, Luke describes the setting and situation in which Jesus 
was circumcised. He begins his account by noting that Emperor Augustus had declared 
an empire-wide census that had consequences for the manner of Jesus’s birth. As a result 
of the imperial decree, all the subjects had to travel to their hometowns, even pregnant 
women like Mary. As a result, Jesus was born in a manger because there was no room for 
them in the houses of Bethlehem (Luke 2:1–7). Luke marks Jesus as part of a people 
subjected to Roman government, one that cares little for the lives of individuals.  
Luke continues, “After eight days had passed, it was time to circumcise the child; 
and he was called Jesus, the name given him by the angel before he was conceived in the 
womb” (Luke 2:21). This is the only Gospel that mentions Jesus’s circumcision. Luke 
connects it to his official naming. But Jesus, Luke makes clear, was circumcised.555  
Jesus was born under a colonial government. That government could displace 
people. Jesus was born under a colonial culture. That culture viewed masculinity in very 
particular ways as dominant (potentially violently dominant), active, and self-controlled. 
                                                
554 See Edith Hall, Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy (Oxford: 
Clarendo Press, 1989), 196. 
555 Luke 1:59 notes John the Baptist’s circumcision on his eighth day as well.  
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Jewish males like Jesus were effeminate, submissive, and deformed, not at all ideal males 
that Romans fetishized.556  
The Gospel of Luke is often considered the most Gentile-oriented of the Gospels. 
The first two chapters of Luke, however, seem much more focused on Jewish issues and 
identities than the rest of the Gospel, leading some redaction-critical scholars to posit that 
the opening chapters are part of an originally Jewish setting that is ultimately subsumed 
and overcome in the rest of the Gospel. Luke, they claim, opens up the gospel from its 
parochial Palestinian setting to a more universal audience of the larger Empire.557 
Accordingly, many commentators argue that Luke stresses the naming, not the 
circumcision, of Jesus in Luke 2:21. Joseph A. Fitzmyer is typical: “Stress is put here 
more on the naming of Jesus than on his circumcision.”558 Yet, beyond the crude 
supercessionism involved in these redactionist revisions of Luke, even if Luke had a 
Gentile audience in mind, then the mention of circumcision seems all the more 
significant. 
Jesus’s circumcision is significant in a Gentile setting because Jews were 
stereotyped as effeminate, submissive, and passive in contrast to the ideal Roman male 
heroes who dominated their enemies and women, Jesus’s circumcision would 
immediately mark him off as less than male. In such a cultural milieu Jesus would come 
across as submissive and feminine, not a man to emulate at all. Jesus’s Jewish manhood, 
marked in his circumcised penis, therefore, functions as a counter-cultural resistance to 
                                                
556 In the Hasmodean period, the Maccabees roamed the Palestinian countryside forcibly imposing 
circumcision as a way to bring conquered people into the Jewish fold. But by the time of Jesus, this way of 
seeing circumcision was gone. See Jacobs, Christ Circumcised, 19. 
557 For an argument of this sort see Luke Timothy Johnson, The Gospel of Luke (Collegeville, MN: 
Liturgical Press, 1991), 8, 10 
558 Joseph Fiztmyer, The Gospel according to Luke I–IX (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982), 
424. See also Raymond Brown, The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in the 
Gospels of Matthew and Luke (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 237. 
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the dominant image of maleness in the Empire. Luke’s use of circumcision, then, is 
similar to how later rabbis, monks, and nuns were viewed according to Daniel Boyarin. 
They were “a category—a third gender—formed by Jewish men whose characteristic or 
ideal mode of existence is scholarly-bookish, and therefore nonphallic and unmanly for 
Eurochristian performances of gender, and monks for whom the same is largely true.”559 
What should have functioned as a sign of Roman dominance of the deformed and 
passive Jews by the hyper-masculine Romans is turned upside down. The mark of shame 
from a Roman perspective becomes a mark of honor from a Jewish perspective. Luke 
specifically mentions a repulsive trait of Jewish males to upturn what his audience should 
expect from Jesus. Jesus is not the warrior-hunter ideal of Roman literature and imperial 
power. Jesus is the circumcised and crucified Messiah. The first indication of who Jesus 
will be is his circumcision: in that context, it is a re-appropriation of a colonial stereotype 
into a positive reconfiguration of maleness that rejects male violence associated with the 
phallus. 
To the extent that circumcision undercuts the ideal of a warrior-hunter man, 
Jewish emphasis on the creatureliness of all that exists also places maleness within a 
relativized status. Men are creatures, too. Men are no better or worse before God than 
women or other animals.560 God created all of them according the Jewish origins sagas. 
God creates male and female humans in the divine likeness and image, but this does not 
                                                
559 Daniel Boyarin, “Homotopia: The Feminized Jewish Man and the Lives of Women in Late 
Antiquity,” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 7, no. 2 (1995): 42. 
560 It is significant that the Talmud does not essentialize gender or make gender into an ontological 
status underlying reality. Men and women do not have their own “natures” in Talmudic literature. The 
Talmud definitely differentiates between males and females, but this kind of differentiation stands in stark 
contrast to the Greek notion of male as the norm and in which “man” is the general word for “human.” On 
the lack of “natures” and ontological status for gender in Talmudic Judaism see Daniel Boyarin, “Gender,” 
in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, edited by Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998), 117–136. 
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place the male human in the place of dominator and killer of all that is not human. It 
places Adam, the first human male, in the place of intimate relationship with other 
creatures so that he can know them and name them.561 His relationship to nonhuman 
animals was one of naming not consumption: fruit and seeds were his food, not flesh. The 
male, right from the start of the Jewish story, is utterly different than the Greco Roman 
male and the typical American male, who typically are taught to desire animal flesh and 
leave salads alone as “women’s food.” 
The ideal is no longer the male military leader as John the Baptist expected, in 
line with so much prevailing culture.562 Instead of a violent male military leader as the 
ideal for male humanness, the norm becomes the peaceable human whose identity is not 
in competition with other creatures through hunting and warfare. Jesus’s nail- and spear-
pierced body, bleeding and dying on the cross, reveals a manhood that undercuts the 
hegemonic stereotype of typical masculinity. 
                                                
561 I take naming to be a fundamentally relational activity, not an activity of domination. 
Theologian Jean-Luc Marion argues, to the contrary, that Adam names nonhuman animals because naming 
objectifies that which is named and places the named under the power of the namer. All naming is therefore 
an inherently violent activity. The practice of naming objectifies the other into an object under one’s power 
to dominate: “Man has the power to name, to understand, and thus to dominate.” That is why humans do 
not name themselves or God, but do have a divine permission to name (dominate) all other creatures.” See 
Jean-Luc Marion, “Mihi magna quaestio factus sum: The Privilege of Unknowing,” Journal of Religion 85, 
no. 1 (2005): 15. The first thing to note here is that Marion’s anthropology, therefore, trades on a 
fundamental exclusion in which human dignity comes at the price of other creatures. 
Moreover, Marion seems to misinterpret Adam’s naming in Genesis 2 (an interpretation he draws 
from Hegel). The naming-story does not suggest that Adam somehow “objectified” the other creatures. In 
fact, God brought them to Adam because God considered them to be suitable companions. Marion also 
misinterprets naming in Scripture, which serves many different purposes, including dominion, and we 
cannot reduce every instance of naming to any one purpose. In Genesis 16, Hagar “named the LORD who 
spoke to her, ‘You are El-roi’” (Gen 16:13). We can hardly imagine the author of Genesis envisioning that 
Hagar has exercised dominion—understood as domination— in naming God. Moreover, Hagar’s naming of 
God directly contradicts Marion’s claim that humans cannot name God just as much as Adam’s naming of 
Eve contradicts his claim that humans cannot name humans (and the absent sea creatures also challenge his 
thesis that nonhuman creation is under dominion through the act of naming). 
562 How ironic that the Baptist, so counter-cultural in many ways, stands in the line of patriarchal 
visions of the violent male ideal. 
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Jesus goes to the cross. He dies. He suffers. In the Roman economy of signs this 
is the utter defeat of a weak man. Some feminists also reject the cross, but not because it 
does not signify a violent male. Alison Jasper sees the cross as glorifying suffering per se 
as a type of obedience to God’s will. Moreover, Jasper argues, this crucifixion seems to 
shed the body in ways typical of later Christianity that seems to have a low view of this 
material world and our bodies in general. The cross glorifies suffering and devalues the 
body in this interpretation. I think Jasper is right at one level: to the extent that Jesus’s 
cross legitimizes oppression and tells women to just grin and bear it “like Jesus,” the 
cross becomes a tool of oppression. To the extent that it tells oppressed men to grin and 
bear it is also problematic. But Jesus’s crucifixion undercuts the prevalent portrait of 
manhood in his and our culture.563 
The trial and crucifixion narratives give no indication that they condone what 
happens to Jesus or that the stories are meant to justify sadistic male behavior toward 
others, be they human females or nonhuman animals. Yet without the resurrection, these 
narratives would seem to trap women, nonhuman animals, and low status males in a cycle 
of victimization. It is from the vantage point of the resurrection that we can read back to 
the crucifixion and see the suffering endured there absolutely condemned.  
Jesus, the subjugated male, with whom there is no reason in principle that women 
cannot identify, does not stay dead. Death is what Jesus was supposed to fear the most. 
Death is what Roman male dominance could give out as its mirrored other, in which that 
which they feared the most is inflicted on others. But the tomb, the place where Jesus is 
cast as another victim of male power, becomes a place for life to spring forth yet again. 
                                                
563 This is not an idea unique to me. See Kent Brintnall, Ecce Homo: The Male-Body-in-Pain as 
Redemptive Figure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 132.  
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Jesus thus offers women hope: hope that despite being cast aside in the patriarchal 
system, there will be life. The feminized male flesh of Christ rises from the tomb. How 
can this not be a symbol of hope for women and a release for men from their hyper-
masculine fears masked in domination? 
To argue that Christ’s maleness, per se, cannot be a source of hope and life for 
women is to have a very peculiar understanding of male and female. It seems to reflect a 
static view of biological sex and gender that does not do justice to the way the Gospels 
portray Jesus’s body, as Graham Ward notes. Moreover, gender and queer studies in 
theology are now recognizing just how problematic the idea of male and female are 
biologically speaking anyhow.  
This is not to say that the Gospels (much less the New Testament in general) 
portray Jesus in such a way that are not troubling in terms of his relationship with 
women. There are certainly plenty of instances of Jesus subverting the patriarchal values 
of his time in relationship to women and men.564 But feminist readings are right to point 
out that these are not always decisive. The male Jesus still often reflects certain ideas 
latent in his and our modern culture that keep women in their place. 
Nevertheless, essentialism about what it means to be male or female has to be 
rejected to the extent that it depicts an either/or situation: either Jesus is male and 
                                                
564 For example, when scribes and Pharisees wanted to execute a woman for adultery, Jesus 
challenged their patriarchal authority. He refused to comply with the scribal and Pharisaical insistence that 
the woman be executed, and instead called upon the men to recognize their own sins. As a male, Jesus here 
broke with patriarchal power, leveling out the playing field between men and women. In this sense, Jesus 
offers an example of manhood that critiques and refuses patriarchal power and privilege. By refusing to 
condemn the woman, Jesus, in some sense, takes on her sin. By calling on the men to see their own 
duplicity, Jesus shows men the way forward. Jesus crosses a boundary. So Jesus’s maleness can be a 
critique of male power and domination and models a boundary crossing identity that is not easily 
assimilated into the gender roles into which some people place him. Rather than an essentialist reading, in 
which Jesus’s maleness either hinders or furthers some theological point, this way of seeing Jesus’s gender, 
begins to break down the rigid divide. 
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therefore not able to save women, or his maleness is utterly unimportant and he might 
have some value for women. Jesus’s maleness is a problem for modern males even more 
than his male identity is for women because it does not conform to some of the most 
enduring Roman hunter-warrior ideals.  
Jesus let himself be crucified rather than wage war and violence. That rubs 
directly against dominant ideas of what it means to be a man down through the ages. As 
Boyarin notes about Jewish males (as well as Christian monks, nuns, and priests): 
“Within the context of a culture in which ‘strength, assertiveness, activity, stoicism, 
courage and so forth’ were the essential characteristics of manliness, Jewish men (and 
certain classes of Christian men as well) appeared to be not-male or feminized.”565 This 
reconfiguration of the ideal male is far from theologically marginal.566 
Jesus was not ashamed of his circumcision. We have no indication—as we do in 
other sources for some Jewish males—that he tried to hide his circumcision or reverse it 
through various techniques of stretching skin. Moreover, I will argue more fully in the 
next chapter that Jesus’s circumcision, to the extent that it feminized him in the Roman 
economy of signs, an economy that Jewish people resisted and subverted by rejecting 
                                                
565 Boyarin, “Homotopia,” 43. 
566 In terms of modern Christian ethics, Jesus’s maleness is a challenge to Protestant and Catholic 
ministries to males such as the Christian Bowhunters of America, the Christian Sportsmen’s Fellowship, 
Ironman Outdoors, Outdoor Connection, and South Carolina Baptist Convention’s Bow Hunting with a 
Purpose.  
A sample of these “manly” ministries comes from Brent Henderson’s Hunting Truth Seminars & 
Wild Game Banquets, in which he recommends to churches appeals to males dressed in camouflage, 
surrounded by or holding weapons, with stuffed, dead animals on the walls. His videos show him killing 
animals and waxing about the importance of husbands and fathers in the household. In his Event Planning 
Guide for churches he recommends prizes like bows and arrows, knives, guns, and other hunting gear. In an 
attempt to draw men further into church life he also recommends that churches have plenty of meat for 
them to eat.  
Henderson’s masculine appeal is echoed in Men’s Ministry in the 21st Century: The Encyclopedia 
of Practical Ideas, which advises churchgoers to make their events safe for men by having food for them: 
“men can sit together and talk as long as they have a purpose like devouring a roast pig!” 
In these modern male ministries we are a far, far cry from the Jesus of the Gospels, in large part, I 
would argue because his maleness has been detached from his Jewishness.  
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their ideal male, also dehumanized him in that economy. Roman beauty was pitted 
against Jewish beastliness.  
Conclusion 
My argument in this chapter proceeds from what I argued in the previous chapter 
about Jesus’s Jewishness. One of the presuppositions of this chapter is that Jesus’s 
maleness inextricably intertwines with his Jewishness. There is no such thing as a “Jew.” 
There is no such thing as a “male.” There are only particular embodiments and 
performances in which aspect of identity that we might logically separate for the sake of 
analysis are actually intertwined so deeply that any sharp division between Jew and male 
in the case of Jesus would not do the Incarnation justice. Not only this, but unlike 
previous studies, which have glossed over Jesus’s Jewish maleness and argue for a broad 
creatureliness, I have tried to face it squarely with the awareness that Jesus’s identity as a 
particular person in a particular place and time can speak to a universal audience. It is 
precisely through his particularity that we begin to see how Jesus’s identity is salvific for 
nonhuman animals and humans. 
Gender is a performance. Maleness is a performance. Jewishness is a 
performance. Jesus’s biological sex is intertwined with a transgendered performance that 
is just as problematic for modern males as it is for modern females. The Gospels, as 
Graham Ward has argued, paint a radically transgendered portrait of Jesus’s body in 
which his male body does a lot of theological work across the gender divide. Any “men’s 
ministry” that wants to pick up some helpful hints from Jesus’s maleness to reinforce 
their hunting, killing, and violent tendencies, as some male ministries certainly do, will 
254 
 
only be able to do so to the extent that they read Jesus in the most shallow manner 
possible. 
But when it comes to nonhuman animals, Jesus’s transgendered theological body 
needs its Jewishness. Scholars have paid far too little attention to this aspect of Jesus’s 
maleness to date. But it is precisely as a Jewish male that the Incarnation begins to take 
on significance for other than human creatures. The dominant society made the ideal 
male into a hunter who kills helpless and relatively defenseless nonhuman animals, and 
then turns them into killers of their own kind of who must constantly negotiate their 
power in relationship to others. But Jewish tradition can be read as often doing the 
opposite. The record is not one of unbroken success. Yet there are trajectories that move 
us toward liberation. Jesus’s own life is not one of an utter break with everything modern 
theologians and critical theorists might see as patriarchal or speciesist. Yet he sets a 
course that if taken to its conclusion will lead to more and more understanding and 
critique. It will lead to more attempts to overcome patriarchy and speciesism. His 
disciples, as he himself suggested, will do greater things than he. 
If we ignore Jesus’s maleness we may also tend to take the Incarnation out of its 
Jewish roots, where a creation-wide eschatological vision widens the scope of our 
theological vision. Severed from these roots, we may miss the way Jesus’s maleness 
transgresses constructed boundaries about what we think it means to be male or female. 
We can only deconstruct stereotypical theological renderings of Jesus—which make his 
gender something useable for patriarchal purposes as the characters do to Jesus in the 
crucifixion—by focusing first on Jesus’s particularity and working through it. 
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Theologically speaking, Jesus’s maleness as narrated in the Gospels has a 
“transgendered” quality that subverts patriarchal domination and makes it problematic to 
use that maleness to speak about “active” and “passive” aspects of life that could 
underwrite social gender hierarchies. Jesus was a male Jew, and that Jewishness 
influenced how he negotiated life as a man. They are related. The way Jesus crosses the 
patriarchal boundary was completely within an interpretation and embodiment of Jewish 
history and eschatology. 
Jesus stands, I have argued, in a Jewish tradition that rejected the dominant image 
of the ideal male as a violent hunter-warrior, a portrait of manhood that has been 
prevalent from ancient to modern times. The virulent and violent male warrior, actively 
conquering enemies and killing and consuming nonhuman animals, is not the ideal male 
in this Jewish vision. Jesus stands in a tradition that undercuts the active violent male and 
brings a new vision of peaceable masculinity into the foreground. That does not mean 
there is not room for critiques of ways that the Gospels portray Jesus as still within a 
system of the dominant. But it does mean we are not in an either/or situation, but a 
trajectory set in motion long before Jesus and carried to new heights in the Incarnation.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE WORD BECAME A JEWISH, MALE HUMAN 
 
 
 
In chapters 3 and 4, I argued that Jesus’s particularity as a Jewish male helps 
animal theology. The Jewish origins and eschatological stories frame everything Jesus 
said and did. These theological bookends frame Jesus's maleness. His maleness 
overturned dominant portraits of the bloodthirsty male hunter and warrior. Jesus’s 
theologically-transgendered body challenges our bipolar views of biological sex and 
culturally-generated gender. At the same time, his circumcision marked him as radically 
different from the ideal Roman male. How Jesus was male matters for how we think 
about the Incarnation and nonhuman animals. 
Despite these trajectories, Jesus’s humanness may provide an insurmountable 
barrier. While we might be able to revise the Nicene Creed from “Who for us men, and 
for our salvation, came down from heaven; and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the 
Virgin Mary, and was made man” to less a less masculine-biased translation—“Who for 
us human beings, and for our salvation, descended from heaven; and was made incarnate 
by the Holy Spirit from the virgin Mary, and became human”—even this gender-
inclusive translation about the Incarnation could reinforce the assumption that Jesus’s 
humanity is the all-decisive particularity for thinking about God and creation. In other 
words, Jesus’s humanity could derail reflection on the Incarnation and nonhuman 
animals.  
Responding to Christian anthropocentricism, many theologians dismiss Jesus’s 
humanity as a Christological focal point. As noted in the introduction, Sallie McFague 
argues that we must relativize Jesus of Nazareth in Christology but “maximize it 
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[Christology] in relation to the cosmos” by seeing the cosmos as God’s body.567 Others, 
such as Denis Edwards, Niels Gregersen, and Elizabeth Johnson, take a different 
approach. They view humanity as comprised of cosmic elements that began billions of 
years ago. So while acknowledging Jesus’s humanity, they connect Jesus’s humanity to a 
wider ecology.  
I have argued that McFague does not take the Incarnation’s particularity seriously 
enough. The “deep Incarnation” approach produces more enlivening results for Christian 
theology. Ecological and cosmic forces have shaped humanity. Everything is 
interconnected. Nevertheless, this approach may take such a wide view of Jesus’s 
humanity loses particularity. Moreover, these theologians' broad viewpoint may 
clash with the personalism of the Triune Creator who notices every sparrow. In this 
chapter, my approach supplements deep Incarnation theology. I will read Jesus's 
humanity as necessary for animal theology. 
Jesus’s Humanity as a Problem for Animal Theology 
Before constructively reading Jesus’s humanity in relation to nonhuman animals, 
a couple of scriptural challenges seem to halt the endeavor. Commentators across the 
ages have used the stories of Jesus sending a demon into pigs as exemplifying human 
superiority and dominion. Commentators have also used the Gospel of Luke’s fish-eating 
Jesus in a similar way. In this section, I will examine these stories and argue that they do 
not establish human superiority and violent dominion based in Jesus’s humanity. 
                                                
567 McFague, The Body of God, 162. 
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Pigs and Demons: Mark 5:1–20 
In a pericope common to all three Synoptic Gospels, Jesus seems to show little 
regard for pigs. In Mark’s Gospel, Jesus lands in the vicinity of Gerasenes and encounters 
a man who lived in the tombs (Mark 5:1–20, see also Matt 8:28–34 and Luke 8:26–39). 
This man had broken shackles and howled at the moon. He also regularly committed 
violence against himself (Mark 5:5). Upon seeing Jesus, the man ran toward Jesus, whom 
he called “Jesus, Son of the Most High God” (Mark 5:7), imploring Jesus not to 
“torment” him. Sensing a demonic presence, Jesus commands the spirit to leave the man, 
but then asks what the spirit’s name is. The spirit says, “Legion, for we are many” (Mark 
5:9). Then the spirit begged Jesus not to send them away to “torment” (to “the abyss” in 
Luke 8:31). They feared Jesus was going to kill them, so they asked to go into a “great 
herd of swine” of about two thousand: “Send us into the swine; let us enter them” (Mark 
5:12). Legion apparently viewed going to the pigs as a refuge and escape. Jesus “gave 
them permission.” The spirits entered the pigs, who then stampeded down a hill and 
drowned in the sea (Mark 5:13). 
Commenting on this story, Bertrand Russell charged that Jesus “was not very kind 
to the pigs to put the devils into them and make them rush down the hill into the sea.” 
Jesus, Russell argues, is supposedly God and as such would be omnipotent: “He could 
have made the devils simply go away; but He chose to send them into the pigs.”568 Jesus 
let the evil spirits kill pigs for no reason: he could have denied the demonic request and 
sent the spirits completely away. Indeed, Jesus “made” the pigs drown in Russell’s view, 
                                                
568 Bertrand Russell, “Why I Am Not A Christian,” in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 575. 
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disproving his goodness and divinity. Animal rights philosopher Peter Singer also sees 
this passage as pointing to Christological flaws. “Jesus himself is described as showing 
apparent indifference to the fate of non-humans.”569 Biblical scholar, David Rhoads, lists 
this incident as one of the more “egregious examples of disparaging attitudes toward 
nature in the New Testament.”570 Stephen D. Moore adds that the pigs are 
“natural/supernatural hybrids” and as such represent “the literal demonization of the 
animal in Mark.”571 The destruction of the pigs, therefore, according to Moore, violently 
establishes human superiority. 
By contrast, some interpreters read the story as a political allegory. Ever since 
Ched Myer’s groundbreaking work Binding the Strong Man, many scholars have seen 
this story as veiling a conflict between Jews and Romans. English translations mask 
numerous Greek and Latin terms that signal the Roman military as the story’s target.572 A 
Roman legion—with a boar as their ensign—was garrisoned in the vicinity. That Legion 
drowns in the sea recalls the parted Red Sea crashing down around Pharaoh’s army. 
Drawing on such scholarship, Charlie Camosy writes, “The demon’s name, Legion, 
seems to be a dead giveaway here.”573 Annika Spalde and Pelle Strindlund argue that 
                                                
569 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: 
Random House, 1975), 191. 
570 Rhoads, “Who Will Speak for the Sparrow?,” 67. 
571 Stephen D. Moore, “Why There Are No Humans or Animals in the Gospel of Mark,” in Mark 
as Story: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. Kelly R. Iverson and Christopher W. Skinner (Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2011), 90. 
572 For a summary see Ched Myers, Binding the Strong Man: A Political Reading of Mark’s Story, 
Anniversary ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2008), 190–91. 
573 Charles Camosy, Peter Singer and Christian Ethics: Beyond Polarization (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 107. Camosy does reveal his sources on this but the political reading 
that Ched Myers offers is fairly pervasive in regards to Mark’s story. 
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such “coded political messages” commonly appears in the Bible and in culture. The Book 
of Revelation uses this kind of imagery, for instance.574 
Many commentators, by contrast, maintain that Jesus chose a lesser evil. The 
demons feared that if they would die without a body to live on parasitically, and since 
demons were territorial, they saw the pigs as a suitable substitute for the man. The 
demons, these scholars claim, had meant to kill the man, but Jesus sent them into the pigs 
as a “lesser evil.”575 According to Bauckham, this story does not teach that nonhuman 
animals are valueless. Nevertheless, “the principle that human beings are of more value 
than other animals here operates to the detriment of the latter, in a case, unique within the 
Gospels, where a choice has to be made.”576 Jesus’s action, therefore, becomes less of a 
problem by imposing hierarchies of being and moral quandaries on the story. 
Michael Gilmour sees several problems with Bauckham’s way of reading this 
story.577 First, if the demons wanted to kill the man, why had they left him alive? Second, 
if their plea was for survival, as many scholars argue, why would they drive the pigs into 
the ocean to drown, since they needed a body to survive as well, according to the then 
                                                
574 Annika Spalde and Pelle Strindlund, “Doesn’t Jesus Treat Animals as Property?,” in A Faith 
Embracing All Creatures, ed. Andy Alexis-Baker and Tripp York (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2012), 101–13. 
Moreover, they point out that there are unrealistic depictions of pigs in this story. They do not stampede 
because they are not really herd animals. And two thousand pigs would be far beyond most farming 
capabilities at that time. See ibid., 106–107. 
Nevertheless, a pig is not a pig in this reading. The pigs remain coded signs for something else, in 
this case, a military insignia. The pigs are signs to be interpreted. They represent something else. So the 
ethical problems involved are dissolved through a process of erasure. The pigs are not really there. They are 
just codes. The unwieldy potential of this kind of reading is only reined in by a historical-critical method, 
which looks at what “really” underlies the text. While the reading is intriguing and insightful, I suspect one 
could read almost any Gospel story in such a manner. It also plays into a long line of “animal erasure” in 
biblical interpretation, only this time in order to acquit Jesus of potential wrongdoing. 
575 This is how Richard Bauckham reads the story. See Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures, 
97–98. I am using Bauckham primarily because he is sympathetic to the kind of work I am doing in this 
dissertation and has written extensively on the Bible and a theology that cares for creation and nonhuman 
animals specifically. 
576 Ibid., 98. 
577 See Gilmour, Eden’s Other Residents, 84. 
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prevailing views of demons? Third, Jesus cast out other demons without such collateral 
damage and could have done so here. Fourth, to attribute the wanton destruction of life to 
Jesus raises problems of consistency since Jesus indicates that God cares about even a 
single sparrow’s death (Matt 10:29–31). Finally, argues Gilmour, the standard 
interpretations raise issues about Jesus’s authority. Cannot Jesus save the pigs as well as 
the human? If Jesus is lord of all creation, then this limitation seriously challenges the 
standard interpretations about the pigs. 
Gilmour offers his own reading: the pigs are neither passive victims of demonic 
murder nor docile nothings whom Jesus disregarded. Rather than being acted upon 
passively, the pigs actively resist the demons. The Bible does not depict nonhuman 
animals as Descartean machines. Rather, nonhuman animals cry out to God for food (Job 
38:41; Ps 147:9; Ps 104:21; Joel 1:21); actively recognize angels (Num 22:22–35); work 
as God’s agents (Jonah); and groan for redemption (Rom 8:18–23). Nonhuman animals 
praise God and in the Book of Revelation surround God’s throne (Rev 4:8). Meanwhile, 
the demons have an interest in their hosts staying alive. So Jesus’s permission to the 
demons to enter the pigs does not mean he permitted the demons to kill the pigs. Rather, 
the pigs act against the demonic forces. “The demons do not anticipate creation’s 
abhorrence of their evil presence, which through an exercise of self-sacrifice destroys 
them. The demons do not plunge the swine into the waters. It is the other way around. 
The swine hurl the demons into the ‘sea’ using their own bodies, destroying the devils in 
the process.”578 The sea, in biblical literature, is a place of chaos and abyss, exactly where 
Luke says the demons wanted to avoid.  
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If Gilmour’s interpretation is plausible, then the pigs in this story cooperate with 
Jesus in freeing the man from his demonic possession and in liberating the Earth from a 
demonic presence. Rather than pitting Jesus against nonhuman creatures in a “lesser evil” 
scenario, Gilmour’s interpretation places the pigs and Jesus in a cooperative role more 
fitting to Jesus’s role as savior and liberator.579 Rather than violently establishing the 
superiority of humanity, as Moore asserts, this story shows pigs working against evil. 
Supporting Gilmour’s interpretation is the fact that an active verb describes what the pigs 
did: ὥρµησεν ἡ ἀγέλη (the herd rushed—Mark 5:13—third person, singular, active, 
aorist, indicative). The herd itself ran. They acted. If the demon had run then we might 
expect the subject to be Legion: “Legion rushed.” If Legion caused the pigs to run, we 
might expect a passive construction—“the pigs were rushed”—or some kind of causal 
statement like “Legion caused the pigs to run into the sea.” Yet the Greek text states that 
the pigs stampeded into the water, drowning themselves and depriving the demons of 
their bodily hosts.  
As a way of comparison, it might even be useful to compare the pigs’ action to a 
first-century Jewish protest. Pilate had raised Roman imperial standards in Jerusalem, 
offending many Jewish people. When they objected en masse, Pilate had the protesting 
Jews surrounded with soldiers. In response, the Jewish demonstrators “flung themselves 
                                                
579 Evidence suggests that nonhuman animals act independently rather than being automatons. 
Jason Hribal, for example, has mounted significant evidence that nonhuman animals confined within 
circuses, zoos, slaughterhouses, and other places mount resistance. They are not machines who 
automatically do what they are bid by human overlords. These acts of resistance, which range from 
attacking keepers to plotting revenge and escapes, rarely gain the attention they deserve because zoo 
keepers and circus owners, for example, downplay the animal agency by telling the public these are 
“isolated” incidents that rarely occur. In fact these acts of resistance happen regularly. Many of the 
creatures kept confined in these places mount organized resistance. Hribal claims that if the public were 
made aware of these acts, they would help dispel the notion that humans are the only creatures capable of 
agency. See Jason Hribal, Fear of the Animal Planet: The Hidden History of Animal Resistance (Petrolia, 
CA: CounterPunch, 2014). The Gerasene pigs could be read as waging a collective act of resistance against 
an evil force similar to the mass suicide Jews committed at Masada when the Romans besieged the city.  
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in a body on the ground, extended their necks, and exclaimed that they were ready rather 
to die than to transgress the law.”580 The readiness to resist evil to the point of death can 
also be read in the pigs rushing into the lake. 
In response to reading the pigs as having active agency, some would deny that 
these creatures have any capacity for agency. Sara Grey and Joe Cleffies , for example, 
writing in the left-wing magazine Jacobin, recently argued that nonhuman animals are 
“objects of history” because unlike oppressed humans nonhuman animals have never 
mounted resistance: “Human beings, whatever their racial identity, possess agency. 
Enslaved human beings, even in the most brutal days of the chattel system, were self-
directed beings who not only felt pain and experienced self-perception but who loved, 
reasoned, wrote, and above all fought for their own freedom. Other species will never 
display that kind of agency.”581 But some evidence suggests otherwise. Nonhuman 
animals have resisted captivity and oppression. Take, for example, a story in The 
Guardian about a chimpanzee named Santino held in a Swedish zoo. Santino hates it 
when humans come to observe him. So he began stockpiling bits of concrete that he had 
actively chipped away from a wall. He would wait till visitors showed up and then go to 
his ammunition pile and throw them at the visitors.582 That is plotting and resistance. 
Moreover, the idea that only humans can act purposefully to resist their oppression has 
been used in the past to justify oppression of other humans. For instance, in the 
nineteenth century, white Americans sometimes justified slavery by noting that black 
                                                
580 For the full story see Josephus, The Jewish War, Books 1–3, 2.169–174. 
581 Sara Grey and Joe Cleffies, “Peter Singer's Race Problem,” Jacobin, August 6, 2015. Online at 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/animal-rights-cecil-the-lion-peter-singer-speciesism/ (accessed 
August 30, 2015). 
582 Ian Sample, “Chimp Who Threw Stones at Zoo Visitors Showed Human Trait, Says Scientist,” 
The Guardian, March 10, 2009. Santino planned for the future in this incident, actively trying to resist 
human encroachment into his space. 
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slaves were objects “incapable of deep plots.”583 Yet we know that slaves occasionally 
revolted. Likewise, Jewish people mounted some revolts from their ghettoes against Nazi 
oppression. Does the fact that there were not more revolts mean that Jews and African 
Americans are “objects of history”? There is a circularity to the reasoning that denies 
agency to other animals. Moreover, as we shall see, such reasoning is what Giorgio 
Agamben calls “the anthropological machine.”  
In any case, whether one will allow the pigs in the Gospel account to have their 
own agency will often depend on the aprioi assumptions one brings to this text: are other 
animals capable of acting on their own or not? If so, then the pigs may have acted to 
resist a demonic presence. If, however, a person will not allow for this possibility as a 
matter of principle then there is some bias against other animals being brought to the text, 
a bias, we shall see, that trades on a violent establishment of human superiority. That 
establishment of human superiority, however, is what one brings to the text, not what a 
person simply reads off of it. I will return to this, but first, there is another story to 
examine. 
Jesus and Fish 
Jesus’s relationship to fish creatures seems to model something less than a 
peaceable co-existence.584 Most of Jesus’s use of fish in the canonical Gospels revolve 
around food. He cooks fish for his disciples (John 21:9–13), multiplies fish and bread to 
feed a large crowd (Matt 14:13–21; 15:32–39), helps his disciples catch fish in a net 
                                                
583 See Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts (New York: International Publishers, 
1983), 12. 
584 I will examine this issue in terms of theology rather than ethics per se. I have written about the 
ethical implications elsewhere. See Andy Alexis-Baker, “Didn’t Jesus Eat Fish?,” in A Faith Embracing All 
Creatures: Addressing Commonly Asked Questions about Christian Care for Animals, ed. Andy Alexis-
Baker and Tripp York (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 64–74. 
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(Luke 5:4–6; John 21:6–8), and tells Peter to retrieve a coin from a fish’s mouth (Matt 
17:24–27). In a single Lukan passage, Jesus even eats a piece of fish after the resurrection 
to prove his bodily reality (Luke 24:42–43). 
The debate over Luke 24:42–43 has often turned on the passage’s historical 
reliability.585 Arguing for the nonhistoricity of all passages about fish and Jesus, Keith 
Akers argues that later Christians added Luke 24:42–43 in order to accommodate a 
growing influx of flesh-eating pagans, and so these interpolating Christians corrupted an 
original Christian vegetarianism.586 Yet no solid evidence supports Akers’s thesis. The 
church never condemned vegetarianism per se, only various underlying anti-
materialisms. There are also no extant biblical manuscripts that would demonstrate 
tampering with the fish passages. Consequently, Akers’s lost vegetarian Jesus seems 
implausible. His underlying logic—for modern Christians to be vegetarian Jesus should 
have been one too—displaces eschatology for ethics since the end must be fully realized 
in the historical Jesus. We must be able to look back for a fully realized eschatology to 
imitate. 
                                                
585 Joseph Fitzmyer argues that this passage is a “Lukan embellishment” that is not historically 
reliable. See Joseph Fitzmyer, The Gospel according to Luke X–XXIV (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1985), 1574. By contrast, I. Howard Marshall, claims that Luke 24:43 is part of a “well-attested tradition.” 
See I. Howard Marshall, The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1978), 903. 
586 See Keith Akers, The Lost Religion of Jesus: Simple Living and Nonviolence in Early 
Christianity (New York: Lantern Books, 2000), 127–28. See also Charles Vaclavik, The Vegetarianism of 
Jesus Christ: The Pacifism, Communalism and Vegetarianism of Primitive Christianity (Platteville, WI: 
Kaweah Publishing, 1989), 144. Upton Ewing, likewise, makes Jesus into an Essene and argues that 
primitive Christianity’s original vegetarianism was later abandoned to accommodate flesh-eating pagans. 
But Jesus did not eat fish. See Upton Clary Ewing, The Essene Christ: A Recovery of the Historical Jesus 
and the Doctrines of Primitive Christianity (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961). My critique of Akers 
applies to Ewing and Vaclavik as well. For a devastating critique of this type of literature see Richard 
Young, Is God a Vegetarian? (New York: Open Court Pubilshing, 1999), 6–9. These scholars, Young 
argues, dismiss counter evidence to their thesis that Jesus was an Essene and Essenes were vegetarian as 
later corruptions. They read the evidence uncritically. Moreover, they use outdated scholarship. Scholars no 
longer see the Essenes as vegetarian since excavations revealed that the ritual meals likely contained some 
animal flesh. Moreover, the idea that the New Testament was altered to accommodate meat-eating pagans 
has no textual or historical basis. Moreover, the Christian church never condemned vegetarianism, which 
undermines their thesis. 
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At the other extreme, some scholars completely reject concerns around Jesus and 
nonhuman animals. I. Howard Marshall, for example, asserts dismissively with regard to 
Jesus’s interaction with the demon Legion: “The moral problem can be safely dismissed: 
one man is of greater value than many swine.”587 This response does not allow Jesus’s 
Jewish context to challenge modern Christians. As Richard Bauckham argues, “Jesus in 
his recorded teaching, does not teach compassion for animals, but he places himself 
clearly within the Jewish ethical and legal tradition which held that God requires the 
people to treat their fellow-creatures, the animals, with compassion and consideration.”588 
The creation-wide redemption that the New Testament and the prophets picture of the 
messiah calls for a more careful assessment of Jesus’s actions toward some sea creatures. 
Moreover, if Jesus’s mission is to address the problem of life’s horrors and not just 
human sin, then Jesus’s fish-eating needs careful assessment rather than dismissal as a 
nonissue. 
A third way that scholars have viewed this passage is to claim that Jesus commits 
a “lesser evil” act. In Animal Theology, Andrew Linzey claims, “It can sometimes be 
justifiable to kill fish for food in situations of necessity,” such as survival.589 Jesus and 
the disciples must have faced such situations. But because there is a presumption in 
Christianity for life and against taking it, those who can live without recourse to violence 
should do so, even if there are borderline cases where violence and killing are necessary 
in a fallen world. Yet the text from Luke in which Jesus eats a piece of broiled fish does 
not indicate that Jesus and his disciples faced a situation of necessity. They were never in 
                                                
587 See Marshall, The Gospel of Luke, 336.  
588 Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures, 86. 
589 Linzey, Animal Theology, 134–35. 
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danger of starving. Even when Jesus was hungry and tempted in the wilderness, he did 
not hunt the wild animals that were with him.  
None of these solutions satisfies me. Instead, I think that a more solid footing 
comes by grounding Jesus’s actions in Jewish Torah, which strictly limits the types of 
nonhuman animals Jews may consume. The entire system of Jewish rituals, Milgrom 
argues, is premised on the idea that “human beings can curb their violent nature through 
rituals means, specifically, a dietary discipline that will necessarily drive home the point 
that all life, shared by animals, is inviolable, except—in the case of meat—when 
conceded by God.”590 Milgrom expounds on the fact that the Hebrew Bible does not 
name a single real fish (it only names the mythical Leviathan and a great sea monster, see 
Gen 1:21). The Priestly source (H) lists all the forbidden foods—wild animals, birds, and 
swarmers—but omits fish (Lev 20:25). The relatively scarce legislation regarding fish 
species, therefore, is a consequence of a single fact: “Israelites were not fishermen—at 
least until the end of the Second Temple times.”591 Israel did not control very many fresh 
water streams, and the Sea of Galilee was part of a contested border that had been 
annexed by Assyria when that empire destroyed northern Israel. The Mediterranean was 
not accessible to Israelites for much of its history. So Israel “would, at best, have known 
only a few species of fresh water fish.”592 Milgrom cites studies demonstrating that until 
the modern Suez Canal was built in 1869, the eastern side of the Mediterranean had very 
few species of fish living there because all of the nutrients fish species needed to survive 
were too deep. So the reason that ancient Hebrews did not list species of fish in the 
detailed way they did other animals is “not because they had no contact with the sea, but, 
                                                
590 Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 13. 
591 Ibid., 111. 
592 Ibid., 112. 
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to the contrary, the sea with which they had contact was virtually devoid of fish.”593 The 
fish brought to Jerusalem were from foreign fishermen who could fish the Greek seas. 
The “piscatorial dearth” around Israel, however, has a further consequence. The “fins-
scales” criterion for forbidden and allowed species restricted Israel’s consumption of 
“seafood” nearly to the point that they could not consume sea creatures at all. Only a few 
species, Milgrom argues, passed the test: “It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that 
the very purpose of the criteria for fish, just like the criteria for quadrupeds . . . was to 
limit Israel’s access to the animal world.”594 
The terms “fish” or “seafood,” therefore, are already far too broad when speaking 
about Jesus. Since, in Jesus’s time, water creatures without fins and scales were expressly 
forbidden to all Jewish sects, we can safely assume that Jesus did not eat catfish, shrimp, 
crab, shellfish, dolphin, whale, octopus, and much more just as he did not eat pigs, ducks, 
rabbits, and other land animals that Mosaic dietary laws explicitly or implicitly forbade 
(Lev 11 and Deut 14). We do not know the exact species, but Jesus’s Jewishness already 
limits the broad category of “fish” to far fewer species than such a catchall term suggests 
to English-speaking ears. So the first word in thinking theologically about this passage I 
would offer is limit-with-purpose. The purpose of the dietary limitations was 
peaceableness: God is peaceable; humans made in God’s image ought to be peaceable 
too. Linzey offers the same point, but by way of an unwarranted textual interpretation. 
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594 Ibid., 113. 
269 
 
Jesus’s Jewishness would have provided Linzey with a better route.595 Once again, 
Jesus’s Jewish particularity becomes important. 
I submit that Jesus’s Jewishness is the decisive factor in the act of fish-eating in 
Luke. Not only was his own access to fish severely limited by virtue of the fins-scales 
criterion, but the few fish he and his disciples would have had access to even while 
engaging in fishing were severely curtailed.596 The entire point of this Jewish limitation 
was to point Israelites back to the peaceable kingdom vision of Genesis 1 and forward to 
the prophetic vision of a renewed creation. Perhaps we could say that it would have been 
better for the Son of God to have abstained from fish altogether under that pedagogical 
tool. But that Jesus ate fish at least once still fits within the Jewish tradition’s limitation 
of human violence toward other animals. To condemn Jesus for eating a piece of fish 
misses the radical Jewish disruption of humanity’s desire for consumption. Even if Jesus 
ate a piece of fish, that consumption is already encircled by a system designed to limit-
with-purpose, pointing backwards to God’s intentions for all creatures and pointing 
forwards to new and transformed relationships between all creatures. Indeed, one could 
argue, as I will in this chapter, that eventually the church came to see that relationship 
embodied in the person of Jesus’s ascended body, where the predatorial lion and the 
gentle lamb finally come to rest. 
                                                
595 Stephen H. Webb also deals with Jesus eating fish but simply acknowledges the fact against 
those who distort the texts to make him into a vegetarian. See Stephen H. Webb, Good Eating (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001), 131. 
596 They were curtrailed by the Torah but also by circumstances as Milgrom points out. This also 
makes sense of the miracles the Gospels portray in which the disciples are able to catch a lot of fish. If 
large catches had been normal, those miracles would not have been noteworthy at all. 
270 
 
Clearing Away Another Challenge: Descartes’s Humans and Animals 
I began this chapter with the challenge of Jesus’s confrontation with Legion and 
the pigs’ subsequent action as well as Jesus’s fish-eating not only because they challenge 
my working idea that Jesus’s particularity as a human helps rather than hinders 
theologians to develop an “animal theology.” But I have also used these stories because 
they illustrate that we never read these texts as if they are simple bare facts. We come to 
them with prior assumptions and interpretive grids that can stifle the liberating trajectory 
of the Incarnation. 
If we assume that only humans are capable of rational foresight and active 
agency, then of course we will either have to accuse Jesus of lesser evil thinking, being 
callous, or being a speciesist (for better or worse). If we assume that Jesus’s fish-eating in 
Luke gives carte-blanche permission to Christians to kill and destroy whatever nonhuman 
animal we like, then obviously Jesus’s humanity stands as an insurmountable obstacle to 
animal liberation within a Christian framework. 
Yet different assumptions can open up these texts in liberating ways for not only 
nonhuman animals but also for humans. Reading the texts with different assumptions can 
free us from the responsibility of being lords and masters over others (cf. Luke 22:25 and 
Matt 20:25). Violent dominion harms everyone involved, or as Pope Francis repeatedly 
argues in Laudato Si’: “everything is connected.”597 This statement stands in stark 
contrast to the binary cuts made in theological anthropology at least since the time of 
Descartes.  
                                                
597 Pope Francis, Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home (Vatican City: Libreria Editrica 
Vaticana, 2015), §117. 
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Descartes declared that animals are nothing more than divinely created 
“machines.”598 We can know the difference between “man and beast,” according to 
Descartes, because “it is quite remarkable that there are no men so dull-witted or stupid . . 
. that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance 
from them in order to make their thoughts understood; whereas there is no animal . . . that 
can do the like.”599 This is not because animals do not have the necessary body parts but 
because “they have no reason at all.” All they can do is mimic speech like any robot 
humans might devise. “They have no intelligence at all.” Animals are simply a 
conglomerate of “bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and all the other body parts that 
are in the body of any animal.”600 Animals are totally devoid of λόγος. Only the rational 
soul that humans have can possess this λόγος. Otherwise, we are looking at mere animals 
who are like machines, like clocks whose motion and parts are entirely devoid of reason 
and thought. 
Descartes seems to have believed that animals cannot feel pain because they have 
no perception or interior senses at all, which are the conditions for suffering. Between 
humans and animals there is only an abyss. The “marvelous connection of all things” 
about which Thomas Aquinas spoke becomes flattened into a binary with Descartes: the 
human and the animal, that which has reason or λόγος and that which does not. 
Speaking about Jesus’s “humanity” risks appropriating him into our modern 
human/animal binary. Jesus was not a modern “human” whose humanity was essentially 
                                                
598 See Descartes, Discourse on Method, discourse 5. Descartes’ view had immediate influence. 
For example, in his De motu animalium (1680) Giovanni Borelli maintained that all animal movements are 
quantifiable and mechanistic. Describing animal motion in terms of levers and weights, he meticulously 
studied the muscles, nerves and tissue of animals. See Giovanni Borelli, De motu animalium (Rome: 1680).  
599 Descartes, Discourse on Method, 5, p. 45. 
600 Ibid., p. 44. 
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and fundamentally at odds with the “animal.” When thinking about Jesus’s humanity in 
our time it is important to note that Jesus’s humanity has nothing to do with Descartes’s 
binary in which what is human is defined against animals. In the first chapter of this 
dissertation I examined the roots of רָשָׂבּ and σάρξ, showing that these terms connect 
humanity with all other animals without making a binary hierarchy. All flesh, the 
Psalmist writes, is “like grass; they flourish like a flower of the field; for the wind passes 
over it, and it is gone, and its place knows it no more” (Ps 113:15–16).  
In contrast to a Jewish understanding of difference and commonality amongst 
animal creatures, Descartes not only strips animals of any possible connection to reason, 
he also cuts away everything except the formless and shapeless “mind” in humanity: I 
think therefore I am. Nowhere in Scripture do any authors define humanity and other 
animals in this way. Rather, humans and nonhuman animals are living beings who all 
have God’s breath. It is God’s Spirit that defines the living being, not a special 
“substance.” Unlike every other creation that God declares good, God never says that 
humans are good. Instead, Genesis says that God saw everything, “and indeed it was very 
good” (Gen 1:31). Humans, in this view, are only good in relationship to everything else 
and not set apart from it in a binary opposition. Therefore, if we are to define humans and 
other animals within the Descartean binary, then Scripture does not contain any animals 
or humans. This all too common modern lens for reading theological anthropology and 
views about animals in Scripture simply flattens the swarming and teeming world of the 
Bible. Such a lens will not do for understanding Jesus’s humanity. 
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Animal Rights and Homogeneity 
Descartes’s view stands in a long line of defining what it means to be human by 
looking for characteristics that are unique to humanity such as “reason” or “language” or 
“self-consciousness.” Yet something has happened in our time that radically challenges 
this classical anthropology. We now realize not only that humans are an evolved creature 
with deep connections to other creatures, but that the qualities theologians and 
philosophers once posited as uniquely human are also found in a variety of other species 
to one degree or another. The issue then becomes matters of degree not qualitative 
differences. This is an important and fundamental modern development. 
Consequently, some modern theologians and theorists have tried to reimagine 
human/nonhuman animals relationships based on the idea that those nonhuman animals 
that exhibit the human-like traits of reason and rudimentary language skills should be 
given rights and generally treated as we would other humans.601 This view is generally 
based on a static notion of humanity. Beyond the static notion of humanity, animal rights 
viewpoints have some other tensions to resolve. 
First, rights language posits anthropocentric characteristics as the determining 
factor for ethical consideration. Why not use echolocation found in bats and dolphins, for 
example? Second, those creatures who do not exhibit the necessary capacities for equal 
treatment do not have rights. This reinforces human domination rather than helps to 
undercut it. Third, this viewpoint lacks a robust anthropology since not even all humans 
exhibit the qualities necessary to be human. Mentally incapacitated humans, for example, 
                                                
601 See Tom Regan, Animal Rights, Human Wrongs: An introduction to Moral Philosophy 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
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may not have the necessary qualities that define humanity. So the classical definition of 
humanity does not even really include all humans. There are structural flaws in the 
anthropology from the start. Fourth, animal rights advocates often value “reason” over 
other traits, like emotions. If we must base treatment of nonhuman animals on reason 
alone, then this is a peculiarly narrow way to see humanity, and historically a male-
dominated viewpoint. Why should emotions that elicit compassion, pity, and love be 
excluded?602 This hearkens back to the third point: what is most human is male-
dominated reason, with the more “emotional” aspects equated with females who are 
human but not ideally so. But once again, this is not how we should best define Jesus’s 
humanity. 
Framing a Hermeneutic: Derrida, Deleuze and Guatarri, and Agamben 
Having started the chapter with Scriptural challenges that at first seem to establish 
Jesus’s humanity as violently dominant but on another reading do something very 
different, in the following section I will detail some current philosophical currents that I 
think provide a good lens for interpreting Jesus’s humanity. I do not wish to impose these 
on the text anachronistically. However, these ideas provide some lenses through which to 
view the Incarnation and open the texts to new insights. That is, I will use the ideas from 
the next section to help re-read Jesus’s humanity all while trying to allow the alienness of 
texts from two thousand years ago to speak into the modern world. 
                                                
602 For a different view in terms of feminist ethics see Lori Gruen, Entangled Empathy: An 
Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with Animals (New York: Lantern Books, 2015). 
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Jacques Derrida: The Animal Difference 
In response to ideas examined earlier that would homogenize creatures by forcing 
them into a standard of humanness, Jacques Derrida argues that we should heighten and 
expand differences rather than try to flatten them into sameness. If Derrida’s body of 
work is taken as a whole, he wrote more about nonhuman animals than any other 
subject.603 He claimed, “Since I began writing” that he had addressed issues about the 
human/animal binary “a thousand times.”604 Derrida argues that Western philosophy has 
erroneously posited an isolated human individual without attending to the complex 
systems and network of differences that make such individuals possible in the first 
place.605 So the primary task of philosophy is to recover differences, which includes 
examining the human/animal binary that defines modern anthropology.  
Rather than finding human traits like language or reason in nonhuman creatures 
like great apes or dolphins, Derrida multiplies differences. For example, he calls into the 
question the term “animal.” This “catch-all concept” covers every creature we do not 
consider human fellows “in spite of the infinite space that separates the lizard from the 
                                                
603 One of Derrida’s close associates, Élisabeth de Fontenay, says: “Of all the oppositions placed 
back to back that Derrida sets into place, the one between man and animal is the most decisive: one could 
say that it is the opposition that commands the others.” Élisabeth de Fontenay, Without Offending Humans: 
A Critique of Animal Rights (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 3. 
604 He goes on to detail some of these instances in an impressive array of evidence. When these are 
taken with The Beast and the Sovereign Volumes 1 and 2 and The Animal That Therefore I Am, his work 
has been focused on issues about human and animal identity more than any other issue. See Jacques 
Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. Marie-Louise Mallet (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008), 34–41. 
605 Derrida uses Karl Marx and others to critique the notion of the individual isolated from society. 
Marx wrote that “The individual hunter and fisherman . . . belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the 
eighteenth-century Robinsonades, which in no way express merely a reaction against over-sophistication 
and a return to a misunderstood natural life.” Marx goes on to speak about the way in which social contract 
theories isolate individuals from society in a “natural” pre-political form, untouched by the matrix of 
relationships that actually shape people.  
See Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2011), 25–27. 
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dog, the protozoon from the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the parrot from the 
chimpanzee, the camel from the eagle, the squirrel from the tiger, the elephant from the 
cat, the ant from the silkworm, the hedgehog from the echidna.”606 This homogenizing 
designation erases difference and involves a power relationship. It is not a neutral 
classification. Human and animal are asymmetrical classifications:  
 We have to notice that these two plurals (beasts, men) are asymmetrical and 
problematical. . . . in that the two plurals do not correspond to two classes or two 
species, two comparable sets. All men are supposed to belong to the same species 
or the same genus, the human species, the human race, whereas the beasts . . . 
designates a set with no other unity, any more than that of said animal which has 
no other supposed unity than a negative . . . namely that of not a human being. 
But there is no other positively predictable unity between the ant, the snake, the 
cat, the dog, the horse, the chimpanzee . . . or the sperm whale.607 
Derrida charges that the general concept “the animal” only reduces all the diversity of life 
“by violence and willful ignorance . . . The confusion of all nonhuman living creatures 
within the general and common category of the animal is not simply a sin against 
rigorous thinking, vigilance, lucidity, or empirical authority, it is always a crime. Not a 
crime against animality, precisely, but a crime of the first order against the animals, 
against animals.”608 It is also, he elaborates, an affront to humanity: “The simplisticness, 
misunderstanding, and violent disavowal that we are analyzing at present also seem to me 
to be betrayals of repressed human possibilities, or other powers of reason, or a more 
                                                
606 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 34. Using “animals” in the plural is one way to resist 
the homogenizing effect of the term “animal.” I do not think it is enough, but it already signals differences. 
To add “human” and “nonhuman” to “animal” is another way to resist the homogenizing term. 
607 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II, 8.  
608 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 48. 
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comprehensive logic of argument, or a more demanding responsibility concerning the 
power of questioning and response, concerning science as well, and, for example . . . as 
regards the most open and critical forms of zoological or ethological knowledge.”609 But 
the violence directed against animals, Derrida charges, is largely a result of male violence 
in particular (an argument in line with the previous chapter’s analysis of masculinity and 
animals). He also connects a long-standing hatred of Jewish people with misogyny and 
violence toward animals.610 
According to Derrida, introducing more homogeneity by identifying certain 
“animals” with “humans” does not solve the problem.611 Such an enterprise is impossible 
anyhow because not all “humans” exhibit the necessary traits for the label. Of course, 
various creatures do have things in common. Humans and animals are living beings who 
die, Derrida maintains (in harmony with his Jewish tradition). He writes about a 
hedgehog rolling itself up into a ball to protect herself from an oncoming car. She might 
not see death coming, but this hedgehog dies all the same. Derrida speaks of the 
“hedgehog” rather than “the animal.” He often tries to speak of this or that creature rather 
than generally about “the animal.” He claims, contra Heidegger, that it is not certain that 
humans can experience death as such any more than we can deny that any other creature 
like a hedgehog can experience death. He finds Heidegger’s assertion that animals are 
                                                
609 Ibid., 105. 
610 “The animal’s problem . . . is the male. Evil comes to the animal through the male. . . . It would 
be relatively simple to show that this violence done to the animals is, if not in essence, then at least 
predominately male, and, like the very dominance of that predominance, warlike, strategic, stalking, 
viriloid. There may be huntswomen like Diana and Amazon horsewomen, but no one will contest that in its 
more overwhelming phenomenal form, from hunt to bullfight, from mythologies to abattoirs, except for 
rare exceptions it is the male that goes after the animal, just as it was Adam whom God charged with 
establishing his dominance over the beasts.” Ibid., 104. 
611 Derrida claims that he has “strong sympathy” for the notion of animal rights. Yet, he wonders 
whether “‘right’ is the pertinent concept here. Must we pose the question of our relations with the animot in 
terms of ‘rights’?” Rights, he points out, have not exactly protected other humans from human aggression. 
See ibid., 88. 
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“poor in the world” and cannot experience death to be an absurd dogmatic statement that 
shows his inability to transcend the human/animal binary.612 
Rather than starting with his own rationality, Derrida reflects on his cat. He must 
talk about his cat in particular ways—as a cat, as a “little” cat, etc. Yet the individual cat 
precedes all categorization. This cat “refuses to be conceptualized” because she has her 
own outlook, which he recognizes but cannot comprehend.613 Before Derrida-the-
thinking-human ever arrives on the scene, there is a cat who has her own point of view. 
The cat watches him before he watches the little cat.614 The cat’s gaze precedes Derrida’s 
autonomy. So before asking the question about capacities—Do they have language? Can 
they reason? Do they feel pain and suffer?—an encounter elicits the questions.615 
For Derrida, to posit an “identity” between humans and other animals based on 
traits like reason, language, tool-making, etc., flattens the animal kingdom’s diversity into 
a human/animal binary. Instead, Derrida would have us multiply difference. Indeed, 
Derrida is not against finding a human difference. He thinks that our attempts to separate 
ourselves absolutely from other creatures have failed. Humans may have differences with 
every other creature. But these differences do not reduce into an abyssal human/animal 
binary with humans as dominant. The “animal” cannot contain creation’s rich diversity. 
So we must differentiate between creatures and individuals. But we can differentiate in 
different ways and for different purposes. The Valentinians (chapter 2) differentiated 
                                                
612 On the hedgehog and death see Derrida, “Che Cos’è la Poesia,” 301–325. Derrida levels an 
extended critique of Heidegger on defining humans as world-making and animals as poor-in-the-world in 
Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 141–60. 
613 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 9. 
614 Derrida does not name his cat in the text. For Derrida, the act of naming is a violent act of 
domination. Yet, it seems to me that calling the cat “my little cat” is still naming. This naming, however, is 
impersonal. Giving the cat its own individual name establishes relationship. 
615 I am helped here by Matthew Calarco’s work. See Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The 
Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 117–21. 
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between different types to find an “elect” class. Orthodox Christians rejected this divisive 
hierarchy of being. They stressed creation’s oneness before God and defined creation’s 
multiplicity within the infinite “distance” between the persons of the Trinity.616 
But are the only options either to identify animals with humans (animal rights) or 
multiply differences so that species no longer make sense (Derrida)? Matthew Calarco 
suggests a third option, one that uses Derrida’s ideas. Calarco argues that setting aside the 
human/nonhuman animal distinction altogether is a wiser path than these other two 
options. The purpose of leaving alone the human distinction is so that new ways of 
thinking can develop.617 Calarco calls this third option “indistinction.”618 Indistinction 
does not homogenize differences. When it comes to humans and other animals, “we are 
dealing with a field so utterly complex and so deeply relational that any and all concepts 
we use to refer to it will be inadequate.”619 Creation’s diversity reveals human language’s 
limits by showing us “that which exceeds our conceptual mastery.”620 Moving too 
                                                
616 This is Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Trinitarian vision, derived from patristic and modern Russian 
theologians. For Balthasar, the only way to understand the Trinity is through the Son’s kenosis in the 
economy of salvation, finding its extremity in Holy Saturday. In this outworking of kenosis, God subjects 
death and suffering and all that is not God to the divine life. But this Christological act reveals the mystery 
of the Trinity: God is self-giving love. Kenosis is the reciprocal relationship between the persons of the 
Trinity. The first kenosis, logically, is seen in the Father’s begetting of the Son. Here, the Father “strips 
himself . . . of his Godhead and hands it over to the Son.” See Theo-Drama, IV, trans. Graham Harrison 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 323. The Son’s response is kenotic thanksgiving, which creates a 
“eucharistic movement back and forth from the Father.” See Theo-Drama, I, trans. Graham Harrison (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 243. Thus self-giving and self-reception are unified within God’s own 
being. The Father holds nothing back in generating the Son, and the Father and the Son hold nothing back 
in breathing forth the Holy Spirit, who maintains and bridges the infinite distance between the Father and 
Son. The infinite distance between Father and Son becomes most fully manifest in Jesus’s cry on the cross 
and the silence of Holy Saturday. This distance thus contains all other distances in the world of finitude, 
“including the distance of sin,” but also every “otherness” within creation itself because otherness and 
difference in creation mirror the otherness within God’s triune life. 
617 See ibid., 148–49. 
618 Matthew Calarco, Thinking through Animals (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 
48–69. He labels the other two views “identity” and “difference.” 
619 Ibid., 55–56. 
620 Ibid. 
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quickly toward new conceptual maps to replace the traditional binaries might cause us to 
miss what we can learn in the collapse of the human/animal distinction. 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri: Becoming-Animal 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri develop a highly relevant idea to Jesus’s 
humanity. They write about “becoming-animal.” They open up space in the zone of 
indistinction for imagining the Incarnation in fresh ways that deepen deep Incarnational 
thinking. Deleuze and Guatarri focus much of their work on issues around identity, which 
they argue is always in motion even when it seems fixed. In explaining what this 
becoming means for Deleuze, Damian Sutton and David Martin-Jones use a coffee mug 
as an example: 
If we pick up a coffee mug and look at it, we can have no doubt that it is a fixed 
object in time and space. It is, in fact, fixed to the extent of being brittle. It will 
smash if we drop it, and its “essential” identity would be at an end. What we are 
really looking at, however, is a moment (no matter how long) of apparent rest in 
the life of its molecules and atoms. It was once wet clay, formed and shaped, 
glazed and fired under pressure. It continues to change, cracks and fissures 
forming on its surface, until we break it, when it will be tossed aside as rubbish, 
returning to the earth. This “fixed” object in space is also a fixed object in time . . 
. only inasmuch as we isolate it in our minds from the continual change of the 
universe.621  
                                                
621 Damian Sutton and David Martin-Jones, Deleuze Reframed (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2008), 
45–46. 
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The mug’s identity changes in relationship to the table upon which it sits, to the coffee it 
contains, to the human who uses it, to the floor upon which it smashes. So the mug is 
what it does: “we will avoid defining it by Species or Genus characteristics, instead we 
will seek to count its affects. . . . A race horse is more different from a workhorse than a 
workhorse from an ox.”622 Human identity changes as well. God said to Adam: “By the 
sweat of your face you shall eat bread until you return to the ground, for out of it you 
were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return” (Gen 3:19). Deleuze and Guatarri 
call this haecceity: Adam-in-the-garden-at-five-o’clock-hearing-God’s-judgment; Adam-
staring-at-the-angels’-flaming-swords; Adam-exiled; Adam-father-of-Seth; and so on. 
Becoming involves continuity and change. Humans “are” dust, God said. Adam is a pile 
of molecules and particles slamming into one another, a motion that continues after 
death. He will leak into the ground and become part of it once again. His body is an 
assemblage of differences, but he is not above other creatures. Becoming is a fact of 
life. Deleuze and Guatarri argue that appreciating becoming means seeing identity as 
formed through differences.  
Deleuze and Guatarri see “man” as the principal identity around which human 
identity is pressured. The male-female binary places the male as the dominant pole by 
which to judge identity. But “man” also marks a human-animal binary. In this binary, the 
                                                
622 Deleuze and Guatarri call this haecceity. These individualities are a sum of particle and 
molecule movement and rest as well as their capacity to affect or be affected (to make the hand feel heavy 
or to be broken on the ground). The climate, wind, season, and time, are all part of the haecceity. “The 
street enters into composition with the horse, just as the dying rat enters into composition with the air, and 
the beast and the full moon enter into composition with each other. . . . Climate, wind, season, hour are not 
of another nature than the things, animals, or people that populate them, follow them, sleep and awaken 
within them. This should be read without pause: the animal-stalks-at-five-o’clock. . . . Five o’clock is this 
animal! This animal is this place! . . . We are all five o’clock in the evening, or another hour, or two hours 
simultaneously, the optimal and pessimal, noon-midnight, but distributed in a variable fashion.” See Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 260–65. The quotation is from ibid., 262–63. 
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(male) human serves as the canvas upon which all other identities must be cast. To 
dismantle patriarchy and anthropocentricism, we have to see from a minority view. One 
has to pass through the minority view, becoming-woman and becoming animal. This 
involves seeing from the minority point of view, which is not an essence but a 
“molecular” identity. 
Becoming does not imitate: “becoming is not to imitate or identify with 
something or someone.”623 So becoming-animal does not involve trying to biologically 
change into a difference species. Imitation, for Deleuze and Guatarri, replaces and erases 
the other. Moreover, imitation has a mechanical quality. A person becomes animal in a 
static sense by learning how to sing like a bird, making wings, and so on. Instead, 
becoming-animal moves from stable identity to a “nomadic existence” defying definition. 
Deleuze and Guatarri point to werewolves and vampires. Yet they insist, “becomings-
animal are neither dreams nor phantasies. They are perfectly real.”  
Nevertheless they acknowledge, “The human being does not ‘really’ become an 
animal any more than the animal ‘really’ becomes something else.”624 The human does 
not cross a species barrier. Rather this person occupies an in-between state where the 
distinctions between human and animal begin to fall apart. It is to pass through the animal 
to see through the animal’s eyes. “To become,” claims Deleuze, “is not to attain a form 
(identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or 
indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a 
                                                
623 Ibid., 272. 
624 Ibid., 238. 
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molecule—neither imprecise nor general, but unforeseen and non-preexistent, 
singularized out of a population rather than determined in a form.”625  
Captain Ahab in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick serves as Deleuze’s illustration. 
Ahab does not imitate the whale. Rather, he enters a “zone of proximity” in which “he 
strikes himself in striking the whale.”626 In What Is Philosophy, Deleuze and Guatarri 
argue that philosophers “are not responsible for the victim but responsible before them. 
And there is no way to escape the ignoble but to play the part of the animal (to growl, 
burrow, snigger, distort ourselves): thought itself is sometimes closer to an animal that 
dies than to a living, even democratic, human being.”627  
They chide Heidegger for his views of animals as poor-in-the-world and connect 
these views to his Nazism. Deleuze and Guatarri, by contrast, claim to write “for” 
animals and to “become animal so that the animal also becomes something else. The 
agony of the rat or the slaughter of a calf remains present in thought not through pity but 
as the zone of exchange between man and animal in which something of one passes into 
the other.”628 This “double becoming” happens as one begins to realize and see through 
the eyes of the slaughtered calf, which changes the calf too. Things are never the same for 
those who see “the war on animals” (as Derrida names it) for what it is. 
Deleuze and Guatarri argue that we have a mysterious and enchanted world, filled 
with wonder. Becomings are imperceptible events, not voluntary choices. Becoming is a 
                                                
625 Gilles Deleuze, c, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), 1, emphasis added.  
626 Ibid., 78. See also Deleuze and Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus, 304–305. 
627 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
Burchell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 108. 
628 Ibid., 109. 
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metaphysical event (which is why some have accused Deleuze of being a mystic).629 
They refer to children, who often seek a zone of indistinction between themselves and 
other animals. But their becomings are not the result of rules but of play. The becomings 
are like events. 
For this reason, Deleuze and Guatarri argue, becoming-animal is not imitation. 
Imitation reinforces essentialist, static identities within the human/animal binary, and a 
world without enchantment. Yet children learn how to do things by imitating adults, so 
imitation has its place. But becoming happens at a different level than mimicry.630  
Deleuze and Guatarri seek to decenter humanity from the dominant position in 
order to work toward a more just and peaceable order. They also present a view of world 
that is far more mysterious and fascinating than naturalistic, scientific reduction. They 
argue for seeing the world through the eyes of children.631 Children serve also as an 
example of how society “steals” bodies and becomings. Little girls are told not to act like 
“tomboys” and little boys are told not to act like “girls” but only to see girls as objects of 
desire, imposing “a dominant history.”632 Deleuze and Guatarri aim for liberation from 
these stolen becomings. What might “becoming-animal” look like then?  
Deleuze finds inspiration in the twentieth-century painter Francis Bacon. Bacon’s 
paintings depict human faces as pieces of meat.633 Bacon painted scenes of the 
Crucifixion in which a carved up carcass formed the center of the triptychs. In “Painting” 
(1946), a carcass hangs, arms outstretched, behind a monstrous looking “human” whose 
                                                
629 Peter Hallward, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (New York: Verso, 
2006).  
630 Deleuze and Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus, 275. 
631 See ibid., 257. 
632 Ibid., 266–67. 
633 Images of many of Bacon’s paintings are accessible through an internet search. See the chapter 
“Body, Meat and Spirit” in Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith 
(New York: Continuum, 2003), 20–26. 
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flesh hangs from his jaw, exposing bare teeth and ligaments. Deleuze quotes Bacon: “I’ve 
always been very moved by pictures about slaughterhouses and meat, and to me they 
belong very much to the whole thing of the Crucifixion . . . . Of course, we are meat, we 
are potential carcasses. If I go into a butcher shop I always think it’s surprising that I 
wasn’t there instead of the animal.”634 Bacon confronts viewers with their vulnerability 
by painting “a zone of indiscernibility of undecidability between man and animal.”635 We 
are “meat.” Deleuze finds in these monstrous paintings a space in which humans become-
animal by the mere fact of glimpsing “that every man who suffers is a piece of meat. 
Meat is the common zone of man and beast.”636 Rather than defining humanity as 
rational, Deleuze pushes his readers to accept their “flesh.” In accepting our flesh, we 
become-animal. We are not above the predator-prey relationships in this world. We too 
are edible. Yet the struggle for survival is a struggle to be more than meat, more than 
mere consumer and consumed. 
This is a position different from describing animals as “like us.” In A Thousand 
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guatarri deny that the human “face” elicits responsibility and care 
for another. For Emmanuel Levinas, the face troubles us because it calls us to respond. 
But Deleuze and Guatarri counter: “the face is a horror story.”637 The face has functioned 
as a gate through which a person can enter human society. But it is the white male face 
that has formed the standard from which all other faces descend by “filiation.” Women, 
people of color, children, gorillas, cats, and others must pass through the white male face. 
So Deleuze and Guatarri attack the face. Rather than establish new dominant identities 
                                                
634 Quoted in ibid., 24. 
635 Ibid., 21. 
636 Ibid., 23. 
637 Deleuze and Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus, 168. 
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(this face is like that white male face; this face is like the human face so it elicits ethical 
consideration), Deleuze and Guatarri ask us to imagine what it would be like to have a 
face one turns away from in disgust. We learn to measure faces. We can dismantle these 
biases through “becoming-animal” and rejecting norms of beauty.638 So to inhabit the 
“zone of indistinction” in becoming-animal does not involve looking for human traits in 
other animals. The identity approach dissolves differences and absorbs the other into the 
dominant. Becoming-animal involves passing through their position as a minority and 
oppressed group who resist domination as a “pack.” Becoming-animal, therefore, 
involves becoming like animals: becoming “meat.” Becoming nameless. 
By taking on this vulnerable, fleshly, meat-like existence we can more fully 
appreciate what it is like for animals to exist in our social and political economies.639 
Deleuze and Guatarri claim that “we become animal so that the animal also becomes 
something else.”640 While capitalist society in particular seeks to reduce animals to mere 
“meat,” they are never this.  
Deleuze and Guatarri’s notion of becoming-animal will play an important role in 
how I interpret Jesus’s humanity. The notion that we should give up seeking a human 
uniqueness that sets us apart from all other creatures fits well with a certain reading of 
Jesus’s humanity. When coupled with the idea that identity is never really static but 
always negotiated and changing as well as passing through a deep shift when one comes 
to see and become-animal, Jesus’s humanity will take on a radical role in the Incarnation. 
But before shifting into this theological reflection, there is another lens to add. 
                                                
638 See ibid., 170–71. 
639 On this point see Calarco, Thinking through Animals, 59. 
640 Deleuze and Guatarri, What Is Philosophy?, 109. 
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Giorgio Agamben: The Anthropological Machine 
In Descartes we can see what Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls “the 
anthropological machine.” For Agamben, the separation of bare animal life (ζωή) from 
political human life (βίος) undergirds Western politics.641 This anthropogenesis—a 
metaphysical process—creates the human by separating what is human (language, 
thinking, self-consciousness, etc.) from the animal (emotion, irrationality, the body, etc.). 
This process opens a gap between the human and the animal.642 This “anthropological 
machine” demarcates within every human what is and is not human, those parts that 
belong to politics and those that do not. This anthropological machine does not describe 
the “real” world. The anthropological machine is not a natural process. It is religious, 
social, and political. The anthropological machine enacts this separation and creates the 
world we take for granted. Things could be otherwise. 
The anthropological machine undergirds a great many atrocities, according to 
Agamben. If any creature does not measure up to the human standard, those creatures 
will become vulnerable because they have slipped from the political to the nonpolitical 
and might be killed. Those who are dehumanized and therefore animalized are subjected 
to slavery and even to gas chambers in the twentieth century.643 The separation of human 
                                                
641 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1–12. 
642 See Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 79–80. 
643 Agamben’s comparison of Jews dying in the Nazi death camps with the mass slaughter of 
nonhuman animals in our day finds echo in Derrida as well, who decries modern practices in particular as 
an “act of war, a phrase that undergirds his uncharacteristic disgust at industrialization of animal life. But it 
should be noted that it is Jews who underwent and survived the death camps who first made the connection. 
De Fontenay writes: “After 1945, European Jewish writers and philosophers lent their voices to animals, 
evoking intermittently or systematically the solitude, silence, and suffering of those victims of man: Vassili 
Grossman, Isaac Bashevis Singer, Elias Canetti, Primo Levi, Romain Gary, and the philosophers Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer. They were the first to dare to allow for the understanding that the fate of 
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from animal entails opening up a “zone of indistinction” between the human and the 
animal, a place that corresponds elsewhere to Agamben’s “state of exception” in which 
the rule of law no longer applies: the place of both animals and sovereigns.644 This is the 
space in which one can kill or be killed.645 
Indeed, Roman law made provisions for the homo sacer. This is a person who can 
be legally killed because he or she is outside the law. Agamben cites Pompeius Festus, a 
Roman lawyer, who wrote that once the plebes had seceded, they were granted the rights 
to hunt down and kill—as individuals or as a mob—anybody they had collectively 
condemned to die. This hunted and condemned individual was called homo sacer. Killing 
this person was neither homicide, nor a punishment, nor a sacrifice, because unlike a 
killing under capital punishment, the killing had no purification rites. Indeed, such rites 
were explicitly forbidden. The condemned person was sacer: cast out, abandoned. This 
meaning of the word sacer is more ancient than the idea of the “sacred,” which connects 
                                                                                                                                            
animals sometimes looked like the fate of Jews, unless it was actually the other way around. This analogy 
is no doubt up for discussion, yet it cannot be repudiated as blasphemy for it comes from men who suffered 
in their flesh and their history and who knew what they were saying when they evoked human malice.” de 
Fontenay, Without Offending Humans, 61. Derrida cites an earlier but similar statement by de Fontenay 
saying that he “subscribes to it.” Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 104–105. Derrida even claims 
that Emmanuel Levinas’s denial of a “face” to animals and therefore any duties toward them from humans 
as “surprising” more than from Kant and Heidegger because Levinas is Jewish and “the principle of life . . . 
a great intangible Judaic principle.” In other words, Derrida recognizes the Jewish protections and 
principles in Judaism about nonhuman animals I laid out in previous chapters as something that should lead 
modern Jewish authors to see in animals a call to something better than philosophy has provided. See ibid., 
112. It should be noted, moreover, that Derrida himself is Jewish by birth. He repeatedly uses Scripture in 
his analysis of the human/animal binary, which most philosophers who are following Derrida on the issue 
of animals do not do and mostly ignore. 
644 See Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2005). 
645 “The camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the rule. In 
it, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporal suspension of the state of law, acquires a 
permanent spatial arrangement that, as such, remains constantly outside the normal state of law.” Giorgio 
Agamben, Means without Ends: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 38. In this book is an essay titled, “The Face” which 
demonstrates that Agamben had not yet thought deeply about the human/animal distinction that becomes 
more important in his later work. In “The Face,” Agamben basically takes a position similar to Emmanuel 
Levinas in which the human face of the other calls us to act responsibly toward him or her. Animals, 
however, do not have faces. For the historical development of the idea of an anthropological machine in 
Agamben see Calarco, Zoographies, 79–102. 
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to the notion of sacrifice and holiness.646 The homo sacer is therefore animalized and 
reduced to bare life. 
Now more than ever, Agamben argues, we are aware of the anthropological 
machine’s contingent and dangerous elements. Therefore, he claims, “It is more urgent to 
work on these divisions, to ask in what way—within man—has man been separated from 
non-man, and the animal from the human, than it is to take positions on the great issues, 
on so-called human rights and values. And perhaps even the most luminous sphere of our 
relations with the divine depends, in some way, on that darker one which separates us 
from the animal.”647 
But Agamben’s critique reaches back further than Descartean anthropology 
starting with Aristotle. The medieval chain of being, Agamben would tell us, also trades 
on the anthropological machine even if it is more nuanced than Descartes about the 
nonhuman world. Scripture has other ways way of speaking about Jesus’s humanity. The 
question becomes whether Jesus breaks the anthropological machine in the process of 
becoming-animal. 
Jesus Becoming-Animal 
What does all this have to do with Jesus’s humanity as a particularity with which 
theology must wrestle in relationship to thinking about animals? In Christian doctrine 
Jesus is human and divine. Any theological anthropology must start with the person of 
Jesus Christ. As Karl Barth declared, “The nature of the man Jesus alone is the key to the 
problem of human nature.” Jesus is human, according to the tradition. Yet the Gospels 
                                                
646 See Agamben, Homo Sacer, 71–74. John Milbank draws upon Agamben’s idea of the homo 
sacer, arguing that Jesus was the homo sacer: his death utterly meaningless. See John Milbank, “Christ the 
Exception,” New Blackfriars 82, no. 969 (2001): 547. 
647 Agamben, The Open, 16. 
290 
 
say nothing about the “nature” of Jesus’s humanity. The “rational animal” of Christian 
theology does not appear in the Gospels. If human means a creature with a rational soul 
distinct from all the irrational animals, then the Gospels do not have any human 
characters. Cutting humanity off from other creaturely life is alien to the Bible. 
Deleuze and Guatarri would be skeptical of my claim that Jesus Christ tells us 
something interesting about resistance to majoritarian rule. They state clearly: “Theology 
is very strict on the following point: there are no werewolves, human beings cannot 
become animal.”648 Yet the Gospels depict Jesus as doing just that. 
Jesus speaks about himself in ways that challenge Deleuze and Guatarri. As I 
noted in chapter 4, Jesus said, “Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the 
Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head” (Matt 8:20). Jesus designates himself as “the 
Son of Man,” which might mean human. He then claims that his homelessness places him 
culturally beneath foxes and birds. Jesus also compares himself to a threatened “mother 
hen” who wishes to protect her young (Matt 23:37–39 and Luke 13:31–35). Jesus 
repeatedly speaks about birds and sparrows. Society, Jesus says, tends to views these 
little creatures as less valuable than humans. Jesus has less value than a sparrow. In the 
hierarchy of being, Jesus does not fit a little above the “animals” but a little lower than 
the angels. Rather, Jesus sleeps beneath the sparrow’s nest. This “becoming-animal” 
allows Jesus to see life from a different vantage point than anthropocentrism.  
Jesus: Homo Sacer, Becoming Animal 
The passion narratives, however, provide a powerful context within which to view 
Jesus’s becoming-animal. John Milbank argues that the Gospels present Jesus as a homo 
                                                
648 Deleuze and Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus, 252. 
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sacer in three ways. “Once, because he is abandoned by Jewish sovereignty to the Roman 
executive. Twice because he is abandoned by Roman sovereignty to the sovereign-
executive mob; three times, because he is in some obscure fashion handed over by the 
mob to the Roman soldiers and executed after all in a Roman fashion.”649 Understanding 
Jesus as a homo sacer means that Jesus’s death was not a murder, an execution, or a 
sacrifice. Such interpretations miss his death's full significance because they make 
Jesus’s humanity decisive. Rather, Milbank argues, a lynch mob reduced Jesus to 
something “beneath humanity” to a “half-animality.” Jesus is the wolf-man whom the 
community casts out and whom the community can kill with impunity.  
The implication is that Jesus’s death is not that of a martyr who witnesses to a 
cause. Jesus’s death occurs because of a resentment at his divinity and also a death of 
humanity itself. Jesus suffered “a kenotic death of utterly emptied out humanity.”650 Said 
in other terms, Milbank’s analysis points toward Jesus’s death as a kenosis of 
anthropocentricism and speciesism. Jesus did not have the dignified death of a political 
threat. His death was meaningless. Everyone abandoned him. His death proved 
sovereignty’s arbitrariness. “Christ then was reduced to ‘bare life.’”651 But the 
anthropological machine produces bare life too.652 Christ is “bare life,” the animal. Pilate, 
the mob, and much of the Jewish leadership represent the human. Jesus was cast out from 
all protections that the Torah or Roman law might afford him. From a different vantage 
point than I took in chapter 3, Jesus’s death was not an animal sacrifice in any strict 
sense. Those sacrifices actually protected and limited human violence and sovereignty. 
                                                
649 Milbank, “Christ the Exception,” 549. 
650 Ibid., 550. 
651 See ibid., 551. 
652 Milbank does not note this. 
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Rather, his death exposed animal sacrifices as arbitrary sovereignty. The anthropological 
machine produces this sovereign arbitrariness. Jesus was emptied of his humanity and 
becomes-animal. He becomes the wild animals that Deuteronomy allows Jews to kill. 
These wild animals were not sacrifices or executions. They were of those undomesticated 
creatures anybody could kill. 
Yet the description from chapter 3 of Jesus’s death as an animal deserves 
repetition. He died as a homo sacer, as a becoming-animal. The Gospel of John in 
particular depicts Jesus’s death as one that is nonhuman. Jesus’s bones remain unbroken 
like the paschal lamb (Exod 12.46; John 19.33, 36). Like the dead lamb who had to be 
consumed before daybreak, Jesus’s body was taken away before the next day (Exod 
12.10; John 19.31). Jews used hyssop to smear the lamb’s blood on the doorpost; 
likewise Jesus was offered liquid on a branch of hyssop (Exod 12.22; John 19.29). 
Jesus’s body was run through with a sharp weapon, as would a lamb’s body.653 Many 
biblical scholars argue that Jesus died at the exact time that lambs would have been killed 
in the Temple.654 Moreover, Christian artists through the ages have depicted Jesus as a 
nonhuman animal. To pull just one example from chapter 3, in a twelfth-century 
illuminated manuscript, Jesus’s crucifixion is depicted above the sacrifice of a calf. 
Below the calf is written, “For the blemish of sin a calf is given, worship’s sacrifice; this 
inscription teaches that Christ is the calf.”655  
But the sacrificial similarities also harbor dissimilarity. It was forbidden to 
sacrifice a human in Jewish Torah. The Torah limited Jewish sovereignty over animals. 
                                                
653 See Clough, On Animals, 128. 
654 See Lee, “Paschal Imagery in the Gospel of John,” 25. 
655 Quoted in Morrow, Passion Iconography in Northern European Art of the Late Middle Ages 
and Early Renaissance, 99. See a reproduction of the image in Figure 72 at the end of the book. There are 
many other such depictions that compare Jesus to a sacrificed calf. See ibid., 293n424 and n425. 
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They could not sacrifice an animal at any time or place, for any reason. Nevertheless, the 
sacrificial system still allowed a division between the animal and the human. Jesus’s 
death was not a sacrifice. The Law expressly forbids human sacrifice. His death exposes 
the anthropological machine. His death sunk beneath that of the domesticated creatures of 
Jewish Torah who had the most protection. His was more akin to the wild creatures who 
were far less regulated. He resembled the hunted ones whom Solomon killed. His was 
more like a sport hunt than a sacrifice. 
By contrast, some interpret Jesus as a nonviolent radical executed for being a 
threat to Roman imperial power. But these readings of Jesus often miss the 
anthropological machine in their own theologies. For example, nowhere in John Howard 
Yoder’s writings does the idea appear that Jesus died the death of an animal. Yoder 
reduces Jesus to a political figure. The Romans executed Jesus because he 
threatened Roman economics and political power. Jesus’s alternative vision for social life 
challenged the violent regimes of this world. His nonviolent action in the temple 
triggered his arrest. But his entire ministry hinged on creating a new body politic.  
But Yoder’s body politic is purely human. It never includes nonhuman animals. 
Despite his interest in Jewish-Christian relations, he casts aside Jewish law on nonhuman 
animals. Consequently, the basic protections Jewish law provides other animals from 
human aggression disappear entirely as Jesus’s followers diverge from their Jewish 
heritage. Yoder does not include in his pacifism Isaiah’s visions of peace between 
animals. So reading Jesus solely as a political figure does not get to the heart of what 
establishes Western politics. The anthropological machine produces a fissure that 
establishes the human as the sovereign over that which is nonhuman, and the political as 
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a space where every human becomes a potential homo sacer. The anthropological 
machine runs quite smoothly throughout Yoder’s writings. So he limited the peace he 
found in the gospel to the humans. But this peace is on shaky ground because Yoder’s 
peace vision entails an egalitarianism of love in which human enemies must be on equal 
footing to human friends, lest one animalize (dehumanize) those enemy others and re-
establish violence. I take this to be at the heart of the problem of Yoder’s work and some 
of his theological disciples. Jesus is not becoming-animal but exhibits the full human 
“rationality” God intended by being nonviolent. The struggle for an egalitarian love 
between humans masks the anthropological machine underneath the nonviolence. So a 
violence more basic than peace runs through Yoder’s work.656 Reading Jesus more as the 
homo sacer of Roman law gets to the more basic divisions that lead to violence than only 
reading him as a political pacifist. 
Milbank’s suggestion that Jesus’s death signals “a kenotic death of utterly 
emptied out humanity” needs further development.657 What is it exactly that Jesus 
empties? Milbank equates Jesus with bare life but does not go so far as to identify bare 
life with animal life, perhaps because Agamben did not make the connection in his book 
                                                
656 My aim here is not to do “Yoder exegesis” but to point to the outlines of a problem with seeing 
Jesus solely in the terms with which Yoder interprets Jesus as a political revolutionary of the nonviolent 
variety. Trying to follow this thread through Yoder’s corpus would take me too far afield from the 
argument of this chapter. Moreover, a history of Anabaptism writ large could be written along similar lines. 
The act that really started the radical reformation was based upon the anthropological machine when the 
Zurich radicals refused to observe the traditional Friday fast from animal flesh (except fish) and 
deliberately and publicly consumed pork sausage. While the Radical Reformation may have spawned an 
anti-war pacifist movement within Christianity, or at least a quietist movement that refused to participate in 
the world’s wars, this founding act of violence toward animals has never been questioned by any of the 
Anabaptist theologians over the past few hundred years. Yet, in this act the Zurich Radicals reaffirmed the 
basic stance of the world’s politics to define the human and the animal. The “ban” that the Anabaptists used 
also corresponds to this machine. Agamben details the history of banning a person from the city, which the 
Anabaptists took up with the shift that the Christian community was not allowed to kill such a person: they 
left that to the “world.” On this reading, I am no longer convinced that the ban, what Yoder called “binding 
and loosing,” is the peaceable practice that Anabaptist apologists have made it to be. Underneath this 
practice is a profound violence wrapped up in the anthropological machine. 
657 Milbank, “Christ the Exception,” 550. 
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Homo Sacer that Milbank used but in the follow-up volume, The Open. The traditional 
way to speak about theological anthropology is to see human λόγος in continuity with the 
divine Λόγος. Indeed, this is the presupposition of Gregersen’s idea that Stoic philosophy 
undergirds a radical view of the Incarnation. Continuity between the divine and the 
human makes the Incarnation in human form appropriate. This is one way to view the 
Incarnation and theological anthropology. Human λόγος, whether defined as reason, 
language, thought, discourse, or rationality, has long been the defining factor of humanity 
that separates us from other animals. If Jesus’s kenotic death “empties out humanity,” as 
Milbank argues, then human λόγος—as the self-definition of humanity—must be part of 
this kenosis. 
Jesus’s Kenosis of Humanity 
Donna Haraway has expressed a popular viewpoint among critical animal 
theorists: “The boundary between human and animal is thoroughly breached. The last 
beachheads of uniqueness have been polluted if not turned into amusement parks—
language, tool use, social behavior, mental events. Nothing really convincingly settles the 
separation of human and animal.”658 All the traditional ways humans have defined 
ourselves against other animals no longer hold. They are not utterly unique to humanity. 
Drawing on Freud, Derrida writes of “three great historical wounds to the primary 
narcissism of the self-centered human subject”: 1) the Copernican revolution that 
decentered the Earth; 2) the Darwinian revolution that decentered humanity, placing us 
back amongst the creatures; and 3) the Freudian revolution that decentered human 
                                                
658 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), 151–52. 
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consciousness by revealing the unconscious (this decentering involves pushing aside 
human λόγος in favor of unconscious processes and formations that affect a person).659 
These “wounds,” as Haraway rephrases them, signal that the quest for human uniqueness 
has been so thoroughly undermined that attempts to reassert any anthropocentric 
worldview is implausible. Rather than looking for divisions, Haraway argues, let the 
divisions go in favor of intersectional mapping to discover how to live together. What 
this suggests, according to Matthew Calarco, is leaving aside a search for human 
uniqueness so that we can create space “to think about the field of human beings and 
animals in new ways. . . . creating the conditions for other modes of thought—different 
ontologies and different practices—to emerge.”660 
Jesus’s kenosis of humanity fits this letting go of human uniqueness. Jesus’s 
kenosis creates space for new thinking and practices in our relationship to animals by 
abandoning the search for and assertion of human specialness. Jesus’s humanity opens 
space for new thinking and ways of being as creatures, precisely by giving up humanity. 
Milbank reads Jesus’s death as the kenosis of humanity. Deepening Milbank’s 
analysis should involve thinking about how we often define what is human as λόγος. To 
take Milbank’s analysis further, Jesus empties humanity of content not only in death but 
also in the becoming flesh. I will now revisit the Gospel of John and pay attention to the 
interplay of flesh, life, and humanity. 
                                                
659 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 136. Haraway cites Derrida on this as well. She adds 
a fourth “wound,” however: the cyborg, which mixes the human with the natural world. It seems to me, 
however, that this particular brand of transhumanism undercuts jamming the anthropological machine that 
divides human from animal to the extent that it pushes humanity beyond animality into a technology of 
purely human creation. It is a form of transcendence away from the creaturely rather than into it. Indeed, 
Haraway’s own thought does not overcome the violence humans perpetrate against other creatures. In the 
name of species survival, she has advocated killing and consuming some creatures. For this reason, her 
work has had a mixed reception amongst those working in critical animal studies. 
660 Calarco, Thinking through Animals, 56. 
297 
 
The Gospel of John declares that ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. This λόγος is the one who 
created all things in the beginning and came into the world, and yet the world did not 
recognize the λόγος. The prologue also states that in the λόγος is ζωή: ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν 
(John 1:4a). Without arguing what the text “originally” meant, in light of the death and 
resurrection we might read the ζωή in the λόγος as that which all creatures have in 
common. The ζωή is bare life.661 The prologue continues by stating καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων (John 1:4b). It is ζωή that is the “light” of “humanity.” 
It is as if John’s prologue announces the kenosis of humanity from the start and 
not only with Jesus’s death. Since Aristotle, humans have defined themselves against 
other animals by pointing to the human λόγος (speech, reason, rationality, discourse, 
meaning making, or even self-consciousness). Yet John's Gospel declares Jesus to be the 
λόγος, and it is bare life (ζωή) that is the light shining into the darkness of humanity. 
Reason and rationality should enlighten humanity. But the Gospel declares that the 
human world is full of “darkness.” Humanity—self-defined as unique through λόγος—
could not recognize the divine λόγος because the divine λόγος was full of bare life (ζωή). 
In other words, Jesus was full of the cast out animal life people could kill with impunity. 
The homo sacer, the werewolf (man-wolf) who is driven out of the human city and into 
the wilderness, the ζωή (bare life) that sustains all creatures was utterly incomprehensible 
to humanity defined as λόγος.  
                                                
661 Agamben’s distinction between ζωή and βίος elaborates on the common distinction between 
these two words. In A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other New Testament Literature, 
the editors says that “βίος may be said to denote the manner in which one’s ζωή finds expression . . . and 
the latter term may be used to connote the quality of existence as such. Hence, as the semantic history 
shows, the loss of βίος may not terminate ζωή.” Danker, Bauer, and Arndt, A Greek-English Lexicon of the 
New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 166–67. 
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The Gospel of John empties humanity of its most precious self-definition, 
positing only the divine λόγος. The Gospel denies that humans have this λόγος because 
they do not “believe in him” (John 5:38). Even the disciples could not recognize the true 
radicality of the Incarnation, the kenosis of humanity. They could not see how Jesus’s 
crucifixion could redeem Israel from its oppressive situation and establish Jerusalem as 
the center of the world. Jesus’s male disciples fled. Humans, particularly male humans, 
self-defined against and above animals, could not recognize that Jesus’s “bare life” saves 
us. The Gospel of John tells us that four women were present as Jesus died on the cross 
(John 19:25). It is as if the author is telling us, prefiguring Deleuze and Guatarri by two 
thousand years, that male readers must become women to see the real significance of the 
Incarnation. It is through becoming-woman that the rest of the becoming happens to the 
readers. Jesus’s theological body—to recall arguments from chapter 3—is a becoming-
woman. But it is also, and perhaps through becoming-woman, a becoming-animal.  
In the Incarnation, the Son becomes “flesh” so that “flesh” can become something 
else (to appropriate Deleuze and Guatarri). If human identity entails the “sacrifice” of 
bare animal life, then the Incarnation explodes this self-definition. The Incarnation 
empties humanity of meaning and points back to animals. Jesus the human must become 
nonhuman so that the nonhuman animal can become something other than what humans, 
in violent acts of “dominion,” have named them to be (meat, fur, leather, and pets). Jesus 
becomes “meat” so that what we call “meat”—other animals—can become something 
else. 
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Becoming Animal: Ecce Agnus Dei 
Beyond Jesus’s thinking about foxes, “worthless” sparrows, hens, and his own 
slaughter outside of Jerusalem, the New Testament’s most pervasive image for the Son’s 
Incarnation is a lamb. Through the ages Christian artists have often depicted Jesus as a 
Lamb. By the mid-fourth century CE, the Lamb replaced depictions of a human Jesus. In 
a mid-fourth-century painting found in the Roman Catacomb of Commodilla, a lamb 
multiplies loaves into seven baskets (see Matt 14:13–21, Mark 6:31–44, Luke 9:10–17, 
and John 6:5–15).662 Likewise, in the famous Junius Bassus sarcophagus built in 359 CE, 
a lamb holding a wand multiplies loaves into three baskets and another panel contains a 
relief of a lamb raising a mummified Lazarus from the dead.663 The Church of Saint 
Cosmas and Saint Damian contains a fifth-century mosaic in which the twelve apostles 
are depicted as lambs with the Lamb of God standing on a hill from which the four rivers 
of Paradise flow.664 Even the sarcophagus of Emperor Valentinian III, who ruled the 
Western Roman Empire from 425–455 CE, has a relief of a lamb standing before a cross 
encased between two pillars and roof.665 
This lamb imagery pushes the boundary between human and nonhuman animals 
in ways that has offended Christian leaders’ anthropocentric views. For some, the lamb 
was too much and threatened the divine-human connection. So in 692 CE, the Council of 
Trullo forbade depicting Christ as a lamb: 
                                                
662 See Robin Jensen, Baptismal Imagery in Early Christianity (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2012), 81. 
663 On the Junius Bassus sarcophagus see Elizabeth Struthers Malbon, The Iconography of the 
Sarcophagus of Junius Bassus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
664 See Robert Milburn, Early Christian Art and Architecture (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), 222–24. 
665 The image can be found in the Art Museum Image Gallery database, accession number 
PCD.AA385850. The original sarcophagus is in the Mausoleum of Galla Placidia, Ravenna, Italy. 
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In order therefore that “that which is perfect” may be delineated to the eyes of all, 
at least in coloured expression, we decree that the figure in human form of the 
Lamb who taketh away the sin of the world, Christ our God, be henceforth 
exhibited in images, instead of the ancient lamb, so that all may understand by 
means of it the depths of humiliation of the Word of God, and that we may recall 
to our memory his conversation in the flesh, his suffering and salutary death, and 
his redemption which was wrought for the whole world.666 
The Council seems to have been worried that depictions of the Son of God as a lamb 
undermined the hard-won gains of seeing Christ as having a truly human nature. The 
Seventh Ecumenical Council in 787 CE reaffirmed the decision of the Council of Trullo. 
From that time forward, Christ was to be depicted as a human. The lamb was forbidden 
and cast out of Eastern art. The Council did not attempt to destroy old images. New 
icons, however, should depict the humanity of God exclusively. As a result, images of a 
baby Jesus lying in a bread pan on the worship altar began to appear. Previously, a lamb 
would have occupied this position in iconography. But in response to the prohibitions 
against depicting the Incarnation in terms of a lamb, these new images arose and replaced 
images of the lamb across the Byzantine Empire.667 Deleuze and Guatarri would seem to 
be correct: Christian theologians in the East are uneasy with the idea of Jesus becoming-
animal. 
Yet Christians in the West did not follow the decisions in the Byzantine East, 
which were in large part a response to the iconoclastic controversy. Catholics continued 
to depict the Son as a lamb. The lamb even grew in popularity in the West as an image 
                                                
666 Quoted in Jensen, Baptismal Imagery in Early Christianity, 143. 
667 On the shift from a lamb to the infant Jesus see Kenneth Parry, Depicting the Word: Byzantine 
Iconophile Thought of the Eighth and Ninth Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 179–80. 
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for Jesus. Even illuminated manuscripts depicted Jesus as a lamb. For example, the 
Codex Aureus of Saint Emmeran (c. 870 CE) depicts Jesus as a lamb at the beginning of 
the Gospel of Luke.668 Even when Jesus himself was depicted as human, a lamb was 
often present as well. For instance between 1512–1516 CE, Matthias Grünewald painted 
the Isenheim Altarpiece for the Monastery of St. Anthony. In the center, Grünewald 
painted Jesus’s beaten and diseased human body on the cross, his hands displaying the 
agony of crucifixion. At the foot of the cross stands a lamb, holding a cross and pouring 
out blood into a chalice. A search through the online images at the Koninklijke 
Bibliotheek at The Hague, the National Library of the Netherlands, reveals dozens of 
examples of the Agnus Dei in illuminated Bibles from the medieval collection.669 
The lamb, therefore, has been and remains a powerful image for Christology. But 
the question remains as to what kind of image the lamb is for Christian theology. The 
Council of Trullo signals a lingering notion amongst Christians that the Lamb of God is a 
mere metaphor that we can cast aside in both word and image for literal language. Christ 
is human. Jesus’s particularity as a (male) human is the literal stuff from which theology 
must draw rather than from unnecessary metaphorical devices. As one Orthodox scholar 
has put it:  
Christ is only metaphorically called “the Lamb of God.” He is not the offspring of 
a ram and an ewe. It suffices to think in this connection of the Orthodox refusal to 
depict Christ in the icons as a lamb, as he is frequently depicted in the religious 
art of the Latin West. Such a depiction—a confusion of metaphor with reality—
not only inadvertently blasphemes our Lord; it levels the distinction between man 
                                                
668 See Tom Devonshire Jones, Linda Murray, and Peter Murray, eds., Oxford Dictionary of 
Christian Art and Architecture, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 301. 
669 See http://manuscripts.kb.nl/. Accessed 12/17/2014. 
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and the other creatures, downplaying the central claim of Christianity that God, in 
the Person of the Son, ennobles human nature, itself already an image of the 
divine nature, by assuming human nature in his Incarnation, by redeeming human 
nature in his passion and resurrection, and, in his ascension . . . . It is human 
nature, human flesh-—not the nature of a sheep, or a tree, or a river, or a 
mountain, or a star-—that, in the person of the Son, has been incorporated into the 
life of the Trinity.670 
Here the particularity of the Incarnation in humanity is set up as a test of faithfulness of 
Eastern Christianity over Western Christianity in artistic depictions. Mere metaphor must 
give way to “reality.” Based on Jesus’s particularity as human, all other creatures are 
excluded from the Incarnation’s significance. Using an image of the lamb, regardless of 
its biblical pedigree, threatens to undermine the anthropocentric nature of Christianity. 
This kind of statement finds continuity in John of Damascus’s distaste for animal 
imagery in Christian art, as I examined and critiqued in chapter 3.  
Jesus of Nazareth was a male, Jewish, human who lived in first-century Palestine. 
I do not dispute this historical claim. But Carey and John of Damascus, as demonstrated 
in chapter 2, argue a theological point about Christ’s human nature and therefore human 
nature in general. They assert that humans contain some quality that makes humanity 
worthy of the Incarnation. Other creatures completely lack this quality, making them 
unworthy of the Incarnation. This is the anthropological machine at work. The lamb 
imagery threatens the theologian’s anthropology that segregates humans from other 
creatures. The consequence of their claim is that Jesus should not be depicted as a lamb. 
                                                
670James Carey, “Sedimentation of Meaning in the Concepts of Nature and the Environment,” in 
Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature, and 
Creation, ed. John Chryssavgis and Bruce Foltz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 183–84. 
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By contrast, I am arguing that a sharp division between humanity and other creatures 
does not withstand scrutiny. Even if it is historically true that Jesus was a male, Jewish 
human, Carey’s belief that other creatures are not linked to Christ’s Incarnation does not 
follow. 
Moreover, down through the ages Eastern and Western depictions of the human 
Jesus have not generally depicted him as a first-century Palestinian Jew, but as a 
contemporary Greek or Roman male with white skin. Even depictions of Jesus as a 
human, therefore, have tended toward the “metaphorical” rather than the “literal.” The 
main difference between the metaphorical lamb images and the Greco-Roman Jesus 
images is that the latter have no biblical basis. Rather, these Christians have made Jesus’s 
humanity into the image of contemporary human culture rather than allowing it to be 
what it is and was: Jewish. In this sense, by ignoring Jesus’s Jewishness, the depictions of 
Jesus in Greek icons do far more injustice to the Incarnation’s particularity than do 
images of the lamb.671 Yet both his Jewishness and the animal imagery for Jesus have 
been discarded. When theologians and Christian artists systematically exclude every 
aspect of Jesus that is “minoritarian,” we are left with a Christ of power and might made 
in the image of the dominant in society. But this was not the Jesus who died a lamb’s 
death. 
It would be helpful at this point to look at the way the Fourth Gospel uses the 
lamb imagery for Jesus. John the Baptist declared Jesus to be the “Lamb of God” (ὁ 
ἀµνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ) in John 1:29 and 1:35. In verse 29, the Baptist says that Jesus is “the 
                                                
671 I am not arguing that all artistic renditions of Jesus in terms of another culture are invalid. For 
example, James Cone compares the crucifixion of Jesus to the lynching of Black people in the American 
South. Artist Fritz Eichenberg, likewise, once depicted Jesus as a black male on the cross in his 
woodcarving, “The Black Crucifixion.” These depictions at least have the merit of imaging Jesus in another 
role as an oppressed person. 
304 
 
Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world!” In the following section I will look at 
this statement a bit more closely. But I will do so by comparing John the Baptist’s 
statement, “Behold, the Lamb of God” with the statement of Pontius Pilate, who after 
having Jesus beaten severely, marches Jesus out in front of a crowd and exclaims, 
“Behold, the man!” (John 19:5).  
The Gospel of John Again 
John the Baptist’s statement that Jesus is the “Lamb of God,” is unique to the 
Gospel of John, though a little lamb appears in Revelation using a different Greek 
term.672 Scholars have extensively examined the Baptist’s statement, particularly the title, 
“the Lamb of God” and have posited various backgrounds for the phrase. To date, there is 
no scholarly consensus on whether a precise reference forms the main backdrop for the 
statement.673 
Some scholars argue that the most appropriate background is the near sacrifice of 
Isaac in Genesis 22, traditionally called the Akedah.674 Other scholars claim that the 
Suffering Servant of Isaiah 53 provides a background for John 1:29.675 Isaiah 53:7 says 
about the servant that he will be “like a sheep that is led to the slaughter, and like a lamb 
that before its shearers is silent.” Acts 8:32 quotes this passage, indicating that it was in 
                                                
672 In 1 Corinthians 5:7, Paul says, in the NRSV translation, “Our paschal lamb, Christ, has been 
sacrificed.” The actual word “lamb” does not appear in the Greek, however. Paul says: καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάσχα 
ἡµῶν ἐτύθη Χριστός. Nevertheless, τὸ πάσχα is likely shorthand for the Passover lamb. 
673 I will leave aside the issue of whether the statement is something that the historical John the 
Baptist actually said. On this issue see Raymond Brown, “Three Quotations from John the Baptist in the 
Gospel of John,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 22, no. 3 (1960): 292–98 and D. Brent Sandy, “John the 
Baptist’s ‘Lamb of God’ Affirmation in Its Canonical and Apocalyptic Milieu,” Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 34, no. 4 (1991): 447–59. 
674 Géza Vermès, Scripture and Tradition in Judaism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961), 206. See also Roy 
Rosenberg, “Jesus, Isaac, and the 'Suffering Servant',” Journal of Biblical Literature 84, no. 4 (1965). 
675 See Eric Edward May, “Ecce Agnus Dei! A Philological and Exegetical Approach to John 
1:29, 36” (Catholic University of America Press, 1947), and Helen C. Orchard, Courting Betrayal: Jesus as 
Victim in the Gospel of John (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 230–35. 
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use amongst Christians as a text about Jesus. Some biblical scholars argue that the 
Passover lamb in Exodus 12 is the most appropriate context.676 John 19:36 explicitly 
quotes Exodus 12:46, which deals with the Passover lamb: “These things occurred so that 
the scripture might be fulfilled, ‘None of his bones shall be broken.’” Finally, Jewish 
apocalyptic literature may also provide a background for the lamb imagery in John 1:29. 
Though scholars generally see the lamb-who-becomes-a-ram in 1 Enoch 90:6-19 as a 
reference to Judas Maccabeus and the military wars he led.677 None of these ways of 
interpreting John 1:29, 36—“Behold, the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the 
world”—stands in opposition to the others. They all have interpretive problems. They all 
also have many merits as ways of reading the phrase. It is possible as readers to blend 
together several of these readings to make the Johannine lamb of God.  
All of the approaches attempt to locate lamb Christology in Jewish tradition. The 
idea that Jesus is a paschal lamb and the suffering servant seem to fit best with the 
Johannine context. The Akedah tradition is simply not mentioned in the text, though it 
does in some sense connect with the paschal notion of sacrifice, and the apocalyptic lamb 
seems too problematic historically to be useful as an interpretive lens for this particular 
image. To deny the Incarnation its lamb imagery with exclusive focus on his “humanity” 
is to lose the rich Jewish intertextuality of the Incarnation and to miss the wider 
significance of Jesus.  
                                                
676 See Barrett, The Gospel According to St. John, 176. 
677 See Larry Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature of the Second Temple Period: A Guide for New 
Testament Students (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 137n6 and James VanderKam, “1 
Enoch, Enochic Motifs, and Enoch in Early Christian Literature,” in The Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in 
Early Christianity, ed. James VanderKam and William Adler (Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 1996), 99. 
On the difference between the ram and the lamb in 1 Enoch see Loren Johns, The Lamb Christology of the 
Apocalypse of John (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 88–97. Johns sees a huge difference between the ram 
in early Jewish literature and the lamb in Revelation, leading him to say that that there was no such thing as 
a lamb-redeemer in Early Judaism. The lamb of Revelation by virtue of its nonviolence is different than the 
militant rams of early Jewish apocalyptic literature. 
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Nevertheless, the search for a background to the imagery of the Gospel of John 
can obscure what the imagery does in the Gospel with a view toward theological 
investigation. To take Deleuze and Guatarri’s notion of becoming-animal as a potential 
guide, the imagery of a lamb runs much deeper than references and metaphors. Or 
perhaps a better way to see this is to note how Derrida argues that metaphors are not 
easily separated from real world consequences.678 In other words, we cannot separate 
Jesus the lamb of God from what happens to real lambs in these stories and life. The 
“metaphor” of Jesus as the lamb of God is depicted as violently killed outside the city 
gate, an activity that is perfectly acceptable according to the dominant ideologies of 
anthropocentricism. Humans kill lambs all the time. Why should Jesus’s death as a lamb 
be a problem if his death is understood in this way? 
The story that follows the prologue illustrates what it means for the Word to 
become flesh. The Word takes on a human name—Jesus—but as a lamb remains 
nameless, hidden from sight and barely noticed until somebody decides to violate her. 
The Baptist announced the lamb of God and then that lamb recedes from view in the 
story. Perhaps a better way to say it would be that the subtle becoming-animal that must 
take place for Jesus to truly be the lamb of God happens at a different level. Jesus did not 
go around bleating and eating grass. He did not imitate a lamb. But something else 
happens to Jesus.  
                                                
678 See Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” New Literary 
History 6, no. 1 (1974), 5–74. 
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Becoming-Meat 
In the first chapter I looked at the bread of life discourse as an example of the 
Gospel of John’s use of σάρξ as a broader term than that which would simply mean 
“human.” Jesus’s monologue in John 6 could be read as connecting to the lamb as he 
repeatedly speaks about his body being the bread of life and “flesh.” Those who heard 
him were offended to the point that even some of his disciples left him. When Jesus saw 
that some of his hearers did not understand, he did not make it easier. When he saw that 
some were offended, he did not make his statements more palatable. His own disciples 
began to complain about him (John 6:61). When they left him specifically because he 
spoke about people having to eat his body and drink his blood, saying that his body was 
“meat” for consumption and a mandatory ritual of the new order, Jesus did not try to 
bring them back into the fold. It is hard to believe that Jesus was simply being enigmatic 
and deliberately obtuse. Jesus envisioned himself as consumable. His flesh could be 
eaten. His humanity was not such that he was above all other animals.  
Val Plumwood describes her experience in 1985 of surviving a crocodile attack 
while searching for an Aboriginal rock art site in Australia. Her story may illuminate 
Jesus’s becoming-animal in John 6. As Plumwood paddled along a side channel she had 
the strong and “unfamiliar sensation of being watched.”679 Soon she saw what looked like 
a floating stick, but the stick suddenly had eyes. It was a crocodile coming toward her 
canoe. The crocodile repeatedly attacked her canoe, so she hurried toward a bank lest she 
be capsized. As she reached for a tree limb to pull out of the canoe, she recalls seeing “a 
                                                
679 See Val Plumwood, “Human Vulnerability and the Experience of Being Prey,” Quadrant 
Magazine 39, no. 3 (1995): 29. I am indebted to Calarco who uses Plumwood’s account in Calarco, 
Thinking through Animals, 59–61. 
308 
 
blurred, incredulous vision of great toothed jaws bursting from the water, as I was seized 
between the legs in a red-hot pincer grip, and whirled into the suffocating darkness.”680 
For a moment she could not believe it was happening—it must be a nightmare—only to 
realize that her own death was likely very near. “Indescribable, an experience beyond 
words of total terror, total helplessness, total certainty, experienced with undivided mind 
and body, of a terrible death in the swirling depths.”681 But she survived the crocodile’s 
death roll, only to be subjected to a second bite and death roll in the river. Surviving 
again, she pulled herself free to a branch, yet the crocodile lunged out of the river again, 
biting her leg and pulling her under the river water, rolling furiously a third time. She 
survived but was badly wounded and the crocodile was growling as it still held her leg. 
She gouged its eyes and reached for a tree branch again, the crocodile let go and she was 
able to climb to safety, fortunately being found within hours or else she would have died 
in the swamp from the bite wounds. 
Plumwood was and is a proponent of vegetarianism and environmentalism. 
Rather than allowing this attack to turn her against other animals or the environment 
more generally, Plumwood only deepened her commitments and was led to reconsider 
the place of humans in this world. Her incredulity at being the prey of a crocodile was 
part of the human exceptionalism that allowed humans to think of themselves as inedible 
while other animals are their food. She argued against rangers hunting and killing the 
crocodile, noting that the press and the park service both ignored her individual account 
of what happened, thus silencing her for their own purposes. But more profoundly, she 
began to see that her humanity was not apart from this world; she too is potential meat. 
                                                
680 Plumwood, “Human Vulnerability and the Experience of Being Prey,” 30. 
681 Ibid., 31. 
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Yet her struggle to survive cried out that she is more than this. This becoming, as we 
might call it, led her to see through the eyes of a slaughtered cow or a hunted gazelle, 
whose will to survive testifies to all flesh being more than meat. In becoming “meat” or 
“prey,” as she calls it, she was transformed but so too were other animals.  
Are we to imagine Jesus flippantly speaking about his “flesh” being consumed or 
was he serious? Was he merely trying to provoke his interlocutors with outlandish riddles 
or was he pointing to something thoughtful and concrete? Over and over he reiterates that 
his σάρξ is ζωή. He himself will be reduced to “bare life,” to animal life, and his flesh 
will have to be consumed.  
Is it possible to hear the terror of Gethsemane in the places where he speaks of his 
flesh being consumed? “I am deeply grieved, even to death; remain here, and stay awake 
with me” (Matt 26:38; cf. Mark 14:34); “In his anguish he prayed more earnestly, and his 
sweat became like great drops of blood falling down on the ground” (Luke 22:44). 
“Deeply grieved,” “anguish,” “sweat . . . like drops of blood,” these are the terms that 
resonate with Plumwood’s “experience beyond words of total terror.”  
Becoming σάρξ is risky business. The real scandal of the bread of life discourse is 
that Jesus is showing himself to be the lamb of God in a more disturbing manner than his 
disciples could have imagined when John the Baptist announced it. He would be hunted, 
killed, and consumed. He would lose his name and become a corpse. In the Gospels he 
cries out an indecipherable cry as his last act before dying. He would lose his language, 
the ostensible hallmark of humanity. He will become prey, but unlike Plumwood and like 
billions of other animals, he would not escape. The Roman abattoir will take him. There 
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is, it seems, a deep becoming in John 6: a becoming-animal. If there is a kenosis of 
humanity as Milbank suggests, there is a simultaneous becoming-animal. 
In this regard, Saint Antony, whom Athanasius wrote about and I examined in 
chapter 2, provides another example. Like Jesus, he went into the wilderness and lived 
“with” the nonhuman animals. He lived with them peaceably, refusing to harm even 
those who had eaten the food in his garden. His kenotic life, in which he continually 
emptied himself of the desire to rule over others and define himself against others, but let 
other be who God created them to be, looks very much like Jesus. Athanasius thought we 
should imitate Antony, but Deleuze and Guatarri would warn us that Antony did not 
“imitate” Jesus. Rather he occupied a zone of indiscernibility like Jesus in which his own 
identity was constantly in negotiation and movement as he emptied his desire to use 
others for his own selfish desires even when it would have been “reasonable.” 
But Jesus was not a mere passive victim. Like the pigs in Galilee who acted to 
destroy the demon legion, like so many other animals who do not give up their lives 
easily or willingly, like Plumwood who fought to save her life, Jesus cries out on the 
cross asking, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” (Mark 15:34). This cry is 
a cry that his flesh is more than meat. His life is more than the prey of a senseless 
hunter.682 When his own villagers tried to throw him over a cliff, he ran and escaped. 
                                                
682 Jesus’s cry is a quotation from Psalm 22, where the psalmist asks why God does not intervene 
when the psalmist has faced persecution. In the Gospel of Mark Jesus quotes this verse, not as a cry of 
personal abandonment, but as a faithful Jew who even at the point of suffering an agonizing death still 
quotes Scripture to make sense of his circumstances. Jesus is like the psalmist. I do not read this passage as 
teaching a breach between the Father and the Son, but as Jesus’s cry against his circumstances using 
Scripture to help him make sense of the agony, persecution, and abandonment by the humans around him. 
In Trinitarian terms, it is the Son offering up everything to the Father, who requires no punishment, but like 
the Son refuses to intervene to violently overthrow the structures. It is through the cross and suffering that 
these powers will be defeated, not through violent intervention. 
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Before his arrest he searched potential routes to forestall or halt the coming doom, only to 
find all paths blocked save those that would completely betray his own becoming-animal.  
The Lamb of Revelation 
The Book of Revelation carries out the becoming-animal theme further. The 
resurrected lamb comes into full view. Revelation begins with John’s vision of a human 
in the heavens: “one like the Son of Man, clothed with a long robe and with a golden sash 
across his chest. His head and his hair were white as white wool, white as snow; his eyes 
were like a flame of fire, his feet were like burnished bronze, refined as in a furnace, and 
his voice was like the sound of many waters. In his right hand he held seven stars, and 
from his mouth came a sharp, two-edged sword, and his face was like the sun shining 
with full force” (Rev 1:13–16). This human says he is “first and last” and “I was dead, 
and see, I am alive forever and ever” (Rev 1:18). John leaves no doubt that Jesus, risen 
from the dead and ascended into the heavens, is the one speaking.  
Many Revelation scholars are quick to point out the historical background to the 
imagery in Revelation 1. For example, this Son of Man has a cosmic element as he holds 
seven stars, recalling a coin from the time of Emperor Domitian (81–96 CE) in which 
Domitian’s son, whom Domitian declared to be a god, sits on the earth as Apollo, holding 
seven stars.683 Within this historical context and highly charged iconography, John 
declares that Jesus, not the Roman Emperor, is the one true God who demands allegiance.  
Yet this human Jesus quickly fades away in the face of the most prominent image 
for Jesus in the book, that of the lamb (τό ἀρνίον), who first appears in Revelation 5:6. 
                                                
683 On this interpretation as well as an image of the coin see J. Nelson Kraybill, Apocalypse and 
Allegiance: Worship, Politics, and Devotion in the Book of Revelation (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2010), 
37–38. 
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The human shifts into the nonhuman. The lamb’s appearance surprises the reader because 
of what the elder tells John he will see: “Then one of the elders said to me, ‘Do not weep. 
See, the Lion of the tribe of Judah (ὁ λέων ὁ ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς Ἰούδα), the Root of David, has 
conquered, so that he can open the scroll and its seven seals’” (Rev 5:5). Yet, when John 
looks he does not see a lion. He saw “a Lamb standing as if it had been slaughtered” 
(5:6). From here on out, the lamb appears throughout the book (Rev 5:8, 12, 13; 6:1, 16; 
7:9, 10, 14, 17; 12:11; 13:8; 14:1, 4, 10; 15:3; 17:14; 19:7, 9; 21:9, 14, 22, 23, 27; 22:1, 
3). The “lion of the tribe of Judah,” by contrast, never reappears in the book, recalling the 
lamb-human shift in John in which the lamb of God recedes into the background as the 
human Jesus goes to the cross. 
Many scholars think that the seer deliberately shifts from a lion to a lamb.684 The 
lion, it seems, was too complicated and ambiguous to associate with the Messiah in early 
Jewish Christianity. The lion was associated with violence, domination, and threat.685 The 
lion is a warrior and hunter who produces victims. Bauckham claims that the 
announcement that John would see “the lion of the tribe of Judah, the root of David” who 
“had conquered” (Rev 5:5) are messianic titles that “evoke a strongly militaristic and 
nationalistic image of the Messiah of David as conqueror of nations, destroying the 
enemies of God’s people.”686  
But what John sees is a slaughtered lamb. The contrast with a fierce, carnivorous 
lion could hardly be more dramatic. Lambs do not kill other creatures. They do not 
                                                
684 See, for example, ibid., 98–99; Richard Bauckham, The Theology of the Book of Revelation 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 73–76; Mark Bredin, Jesus, Revolutionary of Peace: A 
Nonviolent Christology in the Book of Revelation (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 2003), 186–89; and Johns, 
The Lamb Christology of the Apocalypse of John. 
685 For the biblical and extra-biblical evidence about how lions were viewed see Brent Strawn, 
“Why Does the Lion Disappear in Revelation 5? Leonine Imagery in Early Jewish and Christian 
Literatures,” Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 17, no. 1 (2007): 37–74. 
686 Bauckham, The Theology of the Book of Revelation, 74. 
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threaten other creatures. They eat plants. They are vulnerable to attack and defenseless in 
the face of a lion. Even if there was a Jewish expectation of a Messiah who could be 
called the Lamb of God and who would violently overthrow Israel’s enemies as scholars 
like John O’Neil claim,687 that is not the portrait Revelation paints of the lamb: The lamb 
that John saw had been murdered. The expectation of a conquering lion or a conquering 
lamb is dashed with the image of a bloodstained, mortally wounded lamb.688 The lamb is 
nameless, like so many slaughtered lambs (and women characters of the Gospels). 
Commentators routinely note the book’s high Christology. For instance Thomas 
Schreiner states, “Even though Revelation is an apocalyptic work, the Christology is 
astonishingly explicit and high. Indeed, the Christology is analogous to that in the Gospel 
of John. Jesus as the Lamb is on the same plane as God and is worshiped as a divine 
being. . . . Just as God is the Alpha and Omega and the first and the last, so too Jesus is 
the Alpha and Omega and the first and the last.”689 But as Stephen Moore has remarked, 
“Revelation’s Christology is highest when it is an animal Christology.”690 It is as a lamb 
                                                
687 See John Cochrane O’Neill, “The Lamb of God in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” 
Journal for the Study of the New Testament 2 (1979): 2–30. 
688 See J. P. M. Sweet, Revelation (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979), 124. Sweet thinks that 
there may have been an expectation of a conquering lamb, but that the author of Revelation deliberately 
uses a slaughtered lamb to undercut Jewish messianic militarism. 
On the other hand, Gregory Beale argues that the fact that the slaughtered lamb has seven horns 
means that the militaristic lamb of Jewish apocalyptic forms the background to the lamb. This is a 
militaristic lamb in Beale’s view. In fact, the translation should be “ram” not “lamb” according to Beale. 
Beale’s view is a minority one in current Revelation scholarship. In any case, though the lamb of 
Revelation does have horns, it is still a slaughtered lamb, hardly a depiction of a victorious military hero. 
See Gregory Beale, The Book of Revelation: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1999), 351. 
Yet even Beale points to the irony of using a lamb as a military hero. He says that “ironic use is to 
mock the enemy’s proud attempt to overcome God and his people and to underscore the fitting justice of 
the punishment.” See ibid., 95. 
689 Thomas Schreiner, New Testament Theology: Magnifying God in Christ (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2008), 430. 
690 Stephen D. Moore, “Ecotherology,” in Divanimality, ed. Stephen D. Moore (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2104), 209. See also Stephen D. Moore, “Ruminations on Revelation's 
Ruminant, Quadrupedal Christ; or the Even-Toed Ungulate That Therefore I Am,” in The Bible and 
Posthumanism, ed. Jennifer L. Koosed (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2014). 
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not a human in Revelation that Jesus receives worship (5:8–14; 7:9–12, 15–17; 19:7, 9; 
21:22–23; 22:3). At the center of the throne room of heaven and the center of the New 
Jerusalem stands the Lamb, a curious icon of power through nonviolence. At the very 
heart of God’s power, the “situation room” of the universe, sits a slaughtered lamb, 
whose iconography signifies a rejection of the absolute power that so pervades political 
and military machines. But this lamb is also a critique of anthropocentricism. It is this 
lamb who holds the key to history, not the one Revelation first announced who looked 
like a human. It is as a lamb, that God interacts most fully with the world, a human 
emptied of his male and human pretensions. 
Jesus’s death, in Revelation, is explicitly rendered in terms of an animal slaughter. 
Jesus’s death was one fitting for a nonhuman animal, not a human. Yet Revelation takes 
up this dehumanizing death into the very center of the divine. Any clear difference 
between humans and other animals in this theological vision is rendered insignificant. 
Jesus’s death and resurrection become linked to nonhuman animal life. To dehumanize 
Jesus is to put him in solidarity with the least of the animal creatures and only reaffirm 
his humanity even more strongly. God’s humanity is intimately linked to God’s animality 
and talk of one without the other would vacate Revelation of its most potent iconography 
for Christology.  
It is in Revelation that humanity regains animality most fully in Scripture. Uniting 
human and nonhuman animal in the iconography of Christ, Revelation challenges us to 
think about what it means to be human without neglecting our animality. Does it mean 
we will ultimately resort to the “baser” instincts that so many theologians have feared 
through the ages? The lion, with its rich imagery in Davidic monarchy and military 
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might, recedes into the background, giving way to the slaughtered lamb. But this lamb 
wages a war. There is a sense in which the nonviolence of Revelation is horrifically 
violent. But the lamb wages this “war” with words alone, a sword that comes from his 
mouth. The lion/lamb/human Messiah of Revelation speaks rather than bearing canines or 
wielding a sword.  
However, the scholars who argue that the lamb displaces the lion may argue too 
hastily. J. Nelson Kraybill, for example, says that the “ferocious carnivore” who is a 
“might Lion” would have to be powerful enough to defeat the beast. In other words, it 
made sense to announce a lion as the opponent of the monstrous beast in Revelation. 
Kraybill sees the lion as a metaphor or symbol of violence. “God’s fullest self-revelation 
has not come with brawn and bluster to match the muscle of Rome.”691 Furthermore, 
Kraybill only uses imagery from the Roman context in which Revelation was written. 
The “lion of Judah” that the angel announces seems to refer to something in Jewish 
tradition every bit as much as the lamb. 
The Hebrew Bible sometimes describes God as a lion. In fact, Scripture describes 
God in terms of a lion more than any other animal. Job accused God of hunting him like a 
lion (Job 10:16), which helps interpret Job’s later statement that God has “torn” him 
(16:9), since lions hunt, tear apart, and eat their victims. Jeremiah 49:19 and 50:44 depict 
God as a lion on the hunt ready to punish Edom and Babylon. “Like a lion coming up 
from the thickets of the Jordan against a perennial pasture, I will suddenly chase 
Edom away from it” (Jer 49:19). The prophet goes on to ask who can stand before such a 
                                                
691 Kraybill, Apocalypse and Allegiance, 98. This way of interpreting Revelation 5 is very 
common amongst Revelation scholars. For another example see James L. Resseguie, Revelation Unsealed: 
A Narrative Critical Approach to John’s Apocalypse (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 134. I do not wish to challenge 
that there is a political challenge to Rome in this book. However, I want to emphasize the Jewish roots of 
this passage and question the motives of erasure in most scholars’ interpretations. 
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lion. When God sets out like a young lion on the prowl, the result is that the land is laid to 
waste: “Edom shall become an object of horror; everyone who passes by it will be 
horrified and will hiss because of all its disasters” (49:17). A corpse devoured by a lion 
would be just such a horror show.  
The first thing to learn from this Jewish tradition is that the “ferocious carnivore” 
and “mighty lion” of Revelation are worthy of being associated with God in Jewish 
tradition. While the language might seem like mere metaphor, as Derrida reminds us, this 
kind of language is never divorced from our practices. Western hunters pay tens of 
thousands of dollars to kill lions in “exotic” locations. The erasure that Kraybill sees in 
Revelation plays out in real life colonialism where an American dentist, for example, can 
lure a protected lion out of its sanctuary in Zimbabwe and shoot it with a bow as it eats. 
So whether the language of lions and lambs is code for political activities happening in 
the first century does not deal with the way that the metaphors still work to erase some 
creatures and reestablish the anthropological machine. 
I would like to read the metaphors a little more literally for once and see the Son 
of God becoming animal. This way of seeing Revelation sits within a trajectory used 
within other Johannine literature, as I already noted. But even more, I would see this 
imagery within the Jewish vision for the peaceable kingdom:  
The wolf shall live with the lamb, the leopard shall lie down with the kid, the calf 
and the lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them. (Isa 11:6) 
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The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, the lion shall eat straw like the ox; but 
the serpent—its food shall be dust! They shall not hurt or destroy on all my holy 
mountain, says the Lord. (Isa 65:25) 
More basic than references to Roman imperial politics are the underlying Jewish images 
of Revelation.692 Revelation alludes to the prophet Isaiah at least 122 times. 
Scholars routinely claim that the author juxtaposes the lion with the lamb. The 
lamb contrasts with the lion as an alternative way of living on the earth. The lamb equals 
nonviolence. The lion means violence. But if we see Isaiah 11 and Isaiah 65 as the 
background to this passage, then the lion should not be contrasted with the lamb so 
sharply. Rather, Jesus’s becoming-animal is a fulfillment of Isaiah’s prophecy that 
predatorial creatures will lie at peace with prey. In Jesus’s eschatological body, a body 
explicitly animalized in the strongest of terms—Jesus is called a lamb more times than 
“Jesus” in this book—the lion lies with the lamb.693 Rather than distancing the lion from 
the divine as a metaphor for unworthy violence, a better strategy is to read this passage as 
a fulfillment of Jewish peace visions. 
Reading these images as pure “metaphors” for human politics alone erases the 
creation-wide redemption of Jewish peace visions. This is a common strategy in pacifist 
literature as well as the general literature on Revelation. But erasing the lion in 
Revelation has real-world consequences, as I already noted. The politics of animal 
                                                
692 See, for example, Steve Moyise, The Old Testament in the Book of Revelation (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1995). Moyise represents a very common view of Revelation as completely 
“saturated” with allusions to the Hebrew Bible. In fact, nearly every verse has some link to Hebrew 
Scripture. The Book of Revelation alludes to the Book of Isaiah more than any other Hebrew Scripture and 
more times than any other book in the New Testament. See ibid., 16. 
693 In Isaiah it is the wolf that lies with the lamb. The lion interacts peaceably with an ox. The ox is 
the lion’s most natural prey. But it seems reasonable to suggest that the author is simply using the prophetic 
vision from Isaiah loosely. Christian tradition, moreover, often depicts a lion resting with a lamb, an image 
from Revelation not Isaiah strictly. But the power of the Christian image is from the Isaiah vision as well. 
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erasure, as Keller names it, is not simply read in benignly, but the erasure is “read” onto 
the bodies of real lions (and I would add all the major predators like wolves) as they are 
nearly rendered extinct. God, in these theological readings, has nothing to do with the 
lion. In the human realm, humans have nothing to do with lions either. The ethics of this 
reading has drastic consequences. Seeing Jesus’s theological body as utterly animalized 
as a lion-lamb within a Jewish vision for creation-wide peace erases the politics of 
violence much more thoroughly than the standard reading in which Revelation 5 engages 
in a bait and switch with the lamb for the lion. Revelation’s Christology is not highest 
when it speaks simply about the lamb, but when it announces the lion of Judah and also 
shows us the lamb. Jesus’s becoming-animal, to use Deleuze and Guatarri again, is so 
that animals can become something different. The lion can no longer be used as a mere 
negative trope for human violence. The lamb can no longer be used as a negative 
sacrificial “animal” whose body functions to establish human identity. Neither the lion 
nor the lamb is simply “bare life” in contrast to the humanity. The anthropological 
machine comes to a halt most fully in Revelation 5. The human/lion/lamb all live in 
Jesus’s theological body without regard for distinction. 
Conclusion: “Behold the Man!” Or “Behold the Lamb!” 
When the Church leaders at the Council of Trullo forbade the imagery of a lamb 
and demanded an exclusive focus on the humanity of God in the Incarnation, they 
unwittingly undercut the Incarnation’s most radical elements in halting the 
anthropological machine. But the Council was not the first to focus solely on Jesus’s 
humanity alone. This happened first in Jesus’s own life: 
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Then Pilate took Jesus and had him flogged. And the soldiers wove a crown of 
thorns and put it on his head, and they dressed him in a purple robe. They kept 
coming up to him, saying, “Hail, King of the Jews!” and striking him on the face. 
Pilate went out again and said to them, “Look, I am bringing him out to you to let 
you know that I find no case against him.” So Jesus came out, wearing the crown 
of thorns and the purple robe. Pilate said to them, “Here is the man!” (John 19:1–
5) 
“Behold, the man!” or in the famous Latin translation “Ecce Homo!” Pilate’s words focus 
squarely on Jesus’s humanity and present us with a vision of Jesus as a male human.  
In John 19, we look squarely at the particularity of the Incarnation through the 
eyes of the Romans. The Roman soldiers beat and mock Jesus, attacking his masculinity 
by calling him “King of the Jews.” This male king is powerless against Roman male 
aggression. Like all Jews, his maleness is suspect to the Romans. He is human. But his 
masculinity is effeminate and passive in Roman eyes. Pilate parades Jesus out to the 
crowd and puts his male humanity on full display: “Here is your male aggressor, utterly 
beaten into submission and passive.” Here is his humanity, barely human at all in the 
eyes of Pilate. This pathetic man is no threat to Roman power in Pilate’s eyes. 
Ecce homo. “Behold the man!” He is only human. He is no god. Jesus, for Pilate, 
is nothing akin to the heroes of legend, the male warriors who threaten to take down 
kingdoms such as Odysseus and the great warriors of the Trojan Wars. He is just a 
human. He is just a male Jewish human, and to Pilate, that is to be subject to the true 
heroes of that world: Roman military and political warriors.  
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But there is an irony in Pilate’s statement. Though he and his soldiers mocked 
Jesus’s humanity and paraded it in front of the Jewish crowds as a passive colonial 
subject who could never present a real threat to Roman power let alone any patriarchal 
Jewish viewpoint, that view of Jesus’s humanity has deep roots in Jewish tradition and is 
ultimately the greatest challenge to violent masculinity. Pilate attempts to place Jesus in a 
taxonomy that makes Jews passive doormats for Roman conquest. He rips Jesus out of 
the prophetic tradition. Pilate situates Jesus within a Roman story. Jesus is certainly a 
Jew, but one defined by Roman military might.  
To focus on Jesus’s “humanity” without situating that humanity within the 
particularities of what it means to be a male, Jewish person in that time and place is to 
distort Jesus’s humanity. By focusing on Jesus’s humanity without noting the Word 
becoming “flesh” and becoming animal—a lamb—Pilate and the Romans only see a 
parody of humanity. They see a mere object, whose masculinity is barely intact, more 
akin to females than males because of the visible cuts on his genitals—they disrobed 
Jesus—and the subjected place of his people. But this is to miss the way in which Jewish 
tradition often situates masculinity at different place that does not make violence the 
defining character of what it means to be male. What it means to be male is to do the 
nonviolent work of listening to the Word of God and giving up all claims to ruling. It is, 
as Mary Douglas claimed, a “kenosis of patriarchy.” What it means to be human is to be 
in God’s “image.” And that image is performed in taking care of the earth and 
befriending nonhuman animals in Genesis 2.694 It is to take on σάρξ, animality, and lay 
down one’s life as a good shepherd on behalf of another creature. It is not to claim special 
                                                
694 Pope Francis, Laudato Si: On Care for Our Common Home (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, 2015), §67. 
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lordly status within creation based on some fictional attribute within humanity (reason or 
language). Being human, as defined by the Incarnation, is a kenosis of 
anthropocentricism.  
The Council of Trullo and other Christians who see animals as a threat to the 
doctrine of the Incarnation in general do not do justice to the particularity of the 
Incarnation because they separate Jesus’s humanity from his Jewishness. They miss the 
way the Baptist’s exclamation, “Behold the Lamb of God,” stands in stark contrast to 
Pilate’s focus on Jesus’s humanity, “Behold, the man!” When the Baptist told his 
followers to see Jesus as a lamb, whether he knew and liked it or not he placed Jesus in a 
particular tradition that absolutely challenges the nations, their war machines, their views 
of masculine violence, their stereotypes of female subjectivity and passiveness, and the 
sharp lines we draw between humans who we do not kill and nonhuman animals whom 
we do kill. Ecce agnus Dei coupled with the language of the Word becoming σάρξ is a 
statement that the Word becomes human/animal/flesh/meat. The lion/lamb/human 
Messiah who is human/animal/flesh/meat/bread is utterly incomprehensible to 
anthropocentric theology. This is a monster Messiah if one has a commitment to human 
exclusivity and uniqueness before God. But this is the cosmic Christ, Jesus of Nazareth, 
for those who read it well. 
And Jesus himself shifts our view of human identity away from a violent 
dominion over others to one that serves and even dies for the other. When Jesus talks 
about his own death in the Gospel of John, he does not depict himself as an involuntary 
lamb going to the slaughter. Rather he reverses the Baptist’s imagery and makes himself 
into the human shepherd who dies in place of and for nonhuman animals. Jesus is the 
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shepherd who knows his flock intimately and loves them (all of which presupposes an 
experience of lambs and sheep that is one of companionship not domination). All of the 
imagery about the shepherd and the sheep are ones of affection and intimate knowledge. 
The fact that Jesus talks about his own death as a human death for animals, human and 
nonhuman, does not undercut the lamb imagery. To declare Jesus as human is also to 
declare him to have taken on animality, in all that animality entails. 
In fact, that Jesus refers to himself as a good shepherd and is yet also presented in 
the New Testament as a lamb may underscore an important point to learn from the 
Incarnation. What we too often want to see in Jesus is a reflection of our own glory and 
immortality. Instead, what we see is a Messiah who gives up his privileges as a male and 
human and who defies our strict boundaries. If Jesus is fully human and that humanity 
defines our own, then we have to give up the strict boundaries of an anthropocentric 
Christology. God took on σάρξ, a term with rich meaning and deep connections to other 
creatures. If the Incarnation is to guide theological reflection, then it is in taking on σάρξ 
that we become human, not in touting our mental prowess and linguistic skills (or 
whatever unique trait we think sets us so apart from other creatures so that they are no 
longer deemed worthy of consideration).  
In this regard the Incarnation is a critique of human self-definition and grasping 
for divinity by seizing λόγος. By emptying ourselves of this tendency we take on Jesus’s 
most telling characteristic: Jesus the one “who, though he was in the form of God, did not 
regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the 
form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he 
humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross” 
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(Phil. 2:6–7). This classic passage for kenotic Christology should be read alongside the 
passages in which Jesus speaks of himself as edible, his flesh as meat, his seeing through 
the eyes of a lamb.  
A Challenge 
Becoming-animal and becoming-flesh are a central characteristic of the 
Incarnation in my reading. Jesus is the one who empties himself of his humanity to allow 
a becoming that many humans think impossible and undignified. This is an exchange that 
can lead further and further toward renewed relationships and a new creation in which 
humans do not dominate other creatures. Yet, as I noted at the outset to this chapter, one 
particularly troubling challenge to my project is that Jesus, even after his resurrection, is 
said to have eaten a piece of fish. Regardless of the restraint we might note in this action, 
it is still there. On the one hand it would be easy to simply say that Jesus inaugurated an 
eschatology that is not fully realized, therefore his fish-eating is not as problematic. But 
“not as problematic” is still problematic for the Prince of Peace, who empties himself of 
humanity and becomes animal. Can he not, after experiencing the indescribable terrors of 
the abattoir, refrain from committing the same? 
So I will end my exloratory argument with a simple illustration of becoming 
animal that points to a theological path forward. In Matthew 15:21–28 a Canaanite 
woman approaches Jesus, requesting that he heal her demon-possessed daughter. In 
response, Jesus answered callously, “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of 
Israel.” She pleaded with him, but Jesus replied even more sternly, “It is not fair to take 
the children’s food and throw it to the dogs.” Her answer elicited from Jesus surprise that 
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he commended her for her faith, something he never did to his own disciples. She said to 
Jesus, “Yes, Lord, yet even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall from their masters’ table.” 
Even before this encounter, Jesus had met a centurion who wanted him to heal his 
servant. Jesus did so without any seemingly tone-deaf responses. Therefore, it was not 
simply because the Canaanite woman was an outsider that Jesus refused her, but most 
likely because she was a female and a Canaanite (people Israel had supposedly wiped out 
according to some version of the conquest narrative).695 Postcolonial feminist readings of 
this passage tend to focus on the fact that in relationship to a Canaanite woman, Jesus, 
son of David, would have been a powerful colonizing male figure. In this vein, Leticia 
Guardiola-Sáenz reads the Canaanite woman’s initial “shouting” at Jesus and his 
irritation with her as her having a quite different tone than one of pleading, “a tone of 
anger of the displaced and rebellious woman . . . coming to get compensation for what 
was taken away from her.”696 She knew how to flatter Jesus by calling him “son of 
David” and the proper formulas for asking powerful men for favors. She even kneels 
before him. But this, according to Guardiola-Sáenz’s reading, is part of her persistent 
agenda to get what she needs and deserves. She was not a submissive woman, but a 
strong and determined person. Her presence before Jesus is a testimony that her condition 
as an impoverished Canaanite is a consequence of Jesus’s own privilege seen in his royal 
lineage, a family lineage that is replete with genocidal intentions in the monarchy. 
Jesus calls her and her daughter dogs. According to Guardiola-Sáenz, “She will 
not rest until the oppressor realizes that the cost of his privileges is not just the 
                                                
695 On this interpretation, see Musa W. Dube, Postcolonial Feminist Interpretation of the Bible (St. 
Louis: Chalice Press, 2000), 165. 
696 Leticia A. Guardiola-Sáenz, “Borderless Women and Borderless Texts: A Cultural Reading of 
Matthew 15:21-28,” Semeia 78 (1997): 76. 
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dehumanization of the oppressed, but his own dehumanization. That effect on himself is 
due to his inability to respect and engage in dialogue with the Other.”697 While I certainly 
agree that Jesus’s response to the Canaanite woman was one of disrespect born out of 
male privilege based in a violent heritage, I am not sure that the best way to interpret this 
story is to see the Canaanite woman as taking back her “humanity” and forcing Jesus to 
recognize his own “humanity.” That reading relies much too heavily on the 
anthropological machine: nonhuman animals are killable and subject to abuse; humans 
are not. 
But this woman challenges Jesus by taking the position of a nonhuman animal: a 
dog that Jesus thought was not worthy of his messianic time. Yet the woman’s 
challenge—that even dogs eat crumbs from their human masters’ tables—caught Jesus 
off-guard. Is it that he recognizes her humanity and his own, or that the very idea that 
there are creatures on this earth who should be cast away and given no compassion is 
counter to the very idea of the Messiah? He sees the dog in her anew. Later in the story 
Jesus does the unthinkable: he compares himself to a mother hen, a female chicken (Matt 
23:37). This Canaanite woman, it seems, pushes Jesus’s anthropocentric boundaries to 
the extent that he can now compare himself to a nonhuman animal that he at one point 
would have used as an insult to another human.  
It is possible to read Jesus’s encounter with the Canaanite woman as provoking 
what Deleuze and Guatarri call a “becoming-animal” in which rather than simply 
redrawing the lines of anthropocentricism to include a Canaanite woman, he begins to 
obliterate the lines altogether. She provoked this becoming with her persistent, obstinate 
demands of the oppressed. Jesus shifted as a result.  
                                                
697 Ibid. 
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With regard to the fish-eating in Luke 24, Christians could all be Canaanite 
women to Jesus and ask him persistently but no less adamantly, “Can the Prince of Peace 
do justice to all creatures?” “Are not fish God’s good creatures too?” “Do fish not also 
receive God’s blessing?” These are the kind of questions that Jesus responded to with 
favor and deep learning. Challenging Jesus toward peace and justice was something he 
accepted. What he did not accept was challenges from his disciples in the other direction: 
to reign down fire from heaven on detractors (Luke 9:54) and to fight the authorities with 
swords (Matt 26:51). Jesus the mother hen, Jesus the lamb, these mark out the Son of 
God and begin to sabotage the anthropological machine. Pushing the boundaries of the 
Incarnation further in this direction just might elicit the wonderfully surprising response 
of “see what great faith” that holding onto the anthropological machine will not.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
I have tried to show how Jesus of Nazareth, a Jewish, male human, matters for 
how we think about the Incarnation in relationship to nonhuman animals (and to a lesser 
extent creation as a whole). In recent decades, the Gospel of John’s statement that “the 
Word became flesh” has served as a theological impetus to develop a view of the 
Incarnation that has significance for all of creation. Focusing almost exclusively on 
nonhuman animals and theology, Andrew Linzey was an early proponent of this idea, 
though it never played a role beyond a few lines in his work. More recently theologians 
such as Gregersen, Edwards, Johnson, and others have developed a notion increasingly 
termed “deep Incarnation.” 
Deep Incarnation is the idea that in taking up “flesh” the Son took up all that 
“flesh” would consist in, including the stardust we now believe helped to form earth, 
evolutionary history, and a sense of interdependence with other creatures and our 
environment. For The Word to become human flesh, and be truly human, the entire 
history and environment of creation has to be involved. Humans are not humans without 
all of this. God takes it all up in becoming flesh. In the first chapter I argued that, indeed, 
the idea of “flesh” in the New Testament is very much in line with much of what these 
theologians have been saying. 
Yet these theologians, including David Clough, who has written the first 
systematic theology focused on issues around nonhuman animals, largely dismiss the 
particularity of the Incarnation. Instead they focus on the cosmic dimensions of 
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Christology. Jesus’s Jewishness, his maleness, and his humanity do not play an important 
role in the recent literature.  
I have tried to show that these three particularities are important for any doctrine 
of the Incarnation. Bypassing Jesus’s Jewishness, maleness, and humanity leaves 
theology impoverished and distorted. We have two early examples of this problem in 
Athanasius and John of Damascus, who used the Gospel of John to claim that the Word 
became “matter.” But in switching from the New Testament language of “flesh” with its 
deep ancient Jewish roots and its ambiguous meaning (does it mean human, animal, flesh, 
or meat?), these authors opened themselves to undermining basic insights of the 
Incarnation from particularity. Athanasius prefers to speak about planets and stars rather 
than nonhuman animals. Celestial bodies seem more fitting than animal bodies to his was 
of thinking. The story he tells is one that looks hard for the beauty and goodness of 
creation broadly speaking, but his story is mostly anthropocentric. It is also vehemently 
anti-Jewish, which keeps him from looking at the particularity of the Incarnation. There 
are similar problems in John of Damascus, who waxes eloquently about the necessity of 
hypostasis, but misses the particularity of Jewishness, even deriding Jews as a bunch of 
infants for painting animals in their synagogues, a practice that Christians also engaged in 
at that time. Some of these mosaics reflected Jewish eschatological hope of creation-wide 
renewal. 
Jesus’s Jewishness is not a hindrance to developing a theology on behalf of 
nonhuman animals. Rather it is extremely helpful and necessary. The eschatology 
involved in the specific trajectory of Jesus has to do with a transformation of relationship 
in creation so that predators like lions and wolves do not harm prey animals like lambs 
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and calves. This eschatology looks forward, but Jewish people also look backward to 
God’s original intention of vegetarianism, signaling peaceable relationships as God’s 
intention all along. Even Jewish laws that restrict what Jews can touch or eat in 
relationship to nonhuman animals point back to God’s intention, and possibly forward to 
the messianic age in which the Torah would be fulfilled. That Christians have largely left 
behind these laws as “Jewish” is one of the greatest tragedies of Christianity. 
Jesus’s maleness shows us that Jesus was a male in a particular way: he was not 
the Greco Roman ideal hunter/warrior. Rather, like most Jewish people, he was not a 
hunter. When he was in the wilderness it was not as a killer of wild animals, but as the 
peaceable messiah. Jesus’s circumcision marked him off in the Greco-Roman world as a 
less-than-human male. But, in line with many Jews of his time, Jesus takes this 
dehumanization and stands it on its head. 
He does this by problematizing what it means to be human. I used a number of 
contemporary philosophical ideas about animals and humanity to read Jesus’s humanity 
in a way that challenges the most common definition of humanity as sole possessors of 
language and reason. The idea that Jesus “becomes-animal” and challenges the 
anthropological machine at the heart of defining human identity finds deep resonances in 
the Bible as Jesus is depicted as several animals. Most notably this becoming-animal 
resonates in Revelation’s human/lion/lamb Messiah, whose own body is animalized in a 
way that fulfills the Jewish vision for a creation-wide peace. 
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